I'll assume your referring to Alesia there, I believe the Romans actually had as many as 60,000 men and the Gauls significantly less than 250,000 men, more like 180,000.

 There's a major difference between a great battle and big battles (numerically), big battles arent necessarily the most important or even decisive.

 In terms of importance positively for Rome, I would have to say Naissus 268AD and Lake Benacus 268AD also throw Zama and Ilipa in there to.

 Greatest defeats Carrhae 53BC the Teutoburg forest 9AD and Adrianople 378AD.

 The greatest battle Rome ever fought in I think could be Chalons 451AD even though it didnt do Romem uch good in the long term, the battle was of huge importance to the future of Europe, Western Europe especially  in that would it be under the control of the Germanic tribes or the Hunnic empire.

 All the battles I mentioned were hugely important and more often than not, decisive. I'm sure ive missed one or two majors battles however.

 What I find disappointing about Cannae is even though it was a masterclass by Hannibal his opponent Varro was a disgrace.

 It'd be infintely more impressive a victory had the Roman commander been even remotely competant, Varro's strategy provoked annihilation, i'm stunned he couldnt see that.

 His idea of breaking the Carthaginians through an overwhelming concentration of force in the centre was sacrificing the flexibility of the legions for the rigidity of the phalanx, the result when up against a general like Hannibal could be nothing but a Roman defeat.

 Hannibal must have struggled to believe his luck when he saw the Roman formation as they advanced.

Well, unless the definition is defined with certain specifics, the 'greatest battle' a Roman army was involved in was, hands down, Cannae. Hannibal's masterpiece has resonated beyond its age as much as any other in history. The crescent formation. Double-envelopment. The elastically hinged wings of cavalry. Simply brilliant. Of history's great commanders, Hannibal was unique in being essentially defensive in his use of infantry. Even at defeat at Zama, the aging Hannibal, probably suffering from mental and even physical exhaustion, and no longer with a great cavalry force or adept lieutenants, skillfully used his inferior cavalry as a rearguard action to rid the cavalry squadrons of both armies of the field (this is conjectural), and absorbed Scipio's legions toward his veteran line, which he placed in reserve, thus immediately thwarting Scipio's chances of using his tactics of pinning an enemy's center and sending his rear lines to envelop and crush that enemy. It may have been very fortunate for Scipio, who certainly generaled with great poise that day, that Hannibal's first 2 lines lacked co-operation and began fighting amongst themselves. The superior cavalry arm decided Zama (basically), and Scipio was very prudent to secure these allies before engaging Hannibal.

True, luck always plays a factor in these situations.

Let's get one thing very clear - Varro was no genius. But I don't think he was the fool everyone seems to make him out to be. remeber, we have the benefit of hindsight, and I doubt anyone before August 2, 216 B.C. could predict what could have happened. Every victory in history which was an illustration of superbly innovative tactics was one with the loser not being more than a moderate commander (I think). Roman writers and historians were, for the most part, either wealthy aristicrats or dependent on the aristocracy - in the case of Polybius, the Scipionic circle. My point, which is simply humble my opinion, when 2 consuls shared command, as was the case at Trebia and Cannae, the patrician was always the 'hero' and the plebeian the 'goat'. Gaius Terentius Varro was a plebeian.

Praise has been showered upon Fabius Maximus for his policy of delayed inaction against Hannibal, but Varro's dispute with Fabius, which is what made him so bad in the eyes of the aristocratic writers, was very sensible; indeed, Fabius was a nuisance to Hannibal and his army, but Hannibal still marched where and when he wanted, devastaing the countryside and appropriating all the victuals and supplies for sustaining his ends. Varro's argument was how could the Romans expect to keep their federation intact, which relied on promising protection for obediance, if they couldn't protect their own people? Actually, Hannibal was indirectly enriching Fabius and his fellow aristocrats as farmers fled the land and crowded into Rome. Their farms were sold for a mere pittance, and the senators etc. were incorporating them into their already vast estates, known as latifundia, and working them with slaves. Sorry - this really isn't the point, but interesting trivia.

Moreover, Fabius' style was not the Roman way. Varro did what was expected of him -be aggressive. Fabius' wisdom, though, was indeed appreciated after the lesson of Cannae. He certainly never 'outwitted' Hannibal, as many seem to feel. It was the other way around; has anyone ever read of the famed stratagem Hannibal pulled on Fabius in the Falernian plain in 217 B.C. by using some 2,000 cattle? It was a page for the art of deception.

