…..In the 1930’s Britain was the greatest world, colonial and imperial power. After the WWI, the imperial position had significantly improved with Britain gaining many new Arab and African territories; however, there was a loss to be considered in marketing and investment. World War I cost Britain £4 billion in money rates even then. Despite this, Britain remained an economic power until WWII when relative economic decline had set in for good. The prevailing view in government circles was that another war would not be good and costly even if you win! By 1926, Britain had no territorial ambitions and wanted to keep the peace. War was felt to be harmful to commercial and financial interests and the overriding factor to maintain peace and stability…….

…..The British attitude towards Hitler in the 1930’s was the same, there was moral opposition but it was not commercially viable to physically oppose the regime in Nazi Germany, Britain firmly remained a bastion of self-interest. In addition, a significant amount of pacifist sentiment found expression in Britain. Many feared a war even worse than the WWI. There were deep memories of WWI and few believed that another political leader would use war as an instrument of foreign policy again, but without bargaining for the fanatical and disturbed Adolf Hitler.(remember we know this now with the benefit of historical hindsight, it was not so clear cut then what Hitler’s ambitions were)….

..another reason that led to the policy of appeasement was the English channel. The British navy was no longer the protective body it once was and there was a fear of the new superiority of airpower. Many felt that in the event of war, it would be the bombers that would get through. Chamberlain believed this, and his fear was grounded in not being able to protect British cities, the logic therefore was not to go to war…..

..another reason for the policy of appeasement  was that Britain was now an overstretched power with a colonial empire far too big to manage effectively, which again caused worry over issues of defence. What if Italy, Japan, and Germany attacked parts of the empire? How could Britain defend against this? How to defend what they already had? Such predominant thinking encouraged and developed into a strong ‘defensive attitude’….

..one economic reason for applying a policy of appeasement arose when the government considered the cost of Defence expenditure. In 1918, £2.5 billion was spent on defence and in 1924, this had been reduced to £130 million, but there was still the need to make this figure even lower. In 1928, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was Winston Churchill. Churchill had enquired with the Joint Chiefs of Staff if war was coming and when the answer was no, there was no raise in expenditure…..

..as a direct result of these concerns, in the late 1930’s the minister of Coordination of defence, Thomas Inskip, produced a report which dealt with Britain’s ability to catch up with Germany’s defence spending. There were two factors to consider in this report. One, the UK had too many enemies to fight at once. Two, the UK could only win a long drawn out war using economic advantage. As a result of this report, Britain minimised naval spending, did not spend any more on the army and put most of the budget into fighter aircraft for defence. Britain could then use its ‘4th arm’ of defence by using financial advantage to economically starve the enemy to ‘death.’ The idea was implicitly to  ‘buy off’ potential enemies until military ‘defence’ is ready. This is where the idea of ‘appeasement’ came from and there is logic to this policy. Britain at the tail end of the 1930’s was a cautious, introspective nation looking to avoid war….

..if appeasement was only designed to push Hitler into aggressive action against the Soviet Union? Why did Britain eventually go to war? I tell you why. Once again, it was total British self-interest; there was no such plan to ‘kill two birds with one stone,’ and no ‘plan’ to aid Hitler in defeating Communism. To put it even more simply, just take a look at British imperial policy throughout the country’s history, total self-interest all the way. So why is it so difficult to comprehend these were the exact same reasons why Britain chose appeasement, and conversely, then went to war….

….so why was there an ardent decision to go to war in September 1939 and not in September 1938? Did ‘appeasement’ still exist in 1939? One answer is yes it did, so why did Chamberlain decide to got to war. By the time 1939 arrived, the reasons had nothing to do Czechoslovakia, Poland, or even the Danzig Port. In the greater scheme of things, these issues are irrelevant as far as British interests go. The answer is simple and clear-cut. The ‘reasons’ were that empire, trade, power, self-interest were all more important to Britain in 1939 than in 1938…..

