<SPAN>my comment: It's true that the Poles understimated the Swedes until (at least) 1621. But there were solid reasons to do it. The Swedish-Polish war began in 1600. Until 1626 the Poles and Lithuanians won every battle with Swedish army – even if the Swedes outnumbered P-L armies many times (like at Kircholm 1605 or at Paide 1604 etc.). Sweden was poor, weak and sparsely populated country. And I have to say it (I hope Swedish members of this forum will forgive me), Sweden wasn't civilized country (at least in the opinion of the Poles). The war until 1620 only confirmed that P-L Commonwealth had no reason to affraid Sweden. </SPAN>

<SPAN>Opposite to Sweden, Ottoman Empire was one of the strongest states in the world. Its successes in fighting Christians were well known in Poland. The Poles remembered very well </SPAN><SPAN>battles of Warna 1444 and Mochacz 1526 (where fought and lost also Polish soldiers). And the Poles had new and terrible example in 1620 – the battle of Cecora, where Polish regular army was beaten and where 2 main commanders of Polish army (I mean both hetmans) were killed (Stanis?aw ?ó?kiewski) and captured (Stanis?aw Koniecpolski).</SPAN>

Spartan: The campaigns fought by Gustaf II Adolf, more commonly known to us outside of Sweden as Gustavus Adolphus, the king of Sweden, in Livonia and Polish Prussia between 1617 and 1629 recieve comparitively little attention. This disappoints me, as the military reforms of Gustavus, those of utilizing his country's patriotic fervor with a draft of manpower and combining arms of shock power with cavalry charges in conjunction with infantry and lighter and more mobile field artillery, were surely influenced by the fact that the superior Polish-Lithuanian cavalry, most notably the vaunted husaria (plural for hussar), the crack heavy Polish cavalry, and the pancerni,

my comment: Actually in the first half of 17^th c. Polish light cavalry was called 'kozacy' (cossacks in English). The name 'pancerni' was used only since the second half of 17^th c.

Spartan: the medium cavalry, could not be beaten at this time in the early 17th century without utilizing combined arms and terrain not conducive to their style, which would diminish their ability to fight to the degree that ensured them victory. As it turned out, it worked.  
 

Gustavus' father, king Karl (Charles) IX of Sweden, repulsed an incursion into Sweden by Sigismund III at Stangebro (near modern Linkoping) in 1598.

my comments: Spartan, don't get me wrong, but I think that you involuntarily repeat old Swedish propaganda. Why do you write 'repulsed an incursion'? Sigismund III (Zygmunt III Waza in Polish) was a legal king of Sweden since 1592. The Swedish throne was heraditary. Sigismundus was the oldest son of king of Sweden Johan III (Jan III in Polish). After Johan's dead Sigismundus become a king of Sweden.

When legal Swedish king Sigismundus went to Sweden, he wasn't invader.

Karl (later Karl IX) was a brother of Johan III. In 1598 he was only a chancellor. Nothing more. It should be also remembered that before Johan III's death, the king administered an oath to Swedish aristocracy which obliged them to resistance against Karl. I mean, if Karl had tried to reach Swedish throne, Swedish aristocracy was obliged to resistance.

Spartan: Sigismund III desired to establish a permanent union between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,

my comment: Spartan, I am not certain if Sigismund has ever thought about „a permanent union between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth”. Sigismund was most of all the Swede and the Catholic. AFAIK, he didn't plan to join Sweden and Poland. But by no means he wanted to increase Catholic influences in Sweden.

Spartan: but instead created hostilities which led to intermittent war between the 2 nations lasting until 1660. He was, however, unsuccessful when he invaded Livonia in 1600

my comment: I suppose that you mean Karl here?

Spartan:; his army was smashed by Jan Chodkiewicz's husaria at Kircholm in 1605, and another army helping the Muscovites under Jakob De la Gardie was defeated 10 years later at Kluchino.

my comment: Actually it was 5 years later (in 1610).

