Why do the Germans lose at War?

Yes, I certainly appreciate that the situation was 'complex', and that the Wiki synopsis is not the 'whole picture'.  My point was simply that a clear 'threat' of military action would not be consistent with your sources description of "... gave him to understand, in a way which was not meant to be offensive...".  Further, a clear 'threat' of military action against Germany would have resulted in an end to the alliance with Russia, however, that did not happen.  Bismarck may have been 'embarassed' by the episode.  However, that was in reality due more to his own 'misstep' than it was any betrayal on the part of Russia.  As I said previously, Russia felt that they had already 'allowed' Prussia to gain greatly in Germany - not only with the neutrality of Russia but with their actual offer of support.  In 1868 Prussia had an 'alliance' with Russia that committed Russia to sending troops against Austria if Austria moved against Prussia in the context of a war between Prussia and France.  Yet, Prussia felt the need to 'reconfirm' Russia's intentions immediately before the Franco-Prussian war breaking out in 1870.  That was how the diplomacy worked at that point - even erstwhile allies would not allow one another to gain too much or become so powerful as to threaten the 'status quo'.  However, Russia (in their view) had allowed Prussia to gain considerably.  So the stance in 1875 was more of a 'friendly' indication that 'hey, that's enough, don't go too far'.  Defeating France a second time so soon after the defeat inflicted in 1870/1 was seen as too big of a threat to the 'equilibrium' of Europe.  It is not my impression that Germany felt threatened to the extent that they could no longer 'trust' Russia at that point.  It was specifically Bismarck, with his need to 'control' and 'dominate' who felt anger towards Russia, when really it was his own mistake in putting Germany clearly 'in the wrong' that was the cause of his problems in this case.  In any case, Bismarck took the opportunity to 'pay back' Russia at the Congress of Berlin, and thereby precipitated a clear break with Russia.  As previously noted, Russia felt that they had allowed considerable gains by Prussia and then was 'repayed' by having Prussia deny significant gains by Russia.  It was Russia who then left the Dreikaiserbund, thus making clear the 'break' between Germany and Russia.  If Bismarck had been a better statesman, he could have / should have realized his own errors in 1875, supported Russian claims at the Congress of Berlin (which still would have been opposed by the other major powers) and thereby maintained a close relationship with Russia.  In the end, when forced to choose between Russia and Austria, Germany would have been much better off in sticking with Russia and 'allowing' Austria to end up in alliance with France.  Italy would have been a much more 'natural' ally of Germany and Russia (Italy having claims against both France and Austria), and thus much more likely to honour that alliance than they were the Triple Alliance.  As I mentioned previously, it was therefore Bismarck who was responsible for setting Gemany on the path to being 'stuck' with Austria as their primary ally, and thereby allowing Russia and later Italy to 'slip' into alliance with their enemies.

Edited by deadkenny - 10-May-2008 at 12:39

Yes, you've made some valid points and it has been a good discussion in so far as highlighting the issues.  You are quite right that 'friendly' warning is perhaps whitewashing it to some extent.  What it comes down to is that the 1875 'war scare' incident tended to define the limitations of Russo-German cooperation.  Both were powerful, potentially dominant empires.  Neither wanted to allow the other to get so strong as to upset the European 'equilibrium', an 'obsession' in the post-Napoleonic era in Europe.  Russia loyally 'backed up' Prussia through their defeat of France and obtaining of a dominant position in 'little Germany'.  However, that was 'enough' for 'now' in Russia's view.  Thus the 1875 'warning' was more in the nature of 'that's enough' - not wanting even an allied Germany to 'crush' France completely and 'dominate' western Europe.  Thus, I do not necessarily see Russia's warning in 1875 as a 'change of direction' or the first step in an irrevocable ' break' between Russia and Germany.  It was more in the nature of a 'hey, you've already gotten quite alot, don't get greedy'.  Russia then felt it was 'their turn' to gain - expecting some 'payback' from Germany in the form of support for their demands at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.  The fact that Bismarck withheld that support at the Congress of Berlin, holding Russia's lack of support in 1875 against them really highlights the issue.  The difference was that Austria was too weak to deny anything Germany demanded, and was also too weak to make demands of their own without German support.  So in choosing an alliance with Austria over one with Russia, what Bismarck was 'gaining' was a 'partner' whom he could 'dominate' and 'control'.  With Russia he would have had to 'tolerate' more of an 'equal partner'  who might have a different opinion thatc could not be ignored.  Of course, the flaw in Bismarck's calculations was that the very reason for Russia's strength and Austria's 'weakness' would have a direct impact on the outcome in case of war.  Both Germany and Russia had much to gain by maintaining their relationship, even at the 'price' of having to compromise between each other.   

