The confederates knew they did not have the numbers to defeat the Union at sea, but at the same time they needed they're ports open for trade, weapons shipments and troop movements.  Since they didn't have the numbers they needed to think outside the box and they did.  They created many naval innovations such as the CSS Virginia (Merrimac) and the famed Hunley and a number of other such submarines (which are being discussed in another topic).  The Union also saw the need for such machines and developed the USS Monitor and started to fit many other ships with iron sides. 

 

The US Corp of Engineers and the Topographical Engineer Corp (1838-1863)  also blazed the way for new railroad systems to be deveopled, improve the way ships can move in rivers, such as the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. 

 

The Confederate Army thrived on its aggression and depended on it and needed newer weapons, faster methods of transportation and the ability to keep up logistically in order to survive.  The Union side also needed a huge logistic's network in order to fight on two fronts far from the Northern states.  Grant made wide spread use of the Mississippi River during his western campaign and Sherman made wide spread use of the railroad to move his army quickly down during his march to the Atlantic.

 

The Civil war also bred the first weapon that would be banned in an International Threaty, the exploding Rifle Bullet(which was developed and used around the same time in Russia).  Land mines and machine guns were in wide spread use also. 

 

I'm glad you bumped this, i didn't see this topic last time i looked.  Although i hope this makes sense, i'm a bit tired.  Cheers.

 

You can I guess call them 'Napoleonic' tactics from the point of view of period, but actually they were more Wellingtonian than Napoleonic from the point of view of the individuals, weren't they?

 

It was also the first war in which cavalry - in the traditional sense of hussars, lancers, dragoons... - played no part, Stewart's and others' troops being more akin to mounted infantrymen.

 

 

Grant did eventually start building his own trench network but only after his corp commanders pleaded with him to cease the frontal assualts.  Some commanders refused to charge altogether.  But you must note, it wasn't only the trench system that won that battle, Meade also poorly moblized many of the attacks on the trenches, knowingly attacking without the numbers needed to break the Confederate line.  This followed with about ten days of trench warfare where the major players were sharp shooters, cannons and mortars. 

 

It is quite interesting that both sides stayed loyal to the 'Napoleonic Era' while having these new weapons and means of fighting.  You must not forget though, this was the way that many of them were taught at West Point and later put to practice in the war aganist Mexico.  I don't think any of the weapon developments were sufficent enough to change the method of fighting at the time.  Even when Grant faced the trench at Cold Harbor, he still resorted to the good old charge with alot of men method.  But he was facing this problem for the first time, and he did outnumber Lee by 20,000 men, i think he thought he had sufficent numbers to take Lee's position without having to resort to many changes in his method of fighting.  But, he was wrong of course and adapted accordingly.  While they did have a high number of military innovations during the time, i do not think they changed warfare suffciently in order to have the Generals at the time reform they're method of waging warfare.  However, i am interested in how you think they should have waged war with these new innovations instead, i don't think trench warfare would've been anymore less bloody then the rank and fire method that they used. 

 

Just my two cents, cheers. 

OK.

 

 

The advances in technology were not yet understood by the generals.  They had all studied physics and mechanics and chemistry at West Point and VPI, but the art of war was still defined by the tactics and strategy of Bonaparte and Frederick.

 

After 1815, there were few wars, and at the same time, the advances of the industrial revolution had outstripped the tactical practice of Napoleonic warfare.  Exactly why, I have never been sure.  In the Crimea, there were hints of "things to come," and in northern Italy in 1859, the French and Austrians had some experience with the newer technical realities.  This was especially true of railways and rifled ordnance.  Probably the time frame was not long enough for these experiences to be digested during the period of warfare from 1855 to 1871 (Crimea to Franco-Prussian, and incl ACW).

 

In the ACW, armies were created from scratch with few experienced soldiers, and it was reasonable to train and drill in tactics that were understood and accepted.  That insured a slow and long learning curve, and very bloody lessons.

 

The same thing happened in WW I.  It took a long time to react and adjust to technological advances - actually moreso than in WW II.

 

 

 

Yes, that was the point i was trying to make in my above post.  The weapon that really made many commanders in the army start to reconsider the way they went into battle was the Henry Repeating Rifle.  This weapon gave one man the firepower of a dozen muzzle loading riflemen.  It did not catch on in the mainstream army until around 1862 when many states such as Kentucky, Illinois and Indiana started to buy them for they're regiments going into combat.  Infact, an example of this would be at the Battle of Altoona Pass, "What saved us that day was the fact that we had a number of Henry Rifles." - Major William Ludlows. 

