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The Ming Army

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jiangweibaoye View Drop Down
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  Quote jiangweibaoye Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Topic: The Ming Army
    Posted: 26-May-2005 at 14:02

Poirot,

It depends on what period of Ming Dynasty you are talking about.  During Wanli, yes, they were how you describe it.  But Yongle or Hungwu, it is the opposite.

Comparing the Samurai to an Imperial Guard is a better comparision.

Concerning the Imjim War, I attached a word document.  My understanding is that the combined Ming/Korean army (I believe that Ming was roughly 70-80% vs Korean 30-20%) was still less than the Japanese invasion force.  I cannot remember where I saw those numbers, but the two sides total solider strength did not differ so much.  I will try to recall where where I got the army totals. 

So when some say that the Chinese just send waves of soldiers is an error, I believe.  Korean resistance played a critical role in the Japanese defeat.  There was also Ming Naval presence in the Imjin War (of course not as significant as the Koreans contribution).  Also, the Ming Army can also be divided from the Northern Armies vs the Southern Armies. Northern Armies (especially the ones from the Capital District * the ones from Liaoning Provinces) was very well trained and equipped vs the undispilined poorly trained southern counterparts.

Some also espouse that the Japanese Army at the time comprised of all Samurai.  Ashigaru (foot soldiers) make the bulk of the Japanese army.  Most were equiped with spears or lances.

Quite frankly, without the outstanding performance from both the Korean and Ming Armies, Hideyoshi's dream of conquering Korea would have been reality.

I have attached the article from Wikipedia. 

Seven-Year War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
(Redirected from Battle of Keicho)

For the 17561763 war, see Seven Years' War.
The Seven-Year War (Chinese:壬辰倭亂; Korean: 임진 왜란 -- Imjin Waeran, lit. "Japanese Turmoil of the Year Imjin"); Japanese: 文禄, 慶長の役, lit. "Battles of Bunroku and Keicho") was the conflict from 1592 to 1598 on the Korean peninsula, following two successive Japanese invasions of Korea.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi initiated two invasions of Korea, in 1592 and again in 1597, with the professed aim of conquering China. In both campaigns, the Japanese were defeated by the expeditionary armies of Ming Dynasty China and local Korean forces, notably the naval fleet of Yi Sun-sin.

The war brought the local political, economic, and social order in Korea to a state of complete collapse. It also carried dramatic consequences for East Asian history. For Korea, the horrible devastation would leave the country in a perpetually weakened state until the Japanese returned and annexed Korea in 1910. In addition, the cost of the conflict also helped to bankrupt the Ming Dynasty and led to its eventual collapse at the hand of the Manchus.


The first invasion

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who established his hegemony in Japan in the latter part of the 16th century, had hoped but failed to receive cooperation from the Ming Dynasty in his attempt to make himself the new Shogun. Motivated in part also by a need to satisfy the perpetual land hunger of his vassals and find employment for restive samurai, he began making plans for the conquest of China. He first made his intentions to conquer China known to Mori Terumoto in 1586, then set about trying to realize it after he defeated the clans of Shimazu and Hojo. First he intended to secure the Korean peninsula as an invasion route for his forces. After King Sonjo refused his offer of an alliance against China and military access for the Japanese troops, Hideyoshi launched a war against Korea in 1592 to secure passage to China.

The Japanese invasion of 1592 with 160,000 troops had great initial success mainly due to the element of surprise and its use of firearms. Two armies, under Konishi Yukinaga and Kato Kiyomasa, landed on the 25th and 26th of May and marched north. Konishi reached the Han River south of Seoul and entered the city on June 12, just 18 days after landing at Busan. King Seonjo and his court withdrew first to Songdo, then Pyongyang and finally to Uiju, on the Yalu River. Japanese troops ravaged many key towns in the southern part of Korea, took Pyongyang and advanced as far north as the Yalu and Tumen rivers. Korean marines and irregulars harassed the Japanese rear so no attempt was made by the Japanese to exploit their initial advantage.

In May and June, a small Korean fleet commanded by Yi Sun-sin destroyed several Japanese flotillas and wrought havoc on Japanese logistics. The Korean iron-roofed Geobukseon, or turtle ships, were technologically superior in almost every way. In all perhaps 72 Japanese vessels were sunk by the end of June.

