Lubomirsky was great untill betrayed. For sure he showned his mastership as commander in war against Russia, defeating all Russian armies but next he signed bad peace treaty with Russia just to have free back when leaded his army against king John Casimir.

Also Stephen Czarniecki proved his extraordinary skills on the battlefield.

As for Sobieski for sure he was a master in fighting Turks. He made many campaigns and won 2 major battles, first at Chocim and next in Vienna.

All mentioned commanders were good in the field and its really hard to say which one was the best.

Actually we can say that Lubomirski was better than king John Casimir because he leaded succesfull rebelion against this king.

Wasnt Lubomirski also very succesfull commander? His campaign against Russia was brillant. Can you say that if Lubomirski had such army like Sobieski at Chocim he wouldnt win as well?

What about Wisniowiecki and his fight against much larger Chmielnicki forces?

And Czarniecki also did great job in much harder situation and in much worse time.

And what do you think about king John Casimir and his military skills?

As you know im not an expert on 17th century so i value your opinion on these matters. Altough im not an expert and cant compare my knowledge about this period with yours, i have read some articles about him. In general i have learned that he wasnt an enthusiast of polish-lithuanian army and prefered to rely on foreign mercenary troops, especially infantry. He was also well educated in military strategy and tactics. Was battle of Beresteczko his achievemnt or some other commander stayed behind it?

I think we should give credit to the Johanes Cassimirus for this battle..this was his idea of the "western type formation" used at Beresteczko ( advised by Zygmunt Przyjemski and Christoff Houvaldt). Generally I think he was able commander but not the great..Victory at Beresteczko should not blanke off the defeats at Zborowo, Żwaniec, Warsaw and finally Mątwy...

Originally posted by TJK With Wiśniowiecki we have no data ..he have command (as general commander) only quite unnumerous corps..I think with his tactical skill he was equal to the Janusz Radziwiłł.

Well, have you ever heard of Zbaraz- Wisniowiecki held there the Tartars and Cossacks back with maybe 10,000 men a force of 10  or 15 times greater, he made many fierce battles with Chmielnicki and won them. And then came the forces of Jan II Kazimierz and won of the enemy finally.

Polish forces retreated to the fortified camp of Zbaraz (10 July to 25 August 1649) where a relatively small force of some 9,000 Polish troops held back the entire might of Chmielniecki and the Khan for over six weeks.

I would say it's rather strange question..when I have two Wisniowiecki biografies on my bookshelf.

Zbaraz was a siege (an you have asked about field commander)..

Inaccurate. Wisniowiecki have repulsed many Cossack's storms and was succesful during some sallys otside the fortification but it still far from winning many battle with Chmielnicki...

Absolutely untrue ! Chmielnicki have split the army and marched with main corps towards Jan Kazimierz, then he ambused polish forces near the Zborów. Only bribery of Crimean Khan by polish chancellor Jerzy Ossolińki have rescued polish army from destruction. 

BTW I think Wisniowiecki was really good - he have palyed great role during battle of Ochmatów as well as at Beresteczko (he have commnaded left polish wing). The defence of Zabaraż is also mainly his credit...however IMO he could not be compared with Sobieski, Chodkiewicz or Koniecpolski..

ah, almost the same...

sorry.

and field commanders, now i count wisniowiecki as one of them too...

and from few points all battles were sieges, for they built fortifications

I would like to mention Hetman Zolkiewski in the Kluszyn battle against Russians.

His army of 6,800 was stuck between two Russian armies: one with 8,000 men and other with 35,000 men. Even Napoleon would have some misgivings about starting battle under these circumstances. Zolkiewski attacked the smaller force and forced them to seek refuge in a nearby fortified town and left some minimal forces to keep enemy inside fortifications, then turned his main force against bigger army of 35,000 and managed to defeat them, then came back to finish the smaller Russian and mercenary force. This was one of the battles involving Polish Hussars. Hussar losses were very minimal (about 100).

