Mongol enemies

The Mongol Siege of Xiangyang and Fan-ch�eng and the Song military

By Chris Hanson

            The Siege of Xiangyang and Fan-ch�eng was one of the longest sieges of the medieval world lasting almost 5 years, from 1268 until early 1273, and was the longest campaign in the war against the Song Dynasty (pronounced sung). 

            Over the course of the campaign chroniclers record many heroic deeds were recorded, yet there is limited information about the siege itself.  Unlike the siege of Acre during the third crusade, between 1189 and 1191, where many separate events are recorded. Examples are the fraternization amongst Latin and Arab troops playing chess, and children wrestling where the parents of the losing child had to pay a �ransom�. Oriental sources quite often do not to cover individual battles/sieges in detail like the west.  However, oriental sources tend to give a broader perspective of the strategic war.  Finding detailed information about the siege of Xiangyang and Fan-ch�eng is difficult, however, there is some information in English sources regarding the siege of the two cities. 

            After Khubilai stabilized his northern territories he established himself as the great Khan of the Mongols and the emperor of China.  Khubilai then turned his resources to the south against the Nan (Southern) Song.  Although, Khubilai took part in earlier invasions of Song territory he did not participate in the siege or other campaigns against the Nan Song.  Instead Khubilai appointed A-chu as the principal commander of the siege.

            A-chu was a gifted commander coming from a family of great generals.              A-chu�s father was Urriyangkhadi, one of Khubilai�s greatest commanders, who in turn was the son of Subedei, the famous general under Chingis Khan. 

            Emperor Duzong appointed Lu Wen-huan and Zhang Tianshun, both committed military leaders and loyal to the Song court, as the military commanders to defend the cities.  Xiangyang and Fan-ch�eng, known today as Hubei, were located on opposite sides of the Han River which led to the Yangtze River.  Its strategic location made it a stronghold which blocked the invasion of Song territory.  In Morris Rossabi�s book Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times he states �Rashid al-Din�s�, (a Persian historian), �informant told him Xiangyang had a �strong castle, a stout wall and a deep moat.��   The two cities were connected via a pontoon bridge allowing troops to move from one city to the other.  The garrison inside both cities were well armed, morale was high and they had plenty of supplies--supposedly enough grain to last 10 years.  However, they lacked less unessential supplies such as salt and clothing.  To support the two cities, the Song used their fleet of ships (river junks) to bring in supplies or to support troops sallying from the cities.  The Song had many forms of siege engines, including gun powder weapons, to counter Mongol siege equipment.

Khubilai realized the capture of both cities would enable the Mongols to use them as a base of operations during the war.  Liu Zheng, a former Song officer who defected to the Mongols, recommended several forts be built in the Sichuan area to cut off grain and food supplies to the two cities.

            In 1268 the Mongols, led by A-chu and Liu Zheng, surrounded Xiangyang with an unknown number of troops.  After viewing the defenses, A-chu realized he could not assault the city without taking heavy casualties.  Therefore, he decided to blockade the city and starve the people.  However, A-chu discovered without a fleet he could not stop supplies from coming up the Han River into the twin cities.  A-chu sent word to Khubilai explaining his problem that his troops consisted primarily of cavalry and were not entirely suitable for the siege.  He requested Shi Shu, a northern Han Chinese commander in Mongol service who commanded several thousand northern Chinese troops, be sent to support the siege.  After the arrival of Shi Shu and his troops, which consisted almost entirely of Chinese infantry, both cities were surrounded.  Again the number of troops is unknown. 

            As the Mongols surrounded the twin cities, troops from Xiangyang tried to break out through the siege lines but failed.  There are no records of the number of soldiers who attempted to break through the Mongol lines, but Chinese sources state many Song troops were captured and beheaded.  From this point forward, the Song troops stayed within their walls and waited for supplies and reinforcements to arrive.

            When Shi Shu arrived, he commanded his troops to start building 500 river junks, training the crews and he was able to capture some river junks from the Song.  Two fortresses, Po-ho-k�ou and Lu-men shan, were built downriver from the twin cities to deal with the Song navy coming up the river.  In August of 1269 the Mongols and their Chinese allies were to have their first naval battle.  A Song general named Hsia Kuei with 3000 junks attacked Lu-men shan.  Hsia Kuei was defeated and fifty of his junks were captured.  What happened to the crews and other junks is either not recorded or possibly not translated into a western language.

            Over the course of the siege it appears Khubilai became unhappy with the lack of results and sent one of his trusted military advisor�s, Shih T�ien-tse, to inspect, review and make suggestions to capture the two cities.  One of the suggestions Shih T�ien-tse made was to build a rampart between the two forts, P-ho-k�ou and Lu-men shan to stop Song river junks from supplying the two cities.  After his review Shih T�ien-tse authorized an additional 20,000 troops to reinforce A-chu�s army.  The Mongols even tried to dam the river or at least restrict the flow to render the pontoon bridge between the two cities unusable.  However, the garrisons of both cities still resisted the Mongols assaults and would not submit.  Even the Mongol changes in their siege tactics, Song officials were still able to find their way into the two cities.

