Stanislaw Koniecpolski vs Gustav II

[QUOTE=ataman]

<SPAN>my comment: It's true that the Poles understimated the Swedes until (at least) 1621. But there were solid reasons to do it. The Swedish-Polish war began in 1600. Until 1626 the Poles and Lithuanians won every battle with Swedish army � even if the Swedes outnumbered P-L armies many times (like at Kircholm 1605 or at Paide 1604 etc.). Sweden was poor, weak and sparsely populated country. And I have to say it (I hope Swedish members of this forum will forgive me), Sweden wasn't civilized country (at least in the opinion of the Poles). The war until 1620 only confirmed that P-L Commonwealth had no reason to affraid Sweden. </SPAN>

<SPAN>Opposite to Sweden, Ottoman Empire was one of the strongest states in the world. Its successes in fighting Christians were well known in Poland. The Poles remembered very well </SPAN><SPAN>battles of Warna 1444 and Mochacz 1526 (where fought and lost also Polish soldiers). And the Poles had new and terrible example in 1620 � the battle of Cecora, where Polish regular army was beaten and where 2 main commanders of Polish army (I mean both hetmans) were killed (Stanis?aw ?�?kiewski) and captured (Stanis?aw Koniecpolski).</SPAN>

Looks like a fair assessment.
The Poles would have been nuts not to focus on the Ottomans. The Swedish turning up would be part of this internal dynastic squabble within the family of the Wasa, hence personal and bitter, but the Swedish army had not yet aquired these new tactics and technologies coming into use. They weren't yet what they later became.
The Swedish poverty and constant problem of underpopulation would only later be (temporarily) made up for by getting really good at administration, but that took the reforms of Oxenstierna (maybe even more important than Gustavus for keeping the Swedes in a fight, his reforms provided the sinews of war for Sweden). Polish confidence at the time would seem to be entirely justified.

However, the break down of the major battles between Swedes and Poles for that particular war by Swedish count comes out even:

Kokenhusen, 17 June 1601 (Polish victory)
Weissenstein 15 September 1604 (Polish victory)
Kirkholm 17 September 1605 (Polish victory)
Riga 15 September 1621 (Swedish victory)
Wallhof 8 January 1626 (Swedish victory)
Mewe 21 September 1626 (Swedish victory)
Hammerstein 13 April 1627 (Polish victory)
Dirschau 8 August 1627 (tie)
Danzig 15 July 1628 (Swedish victory)
Osterode 14 October 1628 (Polish victory)
Gurzno 2 February 1629 (Swedish victory)

And if the initial three encounters were all Polish, after the 16 year "lull", it's Sweden 5-2 and a draw 1621-1629. (Very much looking like sports this...)

And if it's the perfomance of Gustavus on the line, the first three battles were fought under his father Charles IX, at which point Sweden wasn't just dealing with Poland but with Denmark and Russia as well, of which the Danish threat was the most immediate and serious.

The early part of this war might have been a bit of a sideshow for Swedes and Poles alike.

Originally posted by Joinville However, the break down of the major battles between Swedes and Poles for that particular war by Swedish count comes out even: Kokenhusen, 17 June 1601 (Polish victory) Weissenstein 15 September 1604 (Polish victory) Kirkholm 17 September 1605 (Polish victory) Riga 15 September 1621 (Swedish victory) Wallhof 8 January 1626 (Swedish victory) Mewe 21 September 1626 (Swedish victory) Hammerstein 13 April 1627 (Polish victory) Dirschau 8 August 1627 (tie) Danzig 15 July 1628 (Swedish victory) Osterode 14 October 1628 (Polish victory) Gurzno 2 February 1629 (Swedish victory)

Edited by ataman - 30-Nov-2006 at 20:13

Originally posted by Styrbiorn Swedish propaganda? Not exactly. Both points of view exist in Sweden: that Sigismund was the legal king and Karl a rebel, as well as that Karl fought for Swedish interest against a foreign king that did not have the support of the Swedish population.

