Was there a genocide in 1915?

I am happy this opened since another one similar was shut down for no real reason..

That's the funniest thing i ever heard.The armenian population was 1.3 million!And if there was a genocide of million people they would need dozers and stuff to build massive graves.They didn't have that so in that case every house had to have a grave of 10-30 people

Greeks?

Without fighting back?

And for the greek murders:

QWhen the greeks attcked Izmir they commited huge crimes.I have a witnnes on that.They killed pregnant women,stabbed babies and raped dead bodies.The witness(Nazan S.)told me about a woman that didn't want to be raped and commited suicide.Later they found hr body and......

Considering next the World War I period, and the resulting war-dead (lines 76 to 90), a problem is separating from the estimates those for civilian war-dead, versus those including massacres and genocide. I could include confidently only one estimate for war-dead (line 86). When this is added to the probable 400,000 consolidated battle-dead (line 83), we find that some 650,000 Turkish soldiers and civilians died from the war (line 90).

Of greatest importance are the estimates of the Young Turk's genocide during the war. In the table I organize these into several categories. The first gives and consolidates those of the number deported (lines 93 to 102), and then also does this for the estimates of their toll (lines 104 to 121). I calculate an alternative total (on line 122) from the estimated percentages of those killed during deportation (notes on lines 105, 116, and 118) and the consolidated number deported (line 102). From these two alternative ranges (lines 121 and 122) I determine a total (line 123) in the usual way.

Next I list the estimates of Armenians that the Turks killed (lines 125 to 146). These I classified by soldier or civilian and by place killed and then consolidate or sum them (lines 131, 138, and 147), and total them overall (line 148).

Finally, the table presents the many estimates of the overall genocide's toll during 1915 to 1918 (lines 151 to 186). These I order from the lowest to the highest figures. As can be seen, they vary from a low of 300,000 (lines 151 to 152) to a high of 2,000,000 (line 163), which anchor the consolidated range (line 187). Consistent with the estimates 1,000,000 dead (see lines 157, 160, 164 to 178) appears the most prudent mid-value.

Next I independently check this consolidation against the sum (line 188) of those Armenians murdered during the deportations (line 123) and otherwise (line 148). As can be seen, the alternative totals (lines 187 and 188) are divergent, the mid-value alone being off by 808,000 dead. To compensate for this, I give the final genocide range (line 189) the lowest low and highest high of the two and average their mid-values. Thus, given all these estimates, the Turks murdered most likely 300,000 to 2,686,000 Armenians, probably 1,404,000 of them. A critical question is then whether this is consistent with the Armenian population, itself a contentious estimate. This I will later consider.

Not only did the Turks murder Armenians, but Greeks as well. Estimates of this are far fewer (lines 201 to 203), but we do have assessments of those deported (lines 193 to 197) from which to calculate the possible toll (line 198). The actual percentages from which I make this calculation reflect the relevant historical bits and pieces in the sources.⁶ Combining this calculation and the sum of the estimates (line 204) suggest a likely genocide of 84,000 Greeks.

Sometimes the sources would refer to Christians killed (lines 207 to 207b), which most likely included Armenians or Greeks, but could also refer to the relatively small number of Turkey's Nestorians, Bulgarians, or Cossacks. These are totaled separately (line 208).

During the war the British navy blockaded Turkey, including the Turkish Levant. No food was allowed in by sea. The resulting famine in Lebanon and Syria (with consequences shown on lines 208a to 20) would not have become as deadly as it did had not the Turks commandeered available food supplies and refused to help the starving. As a result they bear the greater responsibility for the famine, which I calculate as probably around 75 percent of the total dead (line 208i).

The Young Turks did not confine their democide to Turkey. When they invaded Caucasia, their soldiers massacred Armenians and other Christians and also encouraged Kurds and Azerbaijanis to do so. Overall, Turks possibly killed (lines 212 to 220) 10,000 Christians, most of them probably Armenians--there were very few Greeks in Caucasia. (It is difficult to keep this number in perspective when other figures are in the tens and hundreds of thousands; but imagine the contemporary enraged and horrified outcry were the highest American, British, or French authorities to be responsible for the murder of 10,000 Moslem citizens--the responsible government would fall or be impeached.) For this genocide the table also lists some specific estimates (lines 224 to 227). These I consolidated (line 228) and then add (line 229) an assumed 4/5ths of the Christian dead determined above. The table then sums the two ranges (lines 228 and 229) to get the genocide (line 232).

As noted, the Turks also massacred Nestorian Christians, for which there are also a few estimates (lines 235 to 238). From my assumption that 1/5th of the Christian dead previously determined (line 218) were Nestorians, I calculate a final genocide (line 241).

Only one estimate of Moslem Azerbaijanis killed is available (line 244).

I now can calculate the overall foreign genocide (line 249), which probably ranges from 105,000 to 157,000 killed, most likely 131,000.

