If last week's news had no other effect, it certainly pepped up diplomatic gossip. Around the embassies went the story about Yang Chieh, Chinese Ambassador to Moscow: The day before the German-Russian pact was announced, Yang Chieh called on Russian Premier Viacheslav Molotov and asked what was up.

Said he with Oriental suavity, he had heard rumors of a German-Russian plan to dismember Poland. . . . Thunderstruck, Premier Molotov gasped, drew back, while the veins of his forehead stood out in his apoplectic fury: this, he reminded his visitor, was the Soviet of Socialist Republics, the fatherland of the toiling masses, the vanguard of the antifascist struggle; that any ambassador could believe such a slander of the Socialist State made him, Molotov, wonder if he was the proper ambassador to be accredited to it. The Chinese Ambassador left, to read in Pravda the next day the laconic notice that the agreement had been made. Molotov hadn't been told.

Premier Molotov, whose name in Russian means Hammer (Stalin means Steel), whose pretty wife Paulina is Commissar of Fisheries and is very close to Stalin, may well have been taken by surprise. If so, his astonishment last week must have mounted hourly. No sooner had the German-Russian pact been hailed as thwarting the foul design of British Tories to direct German expansion to the East than the German Army did what (in the Russian view) Tories had failed to accomplish—i.e., directed German expansion to the East...

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761966-1,00.html - http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,761966-1,00.html

The decision to push Germany east to attack USSR was made in 1936 by the British conservative government. These are all facts.

Nothing to worry about, Bankotsu. We had worse in many dark times... and this kind of question isn't offensive from my prospective... it's just pure military strategy questions.

Just like to add that Britain had little reason to support the losing side. USSR had huge advantage over Hitler's collapsing nation with their numerical advantage. Their troops and armour units were getting better equipment thanks to improvement of mass production, and their soldiers were much more experienced in contrast of freshly recruited soldiers. (Much of experienced officers and soldiers were not in service or killed)

It was England's, then Great Britain's than the United Kingdom's policy since Henry VIII that there could be no one power on the continent. It coloured the foreign policy against Charles V, against Phillip II, against old Louis XIV, against Napoleon, against the Russians, against the Germans. Not always successful, but always pursued. So the idea is not out of here.

Chamberlain's policy was to collude with fascism. One of his first acts was to send Sir Nevile Henderson ("Our nazi ambassador to Berlin", as he became derisively known). Henderson drew up a 'Memorandum on British Policy Towards Germany'. This called for a comprehensive Anglo-German agreement which would include the demarcation of spheres of influence, world markets and raw material sources, and also colonial possessions. The whole sense of such an agreement would boil down to guaranteeing Britain her colonial possessions and preserving her great-power positions, having met Hitler's expansionist claims at the expense of other states (notably the USSR).

....this feels like familiar territory so I felt it would be useful to ‘cherry-pick’ from a previous post on a similar topic…

…..while some continue to revise all commonly accepted, credible, and resourced reasons regarding Nazi foreign policy motivation, and seem convinced that Mr Hitler was ‘guided’ and encouraged by Britain to ‘go east’, it might be prudent to take a look at Hitler’s foreign policy ideas before any meaningful political contact between the Nazi’s and British government….…I have deliberately focussed on the book by ‘Noakes and Pridham’ as it is a comprehensive collection of primary source documents and free from bias and ‘revisionist’ thinking…..

…as most people know, Hitler’s first attempt to put forward a reasoned foreign policy was found in his book Mein Kampf written in 1924-25…...even then, Hitler’s ideas were designed to enforce German dominion over Europe and provide the basis for world supremacy……in 1919, he expressed some rather conventional ideas about Germans goals…for example, he focused on the revision of the Versailles Treaty and the acquisition of former lost German colonies and the unification of a Greater Germany...that’s 1919 …not 1936 or 37…it must also be noted that during this time, Hitler regarded Britain and France as the main ‘enemies’…. Not Russia….

“Let us look at our enemies! We can divide them into two groups: one group includes the absolute opponents: England and America, the second group: nations which become our opponents as a result of their unfortunate situation or as a result of their circumstances…we have been pursuing a Polish policy since Bismarck’s time”

Speech made on the 10^th December 1919 taken from police reports of the episode Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

…..Hitler believed Germany was a ‘nation without space’ when compared to Russia, US, Britain and France and believed that the ‘big cities’ and ‘rootless masses’ were easy prey to Marxism …. Hitler’s solution to this was the acquisition of more territory, as we all know, the idea of Lebensraum. To do this however, Hitler realised that he would have to free Germany from the constraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty …Hitler knew he would need allies to take on the might of Britain and France, and initially, he looked towards the possibility of an alliance with Russia. However, in 1919 (that’s 1919 again), Hitler became influenced by a group of Baltic Germans who were refugees from the Russian Revolution, and they convinced Hitler (Baltic Germans, not the British) that the Revolution was the work of the Jews. By this time, Hitler was adopting a firm and aggressive anti-Russian position…..

