conference on WWII

Originally posted by Sarmat12 ...A French offensive in the Rhine river valley area (Saar Offensive) started on September 7, four days after France declared war on Germany...

Originally posted by Sarmat12 ...Regardless of what you mean by "major offensive" French clearly had enough forces to create pressure on the German on the West, which would be a great help for Poles, but they did nothing.

Yet again you contradict your own post.  In one post you claim that the French launced an offensive starting Sept. 7, yet in another post you claim they 'did nothing'.  Well, which is it?  Did they launch an offensive, even though they were not fully mobilized or did they do nothing?  You can't have it both ways.

Again, I'm not sure what you're arguing against here.  You claim that France launched an offensive in order to prove your point that they were 'capable' of  taking offensive action, but then claim they did nothing.  You post that the French planned to launch a 'major offensive' starting Sept. 16 and later postponed it to Sept. 20, yet Poland was effectively beaten by those dates.  Here's  a quote from your new favourite Wiki source that you neglected to copy and paste:

Originally posted by Wiki The problem with Polish expectations was that the French and British commitments greatly exaggerated their capabilities. Although France promptly declared war, the French mobilization was not complete until early October, by which time Poland had fallen. In Britain where mobilization was more rapid, only 1 in 40 men were mobilized (compared to 1 in 10 in France, and 1 in 20 in Poland), thus providing only a token force against Germany's forces of several million. The presumption that "something could have been done but wasn't" overlooks the basic fact that the West, just like Poland, was ill-equipped to fight Germany even with the majority of German forces engaged in the east.

By the time Poland finally surrendered in Oct. (long after having been effectively defeated militarily) the British still only had 4 divisions in France and France itself was only just completing their mobilization.  The fact is that the French were limited by their slow mobilization and plans to launch a 'WWI style' offensive which, among other things would involves days of prepatory artillery bombardment.

You also failed to mention that when the French called off further offensive actions, Gamelin quoted the reason as being that the situation in Poland made further offensive operations meaningless - in other words it was already too late to 'save' Poland.

Originally posted by Sarmat12 The thing is that French have enough forces for the planned offensive of October 16. I already gave you the quotes from "my favorite source."

When was that offensive planned for?

Originally posted by Sarmat12 The decision to halt was made on September 12 and Poland was definetetely not defeated at that time.

Really?  So what condition were the Poles in by Sept. 12 then?

Originally posted by Sarmat12

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Originally posted by Majkes I have to say that if not our "allies nature" the plan of defence would be diffrent and we could fight longer. Military better plan was to focus in the centre of Poland on the line of rivers and there fight Germans. Because our goverment was afraid that if we leave Western Poland without fight, France and England without askin Poland will agree on Germany proposal that will say that Germany took Western Poland and they are ready now to conclude peace. So Poland without fight would lost half of its territory. If our gov was sure of its allies it could adopt much effective strategy of defence.

Yes, now that I can agree with.  First, the Allies had 'encouraged' Poland not to mobilize too early, thinking it would 'antagonize' Germany when there was still hope for a settlement.  Then there's the fact that in the tensions leading up to war Hitler had been constantly focusing on Danzig and the Polish 'corridor'.  So the Poles believed that the Germans might fight a 'limited' war where they grabbed those areas and then tried to negotiate a peace with France in Britain that left them in control of those areas.  Further, Poland was certainly 'misled' by France and Britain into believing that there would be significant 'pressure' applied against Germany's western front much earlier than was in fact the case.  Finally, there was the 'unexpected nature' of the fighting - no one had yet seen the 'Blitzkrieg' in action on the scale executed by the Germans.  The Poles as well as the French and British expected to and were prepare to essentially re-fight WWI.  So the Poles were caught by the fully prepared German forces (their eastern forces having been fully mobilized prior to the war starting) while they (the Poles) were not fully mobilized, were poorly positioned given the 'all out' nature of the German attack and they were unprepared for the speed of the German manoeuver, expecially that of the 10 Panzer / motorized divisions.  Finally, the Poles were certainly misled by the French in particular, who were simply reluctant to admit that they were unprepared to and incapable of acting as quickly as they had promised to.  No one should underestimate the fighting quality of the Polish soldiers, who continued to resist for weeks after the situation had obviously become hopeless, because of the speed of the German campaign.  Certainly if the Poles had been fully mobilized, better prepared and positioned and aware of time it would take the French to mobilize and prepare for a major offensive in the west, the Poles would have done much better.  However, with the Soviets attacking them from the east, the Poles were likely doomed sooner rather than later in any case.

Originally posted by deadkenny Unfortunately you are the one who seems to be confused about what you're debating.  First you try to state that the Allies were 'responsible' for the Soviets signing a treaty with Nazi Germany.  When I refute that, you switch to arguing that the Soviets weren't responsible for starting WWII, which has nothing to do with what I said in the first place.  Then I stated that France was too slow to mobilize and you post a bunch of stuff that doesn't contradict that - in fact in places it actually agrees with my statements - and yet you continue to go on as if you've refuted my statement.  It's really very simple - regardless of what the French had promised to do they simply weren't finished with their mobilization until Oct.  They were reluctant to attack until they were fully mobilized.  The British were only able to deliver a token force to the continent in that timeframe.  Poland fell much more quickly than expected, effectively defeated within 10 days or so.