 

This rifle also made its power be known in Shermans March when Union soldiers were armed with Henry's and would throw back many Confederate attacks with minimum losses but inflicting horrible losses on the Confederates. 

 

 

Edited by Rider: Your Quote wasn't working. If you handtype it, make sure that the first brackets are like this: [quote ] and the final ones [/quote ]

 

http://www.paradesquare.ca/railway/us_civil_war.htm - http://www.paradesquare.ca/railway/us_civil_war.htm

 

Actually, extensive trench warfare dates from the 16th century when new technology in fortifications aced out the advantage artillery gave against medieval walls.  The only way to attack the new "Trace Italienne" was to construct extensive (and almost total) trench lines around a besieged place--lines of circumvalation/offense--and then lines of contravalation/defense to ward off attempts at relief.

 

Most of this activity was done in trenches, sapping and getting close enough to bring guns to bear, while defending against counter batteries, or to mine a weak point (not new to warfare) where a breach could be effected.  Sallies by the defenders were frequent, and very nasty actions were fought in the trenches.  In many cases relieving forces concentrated on driving the besiegers from their trenches to disrupt the siege or force the besieger to lift and withdraw.   

 

There was a lot more trench warfare than pitched battles from about the 1550s well into the 17th cent., and even up to the Fr. Rev.

 

                                       ******************

 

The French army made extensive use of railways in their war against Austria in Italy, 1859.  Logistics were improved, and it even made possible sending home large numbers for soldiers for "R & R."  The assumption is that French experience and observation in Crimea had an effect. 

 

EDIT:  Sorry to be pedantic, but I LOVE this kind of stuff.   

 

The method(s) of attacking these resulted in the type of trenches and trench warfare under discussion.

 

The bastions of fortification like Ticonderoga are little different than those of the walls and internal citidels of important European cities in like 1580.  The only real difference between those of late 16th cent. and Vauban is Vauban's far more complex concepts.  With the expense involved, it is lucky the king was in his corner.

 

 

 

True.  The ditch surrounding even a field work was well known at least since the Roman Republic.

 

(nitpick?.........you hurt my feelings.   )

 

Just wanted to make clear that very extensive trench warfare long predated Crimea and ACW.

 

 

 

Most likely it was a "fashion statement."  Some state militias and some volunteer regiments tended to ape the European armies, especially the French, in the early stages of the war.  Zouave and "Turco" uniforms were not uncommon.  You are of course right about US/CSA cavalry in the war.

 

Most of the European armies retained regiments of lancers into the first World War (and the Poles later).  I agree that in an age of new rifles sighted to over 1,000 yards and of more quick firing artillery it seems incongruous.  I don't know what their tactical utilization was to be, but they all most likely served more as dragoons than anything else....til the big War when most were dismounted infantry (except in the east).

 

Lances were a vestigial remain of chivalry I guess.  Not much chivalry after 1861. 

 

   

 

Technically it was the Gatling Gun, which works differently from the machine gun. It is hand cranked and fires from multiple spinning barrels, while the machine gun was gas powered and was drum or belt fed.

The biggest use of the Gatling gun in the war was at Petersburg, by the troops of Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, who had purchased 10 of the guns for his troops.

Right, railroads making a huge impact on the art of war.  Size of forces increasing drastically, and the speed with which forces could be redeployed.

 

I was just thinking of the rifle improvements that improved the rate of fire and accuracy, so pretty much what you mentioned. 

 

Ah, thats right Napoleon.  I was thinking of the third version not the first.

 

Thanking for the information, edgewaters.

You forget about the monitors which were inspired by Monitor (what a surprise!). Even in Vietnam the US were using a ship which they called monitor. And it was the Ericsson turret what made Monitor special. Though up until WWI fixed guns were kept on the battlewagons the turret was the real enhancement.

The ship that was bat was probably USS Keokuk.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cowper_Phipps_Coles - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cowper_Phipps_Coles

 

Originally posted by drgonzaga The significance of the ironclad in the annals of naval warfare has little to do with hull design but the emplacement of the turret gun! True the initial problem with the "monitor" class was the unbalanced turret (the center of mass was not the center of rotation) that caused dangerous listing, but this problem was resolved by the 1890s and essentially made the casemate gun secondary.