……..In addition, the occupation of the Ruhr region by France in 1923 led Hitler to believe that the French were adopting a policy of dismemberment of Germany. Moreover, he was aware of British opposition to the occupation, and judged this to be a British fear of French hegemony in Europe. Hitler actually felt that an Anglo-German alliance against France was a possibility but such an alliance would also prove to be a barrier to the acquisition of German colonies. Hitler’s problem was how to balance all these shifts of power into a favourable position for Germany. At each and every stage, it was Hitler’s wishes and planning that led to the move eastward. Hitler deduced from all this power-play that the only way Germany could get ‘living-space’ was to take it from Russia. Hitler believed this was the only way to avoid a WWI situation where Germany had to face both Britain and Russia. Hitler had made the decision to move eastwards, it was only a matter of time. (This was 1923 Bankotsu). Hitler made clear this option in Mein Kampf.

“…we National Socialists have intentionally drawn a  line under the foreign policy of pre-war Germany….We are putting an end to the perpetual German march towards the south and West of Europe and turning our eyes towards the land in the East….we must principally bear in mind Russia…..destiny itself seems to wish to point the way for us there”…

....a bit of an afterthought 'post'....

“Everything I undertake is directed against the Russians; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West, and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. I need the Ukraine so they can’t starve us out like in the last war”.

Statement made to Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig, 11th August 1939. Cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

It is probable that the groundwork for Halifax’s visit to Hitler had been laid by the earlier visits of Lords Lothian and Londonderry to the same host, but our knowledge of these earlier events is too scanty to be certain.

Of Halifax’s visit, the story is now clear, as a result of the publication of the German Foreign Office memorandum on the subject and Keith Feiling’s publication of some of the letters from Neville Chamberlain to his sister.  The visit was arranged by Halifax himself, early in November 1937, at a time when he was Acting Foreign Secretary, Eden being absent in Brussels at a meeting of signers of the Nine-Power Pacific Treaty of 1922.

As a result, Halifax had a long conversation with Hitler on 19 November 1937 in which, whatever may have been Halifax’s intention, Hitler’s government became convinced of three things:

(a) that Britain regarded Germany as the chief bulwark against communism in Europe;
(b) that Britain was prepared to join a Four Power agreement of France, Germany, Italy, and herself;  and
(c) that Britain was prepared to allow Germany to liquidate Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland if this could be done without provoking a war into which the British Government, however unwillingly, would be dragged in opposition to Germany...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html - http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

Details of this anglo-german settlement proposed by the Chamberlain regime to Hitler was leaked to the press in November 1937, TIME run an article on it:

...The Yorkshire Post, owned by Mrs. Eden's family, did its best to sabotage Lord Halifax's visit. It was rebuked by the London Daily Telegraph (which is close to Mr. Chamberlain) for printing rumors that "There exist and are known to Germany to exist in this country [Britain] a "certain number of people—not all of them obscure [Halifax & friends]— who would be prepared to welcome a German campaign of territorial expansion in the East [Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia] if by that means Germany could for the time being be diverted from exploiting her nuisance value in other directions [colonies].

Accordingly it requires no great exercise of the imagination to conjecture that Hitler at his meeting with Viscount Halifax will test the ground for some such policy." To the Chamberlainian Daily Telegraph'?, sharp rebuke for printing this rumor, the Edenesque Yorkshire Post sharply retorted that its information was from a "reliable source."

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,758455,00.html - http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,758455,00.html

Falsifiers Of History

1. Hitler Germany was the front-line bulwark against the spread of Communism in Europe.

2. A four-Power pact of Britain, France, Italy, and Germany to exclude all Russian influence from Europe was the ultimate aim; accordingly, Britain had no desire to weaken the Rome-Berlin Axis, but regarded it and the Anglo-French Entente as the foundation of a stable Europe.

3. Britain had no objection to German acquisition of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig.

4. Germany must not use force to achieve its aims in Europe, as this would precipitate a war in which Britain would have to intervene because of the pressure of public opinion in Britain and the French system of alliances; with patience, Germany could get its aims without using force.

5. Britain wanted an agreement with Germany restricting the numbers and the use of bombing planes.

6. Britain was prepared to give Germany colonial areas in south-central Africa, including the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola if Germany would renounce its desire to recover Tanganyika, which had been taken from Germany in 1919, and if Germany would sign an international agreement to govern these areas with due regard for the rights of the natives, an "open-door" commercial policy, and under some mechanism of international supervision like the mandates.

7. Britain would use pressure on Czechoslovakia and Poland to negotiate with Germany and to be conciliatory to Germany's desires.

To these seven points we should add an eighth: Britain must rearm in order to maintain its position in a "three-bloc world" and to deter Germany from using force in creating its bloc in Europe. This point was supported by Chamberlain, who built up the air force which saved Britain in 1940, and by the Round Table Group led by Lord Lothian, Edward Grigg, and Leopold Amery, who put on a campaign to establish compulsory military service.

