Origins of phalanx warfare

A, thank you Aurelianus, you are too kind. Hope you can read Greek though, cause I have already proposed a relevant subject ("Evolution of hoplite warfare in the aftermath of the Peloponessian war") to my publisher. His first reactions weren't very encouraging ("don't you think it's a bit too specialized") but I can only hope. I have to finish my treatise on the Conquistadores first, but after 3 or 4 months I might be able to start it.

A brief note. I believe the "western warfare" comes directly from Rome - here we see all the concepts of the modern armies. The Greeks influenced the Romans, of course, but the latter had a more practical approach and they certainly lacked  the rather anarchistic approach of the Greeks to the subject of pre- and post-battlefield discipline (or lack thereof), the Greek's aversion to a standing structure (election of the officers by the Demos or the fighting men was the norm in Hellas) and the Greeks determination of deciding on the war they'd wage. But the Romans adopted the concept of decisive battle, on a suitable battlefield,  the idea of limited warfare, the close-formation of heavy infantrymen, the vague references to "republic" (the Roman version of democracy - a more practical aristocracy, actually) and freedom and many other Greek "inventions". The Greek model was rendered obsolete by a Greek army, nevertheless: Philip's and Alexander's army was everything the Greek army was (in the underlying concept, that is) but without the democratic implications and the suitability for defensive, mainly, purposes. Alex's army was the first moden army in the sense that it upheld those principles we talked about, but utilized them as means and not goals - means to get a favourable outcome, that is. An army suited to conquest. Such an army cannot be a real citizen army, I believe. But that's only me, I guess

I'd say, the ancient Greek army was simulated only once in modern history: in the pre-Stalin (Tchuchasevski, actually) Red Army of the USSR in the 1920s. The only modern army without standing structure, with communal decision-making pre-battlefield, with questioning of the (temporary) officers and with full political control over any operational aspect of it. Stalin got rid of it in the early 30s, because he needed a "real" army to wage war with and "protect the revolution"

Ah, yes "a marching democracy" - an extremely fascinating concept. I think "the ten thousand" (Myrioi) are one of the very few examples the world history is presenting in that context and the only people that could create such a thing were the democracy-obsessed ancient Greeks

Interesting to note that even the hoplites coming from not-quite democratic states (most Greek city states, contrary to popular belief, were aristocratic oligarchies or shifted between oligarchy and democracy) had the excactly same set of values and ideals to allow them to operate in such a way.

It all boils down to the nature of the city states. Georgios Steinhauer in his "warfare of the ancient Greeks" talks about the social and political parameters - and the practical implementations - that led to the specific way of waging war unique to the Greeks (at least before others adopted it from them).

One must understand the buildup of the city states:

The average city state was an organization that barely could sustain itself. The land wasn't extremely rich, and the only way to get a surplus of food, goods etc. was to snatch the neighbors stuff. But the main point is that the cities didn't have to wage war to survive, they just were better off if they did. This is crucial, as it leads us to our next conclusion.

The city states are operating, as far as warfare goes, in a sense of self-preservation, more than anything else. Remember, the community can survive without having to resort to large scale plundering and destruction of other settlements. So, what would we best than to ensure that nobody destroyes anybody?

The half-ceremonial way of hoplite warfare is specifically suited for this. One could argue that it developed simultaneously to the rise of the "middle class" (free landowners with only a relatively small piece of land, artisans and the rest) to the focal point of the polis institution. A comparison with the less developed Greek areas (Macedonia, Epirus and to an extend Thessaly) where the middle class never gained much leeway and the land was held by few and powerful aristocrats) is very revealing.

So, the Greeks could survive without plundering their neighbours. The location of the city states allowed them to operate more or less without the threat of small outside threats (unless something big was thrown at them - like the army of Xerxes), so what they had to deal with was the threat the neighboring communities (other city states) represented. A limited threat, nevertheless.

The hoplite warfare, before the Peloponessian war, was a type of warfare tailored to those needs. The people manning the phalanx were precisely the middle class, the men who actually ruled their cities. The short campaings and result from a single, decisive battle suited the needs of an agrarian society without a standing army: they campaigned, sought the enemy, faced them in a pitched battle, won/loose, collect their dead and return home.

I'd need to write a book to fully illustrate the adoption of the warfare the very nature of the city states and to the change of conditions that led to the change of the hoplite warfare in the second half of the 5th and first half of the 4th century, but I hope this gives you some food for thought at least.

Welcome, your mind is certainly not poor at all, since you raise legitimate questions.

Greeks never used chariots during warfare. The terrain was not suitable for them. Chariots were only used to transfer the noble warrior-kings to the field of battle, where they would set down and fight. I Imagine them as something close to feudal lords, each one leading a group of followers who would be fighting around them and usually disperse in case their leader was killed.

This kind of war was developed into the phalanx warfare when the social-economic conditions in Greece changed. Thorax and iron weapons became affordable by free farmers who were the backbone of the phalanx. The rest are explained in Hanson's book.

But when it comes to your question "why didn't the opponents tried to flank the phalanx instead of a head-on collision" the answer is "of course they did". The thing is that if you have two neighboring cities, fighting it off for a couple of disputed fields, they're most likely to be equipped in the same manner and therefore bound to fight in a similar way. More over, in order to flank the phalanx (which was indeed somehow inflexible) you have to actually move your own accordingly, not an easy task on the field of battle! You have to do it without having your own formation disintegrated, avoid the flak protection of the opposite phalanx (psiloi - usually archers, javelineers or slingers) and then you could be reasonably sure that your opponent general would have anchored his threatened left or right to a natural barrier, like a creek or a forest.