Edited by Sarmat12 - 25-Nov-2007 at 19:50

i think mobilization is a rather weak argument, even britain in ww1 came to the aid of Belgium after it was already overrun and Britain in 1914 didn't even had introduced conscription yet. the allies had a better chance with their initial forces than after the collapse of Poland with Germanies forces in the west again. afterall they even aided Norway!


Edited by Temujin - 25-Nov-2007 at 21:25

Originally posted by Temujin i think mobilization is a rather weak argument, even britain in ww1 came to the aid of Belgium after it was already overrun and Britain in 1914 didn't even had introduced conscription yet. the allies had a better chance with their initial forces than after the collapse of Poland with Germanies forces in the west again. afterall they even aided Norway!

Well, that comparison hardly makes sense.  We're talking about French mobilization here, not Britain's.  The British didn't come to the aid of Beligium in WWI alone, their forces were added to those of the French.  Without the much larger French army, the BEF would have been an ineffective 'drop in the bucket'.   Further, I have never suggested that the French should have done nothing.  However one must understand the limitations they were working under before one can comment intelligently on what they could have done.  As I stated in the first place, they simply could not complete their mobilization in time to launch a major offensive on the western front in time to 'save' Poland.  Once Poland had been conquered, there was no further reason to 'rush' the offensive (in the view of the Allies). 

Originally posted by Majkes   Here You are wrong as well mr Wiliam L Shirer. The biggest battle of September campain took place 9-19th September so Poland wasn't for sure finished until 12th September. Mr. Shirer information about situation on the front seems to be gently speaking not too precise. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bzura

You have to understand the perspective of that statement, which I don't necessarily agree with in an absolute sense.  However, I do not believe that Shirer was saying that fighting had ended - far from it.  However, look at the map that I posted, and which appears again in the link you have provided.  The last semblance of a 'frontline' that appears is as of Sept. 5.  At that point the the Polish 'front' was penetrated at numerous points and Polish forces broken up into isolated 'pockets'.  Now, one of these 'pockets' was centred around Kulno (see the map) and consisted of the forces that fought the Battle of Bzura.  These forces attempted to breakout, had some initial success against the Germans before they could consolidate their 'ring' around the pocket, but were ultimately defeated.  In the meantime, other sectors of the front were also collapsing and the remaining Polish forces 'contained' in isolated 'pockets' (again, reference the map).  There was still plenty of 'fighting' remaining, but I believe Shirer's point is that it was in the nature of 'mopping up', the Polish forces had been 'fatally compromised' when their front line collapsed.  I'm not trying to minimize the valiant efforts of the Polish soldiers, who continued to fight on.  But realistically, there wasn't much prospect for a continuation of the fight much longer once the pocketed Armies of Poznan and Pomorze were 'contained' and the Radom pocket had surrendered.  If you want to push that date back to Sept. 12, I can agree with that.  In fact that is when the French assessed the situation as 'hopeless' and gave up on their own offensive efforts in the west.

Originally posted by Sarmat12 EVEN, if you what you write is true (although IMO it's wrong), German forces still were occupied in the East (blocking pockets with surrounded Polish forces) and French had enough forces to seriously harass the weak German forces in the West and they did NOTHING.   The so called "Rur offensive" example, which I raised earlier, was actually an example of how French having sufficient forces didn't perform any action agains Germans if you still didn't get it.   It was not an offensive but "a vast joke."

Presumably you'll understand if I continue to believe the 'opinions' of the multiple historians that I quoted over your opinion.

Certainly some German forces would be 'tied up' in the east, finishing off pockets of continued resistance.  However, the entire force initially allocated would clearly not be required.  As can be seen from my previous references, the Germans were already transferring forces west before the French had even planned to make any significant efforts, never mind actually being prepared to launch them.  As can been seen from the Liddell Hart reference in particular, the French were still wedded to WWI tactics and doctrine.  To launch a proper offensive they needed their heavy artillery, which wasn't available until Sept. 16.  Prior to that, they launched 'probing attacks', basically taking up the 'no man's land' between the border and the German western fortifications.  That would be standard procedure in 'preparing' to launch a major offensive in WWI anyway.  As I've stated repeatly, from the first, the French were unable to complete their mobilization and preparations for launching a major (WWI style) offensive prior to the situation in Poland becoming so hopeless that the raison d'etre for launching such an 'early' (in the French view) offensive was already gone.

You've failed to support your claims regarding the French mobilization or the situation in Poland.  The situation was that without their heavy artillery, the French were simply not prepared to launch a major offensive.  So the earliest possible date was Sept. 16.  Well before that the Polish front had collapsed, the last major effort by the Poles being the attempted breakout of the surrounded Armies of Poznan and Pomorze.  By Sept. 12 the French deemed the situation in Poland 'hopeless' and called off their offensive actions.  The fact is, that although I agree that the French should have done more, they were not looking at an easy prospect.  The French were limited in what they could do by their slow mobilization system.  They were also looking at attacking a relatively narrow sector of the front (90 miles long as per Liddell Hart), which was naturally the most heavily fortified sector of the German front.  The French were, obviously, not anxious to have to attack.  All the more so when the reason for attacking (i.e. to 'save' the Poles) was moot by virtue of the quickness of the German campaign before the French were fully prepared to attack in the first place.  I'm not trying to let the French off the hook here, but your unsubstantiated claims that the French were fully prepared to go before Poland was effectively defeated is simply wrong.


Edited by deadkenny - 26-Nov-2007 at 17:57