Edited by ataman - 01-Dec-2006 at 23:59

Spartan: At 16 years of age, Gustavus Adolphus inherited the wars his father began, and only by exerting himself to the utmost was he able to achieve peaceful settlements with Denmark (Treaty of Knarod, January, 1613) and Russia (Treaty of Stolbova, February, 1617). He had to restrict himself due to the terms involving indemnity with Denmark, but his treaty with Russia altogether shut out Muscovy from the Baltic, with its trade there being dependent on Sweden. It was clear that Gustavus would resolve to take up the struggle with the Poles in Livonia if necessary. The Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish Diet) consented to this in spite of financial difficulties.
 
Hostilies had already begun in 1617, though a truce had been formally agreed upon in 1613 and prolonged for 2 years the following year. The king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sigismund III , whose unfortunate and unwavering claims to the throne of Sweden (by birth he was united along the royal lines of the Vasa and Jagiello) would involve Poland in a whole series of unprofitable wars with Sweden spanning 6 decades, instructed his government to not renew the truce. The Swedes captured Pernau (modern Parnu), and by the autumn of 1618 Gustavus was willing to arrange an armistice, but Sigismund III rejected every proposal in that course, keeping unflinchingly to his claim to be acknowledged King of Sweden. Finally a truce was arranged on September 23, 1618, and Jan Chodkiewicz, who had conducted himself with such esteem on the Livonian front, was sent against the Ottoman threat from the south.

my comments: Spartan, you omited some important issues.

In July 1617 Polish and Swedish commissioners signed new armistice in Livonia for 10 years. The armistice was broken by the Swedes in the same month. They captured Dynemunt (it was on the 21^th of July 1617), Windawa (on the 23^th of July 1617), Parnawa/Pernau (on the 14^th of August 1617) and Salis (on the 18^th of August 1617).

Although Polish-Lithuanian armies were involved at 2 other fronts:

- the war in Russia (the expedition to Russia by Wladyslaw Waza. He wanted to recover tzar's throne)

- protection of southern Polish borders (fightings with Tartar incursions, demonstration of Ottoman forces at Busza in 1617 and fightings with Ottoman army at Orynin in 1618)

Lithuanian army commanded by Krzysztof Radziwill was able to recover all losses in Livonia except Parnawa.

New truce with the Swedes was signed on December 8, 1618.

Jan Karol Chodkiewicz couldn't command Lithuanian army in Livonia, because at that time he was with prince Wladyslaw in Russia.

Spartan: The great Polish hetman died in September, 1621, amid his successful entrenched defense against the Sultan Osman II's huge invading army at Khotyn (Chocim), in the Ukraine. During this time the rivalry between Gustavus and Sigismund III transposed into a very different and higher plane.

Another blow for the Poles was the death of Jan Zamoyski in 1605. It had been the firm conviction of this great szlachcic and magnate that Poland could not achieve any long term success against Sweden without a navy. But his efforts to prevail upon Danzig (modern Gdansk) to produce a fleet were in vain, as the neutral city didn't want to displease the Swedish sovereign at the time (among other reasons).

my comments: Here is some kind of misunderstanding. Gdansk belonged to Poland and (for example) paid taxes to Polish treasure. Polish (royal) fleet was build in Gdansk. Sailors of Polish fleet were from Gdansk etc. But cities (especially big ones) in those times in Poland had broad autonomies and many privileges. Gdansk was the biggest and the richest Polish city. Therefore it was a very important 'political player'. The wealth of Gdansk was depended on a trade. Polish � Swedish war was a danger for the trade of Gdansk. Therefore as much as possible Gdansk tried to do everything to be neutral in this war. No sooner than the ending of 1626 had Gdansk understood that its neutral policy gave nothing and it clearly declared itself for Poland.

Spartan: After thorough preparations, Gustavus sailed for the mouth of the Dvina (Duna) in July, 1621 with 158 ships and about 24,000 men (some accounts say 19,000), took the fort commanding it, and opened the siege of Riga on August 13. Gustavus' army in 1621, was well-equipped, but not yet the disciplined force of a few years to come. He offered terms to the garrison before opening a bombardment. A belated relief army under Radziwill was attacked and beaten (Swedish sources say 10,000 men, Polish ones 3,000).

my question: Spartan, anybody

Can you write the description of that battle (between Radziwill and GA at Riga) the way the Swedes saw it? I must admit that I don't have a description of this battle yet. But I'll try to consult Radoslaw Sikora.

