Originally posted by deadkenny
Beyond simply the fact that people got to vote, it meant that there were various people with various points of view who had some power or influence. So, while there were no doubt the 'arch-appeasers' who were willing to cave in to just about anything Germany demanded, there were also others who vehemently disagreed.
|
What you said above is true deadkenny.
For more detailed analysis of british policy see:
Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in
1938-1939 is bound to be difficult because different people had
different motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives
of the government were clearly not the same as the motives of the
people, and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far
or been so well preserved as in Britain. In general, motives become
vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost
circles of the government outward.
As if we were looking at the layers
of an onion, we may discern four points of view:
(1) the
anti-Bolsheviks at the center,
(2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters
close to the center,
(3) the supporters of "appeasement," and
(4) the
"peace at any price" group in a peripheral position.
The
"anti-Bolsheviks," who were also anti-French, were extremely important
from 1919 to 1926, but then decreased to little more than a lunatic
fringe, rising again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate
the real policy of the government in 1939. In the earlier period the
chief figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D'Abernon, and
General Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit
German rearmament, and tear down what they called "French militarism."
This point of view was supported by the second
group, which was known in those days as the Round Table Group, and came
later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the Cliveden Set, after the
country estate of Lord and Lady Astor.
It included Lord Milner, Leopold
Amery, and Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham), as well as Lord Lothian,
Smuts, Lord Astor, Lord Brand (brother-in-law of Lady Astor and
managing director of Lazard Brothers, the international bankers),
Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey Dawson (editor of The Times), and their associates. This group wielded great influence because it controlled the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Trust, The Times of London, The Observer, the influential and highly anonymous quarterly review known as The Round Table
(founded in 1910 with money supplied by Sir Abe Bailey and the Rhodes
Trust, and with Lothian as editor), and it dominated the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, called "Chatham House" (of which
Sir Abe Bailey and the Astors were the chief financial supporters,
while Lionel Curtis was the actual founder), the Carnegie United
Kingdom Trust, and All Souls College, Oxford.
This Round Table Group
formed the core of the three-bloc-world supporters, and differed from
the anti-Bolsheviks like D'Abernon in that they sought to contain the
Soviet Union between a German-dominated Europe and an English-speaking
bloc rather than to destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted.
Relationships between the two groups were very close and friendly, and
some people, like Smuts, were in both.
The anti-Bolsheviks, including D'Abernon, Smuts,
Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher (Warden of All Souls College), were
willing to go to any extreme to tear down France and build up Germany.
Their point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically
in a letter of August I l, 1920, from D'Abernon to Sir Maurice (later
Lord) Hankey, a prot้g้ of Lord Esher who wielded great influence in
the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary to
almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa (1922)
to Lausanne (1932).
D'Abernon advocated a secret alliance of Britain
"with the German military leaders in cooperating against the Soviet."
As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926, D'Abernon
carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the Disarmament
Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany (according to Brigadier
J. H. Morgan of the commission).
The point of view of this group was presented by
General Smuts in a speech of October 23, 1923 (made after luncheon with
H. A. L. Fisher). From these two groups came the Dawes Plan and the
Locarno pacts. It was Smuts, according to Stresemann, who first
suggested the Locarno policy, and it was D'Abernon who became its chief
supporter. H. A. L. Fisher and John Simon in the House of Commons, and
Lothian, Dawson, and their friends on The Round Table and on The Times prepared the ground among the British governing class for both the Dawes Plan and Locarno as early as 1923 (The Round Table
for March 1923; the speeches of Fisher and Simon in the House of
Commons on February 19, 1923, Fisher's speech of March 6th and Simon's
speech of March 13th in the same place, The Round Table for June 1923; and Smuts's speech of October 23rd).
