"Britain and the Tet Offensive..." by Act

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Britain and the Tet Offensive 1967-1968: A �Turning Point� in British Foreign Policy?

Introduction

During the latter part of 1967
and the first few months of 1968, the Labour Government took bold steps
to re-evaluate certain aspects of British foreign and domestic policy.
Not only was the Government re-considering the level of Britain�s
foreign military commitments, it was also desperately attempting to
remedy a financial crisis in which the decision was eventually taken to
de-value the pound. Indeed, a substantial amount of primary evidence is
available in files recently released at the Public Records Office in
Kew, prompting perhaps further investigation into the British
Government�s economic decision-making process immediately before the
devaluation of sterling in 1967 and up to the debates on
post-devaluation measures and defence expenditure in early 1968. With
regards to British military commitment overseas, Jeffrey Pickering in
particular has provided a comprehensive discussion and analysis on the
factors that constituted Britain�s withdrawal from east of Suez
announced by the Government on 16^th January 1968.[1] Pickering concludes that from this point forward, �Britain became principally a European rather than a global power.�[2]
The decision to reduce a significant number of Britain�s overseas
forces was part of a programme to help initiate a concerted effort
towards British integration with the European continent. On the 27th
February 1968, Cabinet level discussions stated that Britain �should
[now] aim to become part of a more cohesive Western Europe which would
provide a power structure able to exert world-wide influence in defence
of its interests.�[3]

A
premise of this study is that part of the reasoning behind the
reconsideration of British foreign affairs was due to the events that
took place in Vietnam between October 1967 and March 1968. General Vo
Nguyen Giap, commander of the North Vietnamese military forces,
initiated a �general offensive/general uprising� in a bid to deal the
United States �thundering blows so as to change the face of the war,
further shake the aggressive will of US imperialism, [and] compel it to
change its strategy and de-escalate the war.�[4]
President Johnson did declare an American policy of de-escalation, and
to some extent, it is possible to connect the North Vietnamese
offensive to the changes in British policy and attitudes around
1967-68. Both devaluation and the withdrawal east of Suez were to have
an effect on Anglo-American relations and with the conclusion of the
Tet Offensive; Britain found itself relinquishing a considerable amount
of global authority and a substantial degree of influence in its
perceived mediatory role in the Vietnam War.

It
is a purpose of this study to describe the nature of the Labour
Government�s response to the American War in Vietnam from 1967 up until
President Johnson�s declaration to de-escalate hostilities in March
1968. In particular, a principal consideration will be to focus on
British concerns during the events that led up to the Tet Offensive,
its duration and concluding stages. The nature of the North Vietnamese
offensive has provided a substantial amount of information regarding
the opinions and thoughts that emanated from the British Embassy in
Saigon during the period in question, chiefly from despatches and
letters sent to the Foreign Office before, during and after the
conclusion of the major hostilities. Additional comments and
perspectives at Cabinet level help illustrate the nature of the
Government�s attitude towards the war in South-East Asia, and in part,
this essay will refer to the historiographical themes attributed to
British involvement in the Vietnam War. While in opposition, Harold
Wilson had openly criticised the United States policy in Vietnam, but
the Prime Minister�s disposition and guiding principles would change
once elected to a position of political authority. The historical
debate on Wilson�s policy toward the Vietnam War has generally centred
on the extent to which Britain provided aid to the United States, the
mediation and peace initiatives engaged in by the Prime Minister, and
the various ways in which Wilson avoided the commitment of British
troops to the conflict. For example, these topics have recently been
considered by John W. Young in Britain and �LBJ�s War,� 1964-68 (April 2002), Sylvia A. Ellis: Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: A Not So Special Relationship? (2001), John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis: British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives, 1966-1967 (January 2003), and John Dumbrell, War: A Special Relationship, Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, Chapter 7-Vietnam, the Falklands and the Gulf (2001).