In July, the Wanli Emperor, responding to King Seonjo's request for aid, sent a small force of 5,000, which was not enough to fend off the Japanese. At this juncture Hideyoshi, after suffering numerous setbacks, including logistical problems caused by Korean saboteurs and major naval defeats at the hands of the Korean navy, proposed to China the division of Korea the north as a self-governing Chinese satellite, and the south to remain in Japanese hands. The peace talks were mostly carried out by Konishi Yukinaga, who did most of the fighting against the Chinese. The offer was promptly rejected.

Having seen the token forces they had sent to Korea wiped out, China sent a much large force in January 1593 under Song Yingchang and Li Rusong. The expeditionary army had a prescribed strength of 100,000, made up of 42,000 from five northern military districts, a contingent of 3000 soldiers proficient in the use of firearms from South China, and far more from Siam and the Ryukyus. Seaports in China were closed for fear that the Wokou invasions of the 1550s would be repreated. In February 1593 a large combined force of Chinese and Korean soldiers attacked Pyongyang and drove the Japanese into southward retreat. Li Rusong personally led a pursuit with a force of 1000 cavalry. He was checked by a large Japanese formation outside Seoul and thoroughly routed.

These engagements ended the first phase of the war, and peace negotiations followed. The Japanese evacuated Seoul in May and retreated to fortifications around Busan. Some Japanese soldiers left the army and settled down in Korea, even marrying Korean women. The ensuing truce was to last for close to four years.


The interlude

In the summer of 1593 a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce. An envoy from Hideyoshi reached Beijing in 1594. Satisfied with Japanese overtures, the imperial court in Beijing dispatched an embassy to invest Hideyoshi with the title of "King of Japan" on condition of complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea. Most of the Japanese army had left Korea by autumn 1596; a small garrison was nevertheless left in Busan. The Ming embassy was granted an audience with Hideyoshi in October 1596 but there was a great deal of misunderstanding about the context of the meeting. Hideyoshi considered himself the victor in the war, and was enraged to find out that he was to be installed as a tribute-bearing vassal. He demand among other things, a royal marriage with the Wanli Emperor's daughter, the delivery of a Korean prince as hostage, and four of Korea's southern provinces. Peace negotiations soon ceased and the war entered its second phase. Early in 1597 both sides resumed hostilities.


The second invasion

Soon after the Chinese embassy was given safe conduct home, 200 Japanese ships carrying a force of 140,000 were sent to Korea. The court in Beijing appointed Yan Hao as supreme commander of an initial mobilisation of 38,000 troops from as far away as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong. These were assisted by a naval force of 21,000 men. Ray Huang has estimated the combined strength of the Ming army and navy at the height of the second campaign at 75,000 men.

The second invasion differed from the first in that the Japanese met with stronger resistance. They pushed to just south of Seoul in August 1597 but were turned back by a large Korean and Ming force that winter. As the Japanese retreated south through Gyeongsang-do they burned Gyeongju and destroyed and stole much of the historic and artistic legacy of Silla. Thereafter they were on the defensive. Naval operations, already deemed important in the first campaign, had a decisive influence on the outcome of the second. Following the loss of Hansan Island, Yi Sun-sin, who had been sent to jail, was reinstated. With his return the Koreans soon regained control over the waters of the straits, forcing the Japanese to land men to take defensive positions along the coast from Ulsan in the east to Suncheon in the west. On September 16, 1597, Yi led 12 ships against 133 Japanese ships in the Myongnyang Straits. The Koreans sank 31 enemy ships and forced a Japanese retreat. In November, the Japanese fleet was lured by Yi into a tide-race where the oar-driven turtle ships caused wholesale destruction.

By early 1598, the Japanese forces, hemmed in by Korean and Chinese armies, found themselves unable to break out of the south despite fierce fighting. The Wanli Emperor sent a Chinese fleet under artillery expert Chen Lin in May 1598; this naval force saw action in join manouvres with the Koreans. Konishi Yukinage warned that the Japanese position in Korea was untenable. Hideyoshi in turn ordered the withdrawal of close to half of the invading force, leaving mostly Satsuma warriors under Shimazu clan member commanders. The remaining Japanse forces fought fiercely, turning back Chinese attacks on Suncheon and Sacheon. The invasion was suddenly abandoned only when news of Hideyoshi's death on 18 September 1598 reached the Japanese camp late in Ocotber.