..on the 15th March 1939, Germany moved to occupy Prague. The German forces invade through Bohemia and Moravia, but Slovakia maintains ‘independence’ for the time being by becoming a German ‘satellite.’ So is this the turning point on the road to war? After all, this is the first time that non-German peoples have been ‘absorbed’ by German actions. This is not a revision of the Versailles treaty, and all Hitler’s rhetoric has been proved false. Hitler’s intentions are now clear, the total domination of central and south-eastern Europe. Chamberlain’s reaction to this is two-fold with differing outlooks. His first reaction is in a speech at the House of Commons on the 15^th March 1939. In this statement, Chamberlain is still looking at ‘appeasement’, and the chance for negotiation through peaceful means. Chamberlain’s second reaction came two days later on the 17^th March 1939 at a speech in Birmingham Town Hall, his own constituency. This time chamberlain’s attitude is firmer. He is more harder on Hitler and points to the dangers of a coming war, and appears ready to stand firm on the issue of further Nazi aggression. It has been pointed out that the ‘human aspect’ to Chamberlain’s reaction on the 15^th might have been an automatic reaction. By the 17^th, Chamberlain had time to think about the situation and possibly felt cheated, fooled, and hence the more non-appeasing stance and more bitter statement concerning Hitler’s action. In addition, Chamberlain was feeling the pressure from more hard-line anti-Nazi’s in British government, and the harder stance was Chamberlain’s attempt to consolidate his leadership in a bid to keep power of the Conservative Party. It might be that Chamberlain was still following ‘appeasement’ but was being reluctantly drawn away from the policy. The Munich settlement can now be seen as moral and practical mistake with Hitler viewed in a different light. This is particularly highlighted by the ‘Night of Broken Glass’ (Kristallnacht), which reinforces the moral mistake of dealing with someone who cannot be dealt with on a rational basis. Such issues usher in a shift of government policy and a change in opinion in Chamberlain who is now questioning the validity of appeasement. He is less convinced that the policy will now work……..

….so why the change in policy and viewpoint for Chamberlain and government? During January and February of 1939, a series of rumours about Hitler’s next move are beginning to circulate amongst government members, and remember that this is shortly after the ‘Munich Settlement’ (30^th September 1938). There is some speculation about Nazi intentions. This includes possible threats to Holland, Ukraine, the Danzig port and even Switzerland, however these rumours are all false (for the time being). Nevertheless, these rumours are taken seriously enough that perhaps shows a lack of confidence in the ‘finality’ of the Munich Settlement. (Some of these rumours were deliberately circulated by anti-Nazi opposition in Germany in a bid to push Britain into action against Hitler and the Nazi’s, and as far as this goes, the tactic is fairly successful, and Britain does begin to act!)….The prime ministerial cabinet decided that if Holland was threatened, Britain would go to war with Germany. This is no vague statement, but a firm statement of intention, most definitely not appeasement, however such threats are just rumour for now. Nevertheless, by February 1939, the cabinet made a decision that ushered in an increase in the British army. The British were now talking more positively with the French, and formulating the idea of sending a British Expeditionary Force to Europe. It now looks like Britain is getting psychologically ready to go to war and events are looking inevitable. The conclusion that could be drawn is that even before Prague was occupied, Britain was slowly abandoning ‘appeasement’, so in effect, Prague was ‘not’ the great turning point in policy and the decision to go to war…..

….the British reaction to the Czechoslovakian ‘crisis’ is important. How much of a turning point was all this in Anglo-French thoughts towards Hitler’s actions? By the 15^th of March, the Czechoslovakian episode was done and dusted. However, by the end of March 1939, there was an Anglo-French guarantee to Poland. Why was this? What were Britain and Chamberlain’s motivation in this issue? The answer to these questions lies in the fact that both Poland and Romania were seen as important to British self-interests. Before the Czech crisis was concluded there was a Polish ‘crisis’ that remained largely undetected until the Czech episode was finalised. The Versailles treaty seems to be at the heart of this crisis.  Before the end of World War I, there was no Polish state since the 18^th century when the Pole’s were absorbed into Russia. Nevertheless, Polish nationalism survived and negotiations at the ‘Peace of Paris’ (1918) conference allowed the birth of a ‘new’ Poland and national recognition.  In 1919, the geographical problem was where this ‘new’ Poland should be. There were no obvious boundaries and physical limits to the new country’s borders. In addition, how would Poland conduct its domestic affairs? The ongoing crisis in Polish affairs came to ahead in 1938/1939. Poland needed access to the sea and was granted the port of Danzig, but this was a German town and it was 'given’ to Poland. Danzig was to be overseen by the League of Nations to help ease tensions, but trouble was still brewing among those who believed that Danzig should be totally German…..