It
is not the aim of this work to re-examine or test the merits of
expositions put forward by historians of British foreign policy and its
attitudes toward Vietnam, however, it is possible to build upon
previous investigation and add a touch of detail gained from research
into some of the sources made available to the general public since
1999. By consulting the primary sources accessible at the Public
Records Office, in particular, the Prime Minister�s Private Office
papers, Foreign and Commonwealth Office files, and Cabinet records from
1967 to mid 1968, it is possible to provide a picture of the Labour
Government�s political position on the Vietnam War for the period. The
nature of the primary sources utilised in this study therefore
constitutes, for the most part, an Anglo-centric view of the time scale
in question. The information contained in the sources provides an
indication of the Government�s concerns regarding Britain�s world
status and the financial difficulties the country was facing at the
time. Not only did the Vietnam War have an impact on the political
integrity of the Commonwealth and British domestic stability,[5]
perhaps more notably in contemporary British political circles, as well
as regarding the historical investigation of Anglo-American
associations, the war influenced the nature of the supposed �special
relationship.� Although by no means an exhaustive study on
Anglo-American relations, it is possible to include an analysis of the
political and personal attitudes within the Government regarding the
contemporary relationship with the United States, principally with
reference to Harold Wilson�s attitudes towards the American
administration.

Anglo-American Relations and the Balance of Power

On
coming to power in 1964, Wilson may have remembered Dean Acheson�s
speech from 1962 in which the American Secretary of State remarked that
Great Britain had lost an Empire and had yet to find a role.[6]
The Prime Minister may not have been influenced directly by Acheson�s
comment, but at times Harold Wilson is portrayed as a stubborn
individual obsessively hanging onto a belief that Britain should remain
a grand world power.[7]
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister drew a favourable judgment from some
of his contemporaries. James Callaghan later described Wilson as �a
fighter who never lacked courage when his back was to the wall,�[8]
equally impartial, Callaghan observed Lyndon Baines Johnson as �so huge
a personality�and despite his faults, a very warm-hearted and human
man.�[9] Even so, one
author suggests rather damningly that President Johnson sometimes came
over �like a cross between Foghorn Leghorn and John Wayne.�[10]
Apparently, the two transatlantic leaders shared a sense of equally
undesirable and admirable character traits, often at odds with each
other and with a tendency to conflict over important political issues.
Anglo-American relations might be viewed in the period as arguably
representative of the tension in Wilson and Johnson�s personal
interaction, similar to that which characterised the more amiable
nature of the wartime relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill.
However, it was in Wilson�s interest to play down the connotations of a
�special relationship� with the United States in order to safeguard and
promote Britain�s position as a mediator in the Vietnam War. By
alluding to the idea of a special relationship, Wilson may have faced
increased pressure to concede to a certain degree of American
expectations, but Wilson refused consistently to entertain the
Churchillian philosophy of an Anglo-American affiliation. The Prime
Minister preferred instead to maintain a �close relationship� based on
�a common purpose, common objectives, and as far as can be achieved,
community of policy. A relationship based not on condescension or on a
backward looking nostalgia for the past, but on the ability of both
parties to put forward their strength and their own unique contribution
to our common purpose.�[11]
Sylvia Ellis has argued that Anglo-American relations in this period
reflected what she describes as the �not so special relationship�
between Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson. In Ellis�s opinion, the
Anglo-American alliance was �weakened substantially� during the 1960�s,
a decline epitomised by the �frosty or at best cool relationship
between Wilson and Johnson.� [12] John Baylis shares a similar sentiment and describes the Wilson-Johnson relationship as one of �antagonism and animosity.�[13]
Nevertheless, despite the political antipathy between the two men,
Ellis concludes, �no country�s verbal support was more important than
the United Kingdom�s. Not only was Britain the United State�s closest
ally�it was also a leading social democratic nation whose example was
important, not least to the Commonwealth nations and in American
liberal circles.�[14]

