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Was it a good strategy to push Hitler eastwards?

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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Topic: Was it a good strategy to push Hitler eastwards?
    Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 08:57
So the historical fact is that, contray to the claim being made,  Britian stood in the way of Germany attacking the Soviet Union, by their agreement with Poland. 


The history is more complex I am afraid. Read through the entire source below:

The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted.  He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee.

As a result, the guarantee was worded to cover Polish “independence” and not her “territorial integrity.” 

This was interpreted by the leading article of The Times for 1 April to leave the way open to territorial revision without revoking the guarantee.  This interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain in Commons on 3 April.

Apparently the government believed that it was making no real commitment because, if war broke out in eastern Europe, British public opinion would force the government to declare war on Germany, no matter what the government itself wanted, and regardless whether the guarantee existed or not.

 On the other hand, a guarantee to Poland might deter Hitler from precipitating a war and give the government time to persuade the Polish government to yield the Corridor to Germany.  If the Poles could not be persuaded, or if Germany marched, the fat was in the fire anyway;  if the Poles could be persuaded to yield, the guarantee was so worded that Britain could not act under it to prevent such yielding.  This was to block any possibility that British public opinion might refuse to accept a Polish Munich. 

That this line of thought was not far distant from British government circles is indicated by a Reuters news dispatch released on the same day that Chamberlain gave the guarantee to Poland.

This dispatch indicated that, under cover of the guarantee, Britian would put pressure on Poland to make substantial concessions to Hitler through negotiations.  According to Hugh Dalton, Labour M.P., speaking in Commons on 3 April, this dispatch was inspired by the government and was issued through either the Foreign Office, Sir Horace Wilson, John Simon, or Samuel Hoare.  Three of these four were of the Milner Group, the fourth being the personal agent of Chamberlain.  Dalton’s charge was not denied by any government spokesman, Hoare contenting himself with a request to Dalton “to justify that statement.”  Another M.P. of Churchill’s group suggested that Geoffrey Dawson was the source, but Dalton rejected this...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

The German Foreign Ministry memorandum on this conversation makes it perfectly clear that the Germans did not misunderstand Halifax except, possibly, on the last point. 

There they failed to see that if Germany made war, the British Government would be forced into the war against Germany by public opinion in England. 

The German diplomatic agents in London, especially the Ambassador, Dirksen, saw this clearly, but the Government in Berlin listened only to the blind and conceited ignorance of Ribbentrop.

As dictators themselves, unfamiliar with the British social or constitutional systems, the German rulers assumed that the willingness of the British Government to accept the liquidation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland implied that the British Government would never go to war to prevent this liquidation.

They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused.  The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany.  This distinction was not clear to the Germans and was not accepted by the inner core of the Milner Group.

It was, however, accepted by the other elements in the government, like Chamberlain himself, and by much of the second circle of the Milner Group, including Simon, Hoare, and probably Halifax. 

It was this which resulted in the “phony war” from September 1939 to April 1940...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html



The fact is that the theory is flawed because Hitler himself was interested in conquering territory in the east, it did not require Britain to 'direct', 'push' or 'force' him in that direction.


Yes, Hitler wanted to go east and Britain did not oppose and even encouraged it.

They allowed and turned Germany east because they hoped that it would lead to a German-Soviet war.


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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 09:04
According to historian Eric Hobsbawn:

"Many a good conservative felt, especially in Britain, that the best of all solutions would be a German-Soviet war, weakening, perhaps destroying both enemies, and a defeat of Bolshevism by a weakened Germany would be no bad thing".

http://joehendren.blogspot.com/2005/10/nazis-well-established-baggage-of-far.html
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 09:07
The British strategy for dealing with Germany found initial expression in Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's 'appeasement' policy. The purpose of Chamberlain's 1938 Munich agreement to give the Sudetenland to Germany was, in fact, to push the Germans to the east and into confrontation with the Soviet Union.

http://rwor.org/a/076/ww2-en.html


Beijing, February 18, 1973, 2:43–7:15 p.m.

Talks between Chou En-lai, Premier of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

PM Chou: Originally Western Europe had hoped that Germany would go eastwards.