Turkey's Armenians also massacred Moslems. Claims that this may have amounted to at least 1,000,000, or even 1,500,000 Moslem dead (table 5.1A, lines 106b and 106e) however, have no substantiation beyond former Young Turks or their officials. Had the Armenians indeed massacred even half this number, the Young Turks surely would have given it wide publicity, photographs and all. They had no better way to counter sympathy for the Armenians they were killing. In any case foreign newsmen and diplomats in the country surely would have noted the massacres. Moreover, the Turkish statistician Ahmed Emin, who was hardly sympathetic to the Armenians, gave (table 5.1A, lines 105 and 106f) an upper limit of 40,000 Moslem Turks killed by Armenians (including possibly by Armenian-Russian troops) in the area occupied by Russian forces after the Russian Revolution in 1917, and at least 128,000 for the 1914-1915 period.⁷ Given the other estimates and the overall populations involved, I estimate that from 128,000 to 600,000 Moslem Turks and Kurds were killed. Since this was done by Armenian irregulars serving with Russian forces, I split responsibility for these deaths in Turkey between the Russians and Armenians, and show in Table 5.1A (line 255) the Armenian half--probably 75,000 murdered.

Many Moslem Turks also died from famine and disease during the war (lines 258 to 262). Most estimates mix up the toll from these causes with the number killed from combat. To compensate for this, I first consolidate the estimates (line 263) and then subtract the war-dead previously determined (line 264) to get an overall famine and disease range (line 265).

Finally, I can bring together these various totals (lines 268 to 271). Domestically and during their foreign military actions and occupations, the Young Turks probably murdered at least 743,000 and perhaps as many as 3,204,000 people, probably 1,883,000 Armenians, Greeks, Nestorians, and other Christians (line 273). Altogether, likely 3,947,000 died or were killed during the war (line 274). When I add this to the toll I will determine below for the next period, we will be able to test the overall total against the population deficit and unnatural death).

The next division in the table covers the interregnum period after WWI. Turkish Nationalist forces fought three wars during this time (lines 279 to 303). Estimates for the Greco-Turkish war give two ways of determining war-dead (lines 302 and 303), from which I select a final war-dead range in the usual way.

There is one incredibly low estimate of the overall war and massacre dead for this period (line 307) and a reasonable one for the Muslim male war-dead from 1914 to this period's end (line 308). From the latter I subtract the WWI war-dead to get an estimate of the post-WWI war-dead (line 310). Since it largely excludes female dead, this is a conservative result. Nonetheless, as can be seen by comparing this to the war-dead sum for the three wars (lines 311), the mid-value and high are significantly greater than the sum. Departing from the usual approach because of the incredible low of zero (on line 310--this implies that less than 500 were killed), I take the low of line 311 for the low (line 312), the high of line 310 for the high, and average the two mid-values.

Following this I list the estimates, consolidations, and sums for the Nationalist genocide of Christians (lines 315 to 329), Armenians (lines 334 to 359), and Greeks (lines 366 to 375). Regarding the Christian genocide, one estimate (line 322) of those killed in Izmir could refer to the former city of Smyrna, or to the Izmir peninsula next to Smyrna. I cannot determine which is meant (the estimate is only cited in Gross⁸ and his source is in Armenian), and I thus conservatively assumed that it largely duplicates those already given for Smyrna. Virtually all the total domestic Christian democide (line 329) took place in the Aydin Administrative District, of which Smyrna was a part. Since almost all the Christians in this area were either Greeks or Armenians, and in 1914 Greeks made up 94 percent of the total of the two,⁹ we then can assume that the Armenians were 6 percent (line 330) and Greeks 94 percent (line 331) of the Christian toll. I later employ the resulting ranges (lines 353 and 373) to determine the total number of these two groups that the Turks killed.

For the Armenian toll (lines 334 to 359) I include the refugee deaths (lines 358 to 359). Armenia, which became temporarily independent during this period, and adjacent areas contained hundreds of thousands who had fled the Young Turk genocide. Within a few years they also had to flee before the genocidal massacres of invading Nationalist forces and their Kurdish-Azerbaijani tribal allies. These refugees died from famine, disease, and exposure--deaths surely the responsibility of the Nationalists. The sources give one estimate of these deaths (line 358), and based on this and the estimates of the number of refugees I consolidate elsewhere in the table (lines 509 to 522), I estimate the range of deaths shown (line 359). To display the effect of these assumed refugee deaths on the Armenian genocide total, I sum the deaths for non-refugees (line 362) and then list one estimate of the overall number of returning deportees killed in Turkey (line 362a), which understandably is much lower than the non-refugee sum. Note, however, that it is the same as the low for those killed in Turkish Armenia (line 350). Adding the lowest of line 362a and 350 to the low for refugee deaths (line 359) gives us the low for the Armenian genocide (line 363), and summing all the estimates, including refugees, gives us the mid-value and high. Most likely then, in total during this period the Turks killed from 325,000 to 545,000, most probably 440,000 of their Armenians--these along with those murdered during WWI.

In the table I next list partial estimates (lines 367 to 374) for the genocide of the Greek. There is one calculation of Turkey's Anatolian (Asia Minor) Greek population deficit during 1912 to 1922, taking into account emigration and deportation from Turkey (line 378). Subtracting from this the WWI Greek genocide I calculated from previous totals (line 379), I get the range of post-WWI losses shown (line 380). This then provides an alternative to the sum of the specific mortality estimates (line 381). From these alternative ranges I calculated a final Greek genocide for this period in the usual way (line 382). Most probably, the Nationalists Turks murdered 264,000 Greeks; 703,000 Greeks and Armenians together in the post-WWI years (line 385).