In
1965, McGeorge Bundy informed the President that support from the
Labour Government was �not only harder get but somewhat more valuable
in international terms.�[15]
Furthermore, at times Johnson found moments to be supportive, if not
politically courteous towards Wilson, verified by a personal telegram
in October 1967 from the President to the Prime Minister in which
Johnson implicitly referred to the war in Vietnam. As an appreciative
gesture, the President wrote, �I think you understand how much it
matters that the Government of the country which means most to me,
aside from my own, is lending its support for what we all know is
right, despite the storms around us.�[16]
David Bruce, the American Ambassador in London observed that
conversations between the two transatlantic leaders were �lengthy,
[but] marked by the utmost courtesy.�[17]
In a conversation with the British Ambassador to the United States,
President Johnson reminded Patrick Dean that the American people �owed
an incalculable debt to the British for the time when they stood
steadfast and virtually alone against the scourge of Hitler.�[18]
Summing up eloquently the state of affairs regarding Anglo-American
relations during the Vietnam War, Lord Paul Gore-Booth, the Permanent
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office reflected upon the nature of the
�special relationship� while he was in office. There was, he said, �a
natural closeness of co-operation between people in the American
administration and in the machine in the State Department and people
doing the same sort of thing in Britain,� adding that �President
Johnson entirely understood Mr Wilson�s domestic difficulties,� and was
�grateful that�we at least didn�t get pushed over emotionally into an
officially anti-American attitude.� In Gore-Booth�s opinion, when the
American military entered Vietnam the United States did not expect
Britain to do the same but added, �I have no doubt they�d have been
delighted if we did.�[19]

Nonetheless,
despite Johnson�s sometimes heated requests, Wilson resisted all
American pressure to commit ground troops to the war and in the six
months leading up to the Tet Offensive, Britain continued to pursue a
policy of peaceful conclusion to the Vietnam War. However, Britain�s
role in the world and Indochina drew opinions in some quarters of North
Vietnam that displayed little sympathy for the United Kingdom�s
predicament. In mid 1967, observations from the British-Consulate
General in Hanoi noted that there was no change in the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam�s basic attitude towards Great Britain, and as an
example, the report mentioned a particular �snide and ungracious assault on Her Majesty�s Government.� It was claimed that an article printed in the �Peoples Daily� in July 1967 referred to British imperialism as �an
old lion who has not enough strength to guard his few remaining
interests. His shaky teeth are in the process of gradually falling out.�
Moreover, the article claimed with reference to the recent British
Government defence white paper and the proposed withdrawal of British
forces in the Far East, that Britain�s decline was a �bitter consequence of the Wilson policy of imitating the United States.�[20]
To some extent, the United Kingdom was intimately connected to the
policies of the United States and subject to a reluctant reliance on
American assistance, a sign that Great Britain was indeed not only
hanging on to a few �shaky teeth,� it was also preparing to have some
of them extracted.

It was increasingly obvious in
London and Washington (and Hanoi) that a stark power differential
existed between Britain and the United States, and that Britain
remained to a substantial degree, economically dependent on American
participation. Both countries were aware that Britain�s role as a world
power was rapidly diminishing, Britain was not only militarily
over-stretched, but the country�s economy was also weakening and facing
a series of financial crises.  During the 1960�s, the
United States Government had provided a series of economic measures
designed to shore up an ailing pound that if left unchecked, may have
threatened the stability of the dollar as well as British overseas
commitments.[21] To
some extent, additional historical analysis has focused on the reputed
existence of a deal commonly known as the �Hessian Option,� whereby
Britain would have been required to extend limited support to the
United States in Vietnam in return for American financial loans to
salvage an increasingly fragile pound.[22]
Britain appeared caught between conflicting priorities. On the one
hand, Britain remained in the short-term protective of its own
interests, in particular Commonwealth commitments in Malaya, Hong Kong
and Singapore. On the other hand, it was desirable to escape an ongoing
dependence on the United States but at the same time, remaining aware
of the crucial need to engage American military and economic aid in the
European theatre. This state of affairs provided ample justification
for Wilson to make efforts to somehow redress the situation, and
economic dependence on the United States was no reason to sit back and
allow the circumstances to continue without doing something. At the
very least, it might have been possible for Wilson to attempt to
strengthen Britain�s remaining influence upon the rest of the world,
perhaps as a key player in finding a peaceful solution to the Vietnam
War. All the same, the period reflects a Prime Minister struggling to
reconcile a belief in Britain�s global status but facing the reality of
the gradual decline of the United Kingdom�s influence and prestige in
world affairs. By acting as a peace broker in the Vietnam War, Wilson
was perhaps, at the very least, able to play Britain�s political cards
before his hand was taken away from him. 