The first seven points were reiterated to Germany by various spokesmen from 1937 onward. They are also to be found in many recently published documents, including the captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry, the documents of the British Foreign Office, and various extracts from diaries and other private papers, especially extracts from Neville Chamberlain's diary and his letters to his sister. Among numerous other occasions these points were covered in the following cases:

(a) in a conversation between Lord Halifax and Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 17, 1937;

(b) in a letter from Neville Chamberlain to his sister on November 26, 1937;

(c) in a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) in Berlin on March 3, 1938;

(d) in a series of conversations involving Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop, Sir Thomas Inskip (British minister of defense), Erich Kordt (Ribbentrop's assistant), and Sir Horace Wilson (Chamberlain's personal representative) in London on March 10-11, 1938; and

(e) in a conference of Neville Chamberlain with various North American journalists held at Lord Astor's house on May 10, 1938. In addition, portions of these seven points were mentioned or discussed in scores of conversations and documents which are now available.

Certain significant features of these should be pointed out. In the first place, in spite of persistent British efforts lasting for more than two years, Hitler rejected Angola or the Congo and insisted on the return of the German colonies which had been lost in 1919. During 1939 Germany steadily refused to negotiate on this issue and finally refused even to acknowledge the British efforts to discuss it.

In the second place, the British throughout these discussions made a sharp distinction between Germany's aims and Germany's methods. They had no objections to Germany's aims in Europe, but they insisted that Germany must not use force to achieve these aims because of the danger of war.

This distinction was accepted by the German professional diplomats and by the German professional soldiers, who were quite willing to obtain Germany's aims by peaceful means, but this distinction was not accepted by the leaders of the Nazi Party, especially Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Himmler, who were too impatient and who wanted to prove to themselves and the world that Germany was powerful enough to take what it wanted without waiting for anybody's permission...

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#44 - http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#44

…..In the 1930’s Britain was the greatest world, colonial and imperial power. After the WWI, the imperial position had significantly improved with Britain gaining many new Arab and African territories; however, there was a loss to be considered in marketing and investment. World War I cost Britain £4 billion in money rates even then. Despite this, Britain remained an economic power until WWII when relative economic decline had set in for good. The prevailing view in government circles was that another war would not be good and costly even if you win! By 1926, Britain had no territorial ambitions and wanted to keep the peace. War was felt to be harmful to commercial and financial interests and the overriding factor to maintain peace and stability…….

…..The British attitude towards Hitler in the 1930’s was the same, there was moral opposition but it was not commercially viable to physically oppose the regime in Nazi Germany, Britain firmly remained a bastion of self-interest. In addition, a significant amount of pacifist sentiment found expression in Britain. Many feared a war even worse than the WWI. There were deep memories of WWI and few believed that another political leader would use war as an instrument of foreign policy again, but without bargaining for the fanatical and disturbed Adolf Hitler.(remember we know this now with the benefit of historical hindsight, it was not so clear cut then what Hitler’s ambitions were)….

..another reason that led to the policy of appeasement was the English channel. The British navy was no longer the protective body it once was and there was a fear of the new superiority of airpower. Many felt that in the event of war, it would be the bombers that would get through. Chamberlain believed this, and his fear was grounded in not being able to protect British cities, the logic therefore was not to go to war…..

..another reason for the policy of appeasement  was that Britain was now an overstretched power with a colonial empire far too big to manage effectively, which again caused worry over issues of defence. What if Italy, Japan, and Germany attacked parts of the empire? How could Britain defend against this? How to defend what they already had? Such predominant thinking encouraged and developed into a strong ‘defensive attitude’….

..one economic reason for applying a policy of appeasement arose when the government considered the cost of Defence expenditure. In 1918, £2.5 billion was spent on defence and in 1924, this had been reduced to £130 million, but there was still the need to make this figure even lower. In 1928, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was Winston Churchill. Churchill had enquired with the Joint Chiefs of Staff if war was coming and when the answer was no, there was no raise in expenditure…..

..as a direct result of these concerns, in the late 1930’s the minister of Coordination of defence, Thomas Inskip, produced a report which dealt with Britain’s ability to catch up with Germany’s defence spending. There were two factors to consider in this report. One, the UK had too many enemies to fight at once. Two, the UK could only win a long drawn out war using economic advantage. As a result of this report, Britain minimised naval spending, did not spend any more on the army and put most of the budget into fighter aircraft for defence. Britain could then use its ‘4th arm’ of defence by using financial advantage to economically starve the enemy to ‘death.’ The idea was implicitly to  ‘buy off’ potential enemies until military ‘defence’ is ready. This is where the idea of ‘appeasement’ came from and there is logic to this policy. Britain at the tail end of the 1930’s was a cautious, introspective nation looking to avoid war….

..if appeasement was only designed to push Hitler into aggressive action against the Soviet Union? Why did Britain eventually go to war? I tell you why. Once again, it was total British self-interest; there was no such plan to ‘kill two birds with one stone,’ and no ‘plan’ to aid Hitler in defeating Communism. To put it even more simply, just take a look at British imperial policy throughout the country’s history, total self-interest all the way. So why is it so difficult to comprehend these were the exact same reasons why Britain chose appeasement, and conversely, then went to war….