The more moderate Round Table group, including
Lionel Curtis, Leopold Amery (who was the shadow of Lord Milner), Lord
Lothian, Lord Brand, and Lord Astor, sought to weaken the League of
Nations and destroy all possibility of collective security in order to
strengthen Germany in respect to both France and the Soviet Union, and
above all to free Britain from Europe in order to build up an "Atlantic
bloc" of Great Britain, the British Dominions, and the United States.
They prepared the way for this "Union" through the Rhodes Scholarship
organization (of which Lord Milner was the head in 1905-1925 and Lord
Lothian was secretary in 1925-1940), through the Round Table groups
(which had been set up in the United States, India, and the British
Dominions in T 910- 1917), through the Chatham House organization,
which set up Royal Institutes of International Affairs in all the
dominions and a Council on Foreign Relations in New York, as well as
through "Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences" held
irregularly, and the Institutes of Pacific Relations set up in various
countries as autonomous branches of the Royal Institutes of
International Affairs.
This influential group sought to change the
League of Nations from an instrument of collective security to an
international conference center for "nonpolitical" matters like drug
control or international postal services, to rebuild Germany as a
buffer against the Soviet Union and a counterpoise to France, and to
build up an Atlantic bloc of Britain, the Dominions, the United States,
and, if possible, the Scandinavian countries.
One of the effusions of this group was the project
called Union Now, and later Union Now with Great Britain, propagated in
the United States in 1938-1945 by Clarence Streit on behalf of Lord
Lothian and the Rhodes Trust. Ultimately, the inner circle of this
group arrived at the idea of the "three-bloc world."
It was believed
that this system could force Germany to keep the peace (after it
absorbed Europe) because it would be squeezed between the Atlantic bloc
and the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union could be forced to keep
the peace because it would be squeezed between Japan and Germany.
This
plan would work only if Germany and the Soviet Union could be brought
into contact with each other by abandoning to Germany Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and the Polish Corridor. This became the aim of both
the anti-Bolsheviks and the three-bloc people from the early part of
1937 to the end of 1939 (or even early 1940).
These two cooperated and
dominated the government in that period. They split in the period
1939-1940, with the "three-bloc" people, like Amery, Lord Halifax, and
Lord Lothian, becoming increasingly anti-German, while the
anti-Bolshevik crowd, like Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, and John Simon,
tried to adopt a policy based on a declared but unfought war against
Germany combined with an undeclared fighting war against the Soviet
Union. The split between these two groups appeared openly in public and
led to Chamberlain's fall from office when Amery cried to Chamberlain,
across the floor of the House of Commons, on May 10, 1940, "In the name
of God, go!"
Outside these two groups, and much more numerous
(but much more remote from the real instruments of government), were
the appeasers and the "peace at any price" people. These were both used
by the two inner groups to command public support for their quite
different policies. Of the two the appeasers were much more important
than the "peace at any price" people.
The appeasers swallowed the
steady propaganda (much of it emanating from Chatman House, The Times,
the Round Table groups, or Rhodes circles) that the Germans had been
deceived and brutally treated in 1919. For example, it was under
pressure from seven persons, including General Smuts and H. A. L.
Fisher, as well as Lord Milner himself, that Lloyd George made his
belated demand on June 2, 1919, that the German reparations be reduced
and the Rhineland occupation be cut from fifteen years to two.
The
memorandum from which Lloyd George read these demands was apparently
drawn up by Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), while the minutes of the
Council of Four, from which we get the record of those demands, were
taken down by Sir Maurice Hankey (as secretary to the Supreme Council,
a position obtained through Lord Esher).
It was Kerr (Lothian) who
served as British member of the Committee of Five which drew up the
answer to the Germans' protest of May, 1 919. General Smuts was still
refusing to sign the treaty because it was too severe as late as June 2
3, 1919.
As a result of these attacks and a barrage of
similar attacks on the treaty which continued year after year, British
public opinion acquired a guilty conscience about the Treaty of
Versailles, and was quite unprepared to take any steps to enforce it by
1930. On this feeling, which owed so much to the British idea of
sportsmanlike conduct toward a beaten opponent, was built the movement
for appeasement.