British Commitment and Foreign Policy in Vietnam 

Britain�s
position in 1967-68 was one of conflicting loyalties between continuing
Co-chairmanship of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, and preserving
a viable political relationship with the United States. Both the
American and British administrations had differing expectations from
their transatlantic allies regarding each other�s foreign military and
political commitment. There was no possibility that Britain was going
to commit troops, both financially and practically it appears
inconceivable that the Labour Government would have entertained such an
idea. Ministers were often pre-occupied in looking for options to
resolve Britain�s domestic financial difficulties as well as minimising
defence expenditure in Europe and elsewhere abroad. Moreover, during
the latter half of 1967, discussions were already underway concerning
plans for the withdrawal of all British military influence east of
Suez. Against this backdrop of political and economic difficulties, a
commitment of British troops to Vietnam was certainly out of the
question. 
Although it was argued in Government circles that
no-one �wished to see South Vietnam captured by the North and its
inhabitants submerged in a totalitarian regime,� it was still believed
that Britain should continue to resist any American pressure to provide
a military commitment.[23] Ultimately, Britain�s �right and duty of intervention� was it seems, based on the �responsibilities for achieving peace.�[24]
Nevertheless, Johnson observed that those countries that were not
militarily committed often viewed the American war in Vietnam from an
�above-the-battle stance.� The President noted wryly that the �British
Government�s general approach would have been considerably different if
a brigade of Her Majesty�s forces had been stationed just south of the
Demilitarised Zone in Vietnam.�[25]
Wilson for his part would later acknowledge that for those not involved
in the fighting it was �all to easy� to volunteer suggestions and
advice for the American administration.[26]
After the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation Council meeting in
Washington during April 1967, Britain had come in for criticism for not
committing any ground troops in Vietnam. However, according to George
Brown there was no military �obligation� on Britain under the SEATO
agreement and that the �most valuable contribution that [Britain] could
make lay in continuing [the] diplomatic efforts to stop the fighting.�[27]
Despite the criticism levied at Britain in April 1967, it was Wilson�s
opinion that Johnson was anxious to reach a settlement, and had made it
clear that Britain must feel free at any time to take further
initiatives in pursuit of a settlement if the British Government judged
it opportune to do so.[28]
In January 1967, the prospects of resolving the conflict in Vietnam
remained �confused and uncertain,� but the British Government asserted
their belief that it was still possible to negotiate a peace settlement
and maintain a position of importance in global terms.[29]
Britain remained confident that it could promote an effort, �both in
public and by confidential diplomatic discussions� with the Governments
of the United States and the Soviet Union, in a bid to advance some
form of �mediation between the parties to the dispute.�[30]
Wilson
had already seen several efforts at brokering a peace settlement in
Vietnam come to nothing, moreover, the initiatives had somewhat
strained the Prime Minister�s patience with the American administration.[31]
In February 1967, Wilson had met with Alexei Kosygin and offered the
Soviet Premier a proposal from the United States that if accepted by
the North Vietnamese, could have potentially led to the cessation of
hostilities in Vietnam. The United States Ambassador congratulated
Wilson�s endeavour and declared the Prime Minister�s efforts as �the
biggest diplomatic coup of this century.�[32]
However, soon after the draft of the proposal was handed to Kosygin,
Walt Rostow informed Wilson that the terms of the proposal were subject
to textual alterations that for the Prime Minister, appeared to be a
�total reversal� of the policy the United States had initially put
forward. Wilson was �furious� and contemplated whether the United
States administration was �suffering from a degree of confusion about a
possible and unfortunate juxtaposition of certain parts of their
anatomy, one of which was their elbow.�[33]
One suggestion is that a reason for the failure of the peace initiative
might have been due to the British Prime Minister�s �wishful thinking,�[34]
although Wilson later claimed to have displayed a realistic degree of
political pessimism and restraint regarding Hanoi and China�s possible
reaction.[35] Furthermore, records show that on the 9^th
February 1967, the Prime Minister voiced his opinion that although the
recent Anglo-Soviet discussions had been �friendly and constructive,�
�it was still uncertain whether progress could be made on this
occasion.�[36]

However, despite Wilson alluding to the American administration�s
apparent anatomical confusion, the Prime Minister continued to impress
Britain�s role as a mediator and foster a working relationship with the
United States.