I'm not quite sure what you're referring to here. The casemate gun became unimportant long before the problem of unbalanced turrets was resolved. Even the Dreadnought class had unbalanced wing turrets.

 

Usually credit for the first dreadnought to eliminate the problem is given to the US South Carolina class.

 

In general though in considering the development of capital ship design from the mid-1900s to the turn of the century, the development of satisfactory long-range breech-loading rifled artillery was just as important as the mountings to put them in. Britain and France were closely competing on that (and Krupp's contribution was significant too). Again the US Civil War provided a useful experimental ground for their use in actual warfare.

 

And neither the turrets nor the guns could have been deployed without hull designs being strong enough...and engines had to be powerful and efficient enough...and muzzle velocities had to be high enough to make long barrels effective...and so on.

 

You can't really single out one single aspect.

 

 

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data.htm - http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data.htm

 

It must be mentioned that John Ericsson pitched the turret battery (the revolving cupola) to Napoleon III in the 1850s as the transition to the iron hull was well underway and the premise was dismissed as a bit too radical and untested. The background and thoughts are captured in a contemporary document from 1862:

 

http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/iron_clad.html - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/iron_clad.html

 

See also the following essays on that site:

 

http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/john_ericsson.html - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/john_ericsson.html

http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/ - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/

 

PS: There's a typo in the post above above, I believe the dating should be "mid-1800s to the turn of the century".

 

Originally posted by drgonzaga The discussion was limited to the design of the Monitor as an ironclad and was not intended as a dissertation on naval technology in refining the problems of the turret.

Well, the general topic of the thread is military (which I assume includes naval) innovation and the Civil War.

Armstrong, Whitworth and Dahlgren rifled breech-loaders, not solid-cast, were for instance just as important a part of that from a naval point of view as the development of turrets to house them in. They kind of go hand-in-hand.

Nevertheless, it was the turret that distinguished the development of the battlewagons via the transitional armoured cruisers. Given that the iron-hulled warship itself antedates the Civil War (HMS Warrior, 1860), and E. J. Reed's HMVS Cerberus entered naval service in Australia in 1870 upon the premise of its turret guns, it is that aspect of the rotatable gun that proved the more memorable.

And Affondatore was laid down in Millwall in 1863, and delivered to the Italians in 1865, in time to become the first turretted warship to fight in a general fleet action in that fascinating mishmash of ship types and tactics at Lissa.

 

I'm not sure why you mentioned Warrior, which wasn't turretted, and wasn't the first ironclad, that being La Gloire a year or so earlier.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data.htm - http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data.htm   It must be mentioned that John Ericsson pitched the turret battery (the revolving cupola) to Napoleon III in the 1850s as the transition to the iron hull was well underway and the premise was dismissed as a bit too radical and untested. The background and thoughts are captured in a contemporary document from 1862:   http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/iron_clad.html - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/iron_clad.html

Interesting enough, but I don't see any reference to turrets in the several pages.

See also the following essays on that site:   http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/john_ericsson.html - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/john_ericsson.html http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/ - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/   PS: There's a typo in the post above above, I believe the dating should be "mid-1800s to the turn of the century".

-------------

Which is why she was called an 'ironclad'.

In contrast HMS Warrior was fully iron-hulled.

 

I'm still not sure why you mentioned her, since she wasn't turretted. Affondatore is relevant because she was the first turretted warship of any real use at sea. Monitor was a dead-end as far as sea-going vessels are concerned.

Warships means also rivers. Monitors were a significant parte of the forces of a lot of states that were at war after 1865.

 

http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/monitor_size.html - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/monitor_size.html

 

Thus, to call it a "dead-end" is inappropriate.

 

Originally posted by drgonzaga You are being argumentative since the general term "ironclad" includes all vessels whether maritime or riverine.

I wasn't being argumentative on that point at all. I simply pointed out that in my original post I said "as far as sea-going vessels are concerned". I could equally well have written "if one ignores riverboats", or I could have said "Monitor's successors were confined to rivers and inshore waters". All of those statements happen to be true, and I wasn't arguing with anybody.

