Gjergj Kastrioti (Skenderbey)

 

You are correct. According to the legend, when Lezha was taken, the Ottomans dug up Scanderbeg's body and took his bones to make ammoulettes out of them. Such was his fame even among the enemy. Or so the legend goes ... what grain of truth there is to this I do not know.

 

 

I am not sure if there is anything English on the Internet which deals with his tactics. But, I have some interesting books at home which deal with this theme -- the books are in Albanian, however, so direct quotations are of little use. I can write a little about it, however.

 

Scanderbeg's Confederation provided him with warriors from the country's all corners. But, most of his men were recruited from his own principality. He had a professional army consisting of 2,000 cavalrymen. They could travel across the country very easily and fast. It was said that Sxanderbeg's light cavalry could travel 70km per day, which is in great contrast to (for example) the Italian cavalry, which could only manage 18-21km per day, according to Da Turzo (1460). These cavalrymen weren't sufficient of course. Therefore, Scanderbeg had the rule of "nj� burr� sht�pie", meaning atleast one man per household was responsible for showing up in battle. They came with whatever weapons they had; swords, axes, bows and arrows, spears etc.

 

The thing with Scanderbeg is that he adapted. Meaning; his tactics and military formations weren't coherent, but changed from time to time in order to make use of weather and terrain. This disabled the Turks from learning of their past mistakes, which otherwise is quite valuable (as was the case with Scipio Africanus vs Hannibal Barca). Quite oftenly, the Sultan would send two forces simultaneously. When forced to work on two directions, Scanderbeg was usually forced to divide his army so that the numbers of each unit ranged from 4,000 to 8,000 men. When having the luxoruy of confronting a clear single target, he usually mustered 10,000 to 12,000 men. At the most, he had 20,000 men, though this was rare. When dealing with Ottoman armies which were three-four times larger than his own forces, Scanderbeg usually annihilated the enemy by the border, such as at Ohrid, Dibra, Polog, etc. Only four times did the Ottomans find their way to the deeper territories, reaching Kruja as well. When that occured, Scanderbeg usually harassed the enemies to demoralize them and decimate their numbers before coordinating a final strike, which usually involved the garrison trapped inside the castle which was besieged.

 

As I also said earlier, Albania is relatively mountainous, and Scanderbeg made use of the highlands to neutralize the Turks. This is what the Byzantine historian Kristobulli (Greek sp?) wrote;

 

 

In narrow passages, engineers made use of rocks and stones, which they at the right moment unleashed with special devices. Even when fighting on flat ground, such as at the battle of Torvioll, Oranik or Drin (the last being against the Venetians), he made use of the terrain somehow. As Pyrrhus of Epirus once apparently said, "make the ground work for you". What is also interesting to note, is that Scanderbeg made use of an intelligence service that operated even in deep Ottoman territory. This enabled the premature exposure of Ottoman tactical plans, in order to better prepare for the upcoming battle. Even when the Ottomans came and these operations mattered little, Scanderbeg was patient and predicted the enemy's moves. Chalcocondylas, another Byzantine historian, wrote following;

 

 

Scanderbeg made also use of quick manouvres, making himself available everywhere he was needed. Chalcocondylas and the Albanian historian Marin Barleti both noticed this and commented on how these quick actions infuriated Mehmed II. Thus, in 1452, through quick manouvres, he defeated two Ottoman armies one after one, headed by Hamza pasha and Talip pasha. Through quick manouvres, he was able to stage surprise attacks which caught the enemies off guard. He made use of bad weather as well; when the enemies were not moving, he exploited the rain and snow to change positions and surprise the Ottomans unexpected. The night was also important, since it made his forces less detectable and enabled surprise attacks as well -- thus were the Ottoman armies defeated on 22 April 1450 (when Debrena pasha was killed) and 17 August 1462 (the Ottoman general here was Sinan pasha).