Indeed, Hannibal had constantly outflanked the Romans before and even after Cannae with his cavalry, but here they had him in terrain that prohibited any outflanking maneuver. Much like Darius III at Gaugamela 115 years earlier, Varro's plan was not subtle but, on paper, quite practical. His cavalry was to be purely defensive against Hannibal's horsemen, designed to hold their ground for as long as possible as he crushed Hannibal's vastly smaller body of infantry with sheer weight (the more seasoned infantry were in the center). Both he and Paullus personally commaned the cavalry units, clearly to hold as much tenacity and spirit as possible. What took place on the wings would be of little consequence after an overwhelming victory by a massive concentration of force in the center. He had every reason to be confident; the spearheads of about 10,000 legionnaires had cut away at the Trebia and, the 6,000 or so of the vanguard, at Trasimene. They would now do so in an offensive manner and absolutely destroy Hannibal. True, he was robbing his army of flexibility, but was enforcing more rigidity. He had to bunch the legions together more than usual to create more depth. It must have seemed so simple. As I stated, Varro, a plebeian, has gone done as the ultimate scapegoat, but with such a huge army at his disposal, attempting anything complicated would have been improbable. Again, he was doing what was expected of him. Like Darius III, he went up against a man that day of battle who is to this day considered one of the greatest leaders in military history.

Hannibal's cavalry at Cannae achieved shock tactics, as he placed his heavier cavalry in more numbers on one side, and the lighter Numidians on the other; the Numidians and their Roman allied counterparts fought equally against each other on Hannibal's right flank, but the force of Hasdrubal's heavy Iberian and Gallic horse, which outnumbered the Roman cavalry on this side, the Carthaginian left, by more than 2-to-1, quickly put them to flight and, employing incredible order, did not pursue too far and swung about 90 %, rode behind the Roman infantry, and before completely smashing into the allied cavalry, achieved the flight of that allied contingent, who were pursued by many of the Numidians. Hasdrubal then rode into the Romans rear, spelling doom for the poor legionnaires, who were already sucked into Hannibal's envelopment on three sides.     

We know what happened to poor Varro and his army that dreadful day for Rome, but he displayed admirable distinction in defeat, rallying survivors at Venusia. He was relatively excused and given posts of command throughout the rest of the war. After the war, he was sent on diplomatic missions to Greece and Africa.

Cannae was indeed a lesson in the art of war, as Will Durant, in his The Story of Civilization Vol. III, wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history. It ended the days of Roman reliance solely upon infantry, and set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".

But the Romans, wrote Polybius, "...were most to be feared when they stood in real danger.....Though they were now so overwhelmingly defeated, and their military reputation had been destroyed, yet, by the peculiar virtues of their constitution, and by wise counsel, they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy.....but in a few years made themselves masters of the world."

Food for thought. Thanks, Spartan

Different Hasdrubal Menander. The Hasdrubal I was referring to was one of Hannibal's subordinates during his campaign in Italy. I should have specified, and there were 2 major Carthaginian generals named Hasdrubal in Iberia at the time, Barca and Gisgo. Along with the 3rd, Mago Barca, they didn't exploit a golden opportunity after the Scipio brothers were defeated; the Ebro line was held by about 9,000 legionnaires under one Lucius Marcius. Their chance to rid the Iberian peninsula of the Romans for good in 211-210 B.C. came and went, as reinforcements arrived first from Gaius Claudius Nero , with about 12,000 foot and 2,000 horse (?), and then Scipio (later Africanus) with about 10,000 foot and 3,000 horse (?).

No merit should be taken form the dourness and spirit of the Romans, but the Carthaginian leaders seemed to have quarreled and disagreed to the point that greatly impeded their chances to win in Iberia. Hasdrubal Barca's aim was to get to his brother Italy, and Gisgo's seemed to protect the vested interests in Iberia for the Carthaginian suffete. I may be oversimplifying all this, though. 

Rome was always going to ultimately win; Hannibal's genius merely prolonged the inevitable. Carthage, except the Barcid clan, was simply not a warrior culture, so to speak. Their talents were that of great middlemen and entrepreneurs, trading what they and others made.

 Well its an important battle obviously the final confrontation of the 2nd Punic war the coming together of two great generals Hannibal and Scipio.

 However as a battle it was unimpressive, little more than a slogging match and totally uncharacteristic of both generals

With no doubt battle of Chalone 451 A.D.

