Hmm, well I've mentioned, oppresion of Human Rights, disrespect towards religions |
So since you have mentioned all these from your national point of view, lets face some facts about the EU republic of Greece from the international point of view...
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
Denial of Ethnic Identity
While many of the improvements that the Greek government has made are substantive and not merely cosmetic, the Turkish minority continues to face a number of serious problems. At the root of these problems is the Greek governments attitude toward the Turkish minority as somehow alien to Greece, as an outside threat that must be minimized or isolated. The most obvious sign of this is the continued state policy of denying the ethnic identity of the minority, which, whether acquired by birth or through acculturation, is undoubtedly Turkish. Greece officially recognizes but one minority, the Muslim minority as defined in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Consequently, it has adopted a militant fear of any group, whether Macedonian or Turkish, that claims otherwise.
While it is indeed true that the minority is mixed on an ethnolinguistic basis, being made up of ethnic Turks, Pomaks (Muslim Slavs who speak a Bulgarian dialect), and Romas, the group overwhelmingly identifies itself as Turkish.34 Indeed many Pomaks and Romas will, especially to outsiders, even deny their ethnolinguistic origin in the belief that being called Pomaks or Romas is merely a state artifice to suppress them.35 One commentator noted that, Due to the uniform way in which Greek authorities and local communities have treated Gypsies and Pomaks, the latter tend to identify with the stronger elements of the minority in Thrace, who are, of course, the Muslim Turcophones.36
The government of Greece justifies its refusal to accept the Turkish identity of the minority on the Treaty of Lausanne, which only mentions a Muslim minority. Others within the government point to the fact that Turkish refers to state identification, rather than to an ethnicity. Mr. Yannos Kranidiotis, the deputy foreign minister, stated that,
In Greece we do not speak of a Turkish minority; we call it Muslim minority. We feel this term, Turkish, gives them an ethnic character of Turkish while downgrading other elements that are not Turkish [such as Pomaks and Gypsies]. We have ratified the code of ethnic self-identity. We will wait for the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights....We have been tolerant and are becoming even more tolerant. Stricto sensus if one wants to interpret the Lausanne treaty they must be called Muslims...We are respecting however the different elements of the Muslim minority. We would like to see what the Commission and what the Court of Human Rights will say, if we should call them Turks.37
Mr. Stavros Kambellis, the state-appointed secretary general for Thrace, argued that the term Turkish refers to the Republic of Turkey, not a specific minority. He stated that,
A person is free to express himself in whatever identity he desires. No one has come to me to complain about the freedom to express ones religious or linguistic identity. The problem is raised with the use of the term Turkish. According to all international conventions they are Muslim. When they name their associations with the name of another state, this has no meaning here. It does not express anything.38
The governments refusal to accept the minoritys Turkish identity has ranged from banning civic organizations bearing the adjective Turkish in their titles to prosecuting individuals who publicly identified the minority as Turkish.39 Greek courts have outlawed the use of the word "Turkish" to describe the Turkish minority. In November 1987, the Greek High Court affirmed a 1986 decision by the Court of Appeals of Thrace in which the Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace and the Union of Turkish Youth of Komotini were dissolved. The court held that the word "Turkish" referred to citizens of Turkey and could not be used to describe citizens of Greece, and that the use of the word "Turkish" to describe Greek Muslims endangered public order.40 More recently, in August 1996, Mr. Rasim Hid, a teacher at a minority primary school, was transferred by the state-appointed secretary general of the region from the city of Xanthi to a mountain region of Rodopi for using the term Turkish school in a teachers meeting.41 In June 1997, twelve ethnic Turkish teachers were given a suspended sentence of eight months, pending appeal, because they signed a union document that included the term, Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace.42 They had been indicted under Articles 188 (participating in an association the aims of which are contrary to criminal provisions) and 192 (inciting citizens to commit acts of violence upon each other) of the Greek Penal Code.43
The most notorious case in recent memory involves the late Doctor Sad1k Ahmet, a former parliamentarian and communal leader. In January 1990, Dr. Ahmet was found guilty of disrupting public peace (diataraxi koinis eirinis) under Article 192 of the penal code. In October 1989, while campaigning for parliament, he had distributed leaflets that spoke of Turks, Turkish Muslims, and the Turkish Muslim minority of Western Thrace.44 Doctor Ahmet was imprisoned from January to March 1990, when the Court of Appeals of Patras upheld the sentence but converted it into a fine with time served. On February 15, 1991, the Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos) rejected Dr. Ahmetsappeal of this conviction. The court ruled that, In this manner the appellants had deliberately attempted to describe as Turks the Greek Muslims of Southern Rodopi....moreover, they knew that there was no Turkish minority in Western Thrace....45