Edited by deadkenny - 10-May-2008 at 18:41

Originally posted by deadkenny Originally posted by vladzo to all on this thread :::::::::::::::::: i support the comments and general opinion of <edgewaters> in this thread. more later;vlad Lol.  Well, you might want to reconsider your 'blank check' when you get to his posts whichare simply demonstrably false, such as: Originally posted by edgewaters The Germans did not develop infiltration tactics at all - infiltration tactics first appeared at Vimy Ridge and were succesfully used to completely overwhelm a previously unassailable German position. However, it was the Germans who were more impressed by the tactic than Allied command, and so the Germans were first to adopt it as standard doctrine - but they certainly didn't develop it. The Canadian forces and British commanders who used it at Vimy didn't really develop it either - they adapted it from the way the Boers fought in the Boer War. or: Originally posted by edgewaters The Germans did develop - or at least, put into practice first - a wholly new tactic (as a result of Vimy, again!). Theorists had for years been discussing "defence in depth" or "elastic defence" but making little headway. After Vimy, a French captain (Andre Laffargue) who participated had written a memo or pamphlet called L'Etude sur l'attaque, in which he noted that even after the German lines had collapsed, a pair of machine guns were able to hold out and effectively interdict all support to the advancing troops. The Germans somehow stole this pamphlet and it was seized upon by German defence-in-depth advocates as proof of theory ... after which the Germans became the first adopters. or: Originally posted by edgewaters Prior to 1917, Strosstruppen were nothing more than using 3 guys with a riot shield and some grenades - that was the whole of the doctrinal changes involved until Riga.

to moderator and all ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
please note that i am taking the place of vladzo because i am the same blogger. that is to say, vladzo2 is now vladzo.
it was the only way i could get back on after a short time of not posting.

to kenny :::::::::::::::::::

i still do support the blogger edgewaters; and these few (very well detailed) examples also seem to be correct to me. i do remember reading all about "stosstruppen" and all that.

more later;
vlad

Originally posted by vladzo2 to kenny ::::::::::::::::::: i still do support the blogger edgewaters; and these few (very well detailed) examples also seem to be correct to me. i do remember reading all about "stosstruppen" and all that. more later; vlad

Edited by deadkenny - 16-May-2008 at 02:03

Originally posted by deadkenny   No, you're wrong here.  First there was nothing 'obligatory' about an alliance with Austria.  If anything, that was the 'unnatural' alliance for Prussia / Germany.  Austria had been the real rival in recent history (at that point in time).   Although Bismarck had 'made an ally' of Austria, that was simply his attempt to return to a new 'status quo', with Prussia's gains in Germany being implicitly accepted in the new 'status quo'.  He also had an alliance with Russia at the time.  As you have pointed out yourself, alliance with Austria effectively ruled out meaningful alliances with Russia and Italy. Although a formal alliance was concluded with Italy, the Triple Alliance, we saw what that was worth in reality.  No, Germany would clearly have been much better off maintaining alliances with Russia and Italy, even if they thereby left Austria 'free' to form an alliance with France.    You say that the alliance with Russia was a leftover 'relic' from the Napoleonic Wars.  Yet, that established a firm basis for the relationship 'reactionary' government was another basis of commonality between them.  There were no serious divergences between German and Russian interests.  One source of friction was economic - German 'tarriffs' against Russian agricultural produce.  Yet that was more the interest of the 'Junkers' in Prussia.  As a whole Germany was more urbanized and industrialized, and allowing more Russian imports would not have hurt the German economy.  Bismarck become concerned about Russia gaining too much power and thus becoming a threat and 'uncontrolable' if allowed to gain too much at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.  Yet Germany was not directly threatened by possible Russian gains in the Balkans, or even if Russia had gained the straits and access to the Med.  It was more France, Britain and Austria that were threatened by that possibility. Regarding Britain as 'the' other potential alliance member, there was no realistic prospect of that.  Britain wasn't even committed to involvement in WWI and that was only due to the obvious threat of the growing German navy, plus occupation of Belgium plus potential dominance on the continent.  Sure, Germany could have avoid the degree of antagonism that developed, by simply agreeing to some sort of limits in the naval arms race.  But there was no way Britain would have become 'committed' to Germany in a military sense.  Germany could simply hope to keep Britain from a close relationship with Germany's enemies (which they failed to do in the end).