Dr. Kissinger: Western Europe.

PM Chou: At Munich.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, at Munich. Western Europe had very superficial leaders. They didn’t have the courage to pursue any policy towards a conclusion. Once they had done Munich it made no sense to fight for Poland. But that is a different issue. And I don’t blame Stalin, because from his point of view he gained himself the essential time.

PM Chou: But there was one weak point, that they were not sufficiently prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: They did make preparations but they were not entirely sufficient. And in Zhukov’s memoirs he also touched upon this. Have you read this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they deployed their forces too far forward.

PM Chou: Also scattered in three directions.

Dr. Kissinger: So, but the basic point that I want to make is not to debate history but to say the lessons of both wars are that once a big war starts its consequences are unpredictable, and a country which encourages a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is likely to produce a disaster for itself. The Germans had made very careful plans in World War I, and they had exercised them for 30 years, but when the war . . .

PM Chou: You mean after the Pact of Berlin?

Dr. Kissinger: World War I—1914—the Schlieffen Plan.

PM Chou: You mean after the Treaty of Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, after 1878, yes, that’s right. But they had exercised the Schlieffen Plan every year after 1893, for 21 years, and they had calculated everything except the psychological strain on a commander under battle conditions. So they thought they were starting a 6-months war and they wound up with a 4-year war. Not one European leader in 1914, if he had known what the world would look like in 1918, would have gone to war. And nor would Hitler in 1939. Let us apply it to the current situation, these observations. If one analyzes the problem of pushing the Soviet Union toward the East, or maybe you trying to push it towards the West . . .

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/
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  Quote Peteratwar Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 09:35
As I said not an iota of proof nor of evidence. A lot of innuendo, phrases taken out of whole conversations, people thinking that something would be nice BUT not a shred of evidence to contradict Britains' bedrock of not allowing any one power to dominate in Europe whoever it was.
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 09:54
BUT not a shred of evidence to contradict Britains' bedrock of not allowing any one power to dominate in Europe whoever it was.


Britain's main worry was Soviet Union.

That is why they let and encouraged Hitler to go east so as to instigate a war of mutual annihilation between Germany and USSR.

Did Chamberlain allow German to go east?

Yes, he did.

When Hitler wanted to expand eastwards during 1938-1939, Britain under Chamberlain regime did not oppose Hitler.

Chamberlain's policy was to collude with fascism. One of his first acts was to send Sir Nevile Henderson ("Our nazi ambassador to Berlin", as he became derisively known). Henderson drew up a 'Memorandum on British Policy Towards Germany'. This called for a comprehensive Anglo-German agreement which would include the demarcation of spheres of influence, world markets and raw material sources, and also colonial possessions. The whole sense of such an agreement would boil down to guaranteeing Britain her colonial possessions and preserving her great-power positions, having met Hitler's expansionist claims at the expense of other states (notably the USSR).

At Halifax 's first meeting with Hitler he praised the Fuhrer for having turned Germany into a 'bulwark of the West against Bolshevism' and put his imprimatur on German ambitions: 'All other questions', ran the minutes of the talks, 'could be said to relate to changes in the European order, changes that would probably take place sooner or later. Among these questions were Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. England was only interested that any changes should be brought about by peaceful evolution'...

http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm






Edited by Bankotsu - 10-Jun-2008 at 09:55
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 09:59
Date: 08 Jan 1939
Scope/content:

Letter from WSC (Chateau de L'Horizon, Cannes) to CSC, reporting on visit to Paris, where he had meetings with Paul Reynaud, Sir Eric Phipps, Leon Blum, discussing French relations with Italy and Germany, also discussing fear in London that Hitler would turn against Britain, instead of going to the East...


http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?search_id=1169092;sort_by=Dscore;index=169

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  Quote gcle2003 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 11:03
Originally posted by Bankotsu

According to historian Eric Hobsbawn:

"Many a good conservative felt, especially in Britain, that the best of all solutions would be a German-Soviet war, weakening, perhaps destroying both enemies, and a defeat of Bolshevism by a weakened Germany would be no bad thing".

http://joehendren.blogspot.com/2005/10/nazis-well-established-baggage-of-far.html
Well, he would say that, wouldn't he?
He joined the Socialist Schoolboys in 1931 and the Communist party in 1936. He was member of the Communist Party Historians Group from 1946 to 1956. The Soviet Invasion of Hungary in 1956 marked the end of the Communist Party Historian's Group and led most of its members to remove themselves from the British Communist Party. Hobsbawm, uniquely among his colleagues, remained in the Party, however, going so far as to defend the Soviet invasion of Hungary.
 