Dr. Ahmet then applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, which declared his case partially admissible in 1994. In April 1995, the commission in its Article 31 report declared that Greece had violated Dr. Ahmets right of free expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and forwarded the case to the European Court of Human Rights. On November 15, 1996, however, the court dismissed the case because Dr. Ahmet had not exhausted domestic legal remedies.46
The Greek states obstinate denial of the Turkish minoritys ethnic identity short-circuits any hope of real reconciliation. Minority members consistently ranked the denial of their ethnic identity as the main stumbling block to improving their lot in Greek society and trusting the Greek state. In meetings with Human Rights Watch, the Turkish minority demanded nothing more than recognition of its Turkish identity and equal treatment within the framework of Greek citizenship and loyalty to Greece. Mr. Birol Akifo_lu, a deputy from The New Democracy party, stated that,
First of all there is the problem of the non-recognition of its ethnic identity, its Turkish origin, a problem from which derive all the other problems of the minority. The significance of the notion of a citizen is of course above the religious or the ethnic identity one may have. We are first of all Greek citizens. Our religious and ethnic identity should not be the reason that they see us as second class citizens. All of the minority is Turkish and the differentiations that are being made (Romas, Muslims, Pomaks) do not derive from the minority itself and consequently are not recognized by it. The name Turkish for associations is not being recognized and it is forbidden. In November 1987 we had the first restriction by a higher court when an association used the name Turkish. It must be understood that one thing is Turkism or Turanism and another thing is to be a Greek citizen and to have a Turkish identity.47
Mr. Adem Bekiro_lu, president of the board of the Minority Scientists' Association, explained that,
We are denied our [right] of self-identity. Muslim minority does not mean anything to us. We speak and learn Turkish, we feel that we are Turks, therefore, we ought to be recognized as Turks. The Greek government after it agreed with Turkey about a Turkish minority ought to recognize us as a Turkish minority. We cannot accept the Greek President's position, who speaks of Turkish individual identity but who refuses to recognize a Turkish collective identity...During the registration of the minority, it was called Turkish in spite of the fact that in the Lausanne treaty of 1923 [the group] was referred to as a Muslim minority.48
Despite claims that the Treaty of Lausanne only allows reference to a Muslim minority, official Greek state policy has fluctuated regarding the identity of the minority and appears largely to be a function of Greco-Turkish relations. Professor Christos Rozakis, a former deputy foreign minister of Greece, commented that,
In Greece....two schools of thought have emerged on the semantics of the word Muslim minority....the one, which is enunciated mainly during periods of crisis in relations between the two States, attempts to limit the nature of the minority to its religious constitutive aspect....The other looks at the minority as an ethnic group....It is not surprising the latter school flourishes in the rare periods of rapprochement between the two countries...49
After the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece in the 1930s, according to Rozakis, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos accepted that the minority was a secular and not only a religious one.50 This switch came as Greek policy began to favor Kemalists within the minority over Islamist traditionalists.51 During the early years of the Cold War up until 1955, the Greek state actually began to use the term Turkish to describe the minority in place of the generic Muslim. For example, Law No. 3065 of 1954, dubbed the Marshal Papagos Law by the Turkish minority, ordered the use of the term Turkish in naming primary schools.52 A December 1954 order sent by the General Administration of Thrace to mayors and other government bodies in the region ordered that, Following the order of the President of the Government (Prime Minister), we ask you that from now on and in all occasions the terms Turk-Turkish are used instead of the terms Muslim- of Muslim.53 In May 1955, the General Administration of Thrace again directed state agencies to use the term Turkish to describe the minority, explaining, In spite of the strict orders of the government to replace the terms Muslim-of Muslim and use from now on the terms Turk-Turkish, in the village Aratos on the public road connecting Komotene and Alexandroupole there exists a very prominent sign with the words Muslim School.54
For its part, the Turkish community has documented this politically motivated duality in government policy. It has gathered the following evidence:
photographs of Turkish elementary schools showing:
a Turkish school in the village of Kalhandos in Komotini about thirty years ago, in which a sign identifies the school as a Turkish elementary school, and in which the name appears written in both Greek and Turkish;
a Turkish school in the village of Makre in Evros taken about twenty years ago, in which the school is called a Turkish school, but the name is written only in Greek; the Turkish Central elementary school of Xanthi, taken in 1967, in which the name is written only in Greek;
in contrast, a current Turkish elementary school, in which the name "Turkish" does not appear in either Turkish or Greek.