 

Something which also helped Scanderbeg was the fidelity of his men. When Scanderbeg's son John Kastrioti (named so after his father) was born, his nephew, Hamza Kastrioti, lost hope of becoming the new head of the principality. He betrayed Scanderbeg and joined with the Ottomans. 1457, he and the general Isak bey Evrenoz invaded Albania with 80,000 men. This was especially dangerous, since Hamza knew of Scanderbeg's tactics and ways. Scanderbeg changed his strategy; he dismantled his army and ordered all to scatter and come back upon his orders. Meanwhile, the Turks met little resistance, reaching even the gate of Kruja, the siege of which they postponed. Searching diligently after insurgents that weren't there, the Ottomans finally concluded that Scanderbeg had been betrayed by his men and that victory was theirs. Even the Venetian governor of Durr�s, Marco Diedo, wrote to the senate on July 21, that "The Magnificient Scanderbeg, deserted by all was trying to find refuge high in the mountains". While parts of the Ottoman armies were besieging local fortresses, such as those of Rodon, Petrela and Guri i Bardh�, the main army camped at the field known as Uj�bardha. There, they celebrated their 'victory', drinking and partying, declaring Hamza Kastrioti as the new king of Albania. Meanwhile, Scanderbeg's men returned upon being given orders, and organized the attack from the mountain of Tumenisht, September 7. The attack was carried out in the middle of the day, when the Turks least expected it; this after guard-patrols were neutralized. The attack was carried out from the north, and the Turks were taken by total surprise. Metal-clapping devices gave the Turks the impression that their enemy was more numerous than they actually were. Total confusion arose; the only one to stay cold was Hamza Kastrioti who knew about his uncle's tactics, and the fact that his forces couldn't possible be so large as was illusioned. That is why Scanderbeg personally lead his professional cavalrymen against Hamza Kastrioti's sipahis (Ottoman knights) and decisively defeated them before they could mobilize the rest of the army. Hamza Kastrioti was captured, some 35,000 Turks killed or captured, and the rest fled in massive panic.

 

The irony is that the Venetian senate received Marco Diedo's letter days after the battle was fought. Scanderbeg's success was also much due to his warriors' skills and bravery. The mountain people of Albania had developed a particularly warlike culture which made them fit to fight. The Turks were very much impressed. This is what a contemporary Turkish historian wrote;

 

 

I do not know about Iran. As far as I am aware, the conflict between the Shah and the Sultan (which by the way I would like to learn more about) escalated only in the 16th century, but I might be wrong. Byzantium was hardly a 'greater' threat than Scanderbeg. As early as in the 1300s, their 'empire' was restricted to the city of Constantinople and some land outside the walls, not much more.

 

The last crusade, likewise, came in 1444, when King Wladyslaw III of Poland and Jan�s Hunyadi were defeated at Varna (modern day Bulgaria). Scanderbeg had just begun his rebellion by then. Germans ... I don't know what threat they posed, as there weren't really much conflict between you guys in those days. Neither were the Russians a threat either ... those days, they were recovering from the Mongol invasions which had devastated the country for centuries. HOWEVER, if you are referring to threats against the Ottoman empire throughout your whole history, then it is another issue. But, when Scanderbeg lived, the Sultan had three major enemies (I wouldn't count Venice, since they switched from behing foes and friends with the Ottomans); George Kastrioti alias Scanderbeg of Albania, Jan�s Hunyadi of Hungary and Transylvania and Stephen the Great of Moldavia.

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More concerning Scanderbeg's tactics. The best way to explain his tactics is to describe his battles.

 

By the end of the 1440s, an Albanian noble called Leka Zaharia (Alexander Zacharias) was killed. It was suspected that another Albanian noble had killed him. This because of a fight, in 1445, between Leka and the other noble over the hand of a beautiful princess known as Jerina. Jerina chose Leka Zaharia, and this angered the other noble, who assasinated him some time later.

 

Now, Danja (Leka's capital) was left under the reign of Leka's mother, Bora. Leka and Scanderbeg had made a truce that if one of them died without an heir, the other would sieze the dead one's lands. But the Venetians also wanted Danja, and took it before Scanderbeg. A conflict quickly arose, and Scanderbeg besieged local fortresses (including Danja) under Venetian rule. But this was to no avail, thus, a blockage sufficed for the time being. Eventually, however, Scanderbeg marched into the vicinity of Shkodra, and the whole region rose in rebellion. The Venetians sent 15,000 men under the command of Daniel Juric, and at the shores of the river Drin, a battle ensued.

