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Was it a good strategy to push Hitler eastwards?

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  Quote gcle2003 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Topic: Was it a good strategy to push Hitler eastwards?
    Posted: 10-Jul-2008 at 13:01
Originally posted by Bankotsu

Originally posted by gcle2003

There is no evidence whatsoever that anyone (except Stalin) gave or was prepared to give anything further to Germany.


The above statement is in error.

There is evidence.

Do you bother to read what you post?

a) The unsupported memory of an 86-year-old isn't the most reliable of sources
b) What is described here is an initative of the German government (at least of Goering) not a British initiative
c) the discussions didn't lead anywhere because the British government refused to co-operate
d) in any case the demand Germany was making at this time was for Danzig and the corridor - i.e. German-speaking and largely ethnic German territory, which was my point.

Even Churchill considered that jaw jaw was better than war war.

With regard to your other post, continuing to quote the same old source doesn't give it any more weight. You can quote Quigley till the cows come home, and you won't be strengthening your case.

.




Edited by gcle2003 - 10-Jul-2008 at 13:02
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jul-2008 at 13:12
Originally posted by Bankotsu

How Neville Chamberlain was forced to declare war on Germany on 3 September 1939;
 
It is not true to say that Britain's declaration of war against Germany is evidence of Chamberlain desire to resist German aggression and thus dismisses the view that he wanted to turn Germany eastwards to destroy Soviet Union.

That is untrue.

By that date, 2-3 September 1939, the question for Chamberlain was a simple one.

Either he declare war or his government collapses. That was how strong the pressure was on him to respond to the German invasion.
 
Originally posted by Bankotsu

So, regarding the Polish-German conflict in 1939, Chamberlain's plan was to resolve the issue through another munich conference and hand over Danzig and Polish corridor to Germany.

It is completely untrue to say that Chamberlain wanted to resist Germany in 1939.

That is totally false.

The error is made when we interpret the polish guarantee and anglo-french-soviet talks as evidence of change in british policy to resist Hitler.

That is not true. Those moves were made as leverage to pressure Germany to go for the "second munich" proposal.

Unfortunately, most british history texts tend to cover up the above facts and interpret the polish guarantee, talks with soviets etc as a change in british policy from appeasement to resistance.

Secret anglo-german talks is also unusually played down or ignored.

This is a falsification and distortion of history.

So Chamberlain's plan failed.

Hitler insisted on a short localised war against Poland to show off German military power.

And Chamberlain gave in to the pressure of public opinion and was forced to declare war.

 
Once again, you've missed the point.  British policy did change.  You've not provided anything that addresses that point, but simply focus on the question of what Chamberlain wanted to do, even though you admit yourself that he could not do what you're claiming he wanted to, because he would have been removed from office.  So what is the relevance with respect to what British policy actually was?  British policy did clearly change after the March 1939 German violation of the Munich agreement.  With the earlier 'crisis' over the Sudetenland, Britain offered Czechoslovakia no a priori 'guarantee'.  Britain negotiated directly with Germany, excluding the Czechs.  Once the Munich agreement was reached, the Czechs were told that they must accept or they would not be supported by Britain (or by implication France, although France would have been violating a previous treaty with Czechoslovakia in that scenario, Britain had no treaty obligations).  Contrast that with the situation with Poland.  Britain provided Poland with a 'guarantee' a priori.  All discussions were held under the implicit understanding that Poland would have to agree to any settlement.  It was further understood that any military move by Germany would result in a British DoW on Germany.  Yes, diplomacy still took place.  However, the entire 'context' of those talks had changed. 
 
As usual we get yet another Spam-a-rama, based on the same old yamaguch and quigley (where's maxists.org this time?).  As for the other sources you provided, here is some of what they have to say:
 

Originally posted by Bankotsu's source

...He (Chamberlain) had a grace period because of France's delay in declaring war and Halifax's accepting the view that Britain ought not to declare war ahead of France.

But time ran out. Chamberlain was told that Tory backbenchers would rise in revolt if the government did not immediately carry out its threat to declare war....

...Rebels against Prime Minister Chamberlain now included some within his own cabinet, who burst into 10 Downing Street during a violent thunderstorm on the evening of September 2 and announced that they would not leave until Chamberlain swore to abandon all thought of negotiating with Hitler....