A geography book dated 1933, written in Turkish, and described as a Turkish book;
protocols for the program in Turkish elementary schools for the school year 1957-1958, in which the schools are referred to as "Turkish schools;
an elementary school diploma dated June 10, 1957, written in both Greek and Turkish, in which Hatice Iman, thirteen years old, is identified as a "Turk;
two emergency orders dated 1954 and 1955 in which the chief administrator of Thrace orders municipalities to change all signs from Muslim minority to Turkish minority (see Appendix C).55
Forced Deprivation of Citizenship: The Legacy of Article 19
Past Practices
In a positive step, the Greek government repealed Article 19 of the 1955 Citizenship Law (No. 3370) on June 11, 1998. The repeal, however, did not apply retroactively. It had been used arbitrarily to deprive ethnic Turks (and other non-ethnic Greeks) of their citizenship. Furthermore, the Greek government promised that all those made stateless under Article 19 who still resided in Greece would be granted citizenship.
However, for forty-three years, successive Greek governments, including the present one, used Article 19 in an attempt to alter the demographic balance in Thrace in favor of ethnic Greeks. In clear violation of the guarantee of equality before the law under Articles 1 and 2 of the Greek constitution and Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Article 19 differentiated between ethnic Greeks and non-ethnic Greeks:
A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. This also applies to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin born and domiciled abroad. His minor children living abroad may be declared as having lost Greek nationality if both their parents or the surviving parent have lost the same. The minister of the interior decides in these matters with the concurring opinion of the National Council.
One scholar noted that, The Greek Constitution does not directly create distinctions on the basis of ethnic origin. Yet....one must examine the application of certain rules in the Code of Citizenship which facilitate the acquisition of Greek citizenship by those who belong to the nation (omogeneis) and its loss by those who do not (allogeneis).56
According to the Greek government, between 1955 and 1998, approximately 60,000 individuals were deprived of their citizenship under Article 19.57 Of these 60,000, approximately 7,182 lost their citizenship between 1981 and 1997.58
Mr. Orhan Haciibram, a lawyer in Xanthi who took on many cases of non-ethnic Greek citizens deprived of their citizenship, complained that,
It must be said here that the revocation of citizenship is not an administrative act of a public servant; it is a state policy implemented in Greece for citizens of Thrace since 1955 and applied by all the governments that came into power. The most massive revocation of citizenship took place in the 1980s, which led a lot of people to leave Greece or to remain in Turkey because they could not return. After 1989 the article has been less implemented than before.59
The process of depriving an individual of his citizenship usually began when the police informed the Directorate of Citizenship that an individual and his family had purportedly moved away or had left the country for an extended period of time. There was no obligation to inform the individual in question of the effort to strip him of his citizenship, and consequently the person generally learned of it ex post facto. Mrs. Karagianidou, the director of the Directorate of Citizenship, asserted that,
To revoke their citizenship it has to be proven that they had also sold off all of their resources and holdings in Greece and that they had not left behind any members of their family. The police would inform the Directorate of Citizenship that they had sold all of their property. It is the police who confirmed such information....If there was insufficient evidence we requested further investigation. Even if one person rests behind we were reluctant to implement Article 19.60
Mr. Mavrikas, a legal advisor on citizenship affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, added that,
When we come to revoke the citizenship of some people it is because we consider that they have given evidence that they don't want any more the Greek citizenship. They have shown that they do not have any contact with Greece....Information where they may be is unavailable precisely because we do not know where they are. We simply inform all our embassies and if some day they decide to go to the local embassy they are informed about it.61
Although by law individuals deprived of citizenship had two months from the time of revocation of their citizenship to appeal to the Council of State, few managed to meet the deadline because, as Mr. Mavrikas points out above, it was often difficult to contact them. Mr. Haciibram, the lawyer, noted that,
Nobody is warned that his citizenship will be revoked. People find out about it when they have to go ask for official documents from a state organization. Usually a letter follows to the state body making the request that it made an error. An appeal must be made (it must be done within two months of the revocation) while one is waiting for the ministers answer that no error is made.62
The case of the Ramadano_lu family, barred from entering Greece in May 1996 after their Greek citizenship was secretly revoked in November 1992, clearly refutes explanations put forth by Greek officials on why citizenship is revoked.63 In 1990, Mr. Husseyin Ramadano_lu traveled to Frankfurt, Germany, along with his wife and new-born daughter Pelin to find work. In 1992, while in Germany, a son, Yusuf, was born. Mr. Ramadano_lu twice renewed his passport at the Greek Consulate in Frankfurt; and his wife renewed her passport once. His daughter also held a valid passport, and his sons birth was registered with the Greek Consulate. The Ramadano_lus regularly visited Greece, sent money back to family members, including their parents, who still live in the country. In short, they maintained regular and proper contacts with the Greek state and its offices abroad.