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  Quote gcle2003 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 11:05
Originally posted by Bankotsu

Date: 08 Jan 1939
Scope/content:

Letter from WSC (Chateau de L'Horizon, Cannes) to CSC, reporting on visit to Paris, where he had meetings with Paul Reynaud, Sir Eric Phipps, Leon Blum, discussing French relations with Italy and Germany, also discussing fear in London that Hitler would turn against Britain, instead of going to the East...


http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?search_id=1169092;sort_by=Dscore;index=169

 
There was probably 'fear in London' that Hitler would do that. It should not be read into that that Britain, either the government or the people, was afraid of Hitler.
 
It needs to be borne in mind that for most people in England Hitler was still a comic figure.


Edited by gcle2003 - 10-Jun-2008 at 11:06
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 11:31
gcle2003, you pointed out that Eric Hobsbawn is biased in favour of communists.

That is quite true, but his statement that many british conservatives favoured a German-Soviet war is not wrong. I have already quoted some sources showing that.

It is not just communists who say that, non-communists also agree, for example, Kissinger.

See:

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA88&vq=the+popular+front+our+task&dq=william+dodd+lothian+german+east+soviet&source=gbs_search_s&sig=A8sifFD2Te-baY2a1HesbZVqYhc

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA168&vq=spain+in+the+web+east+west&sig=ApoEhmqPmYvQCXY--6l4kD5Al-Q

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA178&vq=british+historians&source=gbs_search_s&sig=DOdW4Mp8sbfB3gDPLwk9-TRzjaI#PPA650,M1



Edited by Bankotsu - 10-Jun-2008 at 15:48
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 15:21
Originally posted by Bankotsu

So the historical fact is that, contray to the claim being made,  Britian stood in the way of Germany attacking the Soviet Union, by their agreement with Poland. 


The history is more complex I am afraid. Read through the entire source below:

The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted.  He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee.

As a result, the guarantee was worded to cover Polish “independence” and not her “territorial integrity.” 

This was interpreted by the leading article of The Times for 1 April to leave the way open to territorial revision without revoking the guarantee.  This interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain in Commons on 3 April.

Apparently the government believed that it was making no real commitment because, if war broke out in eastern Europe, British public opinion would force the government to declare war on Germany, no matter what the government itself wanted, and regardless whether the guarantee existed or not.

 On the other hand, a guarantee to Poland might deter Hitler from precipitating a war and give the government time to persuade the Polish government to yield the Corridor to Germany.  If the Poles could not be persuaded, or if Germany marched, the fat was in the fire anyway;  if the Poles could be persuaded to yield, the guarantee was so worded that Britain could not act under it to prevent such yielding.  This was to block any possibility that British public opinion might refuse to accept a Polish Munich....

 
Sorry, but this just amounts to so much 'dancing around' the historical fact that Britain declared war on Germany when Germany attacked Poland.  Even if your point about ceding the corridor is correct, it is moot in the context of the discussion since giving the 'corridor' and Danzig to Germany STILL does not provide them with an avenue for attacking the Soviet Union.  You are still left with the fact that Britain created a situation where Germany could not practically 'go east' without ending up in conflict with Britain and France, which directly contradicts the theory you are trying to put forward.  Unsubstantiated claims and 'newpaper speculation' (at the time) regarding intentions is not convincing.
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George Santayana
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 15:44
Originally posted by Bankotsu

The British strategy for dealing with Germany found initial expression in Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's 'appeasement' policy. The purpose of Chamberlain's 1938 Munich agreement to give the Sudetenland to Germany was, in fact, to push the Germans to the east and into confrontation with the Soviet Union.

http://rwor.org/a/076/ww2-en.html


Beijing, February 18, 1973, 2:43–7:15 p.m.