Nationalist forces also committed similar genocide during their invasion of Armenia, particularly in Kars and Alexandropol (lines 389 to 398). Many Armenians also died during flight to escape the massacres and tribal Kurdish and Azerbaijanis allies (lines 405 to 408). One source provides the overall Armenian toll in Caucasia from 1914 to 1922 (line 412), which gives us a total for this period (line 414) when we subtract those killed during WWI (line 413). There is one estimate we can compare to this result (line 415), which we find within its range. I also repeat the result (line 418) so that we may compare it to an alternative total (line 419) that I summed from the previous consolidations. The two ranges differ enough for me to calculate a final genocide toll (line 420) as for previous such cases.

The Greek Army before and during the Greco-Turkish War massacred Moslem Turks or permitted such to take place by Greek villagers. I show some specific estimates of the democide in the table (lines 424 to 427). From these and material in the sources, particularly Housepian¹⁰ and Toynbee¹¹, I believe a minimum number of killed is 15,000 (line 428).

Finally, I pull together the various totals (lines 431 to 434). In this post-WWI period the Turks killed overall probably 878,000 Armenians and Greeks, or at least 665,000 and even perhaps as many as 1,156,000 in total (line 435). Including war-dead, 1,031,000 Turkish citizens or those under Turkey's rule or fleeing from it died during these years (line 436).

The table's next section in Table 5.1B sums up the various sub-totals and compares them to overall estimates in the sources and demographic calculations. The first of these concerns the Armenian domestic genocide (lines 441 to 449). I consolidate these (line 450) and compare the result to one population based calculation of the Anatolian Armenian dead (line 451--relatively few lived in European Turkey) 1912 to 1922. Clearly this is way below that of the various estimates. Moreover, it also is under the low of the Armenian toll that I calculated in the previous sections (line 452), even when I omit refugee deaths (line 453). This suggests caution in accepting the totals.

To further check on this, I did my own demographic analysis and calculated the likely Armenian unnatural deaths (line 454--see lines 601 to 606). Given that this is calculated independently from the estimate-based totals, the range is remarkably close to that for the relevant non-refugee total (compare line 454 to line 453). Accordingly, I accept the totals previously calculated and restate their sum (line 455).

To get the foreign genocide of Armenians in Caucasia, I sum the previous totals (line 458) and compared the range to that of the Armenian-Russian population deficit (line 459) I calculated separately (lines 608 to 611). As can be seen, the summed range (line 458) is conservative and therefore acceptable (line 460), even keeping in mind that Armenians were also killed in WWI, in the Turkish invasion of Caucasia, in Armenia's war against Georgia, and in military conflict with Azerbaijan. Moreover, thousands probably immigrated from the region.

Next I add together the Turkey and Russian Armenian population deficits and compared them to the sum of domestic and foreign Armenian genocide (lines 463 to 466). The result is acceptable: the low is below that of the combined deficit, the high is close, and the mid-value is also close and below that of the deficit. This helps further establish confidence in the figures determined here.

As to the genocide of the Greeks, I sum the previous totals I calculated (line 470) and show beneath it a partial estimate of the Greek dead (line 471) and the Anatolian Greek population deficit (line 472). The deficit is well within the range that I independently calculated and I therefore adopt it as the final genocide (line 473).

After summing or displaying various totals (lines 475 to 485f), I show Tashjian's estimate of those killed or deported 1822-1922 (line 486). Now, as noted in Death By Government, the Ottoman Empire committed numerous genocidal massacres of Armenians in the previous century, particularly in 1894 to 1896 when Turks murdered perhaps 100,000 to 300,000 Armenians. Were I to add to this 100,000 for other pre-1900 genocides, and then reduce Tashjian's estimate by the sum to compensate for these deaths, and by another 10-15 percent to account for those surviving deportation (for the sources of the percentages, see line 122 of Table 5.1A), the resulting figure (line 486a) would still be within the range calculated here. Adding all the sub-totals (line 488) gives us the grand total genocide in turkey or committed by it: 1,428,000 to 4,380,000 murdered, likely 2,781,000 Armenians, Greeks, Nestorians, Moslem Turks, Azerbaijanis, and others.

Besides the tests of the genocide totals shown above (lines 451, 454, 459, 466, 471, 472, 486), we can also check the table's total domestic dead. The table first lists and consolidated three independent, overall dead estimates or calculations for the years 1912 (or 1914) to 1922 (lines 492 to 495), and then presents together the various totals (lines 498 to 501a) that I previously determined and sums them (line 502) to get the total dead, and next the overall domestic dead (line 503). Beneath this I show for comparison the consolidation of the estimated domestic dead (line 504). The comparison is as it should be: the low of line 503 is lower than line 504, the high is higher, and the mid-value is slightly below by about 5 percent. Because of this, there appears no need for me to reconsider the various calculations going into this total.

I next show the estimates and consolidations for refugees from Turkey's wars and genocides (lines 510 to 537). There is nothing unusual in their presentation and their consolidations figure in the calculation of population deficits and unnatural deaths (e.g., line 606).

In order to calculate population deficits I give population estimates and consolidations for Turkey as a whole (lines 542 to 551) in 1914 to 1915. To determine a population deficit later, I also calculate the population for 1920 to 1921 (line 552) from the minority population estimates given next for Armenians (lines 556 to 596), Greeks (lines 615 to 625), and Muslims (lines 628 to 630). Moreover, I had to calculate an average population controlled by the Nationalists (line 553) for later use in the genocide ratios (lines 640 to 641). I could not find any information on what this proportion was, even for a particular year, and therefore from narrative histories of this period¹² I estimated it to vary from 40 to 75 percent, with a mid-value of 50 percent, taking into account that French and Greek forces occupied a portion of south-western Anatolia during this period.