….so why was there an ardent decision to go to war in September 1939 and not in September 1938? Did ‘appeasement’ still exist in 1939? One answer is yes it did, so why did Chamberlain decide to got to war. By the time 1939 arrived, the reasons had nothing to do Czechoslovakia, Poland, or even the Danzig Port. In the greater scheme of things, these issues are irrelevant as far as British interests go. The answer is simple and clear-cut. The ‘reasons’ were that empire, trade, power, self-interest were all more important to Britain in 1939 than in 1938…..

..on the 15th March 1939, Germany moved to occupy Prague. The German forces invade through Bohemia and Moravia, but Slovakia maintains ‘independence’ for the time being by becoming a German ‘satellite.’ So is this the turning point on the road to war? After all, this is the first time that non-German peoples have been ‘absorbed’ by German actions. This is not a revision of the Versailles treaty, and all Hitler’s rhetoric has been proved false. Hitler’s intentions are now clear, the total domination of central and south-eastern Europe. Chamberlain’s reaction to this is two-fold with differing outlooks. His first reaction is in a speech at the House of Commons on the 15^th March 1939. In this statement, Chamberlain is still looking at ‘appeasement’, and the chance for negotiation through peaceful means. Chamberlain’s second reaction came two days later on the 17^th March 1939 at a speech in Birmingham Town Hall, his own constituency. This time chamberlain’s attitude is firmer. He is more harder on Hitler and points to the dangers of a coming war, and appears ready to stand firm on the issue of further Nazi aggression. It has been pointed out that the ‘human aspect’ to Chamberlain’s reaction on the 15^th might have been an automatic reaction. By the 17^th, Chamberlain had time to think about the situation and possibly felt cheated, fooled, and hence the more non-appeasing stance and more bitter statement concerning Hitler’s action. In addition, Chamberlain was feeling the pressure from more hard-line anti-Nazi’s in British government, and the harder stance was Chamberlain’s attempt to consolidate his leadership in a bid to keep power of the Conservative Party. It might be that Chamberlain was still following ‘appeasement’ but was being reluctantly drawn away from the policy. The Munich settlement can now be seen as moral and practical mistake with Hitler viewed in a different light. This is particularly highlighted by the ‘Night of Broken Glass’ (Kristallnacht), which reinforces the moral mistake of dealing with someone who cannot be dealt with on a rational basis. Such issues usher in a shift of government policy and a change in opinion in Chamberlain who is now questioning the validity of appeasement. He is less convinced that the policy will now work……..

….so why the change in policy and viewpoint for Chamberlain and government? During January and February of 1939, a series of rumours about Hitler’s next move are beginning to circulate amongst government members, and remember that this is shortly after the ‘Munich Settlement’ (30^th September 1938). There is some speculation about Nazi intentions. This includes possible threats to Holland, Ukraine, the Danzig port and even Switzerland, however these rumours are all false (for the time being). Nevertheless, these rumours are taken seriously enough that perhaps shows a lack of confidence in the ‘finality’ of the Munich Settlement. (Some of these rumours were deliberately circulated by anti-Nazi opposition in Germany in a bid to push Britain into action against Hitler and the Nazi’s, and as far as this goes, the tactic is fairly successful, and Britain does begin to act!)….The prime ministerial cabinet decided that if Holland was threatened, Britain would go to war with Germany. This is no vague statement, but a firm statement of intention, most definitely not appeasement, however such threats are just rumour for now. Nevertheless, by February 1939, the cabinet made a decision that ushered in an increase in the British army. The British were now talking more positively with the French, and formulating the idea of sending a British Expeditionary Force to Europe. It now looks like Britain is getting psychologically ready to go to war and events are looking inevitable. The conclusion that could be drawn is that even before Prague was occupied, Britain was slowly abandoning ‘appeasement’, so in effect, Prague was ‘not’ the great turning point in policy and the decision to go to war…..

….the British reaction to the Czechoslovakian ‘crisis’ is important. How much of a turning point was all this in Anglo-French thoughts towards Hitler’s actions? By the 15^th of March, the Czechoslovakian episode was done and dusted. However, by the end of March 1939, there was an Anglo-French guarantee to Poland. Why was this? What were Britain and Chamberlain’s motivation in this issue? The answer to these questions lies in the fact that both Poland and Romania were seen as important to British self-interests. Before the Czech crisis was concluded there was a Polish ‘crisis’ that remained largely undetected until the Czech episode was finalised. The Versailles treaty seems to be at the heart of this crisis.  Before the end of World War I, there was no Polish state since the 18^th century when the Pole’s were absorbed into Russia. Nevertheless, Polish nationalism survived and negotiations at the ‘Peace of Paris’ (1918) conference allowed the birth of a ‘new’ Poland and national recognition.  In 1919, the geographical problem was where this ‘new’ Poland should be. There were no obvious boundaries and physical limits to the new country’s borders. In addition, how would Poland conduct its domestic affairs? The ongoing crisis in Polish affairs came to ahead in 1938/1939. Poland needed access to the sea and was granted the port of Danzig, but this was a German town and it was 'given’ to Poland. Danzig was to be overseen by the League of Nations to help ease tensions, but trouble was still brewing among those who believed that Danzig should be totally German…..