It was a bloody battle

Battle for survival.

http://www.historialago.com/leg_01043_legioncombate_01.htm - http://www.historialago.com/leg_01043_legioncombate_01.htm

Sure, the Germans had heavy casualties at Teutoburger, but again, it is no evidence for heavy Cimbri losses at Arausio.

Neither is Vercellae. The two battles were obvioulsy quite different. Cimbri had previously defeated Romans in all engagements, eg at Noreii, where they did not even hold a very signifigant numerical advantage. The Romans apparently feel their losses were so insignifigant as to be not worth mentioning (unlike Teutoburger, in which German losses are in fact mentioned as being at least noteworthy).

The great strength - and the great weakness - of Roman forces was their adherence to command. In situations where their formations were fragmented and command disrupted - such as in the rout at Arausio - Roman forces were next to useless, because they had no skill at individual combat.

Here the list of the Roman legions:

http://ancientrome.ru/army/leg1.html - http://ancientrome.ru/army/leg1.html

http://ancientrome.ru/army/legions1.htm - http://ancientrome.ru/army/legions1.htm

One of bloodiest battles in roman history is The battle of Mursa (in modern Croatia) between Western Roman Empire (emp. Magnentius) and Eastern Roman Empire (emp. Constantius II) in 351 AD.

Casualties of both sides were about 55 000 roman soldjers and barbarian mercenaries.

 J. Caeser.

 The Romans wernt strangers to surrendering theres the famous Roman surrender of 137bc when the Romans were humiliated by the Numantines. Only thanks to Gracchus was a massacre of the Romans prevented, instead a treaty was signed and the Romans were forced to bend down below two spears with a bar over it, a sign of subservience.

 However I do think this whole idea that the Romans were poor individual fighters is totally baseless, to fight in formation as a team it is still required that every soldier in that team be fully proficient with his weapon. There is absolutely no use whatsoever in a formation if those within it are useless with a sword, the Romans trained for a reason and I dare say they were more than a match for the average barbarian fighter, no matter how brave or how big his axe was.

 Totally totally baseless, as is the idea that all barbarians were experts with their own weapons individually, like as soon as they picked up a sword they were somehow became proficient with it. Across the board a well-trained Roman soldier was superior to the barbarians he could expect to fight, certainly before the barbarians closed the gap on the Romans in regards to order, tactics and technology. 

 Decius Meridiam.

 Can you be sure those figures are accurate? I very much doubt the Roman empire could of afforded (and survived) the loss of 110,000 men in 1 battle, easily 1/4 or 1/3 of its entire army. I can't believe casualties were that enormous at 55,000 each.

 The way your phrased, made it sound like you were saying 55,000 died on EACH side, ammounting to 110,000, simple misunderstanding.

While this is true, the strength of their forces at the point of engagement was almost always far less than that of Roman legions in formation - men per square footage of front and all that.

Obviously a stirring image, for propaganda purposes. A guy fought with a broken sword ... so what ... it really doesn't say much. It isn't like an entire army all happened to have broken swords. And I don't think it is at all comparable to fighting stark naked!

And as many accounts of their annihilation, as well. The Cimbri annihilated the Romans in two major battles and were defeated in the third, after wandering the empire unchallenged for a decade, putting Caesar's brief romp on the far side of the Rhine in true perspective.

Here you have a misconception. Among the Celts, such as the forces at Allia, it is not a mass of men swinging swords, but a front of swordsmen with shields behind a screen of javelineers, with cavalry forces in reserve. The Romans at this time were using the phalanx, and more or less adopted the tactics of Brennus' forces (cavalry, and the use of skirmishers) and merged them with concepts of the phalanx to produce the legion.

Germanic forces did not utilize the sword much at all, only their elites used it. More typical weapons for the mass of Germanic forces were hunting weapons and tools adapted to war - the spear, the bow, the axe.

True, but then gladiatorial combat was not of the same nature as combat in war. Romans and Greeks may have made good fighters in the games, but in the real world, they were certainly not in very high demand as mercenaries.

It is a simple fact, that neither of these forces prevailed against Rome. Rome was only ever defeated by Celts and later by various Germanic groups. Why would the Romans fear the people who lost all their wars, and not fear those who actually conquered Rome itself on multiple occasions? The notion is absurd! The Parthians won a few battles, but nobody fears an enemy who can only win battles but cannot threaten invasion or conquest.

As far as Hannibal - are you saying the Romans feared only Hannibal, but not his army (which was primarily made up of Celtic mercenaries)?    What did they think he was going to do without it?