Despite this, they fell victim to Article 19. In April 1996, they arrived in Greece for a vacation, and then traveled to Turkey to visit relatives holding valid passports duly issued by Greek authorities. On their return to Greece in May, at the Ipsala border gate, Greek immigration officials confiscated their passports and refused to grant them heimatslos (stateless) documents so they could return to their homes in Germany.
Reports of large numbers of stateless individuals still residing in Greeceformer Greek citizens deprived of their citizenship under Article 19also refutes the claim by Mrs. Karagianidou of the Directorate of Citizenship that, it was proven that they [those deprived of their citizenship under Article 19] have also sold off all of their resources and holdings in Greece and that they have not left behind any members of their family. Mrs. Karagianidou even contradicted herself, admitting that some stateless individuals were still residing in Greece under a state of tolerance.64 Estimates of the number of such stateless range from 1,000 to 4,000.65
Remaining Problems: Stateless Persons
As noted, the repeal of Article 19 does not have retroactive force. Those who remain stateless within Greece (1,000-4,000) and those who adopted the nationality of another country after losing Greek citizenship and having left Greece (the vast majority) have no right under Greek law to regain Greek nationality. In August 1998, the Greek foreign minister, Mr. Pangalos, promised that within one year all former Greek citizens who had lost their citizenship under Article 19 and remain in Greece would be granted citizenship, yet no steps have been taken to date.
Stateless individuals have difficulty receiving social services like health care and education anduntil December 1997were even denied the protection of the 1954 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, which Greece ratified in 1975. Mr. Haciibram, the lawyer, outlined the legal no-mans land in which the Article 19 stateless find themselves:
The stateless are neither Greek nor foreign citizens nor refugees. They are registered nowhere. They cannot get a drivers license nor can they officially exercise a profession. Social security takes contributions from them, but when it has to give a pension to a stateless individual, of course, it refuses to do so because he does not have an identity card. When the father is stateless, like the grocery man of Ehinos, Huseyin Zeibek, the children's names cannot appear in the communitys register. They can get married but the registrationof their marriage is not possible. They cannot have a passport nor a stateless certificate. Legally these people do not exist.66
Mrs. Karagianidou of the Directorate of Citizenship denied such a state of affairs existed. She argued that, In our courts there has never been a case of a stateless person who claims to have been maltreated and his rights not recognized. They are treated exactly like foreigners, and they have a permit of residence and a work permit. On substantial legal basis the state of tolerance treats them as all non-E.U. foreigners residing in Greece.67
Individuals whom Human Rights Watch interviewed paint a picture at odds with Mrs. Karagianidous account. Mr. Mustafa, the Coalition of the Left deputy, acknowledged that since 1974 some of the stateless had been given temporary residence permits, but reported that such permits do not grant the right to work.68 An elderly ethnic Turk interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Komotini, Mustafa Salio_lu, reported that he had been able to work even after his citizenship was revoked on June 15, 1964. But without a national identity card, he is unable to collect his pension despite the fact that he paid premiums during all his adult working life. According to him,
My citizenship was revoked on the 15th of June 1964. In 1960-61, I went to Turkey to work, and I left and returned without a passport. Since 1961, however, I have never left Komotini. Now I cannot get my pension because I have no identity card of any sort to prove who I am, although I have paid into the system for thirty years. My appeal to get a disability pension was accepted by the board, but I am unable to get any money because I have no ID card as a stateless individual. In February 1997, I appealed this decision, but the appeal was rejected because I could not provide sufficient evidence of my identity.69
The case of the Zeybek family highlights both the predatory nature of Article 19 as well as the plight of the stateless.70 In January 1984, the Zeybek family went on a vacation to Turkey with valid passports. While there, the father, Huseyin Zeybek, lost his passport and went to the Greek consulate for a replacement. He was told to come back several times over the next three weeks. Finally, he was informed that he had lost his citizenship under Article 19. His family returned to Greece with their valid passports, and later Mr. Zeybek was smuggled back into Greece. Upon his arrival at home, however, police officials confiscated the passports of all family members, whose citizenship was eventually revoked as well. According to Mr. Zeybek,
I went to my village...The police chief took away all our passports. I tried to get a license to open a store. I got it, but then the police came and took it away because, as a non-citizen, I have no right to operate a business. I was constantly fined for running a shop without a license. This went on for almost fifteen years. They took away the license plates of my car. I have no property in my name...I dont have health insurance because I am not a citizen. The company that provides the service would not register me. My daughter wants to get married to a boy in Turkey. She cannot travel there because she has no passport. All but my youngest daughter could not study past primary school because we are not citizens. And all the while, I still pay taxes.