Spartan: But Sweden's power was rising in the Baltic, as her fleet appeared outside Danzig (modern Gdansk) and Riga, capturing and searching ships trading with these prominent ports. Because of Danzig's neutral status at this time, the Swedes were able to provision their troops in Livonia from there.

my comment: Really? I didn't know this.

Spartan: Aging and overwrought, Karl IX died in October, 1611, while war with Christian IV of Denmark, known as the War of Kalmar, which broke out the previous April, was looking inauspicious for Sweden. As a ruler, Karl IX, basically a practical man, was the link between his great father Gustavus Vasa and his even greater son.

Spartan: At 16 years of age, Gustavus Adolphus inherited the wars his father began, and only by exerting himself to the utmost was he able to achieve peaceful settlements with Denmark (Treaty of Knarod, January, 1613) and Russia (Treaty of Stolbova, February, 1617). He had to restrict himself due to the terms involving indemnity with Denmark, but his treaty with Russia altogether shut out Muscovy from the Baltic, with its trade there being dependent on Sweden. It was clear that Gustavus would resolve to take up the struggle with the Poles in Livonia if necessary. The Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish Diet) consented to this in spite of financial difficulties.
 
Hostilies had already begun in 1617, though a truce had been formally agreed upon in 1613 and prolonged for 2 years the following year. The king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sigismund III , whose unfortunate and unwavering claims to the throne of Sweden (by birth he was united along the royal lines of the Vasa and Jagiello) would involve Poland in a whole series of unprofitable wars with Sweden spanning 6 decades, instructed his government to not renew the truce. The Swedes captured Pernau (modern Parnu), and by the autumn of 1618 Gustavus was willing to arrange an armistice, but Sigismund III rejected every proposal in that course, keeping unflinchingly to his claim to be acknowledged King of Sweden. Finally a truce was arranged on September 23, 1618, and Jan Chodkiewicz, who had conducted himself with such esteem on the Livonian front, was sent against the Ottoman threat from the south.

my comments: Spartan, you omited some important issues.

In July 1617 Polish and Swedish commissioners signed new armistice in Livonia for 10 years. The armistice was broken by the Swedes in the same month. They captured Dynemunt (it was on the 21^th of July 1617), Windawa (on the 23^th of July 1617), Parnawa/Pernau (on the 14^th of August 1617) and Salis (on the 18^th of August 1617).

Although Polish-Lithuanian armies were involved at 2 other fronts:

- the war in Russia (the expedition to Russia by Wladyslaw Waza. He wanted to recover tzar's throne)

- protection of southern Polish borders (fightings with Tartar incursions, demonstration of Ottoman forces at Busza in 1617 and fightings with Ottoman army at Orynin in 1618)

Lithuanian army commanded by Krzysztof Radziwill was able to recover all losses in Livonia except Parnawa.

New truce with the Swedes was signed on December 8, 1618.

Jan Karol Chodkiewicz couldn't command Lithuanian army in Livonia, because at that time he was with prince Wladyslaw in Russia.

Spartan: The great Polish hetman died in September, 1621, amid his successful entrenched defense against the Sultan Osman II's huge invading army at Khotyn (Chocim), in the Ukraine. During this time the rivalry between Gustavus and Sigismund III transposed into a very different and higher plane.

Another blow for the Poles was the death of Jan Zamoyski in 1605. It had been the firm conviction of this great szlachcic and magnate that Poland could not achieve any long term success against Sweden without a navy. But his efforts to prevail upon Danzig (modern Gdansk) to produce a fleet were in vain, as the neutral city didn't want to displease the Swedish sovereign at the time (among other reasons).

my comments: Here is some kind of misunderstanding. Gdansk belonged to Poland and (for example) paid taxes to Polish treasure. Polish (royal) fleet was build in Gdansk. Sailors of Polish fleet were from Gdansk etc. But cities (especially big ones) in those times in Poland had broad autonomies and many privileges. Gdansk was the biggest and the richest Polish city. Therefore it was a very important 'political player'. The wealth of Gdansk was depended on a trade. Polish – Swedish war was a danger for the trade of Gdansk. Therefore as much as possible Gdansk tried to do everything to be neutral in this war. No sooner than the ending of 1626 had Gdansk understood that its neutral policy gave nothing and it clearly declared itself for Poland.