...All the same these 'certain questions of procedure' the French had to satisfy alarmed the British. More alarming still was the apparent French disposition, via Bonnet, to use Mussolini's proposal for a five-power conference as cover to effect their military dispositions. At this rate, delaying their demarche until midday on 3 Sepetember would mean that France's declaration of war could not be issued before 5 September, and if that were the case, as Halifax belatedly realized, the British government would find it 'impossible....to hold the situation."

The situation the British government was finding it impossible to hold was political. Late on 1 September both houses of parliament had been treated to statements that Germany had been warned of the direct consequences unless all troops were withdrawn from Polish territory. Few people in London thought a positive German response was likely, and the common deduction was that an ultimatum would be despatached the next day....

...Ciano proposed a five-power conference to discuss the Polish question. George Bonnet, the French foreign minister, encouraged this alternative. British leaders debated, and Hitler promised to respond by September 3.

On September 2, the cabinet demanded that Germany meet a time limit for withdrawal from Poland or Britain would declare war. Contrary to his ministers' wishes, Chamberlain informed the House of Commons that evening that no time limit had yet been set and no agreement had been reached with France. Arthur Greenwood, the deputy Labor leader, spoke, reflecting the general disgust with these delays in declaring war....

...There was no doubt that the temper of the House was for war. I even deemed it more resolute and united than in the similar scene on August 3, 1914, in which I had also taken part....

So, what we are left with is confirmation of the fact that the British Houses of Parliament, and even his own cabinet, would not allow Chamberlain to avoid war with Germany.  It also points to the fact that other factors were involved, other than Chamberlain's own wishes.  For example, the French needed to be involved in the decision making, and they were even less inclined to act quickly.  Again, one must keep in mind that the French in particular were operating on a 'WWI schedule', and no one imagined how quickly things would move.  Nor did they realize, when they declared war, that the Soviet Union would attack Poland from the east in cooperation with the Nazi's only 2 weeks hence. 
 
What we are left with is the question of whether Chamberlain favoured further 'appeasement' (maybe).  But did this amount to a strategy to 'push' Germany eastward?  No.  Was this claimed 'preference' of Chamberlain's something that could have possibly been implemented by Britain in any case?  No.  While potentially interesting historical tangents, they have little relevance to the question of actual British policy at the time.  The facts are that Britain was willing to see Germany occupy territories of largely German population which were west (Rhineland) and south (Austria, Sudetenland) of Germany.  If Germany had not violated Munich with the occupation of Moravia and Bohemia, then possibly Britain would have been accepting of the German occupaton of Danzig (a largely German city) and to the obtaining of a land corridor to East Prussia.  Neither of those would have provided a common border with the Soviet Union, nor would they have faciliated a German-Soviet war.  Britain was not prepared to accept German occupation of non-German territories, which is what would have been require to allow German expansion eastward and / or to facilitate a German-Soviet war.  None of these facts, which clearly contradict the 'theory' being suggested, has yet been directly addressed.
 


Edited by deadkenny - 10-Jul-2008 at 13:15
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jul-2008 at 13:20
Originally posted by Bankotsu

Originally posted by gcle2003

As deadkenny points out, one effect of that was that none of the appeasements provided Germany with a border with the SU.


That is quite true.

Britain's original idea was to let Germany take Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig and Polish corridor and hope that the next target of Hitler would be Soviet Union....



 
Lol.  So Britain 'allowed' or 'wanted' Germany to occupy the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland, Danzig and a land corridor to East Prussia and then 'hope' that they would attack the Soviet Union?  How exactly did Britain 'hope' that this invasion would take place?  Via use of Germany's vastly expanded paratrooper 'army'?  In order to 'buy' your theory, we have to assume that those in the British government who had such 'hopes' did not have access to a map such as the one you've posted.  There was in fact little 'hope' of a German attack on the Soviet Union until after they had occupied Poland.


Edited by deadkenny - 10-Jul-2008 at 13:23
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jul-2008 at 16:27
Originally posted by deadkenny

How exactly did Britain 'hope' that this invasion would take place?


What do you mean?


Edited by Bankotsu - 10-Jul-2008 at 16:28
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 02:06
Originally posted by Bankotsu

Originally posted by deadkenny

How exactly did Britain 'hope' that this invasion would take place?


What do you mean?
 
For the answer, all you had to do was read the rest of my post.
 