I looked at this list and have one comment: All great military leaders from this list will be dead by the end of century. Some of them were already the great leaders in the first half of century. Some of these leaders were better that any of their European counterparts. What is interesting is that this list doesn’t contain any leaders that  could lead Poland military into the next century. In any country, such end of century list  would contain also next century leaders as well. It would be interesting to open discussion on XVIII century Poland. It is very interesting to see the decline of a great empire.  Lubomirski is probably the sign of things to come. Another thing, you are dealing with history that is not well known for many of readers yet they may want to follow these discussions, could you provide more dates?

What failures do you mean? 

Skworoda’s book is not the source nor scientific elaboration. This is just popular book which however base on scientic works (as Wimmer’s “Polish-Swedish war, aricles of Tresmeden and works of Nagielski). Composition of polish army at Kłecko given in the Appendix is however just vision of author without any scientific base. He probably correctly assume

the presence of Lubomirski 2 dragon freicompanies and newly founded unit of Zamoyski but he not consider the units ofJjacob Weyher which have operate in this period in Wielkopolska.  

Which historians doubt about this ?

Skworda book could not be even compared to the foundamental work about Deluge of Jan Wimmer redaction.

..and which fit also to my statement 3 to 7 companies….

1.       Again which historian claim there werent ?

2.       This not the main factor – polish regiments have not fixed copmositon and the units were often detached to antother regiment depending from the task. You have such example at Warka.

3.       This is absolutely improbable – the phase of Czarniecki attack is described most detaily by at least 3 memories of polish soldiers (Kochowski, Łoś, Jemiołowski) and by 2 swedish soldiers (Dahlberg and Pufendorf), no one even mentioned about polish dragons

Go back to the root of this discussion. I claim the Czarniecki and Lubomirski were mostly cavalry commanders and the way they command combined arms was a little obsolete. You deny this. You have to prove:

1.       They command combined arms in the battle

2.       They coordinte the different arms in the way used by western commanders

Czarniecki used dragons during Warka battle. This was however one single volley, nothing more. Never used mixed formation of cavalry and infantry/dragons.

What is not true ??? Read carefully your “newest elaboration” (pages 178-179)….

Well,  this is just obvoius that books from the “Historical battles” series are just popular works and with few exeptions (works of Nadolski, Nagielski, Wagner,  Długołęcki Plewczyński and some few more) authors base not on their own examintaion of primary and secondary sources but on the other elaborations. I like Skworoda books but as well "Warka-Gniezno" as "Hammerstein" could not be desribed as newest  scientific elaboration.

Ok, give me any primary source which confirm dragons units given by Skworoda.

Historians didn’t write primary sources. Give me the names of historians, title of works and page where modern scholars give the statement that presence of polish dragons is doubfull.

..and look to the “Polish Warfare Traditions”  vol. 1 under redaction of Janusz Sikorski – page 340 “ Czarniecki and Lubomirski have 15 thousand soldiers including 1000 dragons, rest cavalry including 5 thousandn general noble levy.”

Yes, if he made his own examintaion of sources (not only relation from battlefield but also reports, Juristic books etc.), however he didn’t at least he didn’t mentioned any own examintaion just putted the units which seems to him probable.

..and I belive much more in elaboration of prof. Wiesław Majewski  (in above mentioned Polish Warfare Traditions”)

This is not the case if the dragons were to far to support Czarniecki regiments. The questions is why he (Czarniecki) havent get with him the dragons to support the cavalry attack. My answer is he belived much more in impectic cavalry attack (probably form the time of battle of Kumeyki) and he didn’t appreciate in this time the fire support which can be given to the cavalry attack by dragons.

According this “logic” we don’t know if any light banners have take part in the battle.. Lack of information about ditch can expalined easy  - just other participants of battle havent’ see this as the important factor. Presence nad fire support of dragons would be noted with sure (even if it would be only 300 dragons).

Whole this discussion is funny – you call the popular work  as newest scientific elaboration  then you write modern historian are less reliable than primary (narrative ) sources and claim that every primary source give the same reason of defeat as Kochowski  (ditch) and then in next sentce you admit that dich is only in Kochowski memories..really funny.