 

In this battle, Scanderbeg made use of his light cavalry. He knew the well-armoured Venetians would have difficulties with fast manouvres, and so, with his horsemen, he charged ferociously against the weakest point in the enemy lines, namely the interval between the heavy cavalry and the infantry. Scanderbeg led the charge personally. The strike was successfull and the enemy formation was broken. The centre was divided from its right wing, and Scandebreg and his men thus attacked the flanks of the heavy cavalry, while his infantry neutralized the strongest components of the Venetian army. Thus began the gradual and systematic disintegration of the Venetian military formations; Scanderbeg made use of the tactics "attack and annihilate small components, attack block and surround big components". He now encircled much of the Venetian army, which now also got attacked from the back by volunteering local farmers and highlanders. The defeat was decisive.

 

Unfortunately, Scanderbeg did not get much out of this victory. Venetian diplomacy had intentionally bought time and delayed a confrontation, whilst simultaneously calling the Turks for help. A Turkish army of 40,000 men marched into the country, and Scanderbeg was forced to fight on two fronts. The Turks besieged the city/castle of Svetigrad, where the defenders (who also included a Bulgarian contingent) fought under the command of Peter Perlati (Pjet�r Perlati). Scanderbeg tried to aid the city, and deployed his tactics of harassing the besieging Turks. The defenders fought heroically as well, but the Turks found the channel which provided the city with water. This forced the defenders to give up the city. Scanderbeg had lost an important castle, and furthermore, without artillery and other equipments, he could not take Danja. A peace was finally signed, which gave Venice Danja, whereas Scanderbeg would receive an annual pension of 1,400 ducats. The Venetian conducted another sabotage here as well. They intentionally delayed the first payment, which in turn delayed Scanderbeg who was to join forces with a major Hungarian-Wallachian force commanded by Jan�s Hunyadi. By the time Scanderbeg arrived in Kosovo, the Hungarians had been defeated 1448, on the Second Battle of Kosovo (the first being 1389).

 

This is a great "what if". What IF the Venetians didn't ally themselves with the Ottomans? What if George Brankovic, the despot of Serbia, didn't try to sabotage Hunyadi's advance and instead joined forces with him? Hunyadi led an army of circa 30,000 men southwards. Scanderbeg in turn had some 20,000 men under his command; together, they'd be a force of 50,000 warriors under the command of the region's two most charismatic leaders. Though I doubt they'd sack Constantinople, surely they would have been a massive threat to Ottoman presence in Europe. Instead, Scanderbeg's delayel forced him to engage the Turks alone. Three days the battle lasted it was said. If this is true, it means that the two forces were relatively equal in strength. The fresh arrival of 20,000 warriors under the veteran Scanderbeg would have most probably shifted the luck to Hunyadi's advantage. Instead, on the third day, a Wallachian contingent deserted Hunyadi and his army wad defeated.  

 

He is ignored, because he was not a real danger too ottomans. Yeah he protected his country well. So what? There are others who protected his country well too. Why do you think we should learn all of them?

 

do you aware of how large ottoman empire and how long It survived? Please, we are talking a small place and a small time span compared with all ottomans. They cannot teach us to all..

 

By the way, Who is this sami guy?

 

 

...is the one who a football stadium has his name=>"ali sami yen"

 

 

Sami Frasheri=Şemsettin Sami. True, he was albanian and was the first that made the vocabylary .

 

Ali Sami Yen was son of Şemsettin Sami.  Oh well. Add, him to infamous albanians too.(He is also one of biggest builder of Galatasaray club.)

 

At this stage the majority of the albanians were Catholics and Orthodoxes.

Regarding your friends, what they say is true, nobody forces them now to be muslim. All the albanians believing in islam nowadays are not forced to. But regarding the conversion during the ottoman occupation, thats another issue...

Albanians dont have any deep ingrained hatred for Turks, and they dont have any deep ingrained hatred for other nations. Many albanians do have negative feelings for the Serb Nation, because of the oppression in Kosova, and because of the war crimes. Some albanians could have problems even with the Greek Nation, because of problems caused by the albanian massive emigration during the 90's.

But I believe that modern albanians will learn to get along with their neighbours, myself I have very good friends in all the Balkan Countries, and i've had a fine time in Belgrade, Athens, Sofia, or Istambul. The problem with the balkans, IMO is that people are egocentric or ethnocentris, and that doesnt help.

 

After Scanderbeg died (1468), the resistance continued for some while. Initially, it was led by Leka Dukagjini, a noble who some say was of Norman origins, though I am sure that is a legend. He was eventually defeated and took refugee in Ragusa and thereafter Italy. Scanderbeg's son, John Kastrioti, also fought the Turks some while after, as did his son, George Kastrioti or Scanderbeg the younger. This was all in vain though. The Ottoman power was too overwhelming, and Albania became a province. Many mountainous areas maintained their freedom, however. This was especially true for the regions formerly ruled by Leka Dukagjini. There, the Turks were unable to firmly implement their authority and organization.