As a result of pressure from the Greek Helsinki Monitor, around one hundred ethnic Turks made stateless under Article 19 have received identity documents from Greek authorities in accordance with the 1954 Stateless Convention. In August 1998, Mr. Theodore Pangalos, the foreign minister of Greece, stated that within the year most or all of thestateless residing within Greece would be offered Greek citizenship, but to date the government has taken no steps to carry out this promise.71
Selection of Muftis
Although the Treaty of Lausanne clearly grants the Turkish minority the right to organize and conduct religious affairs free from government interference, since 1985 the government of Greece has directly appointedagainst the wishes of the overwhelming majority of ethnic Turksthe communitys religious leaders (mufti).72 In December 1990, this policy was codified by Law No. 1920. Greek officials argue that the mufti performs both religious and civil functions and consequently his appointment must be state regulated.
Article 38 of the Treaty of Lausanne, however, states that, All inhabitants...shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals. Article 40 further outlines the right of the Muslim minority to exercise their religion: In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.
In addition, earlier legislation, both an international treaty and Greek law, allowed the Turkish minority to choose its religious leaders. The Treaty of Athens of November 1913, which confirmed Greek sovereignty of former Ottoman territories in Epirus, Macedonia, and the Aegean, allowed muftis to be elected by the Muslim population.73 Greek Law No. 2345 of 1920, which regulated matters pertaining to the mufti and the vak1flar (private charitable foundations), did so as well. Under Article 6 of Law No. 2345, the muftis were to be elected by the Muslim population after a list of candidates had been approved by both the head mufti, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the governor general and/or prefect of the region.74 The chief mufti was to be appointed by the state from three candidates nominated by all Greek muftis appointed or acknowledged by the Greek government. In addition to carrying out Islamic law, the duties of the muftis under the law also included supervision, in conjunction with community boards, of education and the vak1flar.
In the past, the minority and the state had apparently worked out a modus vivendi, that, while not implementing fully Law No. 2345, generally respected the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne. Leaders from the minority were consulted and nominated a candidate for mufti, which state authorities then confirmed in office. 75
In 1984, however, at the height of state pressure against the Turkish minority, the mufti of Komotini, Hseyin Mustafa Efendi, died of a heart attack after a long illness. In his place the Greek government appointed Mr. RstEthem as acting mufti, without consulting the minority.76 The minority objected to the appointment and, citing the 1913 Treaty of Athens and Law No. 2345, petitioned the governor, but to no avail. In 1990, the Turkish community held unofficial elections for mufti, electing Mr. Mehmet Emin A_a in Xanthi and Mr. Ibrahim Serif in Komotini.77
On December 24, 1990, the Greek government countered with Decree No. 182. It ended the previously informal, if irregular, system of electing muftis, and repealed Law No. 2345. The decree was approved by parliament on January 26, 1991, and became Law No. 1920.
