Originally posted by gcle2003
I guess you can think anything you like, but why would the British abandon several centuries worth of comon historical strategy? |
No reason why Britain should abandon a good strategy.
After the defeat of Germany in 1918, Britain also continued this balance of power strategy:
...Britain, after 1918; felt secure, while France felt completely insecure in the face of Germany. As a consequence of the war, even before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, Britain had obtained all her chief ambitions in respect to Germany. The German Navy was at the bottom of Scapa Flow, scuttled by the Germans themselves; the German merchant fleet was scattered, captured, and destroyed; the German colonial rivalry was ended and its areas occupied; the German commercial rivalry was crippled by the loss of its patents and industrial techniques, the destruction of all its commercial outlets and banking connections throughout the world, and the loss of its rapidly growing prewar markets. Britain had obtained these aims by December 1918 and needed no treaty to retain them.
France, on the other hand, had not obtained the one thing it wanted: security. In population and industrial strength Germany was far stronger than France, and still growing. It was evident that France had been able to defeat Germany only by a narrow margin in 1914-1918 and only because of the help of Britain, Russia, Italy, Belgium, and the United States.
France had no guarantee that all these or even any of them would be at its side in any future war with Germany. In fact, it was quite clear that Russia and Italy would not be at its side.
The refusal of the United States and Britain to give any guarantee to France against German aggression made it dubious that they would be ready to help either. Even if they were prepared to come to the rescue ultimately, there was no guarantee that France would be able to withstand the initial German assault in any future war as she had withstood, by the barest margin, the assault of 1914. Even if it could be withstood, and if Britain ultimately came to the rescue, France would have to fight, once again, as in the period 1914-1918, with the richest portion of France under enemy military occupation.
In such circumstances, what guarantee would there be even of ultimate success?
Doubts of this kind gave France a feeling of insecurity which practically became a psychosis, especially as France found its efforts to increase its security blocked at every turn by Britain. It seemed to France that the Treaty of Versailles, which had given Britain everything it could want from Germany, did not give France the one thing it wanted. As a result, it proved impossible to obtain any solution to the two other chief problems of international politics in the period 1919-1929. To these three problems of security, disarmament, and reparations, we now turn...
...Thus France wanted security, while Britain had
security. France needed Britain, while Britain regarded France as a
rival outside Europe (especially in the Near East) and the chief
challenge to Britain's customary balance-of-power policy in Europe.
After 1919 the British, and even some Americans, spoke of "French
hegemony" on the Continent of Europe. The first rule of British foreign
policy for four centuries had been to oppose any hegemony on the
Continent and to do so by seeking to strengthen the second strongest
Power against the strongest; after 1919 Britain regarded Germany as the
second strongest Power and France as the strongest, a quite mistaken
view in the light of the population, industrial productivity, and
general organizations of the two countries...
...Because France lacked security, its chief concern in every
issue was political; because Britain had security, its chief concern
was economic. The political desires of France required that Germany
should be weakened; the economic desires of Britain required that
Germany should be strengthened in order to increase the prosperity of
all Europe.
While the chief political threat to France was Germany, the
chief economic and social threat to Britain was Bolshevism. In any
struggle with Bolshevist Russia, Britain tended to regard Germany as a
potential ally, especially if it were prosperous and powerful...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/06.html#16
Edited by Bankotsu - 17-Jun-2008 at 06:02