Talks between Chou En-lai, Premier of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

PM Chou: Originally Western Europe had hoped that Germany would go eastwards.

Dr. Kissinger: Western Europe.

PM Chou: At Munich.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, at Munich. Western Europe had very superficial leaders. They didn’t have the courage to pursue any policy towards a conclusion. Once they had done Munich it made no sense to fight for Poland. But that is a different issue. And I don’t blame Stalin, because from his point of view he gained himself the essential time.

PM Chou: But there was one weak point, that they were not sufficiently prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: They did make preparations but they were not entirely sufficient. And in Zhukov’s memoirs he also touched upon this. Have you read this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they deployed their forces too far forward.

PM Chou: Also scattered in three directions.

Dr. Kissinger: So, but the basic point that I want to make is not to debate history but to say the lessons of both wars are that once a big war starts its consequences are unpredictable, and a country which encourages a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is likely to produce a disaster for itself. The Germans had made very careful plans in World War I, and they had exercised them for 30 years, but when the war . . .

PM Chou: You mean after the Pact of Berlin?

Dr. Kissinger: World War I—1914—the Schlieffen Plan.

PM Chou: You mean after the Treaty of Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, after 1878, yes, that’s right. But they had exercised the Schlieffen Plan every year after 1893, for 21 years, and they had calculated everything except the psychological strain on a commander under battle conditions. So they thought they were starting a 6-months war and they wound up with a 4-year war. Not one European leader in 1914, if he had known what the world would look like in 1918, would have gone to war. And nor would Hitler in 1939. Let us apply it to the current situation, these observations. If one analyzes the problem of pushing the Soviet Union toward the East, or maybe you trying to push it towards the West . . .

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/
 
Kissinger and Chou?  That supports your theory how exactly?  The fact is that you persist in using the term 'forced' or 'pushed' when that was already the direction that Hitler himself WANTED to go in.  So at most you might accuse Britain of having failed to do enough to 'prevent' Hitler from going east.  But your 'pushed' east theory just doesn't hold water in face of the historical facts.
 
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George Santayana
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  Quote gcle2003 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 16:39
Originally posted by Bankotsu

gcle2003, you pointed out that Eric Hobsbawn is biased in favour of communists.

That is quite true, but his statement that many british conservatives favoured a German-Soviet war is not wrong. I have already quoted some sources showing that.

It is not just communists who say that, non-communists also agree, for example, Kissinger.

See:

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA88&vq=the+popular+front+our+task&dq=william+dodd+lothian+german+east+soviet&source=gbs_search_s&sig=A8sifFD2Te-baY2a1HesbZVqYhc

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA168&vq=spain+in+the+web+east+west&sig=ApoEhmqPmYvQCXY--6l4kD5Al-Q

http://books.google.com/books?id=-VarDLHA3_YC&pg=PA178&vq=british+historians&source=gbs_search_s&sig=DOdW4Mp8sbfB3gDPLwk9-TRzjaI#PPA650,M1

It's perfectly true that the western countries were opposed to Soviet communism, and would be for the rest of the century. It's also understandable. It's also true that some British figures, including cartoon stereotypes like Rothermere, preferred Hitler to Stalin - though it shouldn't be forgotten that until the Anschluss anyway Mussolini was considered a far bigger threat than Hitler.
 
It is also of course true that right up until June 1941, the Communist Party of Great Britain (including Hobsbawm), in common with those in other western countries opposed the war against Hitler, which they denounced as yet another imperialist adventure like WW1. Stalin did a great deal to encourage German revanchism in the early years, long before the 1939 pact, including training his air force.


Edited by gcle2003 - 10-Jun-2008 at 16:40
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  Quote deadkenny Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 18:23
Originally posted by gcle2003

It's perfectly true that the western countries were opposed to Soviet communism, and would be for the rest of the century. It's also understandable. It's also true that some British figures, including cartoon stereotypes like Rothermere, preferred Hitler to Stalin - though it shouldn't be forgotten that until the Anschluss anyway Mussolini was considered a far bigger threat than Hitler.
 