The central issue is one of design with regard to purpose, but in terms of continuity the focus is the rotating turret gun. John Ericsson himself explained the reasons for the Monitor's specific hull design with regard to the conditions in which the vessel had to operate.   http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/monitor_size.html - http://www.mariner.org/monitor/04_revunion/monitor_size.html   Thus, to call it a "dead-end" is inappropriate.

But I'm disputing the particular importance of the gun turret, at sea or anywhere else, as opposed to hull composition, hull length (Warrior was 100ft longer - nearly 50% - than any previous warship), breech-loading heavy guns, abandonment of cold-boring for guns, propulsion by propellor, and for that matter steam itself. The turret started with Monitor, agreed. Every other aspect of Monitor led nowhere, except for limited application in rivers and inshore.

-------------

Funny, sea faring vessels are much more important for USA than for Russia, for example. So monitors were a far more useful ship for the russian than for the americans. Maybe gunboats could be considered an offspring, though distant, of Monitor. 

 

Originally posted by Cezar The particular importance of an innovatio/invention is relative, gcle.

So is pretty well anything. Relative to the development of modern warships in general,  Monitor is not a significant innovation. As a design she was much too specialised, and moreover the design didn't introduce any new theoretical principles. Within that speciality she was of course a significant precursor of other craft. Outside it, Merrimac was more in the main evolutionary stream, though, if course not particularly innovative.

 

That evolutionary stream goes back to the 1840s with Guadeloupe and HMS Birkenhead (aka Vulcan) marking the introduction of iron hulls and steam, though again, being paddle-wheel driven, they were even more of a dead end.

Funny, sea faring vessels are much more important for USA than for Russia, for example. So monitors were a far more useful ship for the russian than for the americans,

I don't see how you can say that. The Russian fleet throughout most of modern history (say, 18th-20th century) was more powerful than the American.

 

In terms of the strategic importance of the sea to them, I'd say they come out about even. Of course more wars have been fought on Russian territory than on US territory, but in those wars in the US shallow water boats have been of important strategic value, whether on the Mississippi or Lake Erie.

. Maybe gunboats could be considered an offspring, though distant, of Monitor.

River gunboats, yes.

-------------

But I'm disputing the particular importance of the gun turret, at sea or anywhere else, as opposed to hull composition, hull length (Warrior was 100ft longer - nearly 50% - than any previous warship), breech-loading heavy guns, abandonment of cold-boring for guns, propulsion by propellor, and for that matter steam itself. The turret started with Monitor, agreed. Every other aspect of Monitor led nowhere, except for limited application in rivers and inshore.

In that respect the same can be said of the battlewagons that were the ultimate result of iron-hulled technology. They too were technological dead-ends with the advent of new offensive technologies. The battleship as a direct descendant of the ship-of-the-line is obsolete as an offensive weapon (no matter the fiasco off the Lebanese coast in the 80's). World War II settled that question. Only craft conditionally designed (as was the Monitor) prevail.

 

Edited in the never ending gotchas between gcle and myself.

 

Originally posted by drgonzaga Gcle wrote: But I'm disputing the particular importance of the gun turret, at sea or anywhere else, as opposed to hull composition, hull length (Warrior was 100ft longer - nearly 50% - than any previous warship), breech-loading heavy guns, abandonment of cold-boring for guns, propulsion by propellor, and for that matter steam itself. The turret started with Monitor, agreed. Every other aspect of Monitor led nowhere, except for limited application in rivers and inshore. In that respect the same can be said of the battlewagons that were the ultimate result of iron-hulled technology. They too were technological dead-ends with the advent of new offensive technologies.

The same can be said of anything, including probably as I've been arguing elsewhere, aircraft carriers.

 

That isn't what 'dead-end' means. 'Dead-end' means there were no subsequent developments from that particular innovation. And, as far as sea-going vessels are concerned, Monitor had no such descendants, whereas Warrior for instance did. So did Dreadnought. (That's not a criticism of Monitor, which was never intended to be used in the open sea.)

 

One could I suppose consider something like Affondatore as a dead-end since though she was turretted, she was purpose-built as a ram, and rams were never used in battle apart from Lissa (as far as I know), But at least sea-going rams continued to be built for the next half-century or so, so it was not an immediate dead-end, whatever the ultimate result.