Edited by ataman - 03-Dec-2006 at 01:26

Spartan: The conquest of Riga meant there was no longer any possibility for Poland to establish herself as a Baltic power. Through Riga passed 1/3 of her exports.

my comments: Through Riga passed only 6.2% of P-L export. To comparison, through Gdansk passed 82% of P-L export.

Spartan: With it Gustavus gained political and strategic advantages and a base for equipping his fleet.

The east part of Livonia and the important town of Dorpat remained, however, in the Polish hands. In the autumn of 1622 both sides were again ready to accept an armistice. Gustavus was too eager for peace to grudge Sigismund III the title of King of Sweden, so long as he did not call himself Hereditary King. Kryztof Radziwill had advised Sigismund III to ask for an armistice, but, as usual, he hesitated to the very last. This gave Sweden's Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, an opportunity to seperate the interests of Poland and Lithuania, and to offer the latter peace and neutrality in the struggle between Sweden and Poland. This was the first Swedish attempt to drive a wedge between the two halves of the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy. But the plan did not succeed, and Gustavus personally conducted the campaign in the summer of 1622. A battle was fought on August 3, 1622 at Mitawa against Radziwill. Initially, Swedish infantrymen, positioned in thickets with swampy ground between them and the Lithuanians, fired upon the enemy, refusing to come out in the open, a condition which Radziwill proposed. The Swedes overwhelmed the outnumbered haiduks (mercenary foot-soldiers of mostly Magyar stock) in an infantry clash. Some companies of husaria then displayed some recalcitrance, as there existed serious financial problems with the Lithuanian forces, which was more a private army than a state one at this time, which led to a lack of loyalty and morale amongst many. But 2 banners (some 400 husaria?) did charge and despite unfavorable ground, penetrated through with minimal loss. But the Swedes reinforced their positions which precluded the husaria from turning around.

My comment: More detailed description of the fighting in that day was written by Radoslaw Sikora in the group Zaglobastavern. Below is a quotation from Sikora's description. But I'd like to stress that the fightings on the 3^rd of August, 1622 were only part of the battle of Mitawa 1622. I'll write more about that battle in my next message.

On August 3, 1622 in the vicinity of Courland's town of Mitawa/Mittau the armies of Krzysztof Radziwiłł and Gustavus Adolphus clashed. Vanguard of the Swedish army consisted of several (3 or 4) reiter cornets/companies. They placed themselves at the forest's edge, "in the thickets, past the swamps" in such manner so the Lithuanian horse could not attack them. In van of these reiters came two canons, "and they fired from them against our banners/companies but by God's grace without any harm." Then, the commander of the Lithuanian reiters, Jerzy Krzysztof Rożen, with the hetman's permission sent a trumpeter to the Swedish reiters, "challenging them to take to the field unless they were sons-of-the-bitches." Swedes did not show any interest in such presented proposition. Instead of awaited cavalry action "several companies of (enemy) infantry rushed out from the forest.". Hetman directed against them three rota/companies of haiduk infantry. The firefight raged between the infantries of both sides. "Very laud musket gunplay lasted for an entire hour, as in a regular battle it would not have been greater." There were some 20 haiduks killed (and fell into the enemy's hands) while wounded there were some 30 more. When the servants "that on a hillock were digging a trench (entrenchment), being afraid of the gunplay, started to flee with their spades," Swedes, "understanding that these were the soldiers who were fleeing, sent to their own a larger reinforcement, and in such manner more than 2000 Swedish infantrymen jumped our throats and onto the hillock pushed."