 

The Islamization process started taking place en masse during the 17th century. Some say we converted because of the fine rhetorics of the Muslim clergy. Others like to believe we converted because we were forced. Neither of these explanations are entirely true, I would say. The reasons were socio-economic. One must have several things in mind, in order to understand why Islam spread in Albania and not in neighbouring Balkan territories. Firstly, our resistance in the 1400s brought massive destruction. Mehmed II's campaigns in Albania resulted in widespread massacres of the population, which lead to an unhealthy decimation of our numbers. As if this wasn't enough, 1/4 of Albania's population fled to Italy, particularly Sicily & Calabria, where they've lived ever since. This made us especially vulnerable, and as if this wasn't enough, the Ottomans imposed the taxes on non-Muslim populations (jizya) and reduced the peasantry into a raya class (serfdom). Economic devastation and the severe decimation of our population as a result of continuous warfare for almost a century had its effects. Converting to Islam was a way to atleast slightly improve our conditions.

 

The second reason is social. Albania differed very much from Greece or Serbia, for example. While the Albanians were primarily a pastoral population divided into clans, the Serbs and Greeks were mainly peasants reduced to serfdom. The Ottomans and their raya system didn't mean anything new for the Greeks and Serbs, who were predominantly serfs even prior to the Ottoman arrival. Their primary authority was the Church, hence, their Christian identity was better established in the sense that the Church clergy were indeed their shepherds. In Albania, no unified church was to be found. The main authority there was the nobility and clan-leaders. Their primary interest was the preservation of this authority ... hence many of our leaders, be they nobles or clan-leaders, converted to Islam. The population followed ... much like the population in Germany during the 17th century which switched between Protestantism and Catholicism whenever their leaders did so.

 

To other Christian populations who had already experienced the phenomenon of serfdom, the Ottoman system introduced an even more liberal form of the meropah social-structure. To clan-based socities which had enjoyed relative freedom previously, this wasn't so easy. Hence, wherever you found pastoral populations, some degree of Islamization occured, like in Crete. The main exception here were the Vlachs, who were enabled to maintain their ways of life.

 

Regarding your Kosovar friend's statement, I cannot really confirm what he stated, because I would need concrete examples of this mistreatment. If the church mistreated our people, it probably didn't differ from the ways the church mistreated people elsewhere, namely by trying to opress anything abnormal and which did not coincide with their views and perspective on matters ... views and perspectives which quite oftenly weren't even linked to authentic Christianity, I would say. Therefore, I doubt such a thing had any impact on our decision to convert (I am speaking of the Muslim segment here; plenty Albanians preserved their Christian faith). On the other hand, persecutions against heretics in Bosnia did take place. I do not want to discredit your friend (who also happens to be my compatriot), but there is a slight chance he confused us with the Bosnians. No offence; my cousin once told me we descended from Romans

 

What he could've meant was the refusal of the Church to accept the Crypto-Catholics as true Christians. In our language, these people were called laraman. These type of Catholics existed especially in the lowlands, where in order to maintain a level of freedom from taxes etc, they needed to make atleast an official conversion to Islam. In the highlands, particularly the region around Shkodra, the inpenetrable mountains served as a natural barrier/fortress. The Pope could not, however, accept this movement, and consequently, the laramans embraced Islam.

 

Regarding pashas/governors being popular in our tradition, I would agree. In particular two pashas; Karamahmud Bushati of the Shkodra sanjak (he claimed descent from the powerful Dukagjini family) and Ali pasha Tepelena of Ioannina. During their reign, our territories were essentially autonomous and only nominally under the High Porte. These two pashas even rose against the Sultan. Karamahmud Bushati's capital survived two major sieges. He died, however, in a campaign in 1796 when his forces tried to subjugate the Montenegrin clans to the north. Ali pasha rose in 1821, but his rebellion wasn't successful; his general, Omer Vrioni, betrayed him in the most crucial hour, and Ali pasha himself died later on in a small fight in the monastery of S:t Pandeleimon. He is briefly mentioned in the famous novel by Alexander Dumas, "The Count of Monte Cristo".

 

 P:s May I ask you where you're from?