It is also of course true that right up until June 1941, the Communist Party of Great Britain (including Hobsbawm), in common with those in other western countries opposed the war against Hitler, which they denounced as yet another imperialist adventure like WW1. Stalin did a great deal to encourage German revanchism in the early years, long before the 1939 pact, including training his air force.
 
Of course, the collaboration of the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany is an episode that communists would prefer to forget - or to try to blame on the west.  A better question than that of this thread (i.e. regarding Britain supposedly 'pushing' Hitler east, which is based on a dubious premise) might be whether Stalin 'pushing'  Hitler west was a good idea.  In the short term it gave the Soviet Union a 'free hand' in eastern Europe (during which the Soviets attacked / occupied all or part of every one of their European neighbors) and the Soviets obtained German industry machinery as 'payment' for the raw materials they were providing to Germany.  However, end result was that it allowed Germany to concentrate on a 'one-front' war, and thereby to defeat France.  The peoples of the Soviet Union paid a heavy price for Stalin's shortsighted decision to 'push' Hitler west.
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  Quote Guests Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 20:14

....this feels like familiar territory so I felt it would be useful to ‘cherry-pick’ from a previous post on a similar topic…

 

…..while some continue to revise all commonly accepted, credible, and resourced reasons regarding Nazi foreign policy motivation, and seem convinced that Mr Hitler was ‘guided’ and encouraged by Britain to ‘go east’, it might be prudent to take a look at Hitler’s foreign policy ideas before any meaningful political contact between the Nazi’s and British government….…I have deliberately focussed on the book by ‘Noakes and Pridham’ as it is a comprehensive collection of primary source documents and free from bias and ‘revisionist’ thinking…..

 

…as most people know, Hitler’s first attempt to put forward a reasoned foreign policy was found in his book Mein Kampf written in 1924-25…...even then, Hitler’s ideas were designed to enforce German dominion over Europe and provide the basis for world supremacy……in 1919, he expressed some rather conventional ideas about Germans goals…for example, he focused on the revision of the Versailles Treaty and the acquisition of former lost German colonies and the unification of a Greater Germany...that’s 1919 …not 1936 or 37…it must also be noted that during this time, Hitler regarded Britain and France as the main ‘enemies’…. Not Russia….

 

“Let us look at our enemies! We can divide them into two groups: one group includes the absolute opponents: England and America, the second group: nations which become our opponents as a result of their unfortunate situation or as a result of their circumstances…we have been pursuing a Polish policy since Bismarck’s time”

Speech made on the 10th December 1919 taken from police reports of the episode Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

 

…..Hitler believed Germany was a ‘nation without space’ when compared to Russia, US, Britain and France and believed that the ‘big cities’ and ‘rootless masses’ were easy prey to Marxism …. Hitler’s solution to this was the acquisition of more territory, as we all know, the idea of Lebensraum. To do this however, Hitler realised that he would have to free Germany from the constraints imposed by the Versailles Treaty …Hitler knew he would need allies to take on the might of Britain and France, and initially, he looked towards the possibility of an alliance with Russia. However, in 1919 (that’s 1919 again), Hitler became influenced by a group of Baltic Germans who were refugees from the Russian Revolution, and they convinced Hitler (Baltic Germans, not the British) that the Revolution was the work of the Jews. By this time, Hitler was adopting a firm and aggressive anti-Russian position…..

 

……..In addition, the occupation of the Ruhr region by France in 1923 led Hitler to believe that the French were adopting a policy of dismemberment of Germany. Moreover, he was aware of British opposition to the occupation, and judged this to be a British fear of French hegemony in Europe. Hitler actually felt that an Anglo-German alliance against France was a possibility but such an alliance would also prove to be a barrier to the acquisition of German colonies. Hitler’s problem was how to balance all these shifts of power into a favourable position for Germany. At each and every stage, it was Hitler’s wishes and planning that led to the move eastward. Hitler deduced from all this power-play that the only way Germany could get ‘living-space’ was to take it from Russia. Hitler believed this was the only way to avoid a WWI situation where Germany had to face both Britain and Russia. Hitler had made the decision to move eastwards, it was only a matter of time. (This was 1923 Bankotsu). Hitler made clear this option in Mein Kampf.