the alliance between Austria was only unnatural due to geographic reasons (sme reason because a Russian alliance was unnatural). but due to cultural reasons (both empires had a german speaking ruler) they were natural allies even though geopolitical it didn't made much sense. Germanies enemy was France, not Russia, therefore possible allies are only Italy, Spain and Great Britain. i already commented on Italy and Gb and Spain simply wasn't satrogn enough as evident in the American-Spanish war which kicked Spain out of global politics entirely. it is true that Prussia and Austria were natural enemies, but after the German question got solved and Austria concentrated on the balkan for expansion which made berlin and Vienna best friends, similar to how America and Britian eventually went from arch-enemies to closest allies. again, Russia can't really help in a war vs france, but on the other hand russia is a natural ally for france and vice versa to keep germany in check. Germanys and Russias borders were not really natural but both countries (including K.u.K.) held firm on Poland which made them cooperate anyways in any insurgency there. so there wasn't really any need for an alliance as long as there is no independent poland. Russias expansion was directed south, again Germany couldn't help here either. Bismarck himself once said "the bosporus isn't worth the life of a single pommeranian grenadier." a quote that didn't made much sense to me for a long time. due to the relationship bewteen wilhelm and the British crown, he never amde much efforts for a closer alliance and he didn't saw the rift created by his own naval efforts, but really Germany would have benefitted from GB the most. Germany afterall was already the most dominant land-power on the continent, only ww1 changed that.

Originally posted by deadkenny First, having Russia as an ally would have avoided the 2 front war from the start - along the lines of what Hitler arranged in WWII.

we don't have any disagreement here really, of course it is undesireable for Germany to be caught in a two front war with France & Russia but on the other hand an alliance with Russia isn't desirable either unless there is an independent Poland or in case of war with the Habsburgs, which is very unlikely. the Habsburgs are traditional enemies of France just as much or maybe even more so than Germany (at least until 1870) so this scenario is unrealistic.
regarding ww2, Hitlers choice of alliances was almost perfect. the Annexation of Austria only made an alliance with Italy possible, and in the most dieal scenario Spain would have joined in the fray too, so France would have been almost completely encircled, but defeatign Fracne eventually didn't turned out to be a difficult task afterall so Spain wasn't very crucial, particularly given the state of Spains Army was even more pathetic than that of Italy and Japan (Japan wasn't really pathetic but it was too much ww1 which was made too obvious in the 39 and 45 engangements with the Soviet Union). to draw the Soviet Union in a two front conflcit there are only two choices, China and Japan but China prooved militarically weak compared to Japan and politically unstable, so Germany dropped their support for China in favour of Japan but due to the state of the Japanese Army and their own policy of expansion the alliance was completely fruitless at all. even the Germany-Su alliance turned out well to defeat Poland even though as inc ase with France it wasn't needed but shows how intelligent the foreign policy of Nazi Germany was. the only downside, repeated after ww1, was the odd one out, that is Britain. in both worldwars the ignoring of Britains role in a future war was the biggest plunder in Germanies foreign policy. in both cases it contributed for the outnumbering and eventual defeat of Germany but more importantly economic isolation.

I'm no expert, but from what I've seen from various WW2 documentaries, I'd say too much too fast.

They create more enemies than they can handle (Didn't Hitler backstab the Russians after making a non-aggression pact with them?) and just basically going too far. 

A few territorial conquests against, say, France wouldn't draw the attention of the world like the genocide of millions of Jews and the annexation of Europe...

Originally posted by Temujin well....no. Germany didn't wanted to commit itself on the Balkans, hence my Bismarck quote. and there was no need for an alliance just to get ressources. anyways Germany didn't wanted to strenghten Russia either with an alliance so the idea is rather pointless. the whole idea of a two-front war is a little overhyped. ww1 was the exception and ww2 was a "home-made" two front war. so becoming allies with Russia is really unnecessary and undesired. remaining in a friendly neutralicy is the way to go. well in the most unlikely scenario where Habsburgs and France became friends -  whats the reason that Germany and France can't get friends? i thought this arch-rivalry was the whole premise of this alliance-talk at all....

Apart from many things mentioned above, we can simplistically say that Germans lost because they fought a war on two fronts(in both Wars), and no sensible nation fights wars on two fronts.

wait, didn't the Austro-Hungarians, Germans and Russians ally at some time? I recall an alliance called the alliance of three Emperors.(Dreikaiserbund).