conference on WWII

Poland transferred its ultimatum to Czechoslovakia with the demand to give up Teshin region. Polish military units were involved in several clashes and attacks on Czech border guards and supported German separatists military formations.

On September 30, 1938 Polish military occupied Czech Teshin region.

As Churchills writes about this: �Poland with the greed of hyena took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovakian state.�

In Poland however this shameful act of aggression was regarded as a national triumph and Beck was awarded the order of the white Eagle for his �achievements.�

Besides, Poland was planning hostile actions against the Soviet Union

Report of the 2d intelligence department of the polish military headquarters dated December 1938, was saying: �Partition of Russia is the foundation of the Polish policy in the East. That�s why our position in case of such partition is that Poland shouldn�t be passive in such a historical moment. Our task is to prepare physically and spiritually. Our main task is the destruction and defeat of Russia�

Specially for this  I give a source in Polish Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materialy. T.III. Warszawa, 1968. S.262, 287

Moreover. Ribbentrop noted after the meeting with Beck on January 1939: �Mister Beck didn�t hide that Poland has claims in the Soviet Ukraine and want the access to the Black Sea.�

In other words, it was clearly more than possible that Poland could take part in the German aggression against SU.

Now let�s get back to the role of Poland in the negotiations between the West and SU.

In 1939 SU didn�t have a common border with Germany; so it was unclear how Soviet troops could engage German army in case of military conflict

SU again offered very concrete terms of the possible transfer of the Soviet troops via the Polish territory. The zones of transfer were strictly limited by the Vilno corridor in the north and Galician region in the south.

General Dumenc writes that this proposal has an important meaning in the for the calming down possible fears of Poles, since these proposals had clear strategic grounds.

Again, I want to emphasize that the Soviet Army would move via the Polish territory only if Poland is attacked by Germany, or France is attacked by Germany.

However, Poland even didn�t want to discuss any conditions of the transfer of the Soviet troops via the Polish territory. On August 19 Polish marshal Eduard Rydz-Smigly declared that: �Regardless of the Consequences, Russian troops won�t be allowed to occupy even one inch of Polish territory�

What was wrong in the desire of SU to have concrete condition for the transfer of its troops through Polish territory?

There were 3 possible scenarios of the events:

1. Germany attacks France. SU can�t do anything because it�s can�t help France without crossing Polish territory

2. Germany attacks Poland, again SU can�t do anything until Poland is defeated and German army reaches the borders of SU. Again, in this case possible reaction of England and France is not certain for SU, will they fight.

 3. Less realistic scenario scenario; but if Germany attacks SU through Baltic states and Finland, Western Allies and Poland, can simply ignore their obligations. However, if there is a part in the agreement allowing SU to cross Polish territory, it would be really hard for Poland to avoid participation at war.

Thus, Soviet suggestion had very concrete and reasonable. SU simply wanted to get as many guarantees as it could get from the West and Poland.  Again Western generals and agree that Soviet proposal was reasonable and had concrete practical meaning behind it.

 Churchill rights on this: �Soviet demands according to which Russian armies could cross Vilno and Lvov should they were the allies of Poland were totally appropriate military demand.�

Again, I want to emphasize that SU didn�t pose any territorial demand to Poland, like Germany did to Czechoslovakia, it was only a demand to give concrete obligations of allowing the transfer of the Soviet troops to the front in case of war and nothing more.

Summarizing from this. SU saw that the West was very unwilling to conclude a concrete defense agreement.  Reasonable Soviet suggestions about the corridors through the Polish territory very categorically  denied �regardless of consequences� by Poles.

So what SU, should do?

Pretend that it is an angel and wait for the German attack? Without clearly knowing what will follow? How would Poland behave, how would the West behave? Even Churchill writes that he was not sure, whether Chamberlain government will fight in august 1939. And of course SU had even less understanding of British policy than Churchill.

SU had clear example of the bertrayal ofCzechoslovakia and hostile and unpredictable attitude of Poland, which besides had �claims� in Soviet territory.

Under these conditions, I don�t see as unrealistic the scenario that Germany offers Poland some kind of �settlement� with the compensation of some Soviet territories in the East.

 At least it looked very possible in the Soviet eyes.

Again, this was the time that both the image of SU in the West and the image of the West in the SU was very dark. West would like to see Germany fighting SU. SU would like to the west fighting Germany.

So, Stalin decided that it would be better for SU to conclude a concrete agreement with Germany and save at least some time for the future war, instead of wasting the time on the fruitless negotiations with the Western allies and Poland.

I also don�t blame Poland for fearing SU and having its own interest. It was valid for her to have suspicions about the SU. However, unfortunately for Poland, its overconfident calculations went wrong. Not only it was defeated by Germany, but the said territories in the East were lost. Germany proved to be more dangerous than SU.

Moreover Poland was betrayed by the West, which again proved that SU calculations about the dubious Western intentions proved right.

Again, I draw your attention to the fact that Stalin didn�t actually helped Germany so much in the war with Poland. Stalin waited until the last moment, he was waiting for the western reaction, he thought that it perhaps wouldn�t be very reasonable to invade Poland, should France and England actively support it. Nor Stalin nor Hitler had doubts that the Pact was a temporarily measure, and Stalin would think twice before attacking Poland, should the west supported it.

However, the west did nothing and Stalin convinced that his calculations were right and he loses nothing from that, gave the order to cross the Polish border.

Thus, Molotov-Ribbentrop was pact a very practical move in sense that was primarily made to secure some time before the inevitable war with Germany, or even to avoid the war with it. And it was indeed successful in this sense.

This in not to say again, that I support aggression against Poland, Baltic states and Finland. This was totally morally wrong.

But what I can say is that SU acted totally with accordance with the behavior of the other players in this game.

Britain and France, bought some time by betraying Czechoslovakia, SU bought some time by concluding disgusting Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (in fact the disgusting part was a secret protocol to the Pact, not the Pact itself). Poland took part in the partition of Czechoslovakia together with Germany, SU took part in the partition of Poland also together with Germany.

Everybody acted the same, for its own practical gain. And Pact did helped SU to delay the attack, may be it even helped to delay combined western attack on SU.

Another important detail is that there was another danger to SU, from the East-Japan. Japanese cabinet in 1939 was very willing to go to the war with SU. However, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the cabinet resigned, and Japanese switched their attention to the Pacific from Russian Far East.