…. By October 1938, the problem started to present itself in more serious terms. Berlin started to put pressure on Warsaw to deal with this issue. Ribbentrop attempted to ‘talk’ to the Pole’s to end this ‘situation’, but the Pole’s were naturally unwilling to budge on the issue. This is the crisis that preceded the Czechoslovakian episode. Hitler wanted short-term co-operation with Poland and desired Poland becoming a ‘semi-satellite’ to Germany. Hitler also wanted access to Danzig via a road/rail system that would go through the ‘Polish corridor’. (this was not to be an invasion just yet). It has been stated that the ‘Danzig problem’ was a barometer of German/Polish relations according to what was happening with the port. Hitler felt that there would not be problem with this and believed the Pole’s would concede to his demands. On the other hand, the Pole’s, in western eyes, were not a people in the ‘good books’. Poland had played a poor part in the Czech crisis and demanded their part of territory and they took it after Munich! The Polish government was also distrusted because of the slippery nature of their Foreign Minister Josef Beck (However, he did not give in to Hitler’s demands for influence in Polish affairs). There was also an agreement/peace pact in 1934 between Poland and Germany, which Hitler thought would aid the concession to his demands. However, it did not! Strangely enough, in 1938/39, the port of Danzig was not very important to the Pole’s either. Poland had another port in the west called ‘Gdynia’ that was more successful in trading and commerce. Despite this, Poland did not want to give up Danzig as this would set a dangerous precedent by allowing Germany a strategic gain; what would the Nazi’s demand next? For Poland, this was a fine political balancing act between German demands and the prospect of having Russia on its borders ready to pounce (there being no great enmity between USSR and Poland)…..

….As far as Britain was concerned, the government requested an explanation about what was is going on, but no answer was given by the Polish Foreign Minister Josef Beck, who believed that Poland could handle the issue on its own. Poland at this time, held onto a self-belief in its military strength and enough self-confidence to turn down help. In addition, the Polish believed that if Britain and France got involved, it would make Hitler more determined to act aggressively. In Britain, it was seen as if the Pole’s were playing down the crisis. So why did Britain suddenly help Poland by extending a guarantee to help militarily?…

..the answer is Romania. Here lies Britain’s main concern at the time. There were primary British interests in Romanian oilfields and grain supplies. Rumours were again still filtering throughout Whitehall. A Romanian diplomat and junior official called ‘Tilea’ made an appearance at Whitehall on the 16^th March 1939 claiming that Berlin was putting pressure on Bucharest to fall in line with Nazi thinking or face invasion. There was no real substance to this claim, but Britain was sufficiently alarmed to respond to these statements. When Tilea met Chamberlain, the thought was in the Prime Ministers’ mind that Hitler was not just focusing on Czechoslovakia but also Romania as well. This gave the British Government reason to be concerned…..

…Chamberlain’s reaction to all this was to attempt to construct an ‘eastern front’ against Hitler and bring in as many states in Eastern Europe to rally against Hitler’s perceived intentions. (France, Britain, USSR, that is the USSR and Poland were to be employed to protect Romania). However, the fundamental key in all this was Poland. Poland was in a good position to protect Romania but it was recognised that Poland would refuse to accept Russian influence within its borders, so effectively Romania cannot be adequately protected. The advice to Chamberlain was that the ‘best bet’ was to safeguard Poland and create an association that will help protect Romania. In the process of trying to develop this ‘eastern front’, the German and Polish situation erupts. At the end of March 1939, Ian Colvin, a newsman in Berlin, heard rumours that Poland not Romania was going to be the next point of crisis, and that the Nazi’s would invade over the Danzig issue. Chamberlain had by now switched his attention to Poland instead of Romania (not Danzig however, but Poland the country). The Anglo French guarantee now comes about, but not over Danzig, but Poland. On the 13th April, a guarantee is given to Greece, and in May 1939, a guarantee is given to Turkey, perhaps as a part of the eastern front policy? It now looks like that appeasement has been effectively compromised as Chamberlain was willing to negotiate away Danzig but would not let Poland go?…

….Although here is a rational and logical reason for this action, it is a  bit cynical. The problem that remained was how to support Poland. As there was no difference between Poland and Czechoslovakia, there is nothing practical to do, so Britain did not offer military or economic resources to Poland, and this aspect has brought Chamberlain much criticism.  However, there is logic in these actions. Firstly, why waste valuable British resources when Britain can preserve its hardware to defend or attack Germany in the future. Secondly, a cynical view is that Chamberlain believed that he had to take the initiative by stating to the world and Germany that Britain will be active in ‘drawing the line’ in Poland. Thirdly, there is the idea that Hitler would have to respond to Britain’s threat and take Poland where there would be border disputes with USSR that would hopefully weaken Germany in any later conflict with Britain. (use of the USSR again, but not a freehold wish to allow Hitler to destroy the Soviet union, just real-politic). However, for the time being Poland was seen as the best place to make a stand. As far as chamberlain was concerned, it was choice between ‘two devils?’ Chamberlain may have still been looking for a negotiated settlement, but by now, was most likely ‘hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst’. however, as we all know, Hitler attacked Poland and Britain went to war….the attack on Poland was against British economic interests in that Romania was believed to be next. On the 1^st September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, but the declaration of war from the British came on the 3^rd September. the delay in declaring war was Partly because the French refused to declare immediately before they had fully mobilised and Britain was waiting to synchronise. This most definitely is not appeasement…….