Situation before the battle:

The Sejm in 1620 decided that Radziwill's army in Livonia should have 3000 people. It was a theory. In practice, no sooner than on the16th of June 1621, had Radziwill begun to mobilise this army. He had very difficult task, because P-L Commonwealth had already mobilised huge army against Ottomans. There was simply a shortage of people who wanted to serve in an army.

According to Radziwill's letter to the king (dated on 29^th of August, 1621) he had in the camp only 6 units of infantry and 150 horses of light (cossack) cavalry. He had already garrisoned: in Riga 200 reiters, in Dyament 150 reiters and in Kokenhauzen 50 cossack cavalrymen.

According to the Radziwill's instruction for Ditrzyk (dated on 14^th of September, 1621) hetman expected new soldiers from Lithuania.

According to Radziwill's letter to the king (dated on 25^th of September, 1621), he had in the field not more than 1500 soldiers.

So during the so called battle of Riga, Radziwill didn't have more than 1500 soldiers.

Before 'the battle of Riga', Radziwill knew from Swedish POW that Swedish army had 24.000-30.000 soldiers.

According to Piotr Kochlewski's diary (Kochlewski was Radziwill's secretary) on the 9^th of September, Radziwill's 'komunik' (komunik = an army without wagons) approached to Riga. Radziwill's soldiers suprised some Swedish soldiers close to Riga and defeated them in the open field. Tens Swedish soldiers were killed, tens of them drowned in Dzwina river. Lithuanians imprisoned 1 Swedish captain (Abraham Isaac Rosenkranz) and 2 lieutenants.

The whole night between 9^th and 10^th September, the Lithuanian army stayed in the order close to Riga and waited for the Swedes. The Swedes didn't leave their fortified positions.

On the 10^th of September, after the assault of Lithuanian army, Lithuanians returned to their camp, which was 2,5miles (meaning about 18km) from Riga.

Radziwill's instruction for Ditrzyk (dated on 14^th of September, 1621), describes events of the 10^th of September.

Radziwill explained that the whole expedition of Lithuanian army was only a reconnaissance of Swedish positions. Radziwill wanted to see Swedish camp and its position/fortifications. He wanted to take some POW, which could inform him about Swedish army. He also wanted to show citizens of Riga that they are not alone.

Radziwill also tried to provoke the Swedes to the open field fighting. Therefore he stormed one Swedish 'blokhaus' (earthwork) and withdrew. Unfortunately the Swedes didn't leave their fortified positions.

After that, having knowledge about Swedish camp and fortifications, having POW (which later were sent to the Polish king to inform him about Swedish army), Radziwill ordered to return to the camp. He also explained that he had an appointment with the prince of Courland and expected supports from Lithuania (some new units of cavalry).

So, according to these sources, Radziwill, knowing that the Swedes outnumbered him about 20 : 1, even didn't try to rescue Riga and didn't try to supply Riga (therefore Lithuanian wagons didn't leave the camp). Radziwill, having less than 1500 soldiers, only reconnaissanced Swedish army at Riga. He also tried to provoke Gustaw Adolf to open field fighting, but with no result, because the Swedes didn't leave their fortified positions.

After the reconnaissance, Radziwill returned to the camp to gather bigger army and to talk with the prince of Courland. The Swedes didn't chase him.

The so called battle of Riga was nothing more like small encounter, where the Swedes didn't attack.

Gustaw Adolf, having huge numerical superiority, didn't risk an open field fighting (although Lithuanians waited 2 days in the open field and although Radziwill provoked GA to the battle).

