Did the U.S. prolong the Cold War or shorten it?

Reagan's huge military buildup forced the Soviet Union to attempt to meet him - the Soviet Union was an economic timebomb, only partly being kept afloat by the high oil prices of the 1980s. When Reagan moved the Cold War to a battle of national resources, the US was destined to win handily. The US could simply boast infintely more productive resources and wealth than the Soviet Union could dream. Hence more and more and more of the Soviet Unions more scant resources went into attempting to meet the awesome power of the US economy, which in itself was a loosing battle.

Earlier periods, such as the Vietnam war are often seen as failures of the Cold War. I'd have to disagree. The US could win any war on resources, and they could have continued in Vietnam if they had the political capital at home (Which they clearly and perhaps rightly did not) The war itself drained other communist nations of resources and prevented them from any real challenge to US interests in the region.

Reagans interventions in Latin America were extremely important to geopolitical goals. Latin America is a traditional sphere of US influence and allowing it to be consumed by communist revolutions would lead to disaster at her own backdoor. Look at the geopolitical headache Cuba caused for the US.

Not that any of this is justified in any real moral sense, but in the context of the Cold War where it was essential for the US to keep the upper hand (I'd rather American tyranny over Russian or Chinese tryanny any day of the week) it was all vital.

I would also question the logic that since the Soviet Union was winding down anyway, the arms race prolonged the cold war. Doesn't make sense to me. Many countries can wind down and still maintain a dangerous presence. Reagan effectively forced the Soviet Union to exert itself, when it should have been more cautiously stewarding its resources. In that sense, it forced the Soviet Union to take risks which it could ill afford to take.


Edited by Parnell - 26-Apr-2009 at 11:17

I beg to differ here.

Having experienced much of the Cold War, gcle understands what was involved, what was at stake, and how the world was viewed at the time.  I concur with his points with the exception of the obvious inevitability of the fall of the USSR.  Looking back now, it seems inevitable, but in 1984 or 1986, I don't know if we can say that.

Edited by pikeshot1600 - 28-Apr-2009 at 21:13

Originally posted by pikeshot1600 Having experienced much of the Cold War, gcle understands what was involved, what was at stake, and how the world was viewed at the time.  I concur with his points with the exception of the obvious inevitability of the fall of the USSR.  Looking back now, it seems inevitable, but in 1984 or 1986, I don't know if we can say that.   The activity in the Western Hemisphere, much of it in the 1980s, undertaken by Soviet clients, and supported by Moscow or surrogates could hardly be ignored or downplayed as the dying gasps of a disintegrating USSR.  Nor were they.  Here Parnell recognizes the vital geopolitical interests of the United States in the Hemisphere.    US geopolitical activity on the Eurasian mainland was minimal after 1973 and the disengagement from Viet Nam.  The Soviet Union subsequently took every opportunity to exend it's military influence:   - In south Asia (Afghanistan - a geographic threat to the Gulf), southeast Asia (naval forces at Cam Ranh Bay), Africa (Angola, mostly with Cuban proxies) and in the Western Hemisphere's most vital US interest, the Caribbean (Nicaragua and the projected military base and transit point on Grenada - both astride US lines of communication and commerce to South America).   Southeast Asia strategically had already been eclipsed by the Middle East in terms of US interest, so Afghanistan was contested clandestinely.  Africa has always been a peripheral area of US interest, although the prospect of Soviet naval and air forces on the trade route from the Gulf to the Western Hemisphere (and Europe) was a concern.  Incursions into the Hemisphere could not go unchallenged.   If anyone prolonged the Cold War, it was the USSR.    The point about justification "in any real moral sense" does not have relevance in terms of geopolitics.  If one seeks morality, there are churches and monasteries; for vital interests there are clandestine services and military forces.

Edited by Paul - 26-Apr-2009 at 22:49

I really believe the balooney plan of Ronald Reagan, to build the Star Wars ballistic missiles shield, was the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.

Edited by pinguin - 27-Apr-2009 at 05:23

IMHO, Russia and Russians, as opposed to ageing KGB men, have had underlying hostility to the West for centuries - at least since the age of Peter the Great - a love-hate relationship with Western ideas.  It is a cultural issue that had been papered over while Russia turned in upon itself.  "The West as a threat" is a propaganda tool at least as old as Napoleon.  That has played well in regaining influence in the Causasus, a geostrategic vital interest.

Edited by pikeshot1600 - 06-May-2009 at 22:22

Parnell,

Edited by pikeshot1600 - 07-May-2009 at 01:31

Originally posted by gcle2003 When we were studying the Soviet Union in the army we had to go every week to a showing of a Soviet film. Apart from being incredibly boring they all conformed to the standard pattern of being full of Stakhanivite tractor drivers winning the girl, they came from the same mould as Parnell's book.   However, at least once the War Office (or someone) took pity on us and showed Eisenstein's Alexander Nevsky, a film of very different calibre, but one that shows the myth of barbarous Western invasions and Russian bravery in defence of the motherland at its fullest.

More depends on one's cultural perspective of 'savages'.

To be fair, Reagan really accelerated the spending. Haven't the figures on me but it was substantial.