..appeasement had nothing to do with forcing Hitler and Stalin together in mutual defeat….by now appeasement had been grounded and there were pragmatic and self-interested reasons why Britain gave up the policy and went to war. Economic considerations meant that in 1938, Britain could not have entered into a long drawn out war, (as was usual with British tactics to starve the enemy into defeat), as the economy was not strong enough. However, in 1939, the situation appeared different to Chamberlain. Intelligence reports from Germany indicated that the German economy was in a poor state due to rearmament, and could not sustain the growth, and there appeared to be some resistance to the Nazi’s from the working class. Chamberlain was by now receiving advice that the British economy was improving and that it was now possible for Britain to fight a long term conflict as well as in the short-term. However, the economy was believed to be at the peak of its performance and if there was any delay in action, the situation could worsen, ‘this was the optimum moment to act’…..with regards to Allies, France was now better prepared militarily and more confident in its position. The USA were on the fringe providing economic supplies and they appeared more inclined to deal with the Japanese, thus removing the ‘tripartite alliance’ problem solely from Britain’s shoulders (that meant there was less threat to the Empire). For Britain, there was now only Germany to deal with. Italy was showing no signs of entering into a conflict and Japan was facing pressure from the USA…..the imperial dominions were generally appeasers (apart from New Zealand, South Africa, Australia,) but in 1939, the view had changed and they were expressing the opinion that if London was prepared to go to war, then the Empire would follow….

..while there are several criticisms to be aimed at Chamberlain’s actions, using appeasement as a policy to induce Hitler and Stalin to wipe each other out was not one of them.  Perhaps if Britain knew that Poland could not be saved, there should have been firmer negotiations with the USSR? There were indeed talks, but there remained a fear of Communism infiltrating into Europe and Britain’s half-hearted negotiation techniques caused a collapse of talks with the USSR. Besides, the Pole’s did not want to deal with the USSR and certainly did not want Soviet troops in Polish territory, they might not leave at a later date. (Later Proven to be a true). In addition, Hitler was very much aware of the USSR and in the summer of 1939, he was approaching the Russian’s to do a deal through diplomatic talks and the offer of possible treaties and pacts. A pragmatic Stalin does not want to deal with the Soviet’s ideological enemies, but he ‘shrugs shoulders’ and does do a deal. Stalin realises that by siding with the west will only bring war (an event he to wished to avoid until a future date), and Hitler is offering territorial gains as part of the deal. The August 1939 ‘pact’ contained a hidden agenda that Poland would be divided between Germany and Russia. (This deal was not a shock to Britain who had received intelligence reports noting the proposed deal, but Chamberlain believed that it would come to nothing, in this respect Chamberlain was short-sighted in not bringing in the Russians at an earlier opportunity)…..

Deadkenny, I want to clarify my position. I don't think that Britain was "forcing" Hitler to the East. I actully think that British didn't apply any "force" to Germany although they should have done that. But I do think that British thought that directing the German aggression (if such happen) to the East would be the more favorable scenario.

And I aslo think that Munich and Molotov Ribbentrop pact were equally cynnically self-serving deals.

But do you really think that Hitler and Stalin view the pact as something more meaningful than tactical temporary gain and buying some time before the final confrontation?

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the business of the political leadership to await or bring about the suitable moment from a political and military point of view...

http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Epv/munich/czdoc05.html - http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pv/munich/czdoc05.html

Hitler's intent was to liquidate off Czechoslovakia and end its existence as a state.

Annex sudetenland region and thus leave Czechoslovakia alive was not his original intent.

... The details do not concern us here, but it should be mentioned that the dispute arose over the position of the Sudeten Germans within the Czechoslovak state, and as late as 15 September 1938 was still being expressed in those terms. 

Up to that day, Hitler had made no demand to annex the Sudeten area, although on 12 September he had for the first time asked for “self-determination” for the Sudetens.

Konrad Henlein, Hitler’s agent in Czechoslovakia and leader of the Sudeten Germans, expressed no desire “to go back to the Reich” until after 12 September. 

Who, then, first demanded frontier rectification in favor of Germany?

Chamberlain did so privately on 10 May 1938, and the Milner Group did so publicly on 7 September 1938. 

The Chamberlain suggestion was made by one of those “calculated indiscretions” of which he was so fond, at an “off-the-record” meeting with certain Canadian and American newspaper reporters at a luncheon arranged by Lady Astor and held at her London house.  On this occasion Chamberlain spoke of his plans for a four-power pact to exclude Russia from Europe and the possibility of frontier revisions in favor of Germany to settle the Sudeten issue. 