 

The truth of the matter is that in the mid to late 19th century the field of naval development was wide open and all sorts of innovations were taking place, with every navy looking over the shoulders of every other one, and Britain in particular playing the part of shipbuilder to the world. Singling out one aspect in particular as particularly important is as pointless as trying to determine what was of most importance in the development of the tank: the turret, the gun, the tracks, the armour, the internal combustion engine, possibly something I've forgotten, when they are all inseparable and all necessary to the development.

 

Nothing about Monitor was unique or essential to the development of sea-going warships.

 

 

The battleship as a direct descendant of the ship-of-the-line is obsolete as an offensive weapon (no matter the fiasco off the Lebanese coast in the 80's). World War II settled that question.

Are you suggesting that's news to anyone?

Only crafts conditionally designed (as was the Monitor) prevail.

-------------

Anyway, I think that the Civil War was important as a whole, since many agree that it was the first total war.

 

Depends if you wish to follow Clausewitz and Absolute War or Ludendorff's premise of war as the subordination of politics to military exigency. In either event, you would still have to consider the ramifications raised by 16th century Just War Theory wherein any and all actions for a satisfactory conclusion, if the cause is correct (despite their questionable morality), are justified. Some wish to apply the definition soley with respect to the resutls of industrialization upon the technological capacities for the conduct of war so as to restrict definition within the parameters of the 19th and 20th centuries; while others seek to emphazise the historical spectrum and underscore that even under the Ludendorff premise, total wars have an ancient lineage. Guess much of the controversy stems from one's perception of war as either formalized ritual conducted under accepted mutual conventions and rules of engagement or as the full mobilization of one society for the purpose of "eliminating" another.

 

Some might state there is scant difference between the total destruction of Baghdad in the 13th century (1258) and the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945) as a means to terminate conflict, and the recourse to technological finery nothing more than a sophistry.

 

I think the underlined phrases apply to American Civil War.

Point taken, indeed the conflicts at the beginning of the human society are total wars, according to the definition so it is probably restricted to conflicts starting from the late midlle age, I don't know exactly. Some of our leaders adopted  the scorched earth tactic when fighting the ottomans, and that also comes close to the definition.

I'm not an expert on ACW so my statement was only based on what I've read in several articles regarding this conflict. And large populations were indeed mobilized (not the whole p[opulation which is slightly different). While for civilians being directly targeted, most use Sherman's incursion as an example. I reapeat, I don't have extensive knowledge of the ACW.

Sherman systematically targetted civilian infrastructure.  Civilian casualties during Sherman's march, however, were very few.

 

The only part of the ACW where civilians were specificlly targetted on a large scale was the dirty war in Kansas / Missouri. In these states, most of the fighting both before and during the war was carried out be irregular units (Union "Jayhawker" militias, Confederate "Bushwacker" groups) using terror tactics. To the Confederacy's credit, most irregular Bushwackers or Ranger groups were never officially part of the Confederate army. The Union Army not only directly sponsored "Jay Hawker" militias, but converted several vicious militia groups into offical Union regiments.

 

In other areas civlians were specifically targetted, but on a far smaller scale. These areas include:

Appalachian Areas of Tennesse, North Carolina (Pro union locals targetted by Confederate militias

West Virginia (Pro Confederate Partisan Rangers / Pro Union militias terrorize opposing civilians)

I know almost nothing about these. Sorry.

You are welcome.

 

As a side note....

The sports teams of the University of Kansas are called Jay Hawks, after the pro union militias with brutal reputations.  Meanwhile the word to Bushwack (brutal pro confederate militias) means in American English to killy by ambush, treachery, or deception. 

 

No sports team would be called The BushWackers, but the name Jayhawks is ok. I guess it just shows that there are different standards for victors in any war. 

http://www.oldpicz.com/photos-of-the-civil-war-in-the-united-states/ - http://www.oldpicz.com/photos-of-the-civil-war-in-the-united-states/

so hard-learned in the ACW, but at least the 'rules' of campaign conduct had been written..

..& which were still largely part of the 'Gitmo' style..

..'Military Commission' type of 'justice' utilized by Cheney/Rumsfeld neocons.. 

( & graphically shown in the movie) was something that was re-tried in WW1,

although a similar scheme was also presented inthe movie  'Captain Alatriste',

set in the 17th century.. 

Interestingly, neither ACW movies  'Cold Harbour' nor 'Glory' accurately represent the harshly

'gun fodder' nature of the Union Army usage of  'coloured troops' Afro-American soldiery units..