The Romans didn't fear that the Parthians would destroy Rome, only that they would block Roman expansion in the East. Hardly the same thing, as the kind of fear Hannibal's army inspired, and not even close to the memory of Allia - a day which was commemorated ever after in Roman history by the closing of all shops and public places, a national day of mourning. The Parthians never made the Romans take up one of those. Caesar himself speaks of tribes like the Belgae as being quite formidable; they feared the Marcomanni, they feared the Celtiberians, and they feared the Cimbri until Vercellae (or they wouldn't have let them romp around among their vassals and allies, looting at will, for a decade). Name a Roman historian, and he evinces the fact that the Romans greatly feared other groups - be it Caesar, Polybius, Livy, etc. What evidence do you have to dispute these histories? Gut feelings, I suppose?

Neither the Parthians nor Hannibal ever made any momentous impression on the Roman way of war, there were no major changes in Rome's tactical doctrine afterwards (though they did cause changes to strategy). In contrast, Brennus' victory caused the Romans to abandon the phalanx and adopt the legion, along with Celtic arms - the helms they wore, the pilum, and the gladius, and to begin using cavalry. The Marcomanni Wars, far less succesful than the Punic Wars, occasioned further reforms of the Roman military and the adoptation of Marcomanni arms - chainmail, the round shield, and so on. Besides the Germans and Celts, the other major influence on Roman military doctrine was the Greeks. The phalanx was originally used because they shared a common cultural link, and combined with other influences to create the legion, but also Pyrrhus occasioned the adoptation of cataphracts (not, as commonly presumed, the Parthians). What unique influence did Parthian armies ever have on the nature of the legion? Did they start using mounted archers? Elephants? The only thing the Romans ever did with elephants was capture those of their enemies and display them, or use them in the arena as a spectacle. They either prevailed against these forces or simply were never seriously threatened in Italy, so there was no reason to adopt the tactics of such peoples as the Parthians, who could defend themselves but were too impotent to threaten an invasion of Rome itself. The Romans adopted the tactics of people who gave them a bloody nose in Italy itself, or who were a potentially direct threat to Rome itself.

Romans began not only to enlist massivelly the horse archers but foot archers from the eastern provinces. In fact, the parthian threat changed the roman way of war althought the most strong change came with the sassanid armies, strong in all types of cavalry and infantry, but specially in heavy infantry. The arrive of the cataphracts to the battlefields (please don't compare with previous cavalry units) change the entire roman army: adoption of phalanx, adoption of heavy cavalry, add the rise of the achers and the horse archers to the level of Comitatensis in the military reforms of Diocletian and you will see that the military influence of parthian-sassanid was the more powerful.

bye

Eastern empire though ... yes ... definately influenced strongly by the armies of the Near East.

Sub dispositione viri illustris comitis et magistri equitum praesentalis :
     Vexillationes palatinae decem :
     Comites seniores.
     Equites promoti seniores.
     Equites brachiati seniores.
     Equites brachiati iuniores.
     Equites Batavi seniores.
     Equites cornuti seniores.
     Equites cornuti iuniores.
     Comites Alani.
     Equites Batavi iuniores.
     Equites constantes Valentinianenses seniores.
     Vexillationes comitatenses..... :
     Equites armigeri.
     Equites primi Gallicani.
     Equites octavo Dalmatae.
     Equites Dalmatae Passerentiaci.
     Equites Mauri alites.
     Equites Honoriani Taifali iuniores.
     Equites Honoriani seniores.
     Equites Mauri feroces.
     Equites Constantiani felices.
     Equites scutarii.
     Equites stablesiani Africani.
     Equites Marcomanni.
     Equites armigeri seiores.
     Equites sagittarii clibanarii.
     Equites sagittarii Parthi seniores.
     Equites primo sagittarii.
     Equites secundo sagittarii.
     Equites tertio sagittarii.
     Equites quarto sagittarii.
     Equites sagittarii Parthi iuniores.
     Equites cetrati seniores.
     Comites iuniores.
     Equites promoti iuniores.
     Equites sagittarii iuniores.
     Equites cetrati iuniores.
     Equites Honoriani iuniores.
     Equites armigeri iuniores.
     Equites secundi scutarii iuniores.
     Equites stablesiani Italiciani.
     Equites sagittarii Cordueni.
     Equites sagittarii seniores.
     Cuneus equitum promotorum.
Officium suprascriptae magisteriae potestatis :
     Princeps.
     Numerarius.
     Primiscrinius.
     Commentariensis.
     Adiutor.
     Regerendarius.
     Exceptores et reliqui apparitores