 

“…we National Socialists have intentionally drawn a  line under the foreign policy of pre-war Germany….We are putting an end to the perpetual German march towards the south and West of Europe and turning our eyes towards the land in the East….we must principally bear in mind Russia…..destiny itself seems to wish to point the way for us there”…

Mein Kampf cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.
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  Quote Guests Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Jun-2008 at 20:20

....a bit of an afterthought 'post'....

 
....To add to this, Adolf Hitler had already stated on the 11th August 1939 that…

“Everything I undertake is directed against the Russians; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West, and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. I need the Ukraine so they can’t starve us out like in the last war”.

Statement made to Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner in Danzig, 11th August 1939. Cited in Nazism 1919-1945 Book 3: Foreign Policy and Racial Extermination eds J. Noakes and G.Pridham 1988.

 
...The implication here is that Hitler felt that the ‘west’ had proved obstructive in his foreign policy objectives and the ‘west’ would pay for that obstinacy sometime after the defeat of the USSR.....


Edited by Act of Oblivion - 10-Jun-2008 at 20:21
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jun-2008 at 05:13
…..while some continue to revise all commonly accepted, credible, and resourced reasons regarding Nazi foreign policy motivation, and seem convinced that Mr Hitler was ‘guided’ and encouraged by Britain to ‘go east’,


'Britain pushed Germany eastwards to destroy Soviet Union' might not be that good a phrase to use to describe british policy of appeasement.

Britain turned and encouraged Germany to go eastwards to destroy Soviet Union' is probably a better term.

Hitler's ambitions to go eastwards is clear enough.

But it still needed encouragement. If Britain opposed Germany going eastwards, Hitler might had dropped his plans.

But Britain did not oppose Germany going east but encouraged Germany going east.

Britain used these ambitions of Hitler to turn the course of German expansion eastwards so as to close the gap between the frontiers of Germany and Russia, hoping that sooner or later, tensions between Germany and Russia will increase and result in a German-Soviet war.

Britain standing aloof from this conflict, can only benefit as the two states destroy each other.

...On 26 November 1937, one week after Halifax’s conversation with Hitler, Chamberlain wrote to his sister that he hoped to satisfy German colonial demands by giving them the Belgian Congo and Angola in place of Tanganyika.  He then added:  “I don’t see why we shouldn’t say to Germany, ‘Give us satisfactory assurances that you won’t use force to deal with the Austrians and Czechoslovakians, and we will give you similar assurances that we won’t use force to prevent the changes you want if you can get them by peaceful means.'

On 3 March 1938, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Nevile Henderson, one of the Chamberlain group, tried to persuade Hitler to begin negotiations to carry out this plan but did not succeed.  He repeated Lord Halifax’s statement that changes in Europe were acceptable to Britain if accomplished without “the free play of forces,” and stated that he personally “had often expressed himself in favour of the Anschluss.”  In the colonial field, he tried to interest Hitler in an area in Africa between the 5th parallel and the Zambezi River, but the Fuhrer insisted that his interest was restricted to restoration of Germany’s 1914 colonies in Africa.

At the famous interview between Hitler and Schuschnigg in February 1938, Hitler told the Austrian that Lord Halifax agreed “with everything he [Hitler] did with respect to Austria and the Sudeten Germans.”  This was reported in a “rush and strictly confidential” message of 16 February 1938 from the American Consul General in Vienna to Secretary of State Hull, a document released to the American press on 18 December 1948...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

So, to summerise, did Hitler wanted to expand eastwards?

Yes, that was no secret.

What was the attitude of Britain towards Hitler's ambitions?

Britain did not oppose these ambitions but seeked to encourage and bring it to reality. But why Britain no oppose but encourage?

Their aim was to turn Germany eastwards to destroy the Soviet Union.


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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jun-2008 at 05:19
Mao Zedong's talk with British ex-prime minister Edward Heath:

  
Heath: I think the Soviet Union has a lot of troubles. They are facing domestic economic difficulties and agricultural predicament, and there are also differences within the leadership, over questions of tactics and timing, not over long-term strategy.

Mao: I think the Soviet Union is busy with its own affairs and unable to deal with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China and the Pacific. I think it will lose.

