General Islamic/Turkish victories over the Crusaders

The Christians were in a death trap. When they marched up into the angle formed by the Nile and the Bahr as-Saghir, the army had crossed a dry canal. No one thought to consider it a danger. Worse, Pelagius had neglected to bring adequate supplies, thinking to capture the enemy supplies quickly. A Christian fleet of about six hundred ships was in the Nile�enough to keep the army re-supplied at to support its advance. Once it was clear that Mansourah could not be taken quickly, fortifications were built on the other two sides of the triangle.

There were plenty of locals to tell the Crusaders how easily the Muslims could trap them, but Pelagius would not listen. King John again urged acceptance of al-Kamil's terms, but rejecting his advice had become almost automatic by this time. A couple of weeks passed in this manner.

It was August, and the Nile was rising a little every day. Soon, the waters were high enough and water flowed into the canal. Within a few days, the levels were high enough to send ships down it, cutting the Christians off from retreat and from being re-supplied from Damietta. The fleet was trapped, the army was trapped, and there was food enough for only twenty days.

Many in the army urged immediate retreat, before their situation grew worse. At last awakening to the peril, Pelagius agreed. On the night of August 26, without ever having fought a battle, the great army began its retreat.

capture of Edesssa

Zengi now turned his attention north, where wars among the Turks seemed to provide an opportunity. He attacked Kara Arslan, prince of Diarbekir in 1144, a man who was allied with Joscelin of Edessa. Joscelin raised an army and marched out in November, hoping to trap Zengi between himself and Kara Arslan. Instead, Zengi turned unexpectedly and marched on Edessa, arriving there on November 28. Joscelin retreated to Turbessel, unwilling to risk open battle. After a siege of four weeks, Edessa fell.

This victory made Zengi famous, for he was responsible for the elimination of one of the four Crusader states. He appointed a Turk as governor, killed all the Franj males and sold the rest as slaves. He closed all the Latin churches, but he left all the native Christians in peace. He then moved on to take a number of other Edessan fortresses. Trouble in Mosul forced him to break off his conquest of Edessa, but he was back in Aleppo in May 1146, preparing to invade Syria.

In September he was besieging the Muslim town of Qalat Jabar because it would not recognize him as overlord. On September 14, he caught a Frankish eunuch drinking from his cup and severely upbraided the man in public. That night, the man stole into Zengi's tent and murdered him while he slept.

Zengi's career is important because of his conquest of Edessa, but it is important even more for the fact that he couched his actions against the Christians in terms of a Muslim holy war. He is the first Muslim leader to use the jihad against the Latins as a means of mobilizing forces, gaining popular support, and enforcing unity and obedience among his emirs. It was a formula that would be employed even more effectively by Nuradin, Zengi's second son and successor, and by later Muslim leaders as well. When Islam stood united, the Franj would always be defeated (the Byzantine Empire was a different matter), but Islam was notoriously difficult to unite.

Zengi showed that the jihad was an effective tool. He had the imams proclaim the holy war in sermons and prayers, the matter was discussed in the schools and in princely courts; it was, in short, a propaganda tool. This is not to imply that Zengi was cynical in his use of jihad; on the contrary, he believed strongly in its need. Zengi had given the Turks and Arabs its first permanent victory and a vehicle for achieving more.