The Seven-Year War left deep scars in Korea. Farmlands were devastated, irrigation dikes were destroyed, villages and towns were burned down, the population was first plundered and then dispersed, and tens of thousands of skilled workers (celadon ware makers, craftsmen, artisans, etc) were either killed during the war or kidnapped to Japan as captives to help Japanese develop their crafts. In 1598 alone, the Japanese took some 38,000 ears as horrific trophies. The long war reduced the productive capacity of farmlands from 1,708,000 kyol to 541,000 kyol. Pillage and foraging by Chinese troops only added to the unmitigated tragedy of a war from which the peninsula kingdom never fully recovered.

Following the war, relations between Korea and Japan had been completely suspended. Japan was cut off from the technology of continental Asia. After the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, however, negotiations between the Korean court and the Tokugawa shogunate were carried out via the Japanese lord on Tsushima. In 1604, Tokugawa Ieyasu, needing to restore commercial relations with Korea in order to have access to the technology of the mainland again, met Korea's demands and released some 3000 captive Koreans. As a result, in 1607, a Korean mission visited Edo, and diplomatic and trade relations were restored on a limited basis.

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  Quote poirot Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 26-May-2005 at 01:20

When browsing the old threads, I happened to stumple upon a thread titled "Samurai vs. Ming Swordsman."  I was interested because I thought that the comparison was totally inadequate and asymetrical.

I would like to add afew ideas to this old thread, now that I am interested in it.

First, I would like to comment on this asymetrical comparison.  The comparison between Samurais and Ming swordsmen is as asymetrical as the comparison between European Templar or Hospitalier knights and ordinary Muslim footsoldiers.  Why not compare a Samurai to an Imperial Guard?

I would like to add a few comments about Ming armed forces:

1. The later Ming army, in general, was a VERY LOW TECH army.  Before the military revampment effort made by General Qi Xu Guang and others, the normal Ming soldier even wore armor made of paper.  Funds for the army were diverted and spent by corrupt officials for non-military related purposes

2. The composition of the Ming forces are different from that of Japanese forces.  The military was scattered into various provincial districts, and each district's military officers were placed under the command of a viceroy, usually a bureaucrat who understood little about war, let alone wielding a sword.  Unlike the earlier Ming dynasty, when a soldier class was established to provide steady supply of professional soldiers into the military, the later Ming dynasty's forces were primarily composed of poor peasants.  Pay was low, if not cut off all together.   Sometimes, these poor soldiers had to sell their armor to make ends meet.

3. The Ming army was mainly a massive collection of untrained peasants along with small amounts of exceptional superior corps.  The best troops, in terms of provision, were the imperial guardsmen, but the imperial guardsmen were primarily stationed near the capital for obvious purposes.  The revamped units under General Qi Ji Guang only numbered no more than 20,000, primarily peasant volunteers and former militiamen from the southern provinces.  Even Qi Ji Guang himself believed that the Ming army was low tech, and had to devise low tech methods to counter jap pirates.  General Qi converted farming tools into weapons.  He assigned 10-12 men as a fighting unit, with each of them performing a simple task, such as weilding a large broom to ward off the enemy so that the rest can fight in relative safety.  For more information, check out Ray Huang's work "1587: A Year of No Significance."

4. Speaking of firearms, the Ming did include handguns in their military, but at extremely small proportions.  Handgunners were regarded as elite body guard troops and rarely used in serious battle.  Handguns weren't reliable and often, exploded rather than fire at the enemy.  On the other hand, the use of artillery fire was a key to Ming success in the battlefield, for the Ming was famous for its Red Generalismo cannons.

I would attribute the eventual success of the Ming agains the Japanese invasion campaigned by Hideyoshi to two factors: 1. Korean resistance effort  2. Reliance on tactics.  The contribution of the Korean forces, especially those under the brilliant general Lee Sun Shun and his equally brillant turtle ships, cannot be overlooked in overturning Hideyoshi's ambitions.  The Ming did not prevail in 1598 because of a more superior army (quite contrary to that), but because Japan was simply too weak to take on both China and Korea simultaneously at the time.



Edited by poirot
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