Spartan: The conquest of Riga meant there was no longer any possibility for Poland to establish herself as a Baltic power. Through Riga passed 1/3 of her exports.

my comments: Through Riga passed only 6.2% of P-L export. To comparison, through Gdansk passed 82% of P-L export.

Spartan: With it Gustavus gained political and strategic advantages and a base for equipping his fleet.

The east part of Livonia and the important town of Dorpat remained, however, in the Polish hands. In the autumn of 1622 both sides were again ready to accept an armistice. Gustavus was too eager for peace to grudge Sigismund III the title of King of Sweden, so long as he did not call himself Hereditary King. Kryztof Radziwill had advised Sigismund III to ask for an armistice, but, as usual, he hesitated to the very last. This gave Sweden's Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, an opportunity to seperate the interests of Poland and Lithuania, and to offer the latter peace and neutrality in the struggle between Sweden and Poland. This was the first Swedish attempt to drive a wedge between the two halves of the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy. But the plan did not succeed, and Gustavus personally conducted the campaign in the summer of 1622. A battle was fought on August 3, 1622 at Mitawa against Radziwill. Initially, Swedish infantrymen, positioned in thickets with swampy ground between them and the Lithuanians, fired upon the enemy, refusing to come out in the open, a condition which Radziwill proposed. The Swedes overwhelmed the outnumbered haiduks (mercenary foot-soldiers of mostly Magyar stock) in an infantry clash. Some companies of husaria then displayed some recalcitrance, as there existed serious financial problems with the Lithuanian forces, which was more a private army than a state one at this time, which led to a lack of loyalty and morale amongst many. But 2 banners (some 400 husaria?) did charge and despite unfavorable ground, penetrated through with minimal loss. But the Swedes reinforced their positions which precluded the husaria from turning around.

My comment: More detailed description of the fighting in that day was written by Radoslaw Sikora in the group Zaglobastavern. Below is a quotation from Sikora's description. But I'd like to stress that the fightings on the 3^rd of August, 1622 were only part of the battle of Mitawa 1622. I'll write more about that battle in my next message.

On August 3, 1622 in the vicinity of Courland's town of Mitawa/Mittau the armies of Krzysztof Radziwiłł and Gustavus Adolphus clashed. Vanguard of the Swedish army consisted of several (3 or 4) reiter cornets/companies. They placed themselves at the forest's edge, "in the thickets, past the swamps" in such manner so the Lithuanian horse could not attack them. In van of these reiters came two canons, "and they fired from them against our banners/companies but by God's grace without any harm." Then, the commander of the Lithuanian reiters, Jerzy Krzysztof Rożen, with the hetman's permission sent a trumpeter to the Swedish reiters, "challenging them to take to the field unless they were sons-of-the-bitches." Swedes did not show any interest in such presented proposition. Instead of awaited cavalry action "several companies of (enemy) infantry rushed out from the forest.". Hetman directed against them three rota/companies of haiduk infantry. The firefight raged between the infantries of both sides. "Very laud musket gunplay lasted for an entire hour, as in a regular battle it would not have been greater." There were some 20 haiduks killed (and fell into the enemy's hands) while wounded there were some 30 more. When the servants "that on a hillock were digging a trench (entrenchment), being afraid of the gunplay, started to flee with their spades," Swedes, "understanding that these were the soldiers who were fleeing, sent to their own a larger reinforcement, and in such manner more than 2000 Swedish infantrymen jumped our throats and onto the hillock pushed."