Law No. 1920 effectively removes selection of the mufti from the community and grants it to the state. Article 1.5 allows the state-appointed secretary general of the region to name an eleven-member commission, headed by the relevant prefect and including Greek Muslim religious officers and outstanding Greek Muslim members of the district. The committee then nominates a list of candidates, which is forwarded to the state-appointed secretary general of Thrace, who submits it to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. The ministry makes the final appointment pending presidential confirmation. Clearly anticipating opposition and a possible boycott from the Turkish minority, a provision of the law states that, The committee will convene legally with the president and any number of its members. Furthermore, in Article 5 of the law, Duties of the Mufti, supervision of the vak1f property is omitted, a radical change from Law No. 2345. Finally, Article 7 of the new law stipulates that all written correspondence by the mufti must be conducted in Greek; Law No. 2345 had exempted from such provisions correspondence with other Muslims and Muslim communities.
The members of the Turkish minority continue to reject overwhelmingly the new system and the so-called appointed muftis. They support their own muftis, the so-called elected muftis and for the most part shun the appointed muftis. A leader of the ethnic Turkish community, Adem Bekiro_lu, stated that,
Because the government wouldn't arrange an election for the mufti, we were forced to make our own election. We set a date for the electionDecember 28, 1990. Just before our election, on December 24th, the government (the cabinet) announced a new lawLaw No. 1920that said that muftis are to be appointed by the government for ten-year terms. In February [sic] the parliament passed it. In accordance with the new law, the Nomarch of Xanthi appointed Mehmet Sinikoglu the new mufti, displacing Mufti A_a. The Nomarch of Komotini appointed Mufti Cemali as the new mufti, but the Turkish minority elected _brahim Serif the new mufti on December 28, 1990. Now there are two muftis in each communityone appointed by the government and one elected by the Muslim community.78
Most of the minority members recently interviewed by Human Rights Watch believe that the manner in which muftis are selected is undemocratic and deprives the minority of its voice. A member of the Minority Scientists Association summed up this feeling in stating that, We feel that an expressed consensus of the minority is necessary in the selection of the mufti...the minority does not feel bound by the 1990 decree, for which it was never consulted.79 One of the elected muftis, Mehmet Emin A_a, who was jailed for his role as an elected mufti, believes that the state should revert to the old system by which it consults the community and then pro forma appoints the communitys choice. He stated that, The government should consult the local people, and religious and political representatives of the people will recommend someone.80
The Greek government argues that the mufti must be appointed because he is paid by the state and, in addition to his religious duties, carries out official state duties.81 It also claims that the minority community is consulted before a mufti is appointed. Moreover, the appointed mufti for Komotini, Mr. Cemali, told Human Rights Watch that the old law on electing muftis was never applied. He stated that,
One of the major problems is the ongoing controversy around the selection of the muftis. Law No. 2345 of 1920 relating to the selection of the muftis speaks about the election of all the muftis. However, never in Greek history was a mufti elected. In fact since 1400 in the Islamic world no mufti was ever elected....I think the law of 1990 is a very good one in fact. The old system was not so good although the law was good, but it was never applied. On the contrary the new law is good precisely because it is being applied.82
Consequently, the Greek government has repeatedly prosecuted the elected muftis for usurping authority because they use the title of mufti. Mr. Mehmet Emin A_a, the elected mufti of Xanthi, and Mr. _brahim Serif, the elected mufti of Komotini, have faced prosecution on the following occasions:
Mr. A_a was tried on December 14, 1998, in the single-member criminal court of Xanthi on charges of usurping the title of mufti for messages he released on Islamic holidays in 1997. He was sentenced to seven months of imprisonment, but was released pending his appeal of the verdict.
On December 11, 1997, Mr. A_a was sentenced to sixteen months of imprisonment by the single-member criminal court of Lamia on charges of usurping the title of mufti for releasing messages on the occasion of Islamic holidays in 1996. The decision has been appealed;
On April 7, 1997, Mr. A_a was sentenced to twenty months imprisonment by the single-member court in Lamia for usurping the title of mufti in messages he released on the occasion of religious holidays in 1995 and 1996. The three-member criminal court of Lamia upheld the conviction on appeal, but reduced the sentence to fourteen months, converted into a fine. Mr. A_a paid the fine and appealed the case to the Court of Cassation.
On October 21, 1996, _brahim Serif, was convicted in Thessaloniki for usurping the title of mufti because he had used the title of mufti. He was sentenced to six months, but was released on appeal.