This movement had two basic assumptions: (a) that reparation must be made for Britain's treatment of Germany in 1919 and (b)
that if Germany's most obvious demands, such as arms equality,
remilitarization of the Rhineland, and perhaps union with Austria, were
met, Germany would become satisfied and peaceful.
The trouble with this
argument was that once Germany reached this point, it would be very
difficult to prevent Germany from going further (such as taking the
Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor).
Accordingly, many of the
appeasers, when this point was reached in March 1938 went over to the
anti-Bolshevik or "three-bloc" point of view, while some even went into
the "peace at any price" group.
It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John
Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to
anti-Bolshevism. At any rate, few influential people were still in the
appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that Germany
could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized, it seemed to many that
the only solution was to bring Germany into contact with, or even
collision with, the Soviet Union.
The "peace at any price" people were both few and
lacking in influence in Britain, while the contrary, as we shall see,
was true in France. However, in the period August 1935 to March 1939
and especially in September 1938, the government built upon the fears
of this group by steadily exaggerating Germany's armed might and
belittling their own, by calculated indiscretions (like the statement
in September 1938 that there were no real antiaircraft defenses in
London), by constant hammering at the danger of an overwhelming air
attack without warning, by building ostentatious and quite useless
air-raid trenches in the streets and parks of London, and by insisting
through daily warnings that everyone must be fitted with a gas mask
immediately (although the danger of a gas attack was nil).
In this way, the government put London into a
panic in 1938 for the first time since 1804 or even 1678. And by this
panic, Chamberlain was able to get the British people to accept the
destruction of Czechoslovakia, wrapping it up in a piece of paper,
marked "peace in our time," which he obtained from Hitler, as he
confided to that ruthless dictator, "for British public opinion."
Once
this panic passed, Chamberlain found it impossible to get the British
public to follow his program, although he himself never wavered, even
in 1940. He worked on the appeasement and the "peace at any price"
groups throughout 1939, but their numbers dwindled rapidly, and since
he could not openly appeal for support on either the anti-Bolshevik or
the "three-bloc" basis, he had to adopt the dangerous expedient of
pretending to resist (in order to satisfy the British public) while
really continuing to make every possible concession to Hitler which
would bring Germany to a common frontier with the Soviet Union, all the
while putting every pressure on Poland to negotiate and on Germany to
refrain from using force in order to gain time to wear Poland down and
in order to avoid the necessity of backing up by action his pretense of
resistance to Germany. This policy went completely astray in the period
from August 1939 to April 1940.
Chamberlain's motives were not bad ones; he wanted peace so that he could
devote Britain's "limited resources" to social welfare; but he was
narrow and totally ignorant of the realities of power, convinced that
international politics could be conducted in terms of secret deals, as
business was, and he was quite ruthless in carrying out his aims,
especially in his readiness to sacrifice non-English persons, who, in
his eyes, did not count...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42
...there were also others who vehemently disagreed. ...In February 1938, Lord Lothian, “leader” of the Group, spoke in the
House of Lords in support of appeasement. This extraordinary speech
was delivered in defense of the retiring of Sir Robert Vansittart.
Sir
Robert, as Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1930 to
1938, was a constant thorn in the side of the appeasers. The opening
of the third stage of appeasement at the end of 1937 made it necessary
to get rid of him and his objections to their policy.
Accordingly, he
was “promoted” to the newly created post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser,
and the Under Secretaryship was given to Sir Alexander Cadogan of the
Cecil Bloc.
This action led to a debate in February 1938. Lord
Lothian intervened to insist that Sir Robert’s new role would not be
parallel to that of the new Under Secretary but was restricted to
advising only on “matters specifically referred to him by the Secretary
of State, and he is no longer responsible for the day to day work of
the Office.”...
http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html
|