            Throughout the siege, the Song imperial court remained adamant that it would not to surrender the two cities.  Some sources they indicate the Song emperor was kept ignorant of the siege and the threat of the Mongols.  Jia Sidao, the emperor�s chief advisor/councilor was in control of the imperial court and by some sources considered a treacherous minister full of corruption.  Other sources tend not to be as harsh and give him credit for changes within the court to reduce corruption.  However, he was not a military leader and was despised by many within the Song military.  Many commanders defected to the Mongols due to the decisions of Jia Sidao.  In one source, a concubine informed the emperor of the siege.  Later Jia Sidao had the concubine executed.  There is no doubt Jia Sidao was a ruthless and cunning individual who cherished his position within the imperial court.  The continued resistance of the two cities was important to Jia Sidao.  In an earlier campaigns against the Mongols, Jia Sidao claimed a victory after killing fewer than 200 of them, (yet in reality Khubilai was pulling back to deal with his succession).  If the two cities were to fall then the credibility of Jia Sidao would be undermined.  If they held, his position within the court would only strengthen.

            There seems to be little record about the Song Emperor Duzong�s views on the siege of the twin cities in any literature reviewed.  Emperor Duzong was the adopted son of the previous emperor, Lizong.  Emperor Lizong was one of the weakest emperors of the Song Dynasty, taken to the pleasures of his concubines and neglecting his duties as emperor.  Duzong seems to have followed the examples set by his step-father and left the duties of government to Jia Sidao.  Had the emperor put as much effort into the defense of China as his people did the Song army may have held out much longer or even may have stopped the Mongol invasions. 

            There were many attempts made by the Song to break out of the cities.  One example occurred in March of 1270, when Lu Wen-huan decided to break out of the city with 10,000 troops consisting of infantry and cavalry.  The exact composition of the force is not given, but the Song took heavy casualties and had to retreat back into the city behind their walls.  The fact that 10,000 troops were involved is a testimony to the size of the garrison holding out inside the two cities. 

            Over the course of the siege several attempts were made by the imperial court to relieve the siege, primarily by river.  In October of 1270 Fan Wen-hu tried to break through the blockade.  He failed, loosing 2000 men and thirty boats.  August of 1271 the Song experienced another failed attempt to relieve the siege, loosing 2000 soldiers.  In September of 1272 two famous commanders with 3000 men broke through the Mongols lines.  Chang Shun, one of the commanders, died and was considered a terrible loss.  Sometime later the other commander with the remainder of his original 3000 troops tried to break out.  This time the Mongols were ready.  To help them see at night the Mongols put straw on the banks of the river and set it on fire to light up the boats.  Many of the troops were captured and the commander was killed.

            Still, Lu Wen-huan would not surrender, and the Mongols could not storm the city without taking heavy casualties without a strong probability of taking the city.  Khubilai realized something had to be done and sent word to his nephew, Abakha, the Il-khan of Persia.  Abakha sent two renowned engineers, Isma�il of Hilla and Ala al-Din of Mosul, who built the first counterweight trebuchets in China called hui-hui pao, or �Muslim trebuchet�.

            The Mongol commanders employed the new siege weapons against Fan-ch�eng first.  Chroniclers report the siege engines shook heaven and earth when they fired and the projectiles destroyed everything they hit.  The projectiles weighed weigh 150 catties, (approximately 165 lbs. or 75 kg), and had a range greater than anything the Song had within the city so they couldn�t counter the attack.  The Mongols launched explosives and who knows what else into the city with their new siege trebuchets.  Fan-ch�eng could not hold out against such a barrage and fell several days after the weapons were employed.  When Lu Wen-huan received reports regarding the fall of one of the twin cities, he was in dismay but did not give up right away.  The hui-hui pao, or Muslim trebuchets, were moved to other side of the river and placed at the southeast corner of the Xiangyang.  Lu Wen-huan continued to hold out against the continued assaults of the Mongols.  Eventually he was offered the command of the two cities if he was to surrender and defect to the Mongols.  Khubilai Khan encouraged such defections and many Song commanders, seeing Khubilai as the one with the mandate of heaven to be the new emperor of the Yuan Dynasty, defected.  Lu Wen-huan surrendered, ending the long tiresome siege, and the two cities were given to him to govern under the Yuan Dynasty.

            The fall of Xiangyang and Fan-Ch�eng marked the turning point in the war against the Song Dynasty.  Morale collapsed within the Song imperial court, and the Song army was able to hold out for several more years before the Mongols conquered the rest of China.