Originally posted by deadkenny

How exactly did Britain 'hope' that this invasion would take place?  Via use of Germany's vastly expanded paratrooper 'army'?  In order to 'buy' your theory, we have to assume that those in the British government who had such 'hopes' did not have access to a map such as the one you've posted.  There was in fact little 'hope' of a German attack on the Soviet Union until after they had occupied Poland.
 
Britain of course guaranteed Poland, so Germany couldn't occupy Poland and gain the necessary common border with the Soviet Union without having to fight Britain and France. 
 
 
 
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 04:44
Originally posted by deadkenny

 
For the answer, all you had to do was read the rest of my post.


I read your post, I don't understand it.

How exactly did Britain 'hope' that this invasion would take place? = ???

 

Britain of course guaranteed Poland, so Germany couldn't occupy Poland and gain the necessary common border with the Soviet Union without having to fight Britain and France. 


It's hopeless. Approve

Since you refuse to accept the facts, then so be it deadkenny.




Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jul-2008 at 04:45
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  Quote Peteratwar Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 08:06
I suspect you haven't understood the nuances.
 
Deadkenny was stating that if you are correct in your assessment of Britain's strategy then if Britain and France are guaranteeing Poland's independence how can Britain hope that Germany would invade Russia (which is what you allegations are saying) given the network of countries between Germany and Russia.
 
You still by the way have been unable to provide any proof that such was Britain's strategy.
 
Britain' strategy such as it was was to have all round peace and not war anywhere (wars have an unconfortable habit of getting out of hand)
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 08:15
Originally posted by Peteratwar

 
Deadkenny was stating that if you are correct in your assessment of Britain's strategy then if Britain and France are guaranteeing Poland's independence how can Britain hope that Germany would invade Russia (which is what you allegations are saying) given the network of countries between Germany and Russia.


I tire of keep replying to the above.

http://www.allempires.net/forum_posts.asp?TID
http://www.allempires.net/forum_posts.asp?TID=24
http://www.allempires.net/forum_posts.asp?TID=2
http://www.allempires.net/forum_posts.asp?TID=243
 

 
Britain' strategy such as it was was to have all round peace and not war anywhere (wars have an unconfortable habit of getting out of hand)


Produce evidence.


Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jul-2008 at 08:22
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 08:32
Originally posted by Peteratwar

Britain' strategy such as it was was to have all round peace and not war anywhere


Evidence does not show that.

http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?
http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?s


See below for more evidence:

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3
http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDL
http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLH


So what is your view of the above evidence Peteratwar?

Are you satisfied with the evidence?


Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jul-2008 at 08:37
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  Quote Peteratwar Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 08:54
The above is not evidence at all. At best it expresses the thinking of some people which did not reflect Governmental Policy.
 
What would be needed would be first-hand evidence e.g. memoranda from official governmental sources stating this was the policy.
 
Further you still cannot explain how British guarantees to Poland fit in with the proposal to drive Hitler east
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 09:23
Originally posted by Peteratwar

The above is not evidence at all. At best it expresses the thinking of some people which did not reflect Governmental Policy.


Why doesn't reflect government policy? Diplomacy and events in 1937-1939 shows that it was government policy.

Show me evidence that reflects government policy then.


What would be needed would be first-hand evidence e.g. memoranda from official governmental sources stating this was the policy.


For that see:

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3



Further you still cannot explain how British guarantees to Poland fit in with the proposal to drive Hitler east


Guarantee to Poland was to warn Hitler not to attack Poland but take Danzig and Polish corridor through negotiations. The british expected Germany to drive into Russia across baltic states after Hitler had taken Danizg and Polish corridor.

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  Quote Peteratwar Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 10:41
Your link above doesn't seem to work.
 
Your last paragraph has no supporting evidence at all.
 
This thread is your proposal, you have to prove it and evidence so far is non-existent
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 10:53
Originally posted by Peteratwar

Your link above doesn't seem to work.


http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA17
 

This thread is your proposal, you have to prove it and evidence so far is non-existent


I have provided evidence.

It is whether you want to accept it as proof or not.

You, on the other hand have not provide any evidence that supports your claim that Britain's policy "was to have all round peace and not war anywhere".
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 11:02
Originally posted by Peteratwar

Your last paragraph has no supporting evidence at all.


Reason for Polish Guarantee on 31 March 1939:


...He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee. 