1.       Wimmer – few companies, Skworoda - 3 companies, Majewski - 1000 dragons

2.       They could if Czarniceki would include them in the attacking group

3.       No source gives note about fire support

4.        

Where did you go you might tell us that too?

They are not just popular works. They are popularized-scientific works.

TJK, you shouldn't blame Skworoda for lack of his own examinations / researches. You can read the last sentence of the introduction to his book to convince oneself that Skoroda has done his own resarches. Moreover Skworoda is the only one historian who has claimed that there were 3 companies of dragoons (and called them). It shows that he has not copied old elaborations but he has said something new.

'Hammerstein' and 'Warka-Gniezno' are different stories. AFAIK the book 'Warka-Gniezno' (meaning this book with the description of the battle of Kłeck) is a popularized version of Skworoda's thesis.

and therefore I can't find any reason to believe more Wimmer or Nowak who didn't write which primary sources prove their statements than Skworoda (who also didn't write it, but at least his elaboration is newer than Nowak's one)

TJK, forgive me, but I have to say this - you have a very strange criterions of credibility. Sikorski's (Majewski's) book is a 100% popular book and (opposite to Skworoda's book) there isn't even 1 footnote which explains what are sources of particular statements. And this book is more reliable for you than Skworoda's book?

My answer is different than you.

• If there were Polish dragoons in the battle (which might be not true, because neither me nor you know any primary source which confirms their presence)

• and if they could support Royal pulk (which might be not true, because in the same time they could support other Polish cavalry – we simply don't know what they did, because any source writes about them),

• and if dragoons indeed didn't support Royal pulk (again, we don't know what they did, because any source writes about it)

Czarniecki's decision to attack the Swedes without a support of dragoons (if he really ordered this :)) might be explained much simpler than your explanation. Czarniecki didn't know that there was a ditch which prevented Polish cavalry to destroy Swedish dragoons. He could believe that there is no obstacle and therefore Polish charges should be enough to destroy enemy.

When Czarniecki recognized that hussars couldn't defeat Swedish dragoons protected by the trench (or rather - if Czarniecki recognized this at all, because we don't know this), maybe he wanted to use dragoons, but if dragoons were too far, Czarniecki couldn't do it.

And therefore it is important where in reality dragoons were during this battle (if they were in this battle :)).

According to this logic, we know that there were light banners in the battle, because (for example) Jemiołowski wrote about them (BTW, Jemiołowski was a comrade of a light cavalry and participated in the battle).

Or they didn't see this trench (authors of these sources could be too far from this place), or they didn't want to write (I'm thinking about Swedes) that it wasn't their bravery but a banal trench which stopped Polish hussars. We can find many reasons.

Again - this is just your opinion. There are many posibilites including this one, that the presence of dragoons wasn't enough important for soldiers to write about them, or that they (I mean authors of known primary sources) simply forget about dragoons. Therefore I wonder why you are so certain and why you use as qualifications as 'absolutly improbable'.

Read my reply above.

I have to protest again. I have written:

'If they (modern historians) are against opinion of the hussar who fought in this place, yes they are not reliable. Kochowski knew the best why his unit couldn't reach swedish dragoons'

So, I have not claim that 'modern historian are less reliable than primary (narrative ) sources'. I've pointed out that in this particular case, Kochowski is the most credible source of information. Why? Because he participated in this fighting which he described.

I have to protest again. I haven't claim that 'every primary source give the same reason of defeat as Kochowski'. You (again :() got me wrong. I have written:

'What is not true?

We were talking about reasons of the failure of Polish cavalry which attacked Swedish dragoons. It is not true that Czarniecki's or Jamiołowski's opinion about this failure is other than Kochowski's one.'

I haven't write Czarniecki and Jamiołowski wrote the same reason than Kochowski. I have written that it is not true that they wrote other reasons than Kochowski. It is a big difference.