On June 28, 1996, Mehmet Emin A_a was sentenced to twenty months of imprisonment by the criminal court of Agrinio on charges of usurping the title of mufti. The charges were brought because of messages he released on the occasion of Islamic holidays in January and April 1993 and in January and February 1994. Upon appeal, the criminal court of Agrinio upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to six months of imprisonment, to be converted into a fine. Mr. A_a paid the fine and appealed the case to a higher court;
On May 7, 1996, Mr. A_a was given a sentence of twelve months by the single-member criminal court of Thessaloniki for usurping the title of mufti for various messages he gave in 1994 and 1995 on Islamic holidays. On November 5, 1998, his sentence was reduced to eight months.
On April 12, 1994, the three-member criminal court of Xanthi sentenced Mr. A_a to ten-months of imprisonment for usurping the title of mufti. Upon appeal, the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction, and Mr. A_a was sent to jail. After serving six months of the sentence, he was released because of health problems and the remaining four months of his sentence was converted into a fine.
Control of Vak1flar (Private Charitable Foundations)
In another violation of the Treaty of Lausanne, the government of Greece has interfered with the administration of Vak1flar, private charitable foundations used to support education, minority activities, and social welfare. Law No. 1091, passed in 1980, and Presidential Decree No. 1 of January 1, 1991, both aim to weaken the Vak1flar financially as well as dilute the communitys control over them.
Article 40 of the treaty, however, clearly grants the right to control the foundations to members of the minority, stating that, In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein. In addition, Article 12 of the Treaty of Athens of 1913 obligated the Greek government to respect Vak1f property. Furthermore, Article 10 of Law No. 2345 of 1920 stipulated that the muftis would supervise the Vak1flar, which would be, under Article 12 of the same law, administered by councils elected for three years by Muslim voters.83
Attacks on the independence of the Vak1flar first began in 1967, when the Colonels junta seized power in Greece, and have continued to the present. The coup leaders dismissed the members of the community boards that supervised the foundations and replaced them with individuals from government agencies; in 1973, a non-Muslim was even appointed as chairman of one such board.84 Even after the return to civilian rule, the situation did not improvein fact, it worsened. In August 1979, the Karamanlis government presented a bill to parliament further restricting the activities of the Vak1flar and the Turkish minoritys right to administer them. The bill was enacted on November 12, 1980, as Law No. 1091, provoking widespread outrage in the minority community and from the Turkish government.
While Law No. 1091 preserves a facade of elections by the minority of the boards that run the foundations, in effect it arrogates to the state not only a greater hand in running the Vak1flar, but also undermines their very financial basis. Consequently, while Article 5 of the law provides for elections for members of the Vak1f boards, Article 11 allows the then state-appointed prefect of the region to create a single Vak1f board in an area where there is more than one foundation.85
The law also struck at the financial existence of the foundations. Article 20.1 stipulates that, The existing Managing Committees, boards or where lacking, the acting Mutawils, are obligated to submit a statement of the vak1fs properties and those that it administers to their localities Financial Tax Offices, within the revocation deadline of a year from the enactment of the present law.86 While such a requirement may seem innocuous, in reality it is a daunting task given that much of the property owned by the Vak1flar was acquired during the 500 years of Ottoman rule of the region, when book-keeping was primitive at best and records often destroyed during wars and dislocations. Furthermore, Article 16 of Law No. 1091 gives the prefect and his office wide-ranging control over budgetary matters. Article 16.1 and 16.2, for example, respectively state that, Regardless of size, the budget and statement areapproved by an instrument of the local prefect..., and, No modification or transfer of credit may be allowed without the Prefects approval, and no expenditure may be allowed without being recorded in the approved budget.
Faced with continued protest from the community, the law was never implemented. Consequently, the Greek government issued Presidential Decree No. 1 of January 3, 1991, that contained most of the fundamental provisions of Law. No 1091 but added loopholes allowing the state to appoint the members of the Vak1f managing boards in certain situations. Article 25 grants the state the right to make appointments outright if elections are not held. It states that,
In the case of a member of the managing committees declination of appointment, death, resignation or dismissal and lacking a substitute member, the said member is replaced by another, selected by the prefect from the ranking table. If the table is exhausted or all recorded individuals refuse, the prefect appoints a Greek Muslim citizen possessing the proper qualifications. In the case that the elections fail to produce a result or the appointment stipulated above does not occur for any reason or in the case of any appointed members resignation, death or dismissal, the prefect appoints the local financial tax inspector as manager.