…. By October 1938, the problem started to present itself in more serious terms. Berlin started to put pressure on Warsaw to deal with this issue. Ribbentrop attempted to ‘talk’ to the Pole’s to end this ‘situation’, but the Pole’s were naturally unwilling to budge on the issue. This is the crisis that preceded the Czechoslovakian episode. Hitler wanted short-term co-operation with Poland and desired Poland becoming a ‘semi-satellite’ to Germany. Hitler also wanted access to Danzig via a road/rail system that would go through the ‘Polish corridor’. (this was not to be an invasion just yet). It has been stated that the ‘Danzig problem’ was a barometer of German/Polish relations according to what was happening with the port. Hitler felt that there would not be problem with this and believed the Pole’s would concede to his demands. On the other hand, the Pole’s, in western eyes, were not a people in the ‘good books’. Poland had played a poor part in the Czech crisis and demanded their part of territory and they took it after Munich! The Polish government was also distrusted because of the slippery nature of their Foreign Minister Josef Beck (However, he did not give in to Hitler’s demands for influence in Polish affairs). There was also an agreement/peace pact in 1934 between Poland and Germany, which Hitler thought would aid the concession to his demands. However, it did not! Strangely enough, in 1938/39, the port of Danzig was not very important to the Pole’s either. Poland had another port in the west called ‘Gdynia’ that was more successful in trading and commerce. Despite this, Poland did not want to give up Danzig as this would set a dangerous precedent by allowing Germany a strategic gain; what would the Nazi’s demand next? For Poland, this was a fine political balancing act between German demands and the prospect of having Russia on its borders ready to pounce (there being no great enmity between USSR and Poland)…..

….As far as Britain was concerned, the government requested an explanation about what was is going on, but no answer was given by the Polish Foreign Minister Josef Beck, who believed that Poland could handle the issue on its own. Poland at this time, held onto a self-belief in its military strength and enough self-confidence to turn down help. In addition, the Polish believed that if Britain and France got involved, it would make Hitler more determined to act aggressively. In Britain, it was seen as if the Pole’s were playing down the crisis. So why did Britain suddenly help Poland by extending a guarantee to help militarily?…

..the answer is Romania. Here lies Britain’s main concern at the time. There were primary British interests in Romanian oilfields and grain supplies. Rumours were again still filtering throughout Whitehall. A Romanian diplomat and junior official called ‘Tilea’ made an appearance at Whitehall on the 16^th March 1939 claiming that Berlin was putting pressure on Bucharest to fall in line with Nazi thinking or face invasion. There was no real substance to this claim, but Britain was sufficiently alarmed to respond to these statements. When Tilea met Chamberlain, the thought was in the Prime Ministers’ mind that Hitler was not just focusing on Czechoslovakia but also Romania as well. This gave the British Government reason to be concerned…..

…Chamberlain’s reaction to all this was to attempt to construct an ‘eastern front’ against Hitler and bring in as many states in Eastern Europe to rally against Hitler’s perceived intentions. (France, Britain, USSR, that is the USSR and Poland were to be employed to protect Romania). However, the fundamental key in all this was Poland. Poland was in a good position to protect Romania but it was recognised that Poland would refuse to accept Russian influence within its borders, so effectively Romania cannot be adequately protected. The advice to Chamberlain was that the ‘best bet’ was to safeguard Poland and create an association that will help protect Romania. In the process of trying to develop this ‘eastern front’, the German and Polish situation erupts. At the end of March 1939, Ian Colvin, a newsman in Berlin, heard rumours that Poland not Romania was going to be the next point of crisis, and that the Nazi’s would invade over the Danzig issue. Chamberlain had by now switched his attention to Poland instead of Romania (not Danzig however, but Poland the country). The Anglo French guarantee now comes about, but not over Danzig, but Poland. On the 13th April, a guarantee is given to Greece, and in May 1939, a guarantee is given to Turkey, perhaps as a part of the eastern front policy? It now looks like that appeasement has been effectively compromised as Chamberlain was willing to negotiate away Danzig but would not let Poland go?…