IMO, neither Jemiołowski nor Czarniecki wrote reasons of a failure of this hussars who charged Swedish dragoons. Check sources. Czarniecki's letter to the king is having more than one meaning. I am not certain (and I believe nodoby can be certain) if Czarniecki thought about this phase of the battle when he wrote 'Byśmy byli armaty co a piechoty mieli, albo też żeby był Pan Bóg według planu mego umyśloną poszczęścił imprezę, uczyniłby się był nieprzyjacielowi koniec'. As you can see, Czarniecki wrote about the battle in general – he didn't write about any particular event / phase. We can only speculate what he meant.

Moreover, look at this sentence 'Byśmy byli armaty co a piechoty mieli'. It might indicate that there weren't dragoons in the battle at all. In the other case, Czarniecki could write 'byśmy byli armaty co a piechoty WIĘCEJ mieli'. I know, it is just speculation, but I'd like to point out that this source might be interpret in many diferent ways.

As far as Jemiołowski's relation is concerned. Jemiołowski describes a sequence of events, but he doesn't writes why charges of Polish hussars failed. Literally he writes:

'Ale kiedy zaś insze pułki od piechoty i armaty szwedzkiej ustępować musiały [...]'

which might be translated in this way:

'But when other pułks had to withdraw [why they had to withdraw? Jemiołowski doesn't explain] from Swedish infantry and cannons [...]'

Therefore, IMHO, it is not true that Jemiołowski writes other reasons than Kochowski. Jemiołowski simply doesn't write reasons of failure of hussars charges. Only Kochowski writes about it.

Read my explanation above.

1. And we don't know any primary source which confirms this

2. there are too many other posibilites (I have written about them above) to say that they indeed could do it

3. again – there are too many other posibilites to be certain that they did or didn't do anything in the battle.

Everything what we have are our speculations. But if we have only speculations, you can't say that 'the way they [Czarniecki and Lubomirski] command the combined arms [in the battle of Kłeck] was a little obsolete'. We don't know if it was obsolete or modern, because we don't know even basic facts.

Ok, so now, can you answer my other questions?

1. what was elder model of cooperation between dragoons / infantry and cavalry?

2. When this new model of cooperation was introduced to Polish and Swedish army?

Well, I have already explained it above. As you can see, I know these sources :). BTW, Jemiołowski writes about lack of artillery and about a quarrel between Czarniecki and Lubomirski to explain the outcome of the battle. As you remember, we were talking not about the outcome of the battle, but about the reason of the failure of Polish cavalry who charged Swedish dragoons. These are 2 different things.

Don't worry - I am not offended :). As I have written twice – I really don't want to lead this discussion into a flame war. I'd like to discuss, not fight. I hope, you want this too.

So you got me wrong. But it is not important. It is important that I don't think that every failure (meaning – a lack of success in doing something) might be called 'a defeat' (meaning – a victory over someone in a fight). And this was my point in this sentence above. Charges of Polish hussars were a failure, because they were stopped by the trench. Hussars weren't defeated – they withdraw in a good order.

In this particular case – yes, they are more reliable. Why? Because AFAIK, Kochowski didn't participate in this battle.

Great. So you should understand very well, that something might happen thanks to some factor or although some factor is present. I will explain it.

Usually there are many factors which decide about the outcom of a battle. For example – the skill of command of commanders, morale of armies, their tactics, their weapon, the terrain of the battle, a disproportion of forces etc. etc. If sombody writes that some battle shows 'how Swedish army could win having small amount of infantry (or even only dragons) by coordination with cavalry', he should point out how this coordination led to victory. And if dragoons/infantry hadn't cooperated with cavalry in this battle, the outcome would have been other than was.

IMHO, the presence of Swedish infantry in the battle of Wojnicz wasn't necessary to win. If there had been Swedish cavalry insteed of infantry, the Swedes would have won this battle too.

I don't know if I write clear, so I will give you more extreme example.