Ahmet Keyha Ihsan, a PASOK municipal councillor in Rodope province, sums up the situation in the following way:
The boards which manage the Vak1flar are appointed by the Greek state and not elected by the minority in spite of the fact that we had restoration of democracy. The minority has refused to apply the new law of 1980 which limits the administration and financial autonomy of the Vak1flar. Even the muftis were not informed when this law was established arbitrarily... Also all Vak1flar had to submit papers to the revenue office stating their assets or else they would lose them; they have no such papers. This law eventually was not applied with few exceptions because the minority protested too strongly. 87
At present, according to the U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights for 1997, a 1996 presidential decree puts the Vak1flar under the administration of a committee for three years pending a solution to the impasse.
Education
Of all the problems facing the Turkish minority, short-comings in the education system affect the largest number of individuals and have the greatest long-term impact on the community. According to the Greek government, there are officially 230 minority primary schools with 8,500 students; two minority junior high schools with 200 students; two minority senior high schools with approximately 400 students; and two Muslim religious schools (Medrese) with 200 students.88 The curriculum in the minority primary schools is bilingual. Greek, history, geography, civics, and environmental education are taught in Greek. Mathematics, physics, chemistry, religion, Turkish, art, and physical education are taught in Turkish. If the school is large enough, English instruction is provided. The overwhelming majority of minority children attend minority primary schools.89
Although Articles 40 and 41 of the Treaty of Lausanne grant the minority both the right to education in its native language as well as autonomy in managing educational institutions, Greeces respect for these provisions hasbeen the exception, not the rule.90 Mustafa Mustafa, an ethnic Turk and parliamentarian from the Coalition of the Left, summed up the educational dilemma of the minority as follows:
It is noteworthy to mention that most minority students have not even passed high school. There is an asphyxiating situation of controls by the Greek state over the minority schools. Education in minority primary schools is of a very low level and does not correspond at all to the requirements for their progress to secondary education. The idea behind the minority schools is to control them and to influence rather than to provide the appropriate education.91
Seventy-five years of spotty implementation of the Treaty of Lausanne has left a hodge-podge, neglected, and woefully inadequate educational system for the Turkish minority. The Cultural Agreements signed in 1951-2 and 1968 have, like the Treaty of Lausanne, been largely violated or not implemented by Greek authorities. Major problems include a mixed system of administration, a poorly-educated teaching staff, a lack of secondary schools, inadequate and outdated textbooks, and the absence of a curriculum to teach Greek as a second language.
Mixed Administration
Under the Treaty of Lausanne, the minority has the right to run its own educational institutions. In practice, however, the Greek government, through the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, has wide-ranging control over all schools, whether it concerns hiring teachers, distributing textbooks, or building or repairing schools. Mihalis Lambakis, the coordinator for minority schools in Thrace, noted that,
All primary schools are private schools. They belong to the school boards elected every two to three years by the parents, which then function as owners of the schools. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that all schools in Greece are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Here the Christian teachers are paid by the Greek state; some have organic posts and others are hired on a temporary basis. Also the Greek Muslims who come from the Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy are paid by the Greek state. They have organic or temporary posts. The rest of the Muslim teachers are paid by the school boardwe are not interested where they get their money from. The Greek state subsidizes the functioning of these schools to a large degree; for the rest they are responsible. Often in fact when the Greek state authorizes subsidies for various repairs, the minority refuses them.92
According to Mr. Lambakis, a similar situation exists regarding high schools:
The Xanthi high school is private while the Celal Bayar high school of Komotini has a mixed system. All Christian teachers are paid by the Greek state and have automatically renewable contracts (monimoi). The Muslim teachers are paid according to a private law contract (symvasi idiotikou dikaiou). So all teachers coming from Turkey are paid by the Turkish state; the Muslim staff who are Greek citizens are paid by theschool board. In Xanthi, where the high school is entirely private, the Christian staff is paid by the state and the Muslim staff is paid by the owner of the school. In fact the school is a private enterprise. You have in fact two legal situations in the administration of the minority high schools: some function completely as a private business, others are in a bastard situation.93
The minority, however, views this mixed status as a major detriment: it allows the state to manipulate affairs to its liking without providing the necessary means of support. Birol Akifo_lu, an ethnic Turk and parliamentarian, complained that,
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