When the news leaked out, as it was bound to do, Chamberlain was questioned in Commons by Geoffrey Mander on 20 June but refused to answer, calling his questioner a troublemaker.

This answer was criticized by Sir Archibald Sinclair the following day, but he received no better treatment.  Lady Astor, however, interjected, “I would like to say that there is not a word of truth in it.” 

By 27 June, however, she had a change of heart and stated:  “I never had any intention of denying that the Prime Minister had attended a luncheon at my house.  The Prime Minister did so attend, the object being to enable some American journalists who had not previously met him to do so privately and informally, and thus to make his acquaintance.”

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html - http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

Neville Chamberlain intervened in the Czech crisis of 1938 in order to stop Hitler's plans to invade Czechoslovakia.

He did so because if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia, there might be a risk that a european war might break out. France and USSR were bound by treaty to come and assist Czechoslovakia if it was attacked.

Chamberlain's plan was to hand over Sudetenland region to Hitler and avoid war.

When Hitler met Chamberlain on 15 September 1938, he changed his mind and instead asked for sudetenland region. Chamberlain accepted this plan because he was the one who pushed for it in the first place, not Hitler.

...It is worthy to note that no public demand was made by either Henlein or Germany to detach the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia until after September 12, 1938, although influential persons in the British government were advocating this, both in public and private, for months before this date.

...In the meantime the British had been working out a plan of their own. It involved, as we have said, (1) separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, probably through the use of a plebiscite or even by outright partition; (2) neutralization of the rest of Czechoslovakia by revising her treaties with Russia and France, and ( 3 ) guarantee of this rump of Czechoslovakia (but not by Britain). This plan was outlined to the Czech ambassador in London by Lord Halifax on May 25th, and was worked out in some detail by one of Lord Halifax's subordinates, William (now Lord) Strang, during a visit to Prague and to Berlin in the following week. This was the plan which was picked up by Lord Runciman and presented as his recommendation in his report of September 21, 938.

    It is worthy of note that on September 2nd Lord Runciman sent a personal message by Henlein to Hitler in which he said that he would have a settlement drawn up by September 15th.

What is, perhaps, surprising is that Lord Runciman made no use whatever of the Karlsbad Demands or the extensive concessions to meet them which the Czechs had made during these negotiations, but instead recommended to the British Cabinet on September 16th, and in his written report five days later, the same melange of partition, plebiscites, neutralization, and guarantee which had been in the mind of the British Foreign Office for weeks.

It was this plan which was imposed on the Czechs by the Four-Power Conference at Munich on September 30th.

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#45 - http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#45

In Our Time: The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion

This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group.

Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group.

The two policies followed parallel courses until March 1939.  After that date the Milner Group’s disintegration became very evident, and part of it took the form of the movement of several persons (like Hoare and Simon) from the second circle of the Milner Group to the inner circle of the new group rotating around Chamberlain.

This process was concealed by the fact that this new group was following, in public at least, the policy desired by the Milner Group;  their own policy, which was really the continuation of appeasement for another year after March 1939, was necessarily secret, so that the contrast between the Chamberlain group and the inner circle of the Milner Group in the period after March 1939 was not as obvious as it might have been.

In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things: 

(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia;
(2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries;  and
(3) to hoodwink the English people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem.

The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the implications of their policy and tried to reverse it...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html - http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

Eden noted in his diary after talks with Hitler:"Only thing Hitler wants is Air Pact without limitation. Simon much inclined to bite at this....I had to protest and he gave up the idea.... Simon toys with the idea of letting Germany expand eastwards. I am strongly against. Apart from dishonesty it would be out turn next"(cited in Dutton 1994, 50).

http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=UyMXon0JmBsC&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=edens+diary+1935+hitler+simon+&source=web&ots=A58iIH7xr6&sig=IChZUDHy4vJ-mJ8C112mq56Mfks&hl=en - http://books.google.com.sg/books?id=UyMXon0JmBsC&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=eden's+diary+1935+hitler+simon+&source=web&ots=A58iIH7xr6&sig=IChZUDHy4vJ-mJ8C112mq56Mfks&hl=en

...Two weeks after Munich Baldwin said in a conversation with Lord Hinchingbrooke:

"Can't we turn Hitler East? Napoleon broke himself against the Russians. Hitler might do the same"...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life

Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is bound to be difficult because different people had different motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives of the government were clearly not the same as the motives of the people, and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far or been so well preserved as in Britain.

In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost circles of the government outward. As if we were looking at the layers of an onion, we may discern four points of view:

(1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center,

(2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters close to the center,

(3) the supporters of "appeasement," and

(4) the "peace at any price" group in a peripheral position.

The "anti-Bolsheviks," who were also anti-French, were extremely important from 1919 to 1926, but then decreased to little more than a lunatic fringe, rising again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate the real policy of the government in 1939.

In the earlier period the chief figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D'Abernon, and General Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit German rearmament, and tear down what they called "French militarism."