Sombody can write:

'the battle of Wojnicz shows how Swedish cavalry ecquiped of rapiers could win with Polish hussars ecquiped of lances'

This sentence indicates that they were rapiers which decided about Swedish victory and that lances were worse than rapiers. But although the statement (that the Swedish cavalry had rapiers and won with Polish hussars ecquiped of lances) is true, it is not true that using of rapiers decided about Swedish victory and that lances were worse weapon than rapiers (for cavalry of course). Why?

Look that sombody else can write other true sentence:

'the battle of Wojnicz shows that although Swedish cavalry was ecquiped of rapiers, the Swedes won with Polish hussars ecquiped of lances.'

The statement (that the Swedish cavalry had rapiers and won with Polish hussars ecquiped of lances) is true, but this sentence above indicates other inferences than the previous sentence.

If sombody wants to know which weapon was better for cavalry and what decided about the outcome of the battle of Wojnicz, he must know also other factors than only an ecquipment of cavalry involved in the battle. Therefore I have reminded you who commanded in the battle and what was disproportion between hussars and these Swedes (including Swedish infantry) who defeated them.

Thanks, I think we could continue the discussion without this kind of emotions.

Thanks Temujin, my son is now 1 year old so I belive I will have a little more time than in last several months  

I agree.

Some reaseraches have been done - this book is just extension of Skworoda article in “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości vol.  XLI 2004. Regarding 3 companies of dragons Skworoda just copied it from the Zdzisiław Spieralski book “ Stefan Czarniecki” who indicate the 3 dragons companies during battle of Warka, and in this field I don’t see any analyze of sources also regarding the possiblity of presence the pomorian  dragon units as well regarding the Czarniecki own dragon regiment under col. Wąsowicz  ( thanks to the analyze of Adam Kersten we know that during battle of Warka this regiment -or its bigger part- have stationed in Pogórze but we don’t know when it have join the Czarniecki forces – Spieralski indicate the presence of this regiment at Uniejów about 20^th of May (...and Kochowski indicte presence of this unit during battle of Warka – look page 156).

Still I have doubt about calling the “Warka-Gniezno” as the newest scientific elaboration and comparing it with Wimmer& Nowak&Teodorczyk&Herbst&Podhorodecki common work.

Because if there is no direct confirmation it more safety to not define exact quantitiy of tne units. This is also the diifiference between real scientific works and popular–scientic book where in latter case the authors could more easily made their own assumption without justification. 

You are right, but for me Wiesław Majewski is much more credibile historian that Paweł Skworoda. I see him (W. Majewski) as the best polish warfare historian of XVII century to whom only Jan Wimmer could be compared.

I can just agree ..that we disagree  

First I (follow the all modern historians) assume there were present some polish dragon units (not sure how many), second there were the possiblity to using this units by Czarniecki independently to which regiment they belongst (as at Warka) and third the trench was not the decisive factor at least in the 1^st pahase of Czarniecki attack – it were swedish dragons in the forest what stopped the first attack.

But I’m talking about polish authors and I would like to underline again that even in Kochowki realtion the ditch is indicated as the reason of failure the charges in the end phase (earlier the dragons in the forest have stopped the charges)

Not only mine..also Skworoda  :) ( page 174) ..” in addition polish cavalry have charged without own fire support” 

Look the descrption of whole battle by Kochowski... didn’t you see many mistakes ? Where are the ambush group ? His descrption regards only very small sector of battlefield and in fact “the ditch” could be also seen as obstacle which prevent the charge of one or two banners.

I should expalin this a little more... when I have (several months ago) wrote about Lubomirski and Czarnicki  as a mainly cavalry commanders and their style of command of combined arms as obsolete, I haven’t in the mind any particular battle..just it was indictaions that this polish commanders never used infantry&dragons&artillery in the way of their swedish opponents. Next when you ask the question about defeats of Lubomirski and Czarniecki I simply gave you the list of defeats sufferd by them from swedish army – and not as the examples of obsolete style of command of combined arms...

1. Way of using dragons&infantry in the battlefield by polish commanders in the Ist half of XVII century was more “ static”. They have been used mostly to protect the wings or rear of cavalry and not with manouvre with mixed squadrons with cavalry.