The Milner Group, less susceptible to public opinion, did not want the guarantee to Poland at all.  As a result, the guarantee was worded to cover Polish “independence” and not her “territorial integrity.”

This was interpreted by the leading article of
The Times for 1 April to leave the way open to territorial revision without revoking the guarantee. 

This interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain in Commons on 3 April.

Apparently the government believed that it was making no real commitment because, if war broke out in eastern Europe, British public opinion would force the government to declare war on Germany, no matter what the government itself wanted, and regardless whether the guarantee existed or not.

On the other hand, a guarantee to Poland might deter Hitler from precipitating a war and give the government time to persuade the Polish government to yield the Corridor to Germany. 

If the Poles could not be persuaded, or if Germany marched, the fat was in the fire anyway;  if the Poles could be persuaded to yield, the guarantee was so worded that Britain could not act under it to prevent such yielding. 

This was to block any possibility that British public opinion might refuse to accept a Polish Munich.

That this line of thought was not far distant from British government circles is indicated by a Reuters news dispatch released on the same day that Chamberlain gave the guarantee to Poland. 

This dispatch indicated that, under cover of the guarantee, Britian would put pressure on Poland to make substantial concessions to Hitler through negotiations.  According to Hugh Dalton, Labour M.P., speaking in Commons on 3 April, this dispatch was inspired by the government and was issued through either the Foreign Office, Sir Horace Wilson, John Simon, or Samuel Hoare.  Three of these four were of the Milner Group, the fourth being the personal agent of Chamberlain.  Dalton’s charge was not denied by any government spokesman, Hoare contenting himself with a request to Dalton “to justify that statement.”  Another M.P. of Churchill’s group suggested that Geoffrey Dawson was the source, but Dalton rejected this...


http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html


...The British Cabinet considered what should be done, and  the Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee discussed the problem on March 27.Chamberlain said Poland’s attitude was uncertain as to helping Britain and France defend Romania if she were attacked, but Poland was absolutely necessary to create a "second front" against Germany in the East.

Also, Poland might buckle and accept Hitler’s demands, thus lining up with Germany... For these reasons, he favored giving Poland a unilateral guarantee. Halifax said that France and Britain could not prevent Poland and Romania from being overrun, but Chamberlain responded by saying that the Western Powers could divert some German forces by holding the Maginot Line. Finally, it was agreed to give a unilateral guarantee to Poland in order to deter Hitler from further aggression, but without setting a date when it should be given.

Two days later, on March 29, Ian Colvin, the Berlin correspondent of the News Chronicle arrived in London with the "news" that Hitler was about to attack Poland at any moment.

In fact, Hitler had not yet set a date for attacking Poland and the "proof" of attack that Colvin brought -- that is supplies sent to the German troops stationed near the Polish border -- was not at all new for the British War Office had known of it for some time. Nevertheless, with rumors flying around London, that evening, Chamberlain "agreed to the idea of an immediate declaration of support of Poland, to counter a quick putsch by Hitler."

Thus it was that on March 30, Halifax asked Ambassador Raczynski whether Poland would accept a British guarantee of her independence, and Ambassador Kennard transmitted the same question to Beck in Warsaw. The Polish Foreign Minister accepted the proposal at once. It should be noted that he had rejected the German demands on March 25, five days before he was offered the British guarantee.

What  Beck did not know was that the British Cabinet decided the guarantee of Polish independence was conditional on Poland not being "stupidly obstinate" over Danzig and relations with Germany in general, also on Poland actually fighting to defend her independence. Furthermore, at noon on March 31, Chamberlain told the British Cabinet that Britain would decide if and when Polish independence was threatened.

On the afternoon of March 31, Chamberlain read a long statement in the House of Commons. He first said, at great length, that the British government believed every dispute could be negotiated. In the meanwhile, if Polish independence were threatened and Poland resisted with all her forces, Britain would do all in her power to help Poland, and France would do likewise.

However, this was not the end of appeasement. The British guarantee of Polish independence was meant to deter Hitler from further aggression and persuade him to obtain what he wanted from Poland by negotiation. On April 1, (All Fools' Day),Geoffrey Dawson (1874-1944), the editor of the London Times, published an editorial saying the guarantee did not apply to Polish frontiers, but to Polish independence. In his diary, he noted that Halifax and Chamberlain agreed "this was about right." ...


http://web.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/lect16.htm


Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jul-2008 at 11:07
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 12:10
Originally posted by Bankotsu

  The british expected Germany to drive into Russia across baltic states after Hitler had taken Danizg and Polish corridor.
 