The table lays out the calculation of the Armenian population deficit and unnatural deaths (lines 600 to 611). From the consolidated estimates of the Armenian's population growth rate, I projected what the population should have been in 1923 (line 604) and subtracted from it the actual population (line 589). Subtracting from this the number of refugees that escaped the genocide (line 522--this is conservative, since many refugees returned to later be killed by the Nationalists) gives an estimate of those Armenians who died unnatural deaths (line 606). I did the same for Armenian-Russians (lines 609 to 610). I also sum the two ranges of unnatural deaths (lines 606 and 610) to get the number of unnatural deaths for Russia and Turkey's Armenians together (line 611). And I also give or calculate the population deficits for the Greeks and Muslims (lines 626 and 632).

Finally, in the remainder of the table I calculate the democide rates for the Young Turks (lines 636 to 637) and the local Nationalists (lines 640 to 641). Per year the Young Turks killed almost 1 out of every 100 of their population (line 637). The Nationalists, however, were far more vicious. For the population they controlled they murdered 1 out of every 38 per year (line 641). 

hawaiii.edu?And rj Rummel seems like a pure turk that has counted and has acces to every population count.Impressive.....

And like i said no matter how much you meddle with numbers you can't disprove the need for graves

So...our Turks co-forumers , r fed up with Armenians , Americans and Greeks , speaking about the Armenian genocide....

So , lets hear what a Turkish scholar .....

THE GENOCIDE OF THE ARMENIANS
AND THE SILENCE OF THE TURKS.
Taner Akcam ( Turkish Scholar)

The genocide of the Armenians has been a taboo topic for us Turks for eighty years. The eighty-year-old silence has produced such tension and a mountain of prejudice, not only between the two societies , i.e. the Turkish and the Armenian, but also in the academic world, that even the development of a common language in which the subject could be discussed is becoming a serious problem. For this reason, the fact that I, a Turkish historian, am critically approaching this subject for the first time is more important perhaps than the content of my speech. There is not only the risk that I may be accused of treason in Turkey, but also the risk that you may want to perceive me on this podium as the corporate representative of the Turks, expecting from me an account for the Turkish stance of the last eighty years. Conscious of all these problems, I ask you to listen to me, a historian who is about to speak to you solely in his own name.

My purpose is neither to hide behind the "pretext of having been born too late" nor to assert that I do not have my share in the "collective responsibility." Quite the contrary, independent of what position I personally may take, I am aware that I am a member of that collectivity which produced "the perpetrators" (or that I belong to a group of perpetrators). Precisely for this reason, I would like to explore the topic fully conscious of the fact as to what it means in this sense "being a member" and "bearing collective responsibility." It is easier for our generation, which cannot be held directly responsible for the events, to reflect upon the past and to define it as an essential element in our collective identity. This "haughtiness," this vantage of my generation perhaps could help to finally achieve a breakthrough.

On the other hand, the meaning of the passage of eighty years cannot be underestimated. It is incumbent upon us to "remember" a reality that was treated in our history as a non-event, one which was simply denied, to "recover it in our consciousness," and to assign to it the proper significance, But what shape can or will this recovered memory take? What does it mean "to incorporate the fact of the genocide in our historical present, and what will be the result? A start can only be made by way of discovering the meaning of belonging to the perpetrator group and of bearing collective responsibility. We have these and many other questions to answer.

At this juncture I would like to explain just how the Turks view or do not view the Armenian Genocide and how they have made it a taboo topic. The question to which I am seeking an answer may be formulated in the following way: why is it that a calm discussion of the subject is not possible, even if we proceed from the premise that there has not been any occurrence of genocide? Wherein lie the reasons for reacting to the topic with an agitation rarely observed elsewhere? I do not claim that I can answer this question in all its aspects. I will merely list some points that I consider meriting discussion.

I am of the opinion that the formation of the Turkish national identity played a decisive role not only in the decision to commit genocide but also in the current denial and tabooing of it. It is therefore indispensable that I first delve into the peculiarities of the origin of national identity and some of the related factors. I proceed from a concept that the well-known sociologist Norbert Elias has framed. He spoke of "national habitat,"' linking it firmly with the process of the formation of nation states. The concept epitomizes some of the peculiarities which were formed during the creation of a nation state. These peculiarities reflect a common mentality, an ethos permeating the psyche of the entire nation and help to explain why in certain situations general patterns of behavior emerge. In other words, a direct link is being established between national identity and the rise of a nation state, at the same time recognizing the central role of the nation state in the evolution of national identity.

1. UNDERSTANDING THE PERPETRATORS AND THEIR VIEWS

Generally speaking, we are inclined to characterize as "inhuman" acts that we consider morally reprehensible because of their dreadfulness. The revulsion we feel against these acts obviates any need to understand them. This attitude is well suited to engender a distance between us and the act in question, thereby preventing us from identifying with "what is bad." We can perhaps assuage our consciences by this means, but we must recognize that this does not help us to achieve "understanding" or to "evaluate" adequately. Adomo called our attention to the fact that beyond a moralistic attitude, the need "to understand" is absolutely necessary. He offered the following observation:

In the final analysis, the issue concerns the manner in which the past is recalled and integrated into the present; whether we stop at mere reproach or resolutely withstand the sense of horror in order to be able to comprehend even the incomprehensible.