Heath: However, its military strength is continually augmented. Although the Soviet Union has encountered troubles at many places in the world, its strength is continuing to grow. Therefore, we deem this to be the principal threat. Does the Chairman think the Soviet Union constitutes a menace to China?

Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it!

Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China.

Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.

Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.

http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special/mao/txt/w24.htm

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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jun-2008 at 05:23
...We are told sometimes that the criminal plot of the two dictatorships –  Stalin’s and Hitler’s – was legitimate under the international law of the time. What’s more, it constituted a justified or even essential defense in view of the Munich Agreement concluded in September 1938 among Nazi Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France.

That treaty was designed to channel German aggression eastward.


True, it was a shameful Agreement conceived to appease the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia...

-
Mr. Adam Daniel ROTFELD, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, speech at Fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

http://www.polandun.org/templates/statementRotfeld09may.html
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jun-2008 at 05:38
Another point to note is that Britain's policy of appeasement of Germany wasn't a passive policy but an active policy.

It wasn't that Hitler wanted to annex states to the east and Britain just "let him be". Britain just appeased his desires.

Not at all.

Britain's policy of appeasement of Germany was part of an active policy to reach an anglo-german settlement of their mutual differences.

This point is often not emphasized in english history books.

Britain was the first to carry out diplomatic moves to start negotiations to reach this anglo-german settlement. As part of this anglo-german deal, Britain was willing to allow Hitler to annex Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig and also the polish corridor.

...And it was Halifax who opened the third and last stage of appeasement in November 1937 by his visit to Hitler in Berchtesgaden.

It is probable that the groundwork for Halifax’s visit to Hitler had been laid by the earlier visits of Lords Lothian and Londonderry to the same host, but our knowledge of these earlier events is too scanty to be certain.

Of Halifax’s visit, the story is now clear, as a result of the publication of the German Foreign Office memorandum on the subject and Keith Feiling’s publication of some of the letters from Neville Chamberlain to his sister.  The visit was arranged by Halifax himself, early in November 1937, at a time when he was Acting Foreign Secretary, Eden being absent in Brussels at a meeting of signers of the Nine-Power Pacific Treaty of 1922.

As a result, Halifax had a long conversation with Hitler on 19 November 1937 in which, whatever may have been Halifax’s intention, Hitler’s government became convinced of three things:

(a) that Britain regarded Germany as the chief bulwark against communism in Europe;
(b) that Britain was prepared to join a Four Power agreement of France, Germany, Italy, and herself;  and
(c) that Britain was prepared to allow Germany to liquidate Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland if this could be done without provoking a war into which the British Government, however unwillingly, would be dragged in opposition to Germany...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html


Details of this anglo-german settlement proposed by the Chamberlain regime to Hitler was leaked to the press in November 1937, TIME run an article on it:


...The Yorkshire Post, owned by Mrs. Eden's family, did its best to sabotage Lord Halifax's visit. It was rebuked by the London Daily Telegraph (which is close to Mr. Chamberlain) for printing rumors that "There exist and are known to Germany to exist in this country [Britain] a "certain number of people—not all of them obscure [Halifax & friends]— who would be prepared to welcome a German campaign of territorial expansion in the East [Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia] if by that means Germany could for the time being be diverted from exploiting her nuisance value in other directions [colonies].

Accordingly it requires no great exercise of the imagination to conjecture that Hitler at his meeting with Viscount Halifax will test the ground for some such policy." To the Chamberlainian Daily Telegraph'?, sharp rebuke for printing this rumor, the Edenesque Yorkshire Post sharply retorted that its information was from a "reliable source."

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,758455,00.html



Edited by Bankotsu - 11-Jun-2008 at 05:42
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  Quote Bankotsu Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 11-Jun-2008 at 05:55
So why did Chamberlain issue his famous guarantee of Poland on 31 March 1939?

Why did he suddenly decide to oppose Germany expansion eastwards?

Why did he declare war on Poland on 3 September 1939?

I will answer all of these questions.

Everything will become clear.

But first, I hope forummers can take some time to read through the following sources:

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/06.html#16
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html

The explanations of the events of 1938-1939 in europe will become clear.


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