Radziwiłł turned then to the JK Rożen's reiter companies (those were three companies, on register numbering 500-horse strong but their real strength was merely 300 horses) "so they would aid the infantry," but they evasively "said that they had no field" (the ground was not suitable for cavalry) and " replied that winged hussars should rush first." Why they refused? Reiters were foreigners that fought for a profit and not out of patriotic call. The Lithuanian army had serious financial problems at that time and was seriously behind the pay for their soldiers. In face of serious numerical advantage held by the enemy, when the motivation to continue fighting was not strong enough, when the ground was not favorable, all that was enough that the reiters refused to execute command. In such circumstances hetman turned then to the Janusz Ulik Szweryn's hussaria (on the register this unit had 200 horses, the real strength of this unit is unknown). But they also refused to charge. Why? The sources known to us do not explain this. One thing is certain - there is no mention in the sources about any winged hussars' fear of the gunfire of the Swedish infantry. These source suggest that, when faced with numerically superior adversary (just Swedish infantry alone was supposed to be 2000-3000), and having the ground unsuitable for cavalry action and - what may be the most important - the winged hussars seeing that they would not be supported by the reiters (after all those already had refused to attack), then the morale of Szweryn's hussaria must have been weak. Their commander did not decide to charge under such conditions. Thus meeting with another refusal there, Radziwiłł then turned to the next reiter company - Henryk Szmeling (200 horses on the register). Yet and this reiter company refused to carry out the command.

This crisis, however, did not spread throughout the entire Lithuanian army. Unfortunately, "other [companies] albeit willing [to fight] their own places in the army's battle order had to guard, because the enemy horse with part of the infantry in the affair [battle order] stood fast, awaiting our confusion." In these circumstances, before the Lithuanian battle order regrouped, before those 'willing' companies arrived onto the field, the Swedes were able to take the hillock with the Lithuanian artillery pieces there.

Ultimately the Lithuanian hussaria charged those ( troops). There were found "two so righteous hussaria companies" that "while the ground was not for a hussar (undesirable for winged hussars)" yet "in the very fire of the enemy troops they rushed" and "great injury in them they caused." Those companies were: the Połock voivode Janusz Kiszka's company, on the register 200 hussars, and the referendarz of Grand Dutchy of Lithuania Aleksander Korwin Gosiewski's company, of the same register's number. This charge proved to be successful. Hussars, in spite that they were attacking on the ground not quite suitable for cavalry action, withstood the fire of more numerous infantry and passed through its lines, inflicting heavy causalities on the Swedes. It was not, however, the end of fighting. Winged hussar companies "having broken through and without reinforcement remaining, could not turn around." Swedes brought onto the battlefield additional infantry units, position them in the thickets and in the trenches (including the entrenchment dig out by the Lithuanian servants) and maintained their positions, because on such prepared infantry "the cavalry second time could not joust (strike)."

The very charge on the fire-spewing lines of the Swedish infantry cost our winged hussars 2 killed (Nakurski and Orwid) and unknown quantity of wounded, while "in the horses not a small injury they caused." The Swedes were supposed to have died "close to 500" on this day. Some of quoted number included that infantry, which had been under Lithuanian infantry fire before the hussaria's charge.

I've found some new information to the 'battle' of Riga. According to prof. Henryk Wisner's 'Rzeczpospolita Wazów' v. 2, p. 202, Radziwill had about 900 soldiers at 'the battle of Riga'. Wisner claims that Gustaw Adolf's army outnumbered Radziwill's one 20:1 and that Gustaw Adolf didn't decide to fight with Radziwill.

Spartan, you might be also interested in these events:

1. October the 16th, 1621. Close to Mitawa

Krzysztof Radziwill, having less than 1900 soldiers (including 500 infantrymen), sent a 'starosta trojdeński' Benedykt Wahl to Gustavus with a official invitation to a battle. Gustavus, having 7350 infantry and 3000 cavalry (Radziwill thought that Gustavus had 15 000 soldiers), didn't decide to fight in the open field.

2. October the 25^th, 1621. By the river Musza.

Krzysztof Radziwill, having 2171 soldiers (including 500 infantrymen), sent a trumpeter to Gustavus with a official invitation to a battle. Gustavus again didn't decide to fight in the open field.