Again, you've provided not a shred of evidence to support your claim that the British 'expected' Germany to invade the Soviet Union through the Baltic States only, without having occupied Poland (except for Danzig and a land corridor to East Prussia).  Furthermore, as clearly stated previously, such a scheme (i.e. an invasion of the Soviet Union without occupying Poland) was not feasible logistically.  Britain was consistent in being willing to allow Germany to occupy areas with predominantly German populations, but equally consistent in opposing German occupation of other (non-German) territories.  Why should anyone believe that Britain would have accepted a German occupation of the Baltic States anymore than they did Poland?
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 12:17
Germany annex Danzig and Polish corridor and then drive across baltic states into Russia seems prefectly sound to me.

I don't see a problem with that.

In fact that was the invasion route of army group north during the invasion of USSR.


Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jul-2008 at 12:23
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 12:18
Originally posted by Bankotsu

Why doesn't reflect government policy? Diplomacy and events in 1937-1939 shows that it was government policy.

Show me evidence that reflects government policy then.

Originally posted by Peteratwar

What would be needed would be first-hand evidence e.g. memoranda from official governmental sources stating this was the policy.


For that see:

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3



Further you still cannot explain how British guarantees to Poland fit in with the proposal to drive Hitler east


Guarantee to Poland was to warn Hitler not to attack Poland but take Danzig and Polish corridor through negotiations. The british expected Germany to drive into Russia across baltic states after Hitler had taken Danizg and Polish corridor.

 
Everytime you do this you diminish what little credibility you have.  I have already quoted from your source previously, and it simply does not say what you claim it says.
 

Originally posted by Bankotsu's source

...there were powerful currents in high level political and social circles that hoped Germany would at least serve as a counterweight to Russia against the spread of communism.

'Power current' in political and social 'circles' does not equal government policy.  Serving as a 'counterweight' to Russia against the spread of communism does not equal an invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany.  This source simply does not support your claim that British policy was to 'encourage' German expansion eastward or to faciliate a German attack upon the Soviet Union.  The only sites that support that claim are the 3 we are all very familiar with, yamaguchy, quigley and marxists.org.

 

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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 12:24
Originally posted by Bankotsu

Germany annex Danzig and Polish corridor and then drive across baltic states into Russia seems prefectly sound to me.

I don't see a problem with that.
 
I know you don't, because you obviously don't know enough about military logistics.  I already explained this previously, but naturally you just chose to ignore it.  The Germans could also have invaded the Soviet Union by invading Denmark and Sweden, then going through Finland - but that makes about as much sense as does your Baltic Invasion scheme (which is to say it makes no sense).  Furthermore, you've not provided a shred of evidence that this was British policy.  You've simply made it up in order to avoid dealing with the glaring contradiction between your conspiracy theory and Britain's DoW on Germany when Germany invaded Poland.  Your theory states that Britain wanted to 'push' Germany eastward, and facilitate a German attack on the Soviet Union.  Yet Britain declared war on Germany when Germany invaded the one country, i.e. Poland, that was actually east of Germany and the occupation of which would have practically allowed an invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany.
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 12:26
Originally posted by deadkenny

I have already quoted from your source previously, and it simply does not say what you claim it says.


???
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jul-2008 at 12:28
Originally posted by deadkenny

but that makes about as much sense as does your Baltic Invasion scheme (which is to say it makes no sense).


Which is the same scheme of army group north in the actual invasion of Russia.


...Then they wanted to sacrifice the Soviet Union. This plot was clearly revealed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. They lasted for more than four months, from April 15 to August 23, during which the Soviet Union exercised the utmost patience. But, from start to finish, Britain and France rejected the principle of equality and reciprocity; they demanded that the Soviet Union provide safeguards for their security, but refused to do likewise for the Soviet Union and the small Baltic states, so as to leave a gap through which Germany could attack, and they also refused to allow the passage of Soviet troops through Poland to fight the aggressor. That is why the talks broke down...

http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_17.htm


...If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it.  It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States.  For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html


Britain refused to issue guarantee of baltic states so as to leave a space for Germany to drive across into Russia.


Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jul-2008 at 12:43
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