On the other hand, however, difficulties likewise arise with the so-called scientific objective approach. In the first place, the scientific language that can be defined as a "dictionary intended for non-humans," because of its capability to objectify the events, is handicapped in terms of establishing a distance from the language used by the "perpetrators." Every attempt "to understand" has the potential of relativizing and justifying the act of perpetration. We must see to it that every historical reconstruction that "wants to know how events have transpired," as Walter Benjamin maintained, uses the method of introspection when analysing the perpetrator, and consequently becomes guilty of moral indolence.'

For this reason, perhaps it is better not to create a common perspective while analysing a phenomenon such as genocide, but to rely instead on two different perspectives, the perspective of the "perpetrators" and that of the "victims."' These two distinct perspectives bring to the fore distinctly different material for the reconstruction of historical events. The works that have been produced up to today about the genocide of the Armenians have essentially emanated from the perspective of the "victim group." My attempt in this regard can be understood as an investigation of the subject from the viewpoint of the "perpetrator group," a venture that could not be undertaken until now because of the past history of denial and tabooing.

The most important point in which the "perpetrator perspective" differs from the "victim perspective" is the predominance of the factor of historical continuity. In this perpetrator perspective, genocide appears neither as an "unintended accident" nor as an "aberrant phenomenon" free from the exertions of a cultural/ political background, and not likely to repeat itself. This argument does not suggest that events such as genocide are the inevitable result of the sway of certain cultural/political conditions. Certainly, genocide is afforded only by virtue of the existence of a set of very specific conditions that coincide in a special way with the dynamics of a compatible cultural/political background. By sensitizing ourselves to their significance we can better understand and define those special conditions that lead to genocide and determine the extent to which those factors that constitute the above-mentioned cultural/political background are still in effect today.

While I maintain that past events have shaped Turkish national identity and do even determine our present behavioral patterns, others may object that this "has nothing to do with modem times," because the events took place in a "past era." Thus it can be argued from a modem viewpoint that the consequences of the events of a hundred years ago have no great significance insofar as their relationship to the marks they left behind is concerned. Instead of initiating a discussion on these ideas, I would like to limit myself to adducing here a statement by Norbert Elias:

It is always amazing to ascertain the remarkable degree of persistence with which certain patterns of thinking, feeling and acting can endure in one and the same society over many generations, even though the members of that society do make specific adjustments to changing circumstances.'

This is also my thesis with reference to Turkey. If, for example, we examine the arguments that are being advanced with regard to the Kurds, we can recognize evidence of the surprising degree to which the state of mind, the model of thinking that dominated in the decade after 1 91 0, persists today. I do not want to be understood as saying that there is a simple "danger of recurrence." But before we take shelter behind such an easing of the emotions, we would do well to inquire whether the social conditions and the mentality from which the act of genocide has sprung still persists. This is the only way in which we can understand and combat the presence of a barbaric potential, however in different forms, at the core of societies.

If in given societies certain destructive potentials exist as peculiar ingredients of national identity, as a type of mentality, then we must make a conscious effort toward reckoning with these. One of the most important ways to confront a mentality that directs, to a great extent, subconscious processes entailing, almost automatically, spontaneous reactions, consists of bringing this mentality to the conscious level. This is the method that Adomo called "confronting the subject."' If you want "to understand" and analyze collectively committed cruelty, and you wish to prevent the repetition of such events, then you will not find a solution if you direct your attention primarily to the group of "victims." Attention must be directed to the "perpetrators" in order to uncover a series of "conscious or unconscious" mechanisms which underlie their actions, for it is the activation of these mechanisms that makes these people "perpetrators."

Following this general introduction, I would like to list below, in the form of a thesis, a few fundamental features of Turkish national identity that have played an important role in the decision to commit genocide as well as in the subsequent tabooing of the topic.

To be continued..

111. THE REASONS FOR TURKISH SILENCE

Why is discussion of the Arrnenian Genocide a taboo? Why do we Turks have the feeling that lightning has struck our bones whenever the theme is addressed? What are the reasons for this sensitivity and indisposition? At first these reactions appear difficult to comprehend. If it wishes, Turkey can recognize the fact of genocide, at the same time asserting that it had no connection to the act. There is sufficient material available to justify doing this. Turkey maintains that it is a completely new state. Official history propounds the thesis that the war of liberation was also directed against the Ottoman rulers. Moreover, a few members of the Ittihad party that organized the genocide were brought before the court in 1926, and some of them were executed. Even if an explanation along the lines of "it is indeed regrettable, but we did not do it, it was the Ottomans" would meet with strong objections, it could be seen as a normal, expected pattern of response.

Since the possibilities of a discussion free from portentous problems are not being pursued, there must be deeper underlying reasons for the extreme reactions, evasions, and denials. In the form of a preliminary thesis, I would suggest for consideration the following points, fully cognizant of the fact that they are rudimentary points and need to be developed further.

111 A. LACK OF HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The first and most important point concerns the lack of historical consciousness in Turkish society. I would characterize amnesia as a social disease in Turkey. The inability to remember refers not only to the period of World War I but also to incidents from the 1860s and 1870s that have long since been forgotten.