Radziwiłł turned then to the JK Rożen's reiter companies (those were three companies, on register numbering 500-horse strong but their real strength was merely 300 horses) "so they would aid the infantry," but they evasively "said that they had no field" (the ground was not suitable for cavalry) and " replied that winged hussars should rush first." Why they refused? Reiters were foreigners that fought for a profit and not out of patriotic call. The Lithuanian army had serious financial problems at that time and was seriously behind the pay for their soldiers. In face of serious numerical advantage held by the enemy, when the motivation to continue fighting was not strong enough, when the ground was not favorable, all that was enough that the reiters refused to execute command. In such circumstances hetman turned then to the Janusz Ulik Szweryn's hussaria (on the register this unit had 200 horses, the real strength of this unit is unknown). But they also refused to charge. Why? The sources known to us do not explain this. One thing is certain - there is no mention in the sources about any winged hussars' fear of the gunfire of the Swedish infantry. These source suggest that, when faced with numerically superior adversary (just Swedish infantry alone was supposed to be 2000-3000), and having the ground unsuitable for cavalry action and - what may be the most important - the winged hussars seeing that they would not be supported by the reiters (after all those already had refused to attack), then the morale of Szweryn's hussaria must have been weak. Their commander did not decide to charge under such conditions. Thus meeting with another refusal there, Radziwiłł then turned to the next reiter company - Henryk Szmeling (200 horses on the register). Yet and this reiter company refused to carry out the command.

This crisis, however, did not spread throughout the entire Lithuanian army. Unfortunately, "other [companies] albeit willing [to fight] their own places in the army's battle order had to guard, because the enemy horse with part of the infantry in the affair [battle order] stood fast, awaiting our confusion." In these circumstances, before the Lithuanian battle order regrouped, before those 'willing' companies arrived onto the field, the Swedes were able to take the hillock with the Lithuanian artillery pieces there.

Ultimately the Lithuanian hussaria charged those ( troops). There were found "two so righteous hussaria companies" that "while the ground was not for a hussar (undesirable for winged hussars)" yet "in the very fire of the enemy troops they rushed" and "great injury in them they caused." Those companies were: the Połock voivode Janusz Kiszka's company, on the register 200 hussars, and the referendarz of Grand Dutchy of Lithuania Aleksander Korwin Gosiewski's company, of the same register's number. This charge proved to be successful. Hussars, in spite that they were attacking on the ground not quite suitable for cavalry action, withstood the fire of more numerous infantry and passed through its lines, inflicting heavy causalities on the Swedes. It was not, however, the end of fighting. Winged hussar companies "having broken through and without reinforcement remaining, could not turn around." Swedes brought onto the battlefield additional infantry units, position them in the thickets and in the trenches (including the entrenchment dig out by the Lithuanian servants) and maintained their positions, because on such prepared infantry "the cavalry second time could not joust (strike)."

The very charge on the fire-spewing lines of the Swedish infantry cost our winged hussars 2 killed (Nakurski and Orwid) and unknown quantity of wounded, while "in the horses not a small injury they caused." The Swedes were supposed to have died "close to 500" on this day. Some of quoted number included that infantry, which had been under Lithuanian infantry fire before the hussaria's charge.

Edited by ataman - 05-Dec-2006 at 00:35

Spartan, you might be also interested in these events:

1. October the 16th, 1621. Close to Mitawa

Krzysztof Radziwill, having less than 1900 soldiers (including 500 infantrymen), sent a 'starosta trojdeński' Benedykt Wahl to Gustavus with a official invitation to a battle. Gustavus, having 7350 infantry and 3000 cavalry (Radziwill thought that Gustavus had 15 000 soldiers), didn't decide to fight in the open field.

 

2. October the 25^th, 1621. By the river Musza.

Krzysztof Radziwill, having 2171 soldiers (including 500 infantrymen), sent a trumpeter to Gustavus with a official invitation to a battle. Gustavus again didn't decide to fight in the open field.

3. November the 24^th, 1621. Battle of Kropimojza.

Aleksander Gosiewski, having 500 cavalry, defeated the vanguard of Gustavus's army (the vanguard counted about 900 cavalrymen). The Lithuanians killed 280 and prisoned 20 Swedish soldiers. This Lithuanian victory stopped Gustavus's offensive action against Kokenhausen and Dyneburg/Daugavpils.

What a shame that Sparten gave up. It could have been very interesting discussion. Anyway, you did a good work

Alright, I see three specialists on the two commanders. So I must make this proposition for you:

Could you three work together (or two or one, if other's don't wish to do so) and write an article for the Mag about the differences of the two commanders and their skills as commanders?

Well... that counts not.

I was talking of you Ataman, Sparten and Majkes. So, could you work together?

Originally posted by rider Well... that counts not. I was talking of you Ataman, Sparten and Majkes. So, could you work together?

Edited by ataman - 31-Dec-2006 at 13:55