Nonetheless, it is arguable that
any United States and United Kingdom co-operation over peace in Vietnam
was conceivably destined to fail because of the unconstructive and
suspicious state of Anglo-American relations during the period. As a
contemporary illustration of American attitudes towards British
diplomatic involvement, the United Kingdom�s exclusion from the
Soviet-American summit on the Middle East in August 1967 provides an
adequate example.[37]
It has also been suggested that Wilson�s �feverish efforts� to
establish viable contact between the Soviet Union and the United
States, when they had �every opportunity of doing so� without the Prime
Minister�s intervention, only �depreciated� the British in Russian eyes.[38]
More controversially, there are indications that from at least 1966,
America may have viewed Britain as a relatively unnecessary component
in the diplomatic machinery that continued to engage an effort towards
ending the war in Vietnam. In their study of British peace initiatives
in Vietnam, John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis have argued that Washington
was prepared to allow London to �float ideas and to probe openings,�
but were �certainly not inclined to place its faith in constitutive
British diplomacy.�[39]
How practical this policy was in the face of Cold War tensions between
Moscow and Washington is debatable, thus necessitating some sort of
interaction with the British Government, not least as the USSR and the
United Kingdom were Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference.

One
suggestion proposes that Britain�s role in the Geneva negotiations,
which divided Vietnam into North and South, is evidence that Britain
had a keen interest in keeping the region peaceful, �possibly through a
process of neutralisation.�[40] Britain�s discernible support for the neutralisation of Cambodia and Laos[41]
appears in direct contrast to the American view that nationalism and
neutrality were generally not acceptable to United States foreign
policy. Furthermore, although Britain eventually joined SEATO, the
Government remained sceptical about its purpose and the long-term
implication that pro-Western organisations might propel nationalistic
sentiment into the arms of Communism.[42]
The period in question defined the inherent differences between United
States foreign policy and British interests, often seen at odds with
American agendas. In a later discourse, Wilson claimed that Britain�s
role in Anglo-American relations was often �complementary, rather than
identical,�[43]
nevertheless, one line of thought suggests, �it has never been a
recommendation of a policy to the British people that is favoured by
the United States.�[44]
Although the American administration were aware of Wilson�s problems in
supporting America, Washington tended generally to see public and
political opinion in Britain as �defeatist� towards Communist
belligerence, and Johnson remained  �intermittently annoyed� at the British Prime Minister�s ambiguous position regarding Vietnam.[45]
Nevertheless, in one regard, the British were correct in their
assumption that the Americans seemed to be fighting a lost cause in
Vietnam, and with the benefit of hindsight, Britain displayed a notable
level of political foresight by acknowledging that the war threatened
to unite the forces of nationalism in the Third World.[46]
However, perhaps the significant difference between America and Britain
and their approach to policy towards the conflict in Vietnam was the
manner in which the two nations judged their relationship with
Communist China. The United States tended to see the relation between
the North Vietnamese and Beijing as one that could lead to the
emergence of Chinese power as dominant in the region, while with a keen
eye firmly placed on the importance and safety of Hong Kong, Britain
generally preferred a conciliatory attitude towards China.[47]
However, when a North Vietnamese delegation visited Beijing and Moscow
to determine the opinion of their allies regarding the war, China
insisted that the Vietnamese should persist until America was
militarily beaten, adding weight to the United States (and Soviet)
argument that China was potentially an aggressive power in the region.
The Soviet Union, however, recommended that the North should continue
to seek a diplomatic solution demonstrating that in part, Moscow might
have been working to a similar agenda as the British Government.[48]

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