3. November the 24^th, 1621. Battle of Kropimojza.

Aleksander Gosiewski, having 500 cavalry, defeated the vanguard of Gustavus's army (the vanguard counted about 900 cavalrymen). The Lithuanians killed 280 and prisoned 20 Swedish soldiers. This Lithuanian victory stopped Gustavus's offensive action against Kokenhausen and Dyneburg/Daugavpils.

So the whole purpose of the thread is to search for every little skirmish the Poles happened to defeat Swedes? Kinda what I suspected.

It's very interesting. Can you quote Hepburn's description of this event?

Well, Teodorczyk isn't credible source of information. His description of the battle was written about 40 years ago and is biased very much (it's a good example of Communist propaganda). I can recommend you new Radoslaw Sikora's book "Fenomen husarii" (publised few years ago), where Sikora point by point shows Teodorczyk's 'mistakes' ('mistakes' is a very gentle word in this case). If you want, I can write more about it.

Seredyka's contribution to this subject is insignificent. AFAIK he wrote only one article, where discussed some minor aspects of the begining of the war and this battle.

AFAIK this idea comes from Teodorczyk's description of the battle. But even Teodorczyk quoted primary source which states that Swedish infantry shot to charging hussars. And that hussars charged 'like in fire'. So?

My notice - according to Teodorczyk's description, Polish cavalry was deployed many hundreds meters from the place, where the Swedes took position of Polish infantry. Even if there were only 400m, hussars needed at least 2 minutes to approach to the Swedes (look at this

http://www.kismeta.com/diGrasse/HowHussarFought.htm - http://www.kismeta.com/diGrasse/HowHussarFought.htm  )

Don't you think that it is enough for well drilled infantry to reload muskets? I've seen on this page http://www.kismeta.com/diGrasse/PolishHorseArtillery.htm - http://www.kismeta.com/diGrasse/PolishHorseArtillery.htm  a movie which shows that musketeer needs only 12 sec. to load and to shoot.

Do you mean 'The Northern Wars'? I have this book.

It's true that 'Polish tactics were impacted by those of the Swedes'. But Radziwill and Koniecpolski wrote about using obstacles and about avoiding battles by the Swedes. They didn't write about fire discipline of Swedish infantry.

BTW, Frost made mistake in his translation of Radziwill's letter ('The Northern Wars' p.107). Radziwill used the word 'fortele', while Frost translated it as 'stratagems'. In fact 'fortel' in old Polish language meant every kind of obstacle; only in modern Polish language it means 'stratagem'.

The number of infantry in Polish army increased to fight with Swedes, who usually didn't want to leave their fortified positions and didn't want to fight in the open field with Polish cavalry.

Heavy muskets - well, the Poles suffered a shortage of their own infantry, so they were forced to hire foreign infantry. These foreign infantry (Germans for example) used heavier muskets than Polish 'hajduks'. It doesn't mean that fighting Swedes demanded heavy muskets.

It means that he avoided to attack fortified Swedish positions, while he tried to fight with Swedish army in the open field. Sombody should remember that Swedish army outnumbered Polish army in Prussia about 2 (sometimes even 3) to 1. The Swedes always had more infantry than the Poles. They had more infantry and they usually didn't want to leave they fortified postitions. Koniecpolski, having less infantry than the Swedes, was wise enough to avoid attack Swedish fortifications. But in the open field, he attacked the Swedes, even if the Swedes outnumbered him (like at Trzciana 1629)

IMHO (which is based on the newest Polish elaborations) it wasn't the use of fire discipline, which had a major effect on both sides, and changed the way the war was fought. It was the use of obstacles, which secured the Swedes from charges of Polish cavalry. Polish and Lithuanian hetmans (commanders) stressed many times that the Swedes avoided open field engagements, and that Gustaw Adolf tried to win this war by 'krecia wojna' (moles' war). Neither Lithuanian nor Polish hetmans wrote about any impact of fire discipline of the Swedes on their tactic.