To begin with, the founders of the Turkish Republic have severed our connections and bonds to history. Each state that asserts itself as a new entity must provide a basis for its legitimacy and predicate that legitimacy on the historical past. The Kemalist cadres of the republic had serious difficulties with this issue. Islam had consigned everything that was called Turkish to oblivion over the entire course of Ottoman history. For that reason, the rulers of the new republic had no possibility of linking their newly established nation state, which they fashioned on the principle of Turkish national identity, with the Ottomans. They had to find a new Turkish history for themselves. They had to skip backwards six hundred years, past the Ottomans, who had repressed the idea of Turkishness, and who had even degraded it. As a final result, this long time span of history was treated as non-existent.

Through a series of reforms, this time interval, intended or not, was stricken from memory. The Latin alphabet was introduced with the "revolution" of 1928. Thus future generations were barred access to the written testimony of the past. The Turkification of the language was carried out in such an extreme and rapid fashion that the younger generations can no longer understand the language of the 1930s. Consequently, the relationship to the past and to history became circumscribed by the manner in which a few officially approved history professors defined it. It is difficult to conceive of a society that has no access to what has occurred before 1928. Yet it is true that people cannot even read the diaries of their parents and forebears. As a society, we are dependent today on what is etched in our memory, what we have ourselves experienced and what has been conveyed to us by our family members.

111 B. THE REASONS FOR "WANTING TO FORGET"

Lack of historical consciousness is a common problem. However, there are still more direct reasons for fearing the discussion of the Armenian Genocide as if one feared "a monster." I hereby maintain that the "wish to forget history" is directly related to the genocide of the Armenians. In order to be freed from the connotations of the term genocide, the founders of modem Turkey undertook a kind of cleansing as they ushered in the republic. The slow but continuous disintegration of the great empire, the military defeats in wars that continued over the years, the loss of tens of thousands of people, a society whose dignity was scorned along with the constant loss of self-worth, overwhelmed by the imagery of a great history, fantasies about recreating the past, the terminal bursting of these dreams, and the inability to absorb and integrate these numerous contradictions, and ... finally, the genocide: that constitutes a social trauma of major proportions.

As is the case with individuals, so it is also with societies that they experience difficulty in incorporating in their own living history events that produce crises. Mechanisms of blocking out and forgetfulness intrude and encumber the effort to overcome the difficulty. The reason why the republic is described as a new birth, as a zero point, lies in the psychological crises generated by the legacy of the past and the desire to not remember it. The republic believes that the entire dismal image can be suddenly erased and that the Turks can thus be delivered from a nightmare, from an extremely dangerous, fatal illness.

I believe that this frame of mind plays an important role in steering all discussion away from the genocide. To raise the issue is akin to telling someone who was miraculously delivered from a fatal illness that the disease is not really in remission and that he should brace himself for a relapse. Not only do people not want to think of decline, humiliation, and disgrace, but people do not want also to be reminded of them. We like to believe that we have recovered and that we have acquired a new persona. Therefore, the official line is that Turkey emerged from a period of upheaval in history from which "a new personality was created from nothing."

I maintain here that we have not yet recovered, that we have not yet acquired the "new personality that has divested itself of the spell of the old crises," and that as long as we do not talk about the Armenian Genocide, our chances of creating a new "other" remains rather tenuous. As long as the act of perpetration is not consciously accounted for, all peculiarities of this event will live on in the unconscious. If, as Turkey maintains, a decisive turning point really occurred and a completely new element emerged, then there should be a link to the past that would be free of the problems prevalent today. The desperate effort to avoid any discussion about the genocide is the most telling proof that the assertion regarding the rise of a "completely new and other element" is not a valid one. A society, a state does not like to confront an imagery that is at variance with its self imagery, and, as such, is likely destroy its world of fantasies. Herein lies the reason for our sharp reaction to those who call our attention to that reality.

111 C. "WANTING TO FORGET" IS A KIND OF SEQUEL

Another question that must be addressed is what do we expect if we "forget" the genocide or drive its reality into the inner recesses of the unconscious? My suggestion at this point is a kind of "historical quest for the traces." To be sure, it is not just a matter of repressing the memory of a historical period. Through such repression, even the conditions that led to the Armenian Genocide are relegated to the unconscious. However, they are not destroyed, but live on in another form.

The Turks were gripped by powerful impulses of wishful thinking during the years of World War 1. They wanted to free themselves from the shackles of their weak and powerless position, They wanted to establish a new strong hegemony and thereby cast off their feelings of humiliation and disgrace. We can speak of the fact that a strong collective narcissism was developed, primarily through the vehicles of Pan-Turanism and Pan-lslamicism. These needs remained unsatisfied as a result of the Ottoman defeat. Collective narcissism suffered hard blows and neither the community that perceived itself as such a collective, nor individuals have come to terms with this frustration. The relinquishing of the goals to which the elite aspired was not an act that could be compared to a reckoning with the past, but a mere "swallowing." In this respect, the words of Mustafa Kemal are very instructive with regard to Pan-Turanism and Pan-lslamism. It was essential for him not to turn against them, but to choose not to deal with what could not be achieved, given Turkey's insufficient resources.