….Although here is a rational and logical reason for this action, it is a  bit cynical. The problem that remained was how to support Poland. As there was no difference between Poland and Czechoslovakia, there is nothing practical to do, so Britain did not offer military or economic resources to Poland, and this aspect has brought Chamberlain much criticism.  However, there is logic in these actions. Firstly, why waste valuable British resources when Britain can preserve its hardware to defend or attack Germany in the future. Secondly, a cynical view is that Chamberlain believed that he had to take the initiative by stating to the world and Germany that Britain will be active in ‘drawing the line’ in Poland. Thirdly, there is the idea that Hitler would have to respond to Britain’s threat and take Poland where there would be border disputes with USSR that would hopefully weaken Germany in any later conflict with Britain. (use of the USSR again, but not a freehold wish to allow Hitler to destroy the Soviet union, just real-politic). However, for the time being Poland was seen as the best place to make a stand. As far as chamberlain was concerned, it was choice between ‘two devils?’ Chamberlain may have still been looking for a negotiated settlement, but by now, was most likely ‘hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst’. however, as we all know, Hitler attacked Poland and Britain went to war….the attack on Poland was against British economic interests in that Romania was believed to be next. On the 1^st September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, but the declaration of war from the British came on the 3^rd September. the delay in declaring war was Partly because the French refused to declare immediately before they had fully mobilised and Britain was waiting to synchronise. This most definitely is not appeasement…….

..appeasement had nothing to do with forcing Hitler and Stalin together in mutual defeat….by now appeasement had been grounded and there were pragmatic and self-interested reasons why Britain gave up the policy and went to war. Economic considerations meant that in 1938, Britain could not have entered into a long drawn out war, (as was usual with British tactics to starve the enemy into defeat), as the economy was not strong enough. However, in 1939, the situation appeared different to Chamberlain. Intelligence reports from Germany indicated that the German economy was in a poor state due to rearmament, and could not sustain the growth, and there appeared to be some resistance to the Nazi’s from the working class. Chamberlain was by now receiving advice that the British economy was improving and that it was now possible for Britain to fight a long term conflict as well as in the short-term. However, the economy was believed to be at the peak of its performance and if there was any delay in action, the situation could worsen, ‘this was the optimum moment to act’…..with regards to Allies, France was now better prepared militarily and more confident in its position. The USA were on the fringe providing economic supplies and they appeared more inclined to deal with the Japanese, thus removing the ‘tripartite alliance’ problem solely from Britain’s shoulders (that meant there was less threat to the Empire). For Britain, there was now only Germany to deal with. Italy was showing no signs of entering into a conflict and Japan was facing pressure from the USA…..the imperial dominions were generally appeasers (apart from New Zealand, South Africa, Australia,) but in 1939, the view had changed and they were expressing the opinion that if London was prepared to go to war, then the Empire would follow….

..while there are several criticisms to be aimed at Chamberlain’s actions, using appeasement as a policy to induce Hitler and Stalin to wipe each other out was not one of them.  Perhaps if Britain knew that Poland could not be saved, there should have been firmer negotiations with the USSR? There were indeed talks, but there remained a fear of Communism infiltrating into Europe and Britain’s half-hearted negotiation techniques caused a collapse of talks with the USSR. Besides, the Pole’s did not want to deal with the USSR and certainly did not want Soviet troops in Polish territory, they might not leave at a later date. (Later Proven to be a true). In addition, Hitler was very much aware of the USSR and in the summer of 1939, he was approaching the Russian’s to do a deal through diplomatic talks and the offer of possible treaties and pacts. A pragmatic Stalin does not want to deal with the Soviet’s ideological enemies, but he ‘shrugs shoulders’ and does do a deal. Stalin realises that by siding with the west will only bring war (an event he to wished to avoid until a future date), and Hitler is offering territorial gains as part of the deal. The August 1939 ‘pact’ contained a hidden agenda that Poland would be divided between Germany and Russia. (This deal was not a shock to Britain who had received intelligence reports noting the proposed deal, but Chamberlain believed that it would come to nothing, in this respect Chamberlain was short-sighted in not bringing in the Russians at an earlier opportunity)…..