2.  In the swedish army it was introduced by Gustaw Adolf and the first exaple is AFAIR battle of Gniew. In the polish army this kind of using infantry and cavalry you can find in the center of polish army at Beresteczko.

Yeah, exatcly I’m glad we can discuss without turning this into flame war :)

Kochowski have take part in that battle - look page 361 and 362 (comments of Adam Kersten)

Sorry, but I tend to disagree. It is obvious that it could be listed many factors of swedish victory (but not the rapiers of course ): discipline, tactic, grerat comander etc. however the fire of dragons/musketeers have stopped sucessfull hussars in the center – withou the time wined by this unit, poles could attack one of swedish wing which was (both) in still in fight with polish cavalry. i see this as one of the decisive factors.  

TJK, I hope you had a great holidays. Good to see you again in the group.

So I got you wrong :(. If I had known it earlier, this discussion about Kłeck wouldn't have taken place. And I think that there is no reason to talk about this battle any more. Instead of this I suggest talking more about a cooperation between dragoons/infantry and cavalry. Do you agree? If so, look below.

Konstanty Górski in his 'Historia kawalerii polskiej' criticizes this Swedish manner of cooperation between cavalry and infantry (TJK, I am certain that you know Górski, but other members of this forum might not. So I'd like to explain that Górski was a cavalry officer and a historian). So, here is my question – was this manner of cooperation really better than the Polish one, or was it only better for the Swedes, who having worse cavalry than the Poles (I'm writing about the time of GA), tried to protect their poor cavalry in this way. Look that in the 18^th c. Swedish army of Karol XII used other manner of cooperation between cavalry and infantry. But in that time Swedish cavalry was as good as the Polish one (or better).

I think Górski’s claim is a little simplification of the problem. In fact using the mixed squadrons of infantry and cavalry could result in the somehow limitation of cavalry mobility but we should keep in the mind that usually not all cavalry was used in that manner - but only some part. Mixed suqadrons was just best in the defensive fight when attacking group were composed of pure cavalry units. This kind of formation you can find also in polish army – at Beresteczko the center is composed by “mixed squadrons” when the wings just by pure cavalry. Even better example is the second battle of Parkany where Sobieski have composed his left defensive wing (under Jabłonowski) by mixed squadrons of cavalry&infantry&dragons and  right wing (under Hieronim Lubomirski) mostly by cavalry banners.

Probably because of flintlock which became the main weapon of infantry in the end of XVII century. This weapon gave much bigger firepower and also has influence on changing the formation of the infantry – it became one continuous line instead the separate squadrons. It should be noted however that in Swedish army mixed formation was sometimes used also in the beginning of XVIII century – for example on left wing during battle of Kliszów.

Yes, this is the same person.

My point is that probably the much bigger firepower given infantry by using the flintlock was enough to stop (in most cases) the frontal attack of cavalry =>thus usinig mixed formation was not needed. Additionally the cavalry in XVIII century became minor part of the armies ( 20-25%) and its importance on the battlefield was much lower than in XVII century

It seems normal, but I started to wonder, that what does Recruitment do in there? Weren't they professional soldiers and anyone who wanted became one, but they had to buy/manufacture their own weapons and armour and horses?

They had many lances, am I correct? And two pistols, a sword and a carabine. I have read this from somewhere. Also, three horses for one rider or was it one horse and one to carry packages?

Why was the Polish saber best in Europe? In the 16th century and 17th century, the best (or one of the best) swords were made in Sweden and I do not think they had sold many of their swords to Poland.

And i found also this:

"Można nią również wykonać wszystkie najważniejsze cięcia – zarówno te, do których nadają się najlepsze zachodnioeuropejskie szable, jak i te, które można wykonać tylko szablą wschodnią lub mieczem japońskim, słusznie więc uznawana jest za najlepszą kawaleryjską szablę świata."

http://www.allempires.com/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=212&PID=250465#250465 - Please, Majkes, into the other topic.