In the final analysis, the past was not shut off, it is waiting in the unconscious to be summoned up again. "Social-psychologically, it is to be expected that the damaged collective narcissism is lying in wait for a chance to be repaired. It grasps for whatever brings the past consciously into harmony with the narcissistic wish, but there is also the possibility that reality can be modeled in such a way as if there was no damage in the first place. I do not assert at this juncture that collective narcissism will again manifest itself in Pan-Turanic goals. That can occur in yet another way. The underlying drive, however, is the desire to again dominate other nations and to again become a great power.

I will not go into how this affects the unfolding of the present day realities in Turkey. There are, however, a series of indications that we have begun to recover from the shock of the debacles of World War 1. Fundamental changes in world structure and the relative economic strength of Turkey compared to its neighbors reinforce the desire in Turkey to return to the old powerful days of empire. It can be argued that this condition accounts for one of the essential reasons for the strengthening of nationalistic and fundamentalist forces in Turkey. The desire to be a great power and to return to the old days does not derive from a psychology of disintegration and decline, but from a belief that it can be fulfilled through modem Turkey's own resources and strength.

111 D. OUR SELF IMAGE AND THE GENOCIDE

One of the most important reasons for the tabooing of the Armenian Genocide lies in the coupling of this event with the establishment of the republic. To a certain extent, the establishment of the republic depended heavily on the genocide. The founders of the republic knew that, and they were not averse to expressing it openly. For example, one of the leaders of the Ittihad ve Terakki stated: "If we had not cleaned up the eastern provinces of Armenian militia who were cooperating with the Russians, there would have been no possibility of founding our national state." A speech was delivered in the first parliament of the young republic, the thrust of which was that we accept the label of "murderers" since it served the purpose of saving the fatherland:

You know that the problem of [Armenian] deportations threw the world in an uproar and all of us were labeled murderers. We knew before this was done that world opinion would not be favorable and this would bring loathing and hatred upon us. Why have we resigned ourselves to being called murderers? Those are things that have only happened in order to secure something that is more holy and valuable than our own live at the future of the fatherland.

These "brave" words that the Turkish Republic was built on the genocide of the Armenians were reflections of the enthusiasm of the years during which the Turkish Republic was founded. In the course of time, however, we have sketched out an entirely contrary portrayal. Our nation state "had been created from nothing and in opposition against the imperial forces," an achievement of which we could be proud. The Turkish state was the symbolic proof of a national existence, that "we had dug ourselves" out of the national void "with our fingernails." Anti-imperialism was an indispensable component of our national identity. One aspect of national identity of which we were obviously proud was the organizing of the "National Forces" (Kuvayi Milliye) that had helped us obtain our independence. The "spirit" of these fighting forces, which originally were part of the first guerrilla units of the Turkish national movement, was still inspiring the generation of 1968 as a symbol of anti-imperialist identity.

One of the most important reasons we go out of our way not to discuss the Armenian Genocide is, therefore, the fear that our faith in ourselves would collapse. The model, the structures of thought that we use to explain the genocide to the world and in Turkey could collapse through such discussions. A discussion of the Armenian Genocide could reveal that this Turkish state was not a result of a war fought against the imperial powers, but, on the contrary, a product of the war against the Greek and Armenian minorities. It could show that a significant part of the National Forces consisted either of murderers who directly participated in the Armenian Genocide or of thieves who had become rich by plundering Armenian possessions.

Three different aspects can be discussed with respect to the connection between the Armenian Genocide and the establishment of the Turkish republic. First, the Turkish national movement was organized by the Ittihad ve Terakki party that had carried out the wartime genocide. It is known that the plans for this movement were already drafted during the First World War. In case of military defeat, preparations were made to organize a long lasting resistance. These plans were carried out in the Armistice of 1918 and thereafter.

An important point is that organizations, such as the "Society for the Defense of the Rights..." and "Rejection of Occupation," that were the mainstay of the forces supporting the national movement in Anatolia, were formed either directly on the order of Talaat Pasha or with the aid of the Karakol (Police Station) organization connected to Talaat and Enver. If we look at the regions in which those organizations were established and the sequence of the acts of their founding, it becomes clear that these events initially took place everywhere a perceived Armenian or Greek danger existed. Of the first five resistance organizations that were founded after the Mudros Armistice agreement, from the 30th of October,1918 to the end of the year, three were directed against the Armenian and two against the Greek minorities.

The local cadres of Ittihad ve Terakki constituted the main elements among the founders of these associations. This overlap of membership was so great that when later the central organization "A-RMHC" (Society for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia) formed a party, it was stipulated that no one from the "Freedom and Accord Party," seen as an enemy of Ittihad ve Terakki, could become a member." An important mission of the Karakol movement, which organized the national movement in Anatolia, was to arrange the escape to Anatolia of those Ittihadists who had been involved in the Armenian Genocide and who were then being sought by the British. To some extent the organization was a symbol of the nexus linking the Armenian Genocide to the resistance movement in Anatolia.

The second important connection between the genocide and the national movement concerned the formation of a new class of wealthy men in Anatolia who had enriched themselves thanks to the genocide. Even Turks point to the fact that the economic motive played an important role in the Armenian Genocide. An important figure in the national movement, Halide Edip, said, "...there was a strong economic one ... this was to end the economic supremacy of the Armenians thereby clearing the markets for the Turks and the Germans." The prominent people who had enriched themselves through the genocide feared that the Armenians could return to avenge themselves and reclaim their goods. After all, this was part of the Allied agenda. These nouveaux riches were drawn even closer to the national movement on those occasions when Armenians did return with occupying forces to reclaim their goods and carry out a few acts of revenge, especially in the Cukorova (Adana, transl.) region. The newly rich thus became an integral part of the national movement. In many areas the resistance was directly organized by these newly rich elements. It was not an accident but rather a necessity that in many regions members of the governing bodies of the organizations for the protection of rights were those whose fortunes had been made as a consequence of the genocide of the Armenians.