This point of view was supported by the second group, which was known in those days as the Round Table Group, and came later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the Cliveden Set, after the country estate of Lord and Lady Astor...

The anti-Bolsheviks, including D'Abernon, Smuts, Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher (Warden of All Souls College), were willing to go to any extreme to tear down France and build up Germany. Their point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically in a letter of August I l, 1920, from D'Abernon to Sir Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, a prot้g้ of Lord Esher who wielded great influence in the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary to almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa (1922) to Lausanne (1932). D'Abernon advocated a secret alliance of Britain "with the German military leaders in cooperating against the Soviet." As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926, D'Abernon carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the Disarmament Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany (according to Brigadier J. H. Morgan of the commission)...

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42 - http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42

...British policy had only one aim: to cajole, wheedle, guide and direct Germany against Soviet Russia...

http://www.columbia.edu/%7Elnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm - http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm

...On September 1, Hitler  attacked Poland. Britain and France were caught in their own trap. These two countries assisted in all of Hitler's  adventures, hoping to use him against the Soviet Union...

... Unable to see through their dream of seeing the Nazi army charge through Poland to attack the Soviet Union, France and Britain were forced to declare war on Germany. But on the Western Front, not a single bomb would bother Nazi tranquility. However, a real internal political war was launched against the French Communists: On September 26, the French Communist Party was banned and thousands of its members were thrown into prison...

http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.html - http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.html

Well, if you can be 'faulted' for anything it is your 'debating' style, or lack thereof. You consistently fail to respond to any counterpoints posted by others, and simply subject us to another 'deluge' of copy / paste information. Often these are not even a direct reply in any sense to what others have posted. I find it most amusing that you appear to have lumped me into the 'British camp', since I have previously been lumped into the 'German camp'. Perhaps it is a good thing to have 'a foot' in as many camps as possible. ;)

Interesting that your terminology now appears to have changed, from 'forcing' or 'pushing' Germany east to 'allowing' Germany to 'drive eastward'. You say that Chamberlain('s group) was 'successful in all three of these things', and yet they actually failed in (2) and (3), and (1) only came about as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and in direct opposition to British policy!

You do realize that this directly contradicts your theory, don't you? Simon was replaced as Foreign Secretary in 1935 by none other than Eden himself. So in 1935 Simon, who 'toyed' with the idea of letting (note, not pushing or forcing) Germany expand eastwards was replaced by Eden, who was dead set against the idea (fully realizing that Britain would be 'next', if Germany was victorious in the east). So what does that say about your theory that British government policy was to 'push' / 'force' / 'allow' Germany east?

There is some truth to this, however, it is a bit disingenuous as stated. Britain and France were in a bit of an awkward position. First, the purpose for any 'deal' with the Soviets was viewed as being to help deal with the 'current' crisis, which was Germany threatening Poland. Although Chamberlain at that point was willing to entertain the possibility of an alliance with the Soviets for that purpose, the Poles categorically refused any 'assistance' from the Soviets. Further, the Soviets were not willing to agree to a 'generic' alliance with 'vague' commitments about 'supporting' each other. They wanted specifics about the number of divisions that would be committed where, and when in various scenarios. Thus the British and French were in a position where the Poles were not willing to agree to any specific proposal dealing with the scenario where Germany invaded Poland and the Soviets were supposed to 'help'. Further, let us keep in mind that the Soviets were negotiating with the Germans at the same time as talks were proceeding with the French and British. So there is just as much reason to question the sincerity of the Soviets as there is that of the French and British.

That is Carroll Quigley, not me.

...In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things: 

(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia; 
(2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries;  and
(3) to hoodwink the English people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem.

The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the implications of their policy and tried to reverse it...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html - http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

1. Britain 'guaranteed'  Poland against German aggression.  They 'honoured' that commitment as far as declaring war on Germany when Germany invaded Poland.  Further they refused to come to any agreement with Germany even after Germany and the Soviets had 'partitioned' Poland between themselves.  This is in direct contradition to your theory that Britain wanted to 'push' / 'force' / 'allow' / 'encourage' German east.
2. Much of what you've posted in 'support' of your theory amounts to nothing more than the 'musings' of those in Britain who were admittedly anti-communist and extremely right-wing (even to the extent of being fascists themselves).  None of that supports your theory regarding British government policy.  In a democracy there is a difference between what various people say, and what actually becomes official government policy.   The actions of Britian contradict your theory consistently.  The Sudetenland was south of Germany, not east.  Further, it gave Germany no common border with the Soviet Union.  That was the only territorial concession that Britain actually agreed to.  Britain viewed the occupation of the remainder of Czecho-Slovakia as a violation of the Munich agreement, and it led directly to a change in British policy - i.e. the end of 'appeasement' and the beginning of 'deterrence'.  The effect of the British guarantee to Poland was to 'force' Germany west, not east.  Further, Stalin's pact with the Nazi's also 'forced' Germany west.  So the next direction that Hitler went after the Nazi-Soviet 'dismemberment' of Poland was north (Denmark, Norway) and west (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France) not east.