Among those who had been enriched through the genocide were some who served directly at the side of Kemal himself. Topal Osman, for example, was one who later advanced to the rank of commander of the guard battalion, (protecting the institution of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, and the person of Mustafa Kemal-transl.), and Ali Cenani, who had been exiled to Malta, later became the Minister of Commerce in the new republic. The list can be expanded. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 22, 1922, the national government repealed a January 8, 1920 law of the Istanbul government concerning the restitution of Armenian goods. This change served to reinstate the law of September, 1915 concerning the Abandoned Goods [of the Armenians]. The government in Ankara knew it had to take into account the interests of those who had a share in the founding of the republic.

The third important link between the genocide of the Armenians and the republic is a natural outcome of the first. The initial organizers of the national movement were people who had directly participated in the enactment of the genocide. Those who set up the first units of the National Forces in the Marmara, Aegean, and Black Sea regions and held important posts in these units were for the most part people sought by the occupation forces and the government in Istanbul for their participation in the genocide. When Kemal began to organize the resistance in Anatolia, he received the strongest support from the Ittihadists for whom there were arrest warrants on account of their role in the genocide. Many who were sought or were actually arrested and deported to Malta for their role in the genocide, but fled or escaped later, received important posts in Ankara. There are many examples, but a few should suffice here. Sukru Kaya became the Interior Minister and held the office of Secretary-General in the Republican Peoples Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), founded by none other than Mustafa Kemal. During the deportations of Armenians he was "Director General of the Office for the Settlement of Nomadic Tribes and Refugees." This was attached to the Interior Ministry and was officially responsible for the implementation of the Armenian "deportations." For this reason Sukru Kaya was also known as "Director General for Deportation" (Sevkiyat Reis-i Umumisi). Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda) was the governor of Bitlis and later Aleppo during the genocide. Rossler [Germany's veteran consul at Aleppo-trans.) said of him that: "[He] works inexorably on the annihilation of the Armenians. In an affidavit prepared by Vehip Pahsa, the commandant of the Third Army (during the war, in February, 1916) the special role of Abdulhalik Renda in the genocide is being emphasized. According to General Vehip's testimony, thousands of human beings were burned alive in the region around Mush, a district under the control of Mustafa Abdulhalik. This event is mentioned in German consular reports as well as by eyewitnesses.

There are others, for example, Arif Fevzi (Princcizade), who was a deputy from Dlyarbekir during the war years. He was suspect number 2743 in the warrant prepared by the British for the detainees in Malta, was assigned to the group implicated in the genocide, and was to be charged as such. He held the office of Minister of Public Affairs from July 21, 1922 to October 27, 1923. Ali Cenani Bey, the Ittihad ve Terakki deputy for Aintep, was suspect number 2805. He had enriched himself from the loot and spoils associated with the genocide. "In the English archives ... a very dirty file exists on him." He was the Minister of Commerce between November 22, 1924 and May 17, 1926.

Dr. Tevfik Rustu Aras was also one of those who held important political posts in subsequent years. During World War I he was a member of the High Council on Health, which was responsible for the burial of the dead Armenians. Between 1925 and 1938, he served as Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey.

This list could be extended by several pages. It can be stated conclusively that Mustafa Kemal led "the war of liberation ... with Ittihadists who were sought for Greek and Armenian incidents and ... was supported by and relied on prominent persons who carried the ghost of the Greeks and Armenians into the subculture of the resistance movement. Participation in the national war of liberation was a vital necessity, a last refuge for all members of Ittihad ve Terakki and especially the special organization that masterminded the organization of the genocide. Only two alternatives existed for them. Either they surrendered to be sentenced to hard labour or death, or they fled to Anatolia and organized the national resistance. A well-known journalist and close friend of Mustafa Kemal, Falih Rifke Atay, expressed this quite clearly:

When the English and their allies began to demand an accounting from the Ittihadists and especially of the murderers of the Armenians after the end of the war, everyone who had something to hide armed himself and joined a gang.

I think that the tabooing of the Armenian Genocide in a republic whose foundation was created in this way is "understandable." The devastation that would ensue if we had to now stigmatize those whom we regarded as "great saviors" and "people who created a nation from nothing," as "murderers and thieves" is palpable. It seems so much simpler to completely deny the genocide than to seize the initiative and face the obliteration of the ingrained notions about the Republic and our own national identity. I would like to conclude my talk at this point with an open question: What significance do the effects of such a policy have for society today and in the future, especially when such "denial" means that the frame of mind and the pattern of behavior that led to the genocide against the Armenians continue to exist?

The End...

So , it is avisable for the Turks co-forumers , to read and learn....

If they do still choose  to have  their eyes closed and their ears shut ...so be it ..it is their own decision .

Isk.

Your claims are false.Discussing it is not a taboo.You have been ignoring all my posts and common sense.Graves?Civil wars?Witnesses?

All disproved by a professor and you?