The Brusilov and Kerenski offensives

Been away for the Easter break so couldn�t get back to you earlier.

My, aren�t we touchy; and leaping like a spring lamb to conclusions, as usual.

I agree; this was never my contention or had anything to do with your subsequent post that I challenged. Let�s move on.

DeadKenny�s, like Gudmundsson�s account, completely ignores British and French tactical innovations at Neuve Chapelle, (10^th March 1915) Festubert-Artois (May-June 1915) and Loos (Sept-Oct 1915) where, for example, the 15^th Scottish Div history states that following the Creeping Barrage, �The scene resembled nothing so much as a cross country race with a full field. Men ran as if for a prize� and continued to do so for some four miles into the heart of the German defences�. [J. Buchan, �The Long Road to Victory�] and similarly, �The French had already adopted the self-contained Platoon as a unit. Tiny groups, taking every advantage of cover, swarmed forward, intangible as will o� the wisps, illusive as quicksilver. The German artillery was baffled and their defences overrun by these handfuls of men who were everywhere at once. In a few minutes they had disappeared over the skyline. The attack had been successful.� (Eye witness account of a typical French attack on 1^st July 1916 by Maj-Gen Sir Edward Spears cited in White Heat: The New Warfare 1914-18 by J. Terraine, describing Allied �infiltration methods� in use up to that point in the war.)

Nonsense. A man carrying 30-60lb of armour, bulletproof shield and miscellaneous equipment tends not to move as rapidly as you seem to think or want to believe. The first Sturmabteilung unit was designed more as �assault Pioneers� to facilitate clearance of strongpoints and trenches during regular attacks. They were not trained in any form of �infiltration tactics� at this point in time, and you know it [or perhaps you don�t?]. Allow me to quote from your source, (Page 46-47 of Gudmundsson)

�On March 2, 1915, the War Ministry ordered the Eighth Army Corps to form an Assault Detachment (Sturmabteilung) from men provided by pioneer units. In the course of the month of March, this unit, consisting of a headquarters, two pioneer companies, and an overgrown battery of 20 of the lightweight Krupp guns, was assembled at the artillery range at Wahn. The officer chosen to command this unit, Major Calsow, was a pioneer.

The Assault Detachment spent the months of April and May, 1915, developing techniques for using the Krupp guns, which were soon christened "assault cannon" (Sturmkannone), in combat. The men of the cannon battery were trained in the care, manipulation, and firing of the cannon themselves, while the men of the pioneer companies developed techniques for ensuring that the cannon got across "no man's land" and the first enemy trench in condition to take part in the fight. Besides brushing up on the traditional pioneer skill of clearing barbed wire and other obstacles, they practiced using portable steel shields to protect those clearing obstacles from enemy fire.

This training, however, was never put to use. The first combat mission of the Assault Detachment was the defence of a section of the German trench line in France. The pioneers were used as line infantry while the assault cannon were used like the very weapons that they had been procured to combat -- as light field pieces positioned to the rear of the German front line trench. The cost of this improper employment was high. In the month of June the two pioneer companies had taken so many casualties from French artillery bombardments that they had to be consolidated into one under strength company.

The assault cannon proved to be unsuited to employment near the front line. Each time one fired, its pronounced muzzle flash made it easy for the French to determine its exact position. Once located, the assault cannon became the favorite targets of the French artillery.

Needless to say, such a weapon soon became quite unpopular with the troops that had to serve in its vicinity.

In August of 1915 Major Calsow was relieved of the command of the Assault Detachment despite his protest that the poor showing of his unit had been due to the fact that it had not been employed in accordance with the instructions of the War Ministry. In the eyes of Colonel Bauer, Major Calsow's main failing was that he did not see the true potential of the Assault Detachment. Calsow did not share Colonel Bauer's vision of the Assault Detachment as a laboratory where new techniques could be tried out and a school where they could be taught. Rather, he had been content to command a unit that provided other units with detachments of assault cannon and pioneers.�

And anyone who does will realise, amongst other things, that there�s no �n� in Gudmundsson.

A serious scholar like DeadKenny could also have mentioned the following works to get a �Teutophile� view of German tactical achievement in the Great War;

�The Dynamics of Doctrine: The changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War� by T T Lupfer

�Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War� by M Samuels

�If Germany attacks� by G C Wynne

And of course, the classic:

�The Storm of Steel� by E Jűnger, and �Die Deutsche Strurmbataillone im Weltkrieg by Helmuth Gruss

All excellent examples of accounts of how the Germans did things that generally ignore, or chose to overlook allied achievements. Gudmundsson�s highly informative thesis is marred by the fact he generally omits the effects of parallel Allied tactical developments which were often [but not always] far ahead of the Germans themselves.

Clearly DeadKenny has reached the pinnacle of enlightenment and I sit in awe at his pronouncements. The rest of us mere �seekers after the truth� who labour in the �fog of uncertainty� and the �mists of mythology� will soon discover that Gudmundsson published his work in the late �80s, so would not have been aware of subsequent research in the 90�s which finally determined that there was a fatal mix up due to a confusion between Laffargue�s �Impressions and Reflexions� and a competing pamphlet called �L�Etude sur l�Attaque� written by a Commandant Lachevre, C.O. of the 74^th Infantry Regiment, and published by the French Army in November 1915 and translated for the British in June 1916, (according to the OH 1917 vol.2) and quoted erroneously by Gudmundsson in his book as the work of Laffargue�Oops.

Not as 'touchy' as you, when I demonstrated the falseness of your claim of a 100 million German population of the Third Reich. Based on some of your comments, it seems that I have in fact drawn the correct conclusions regarding your attitude.

Before we 'move on', let's look back for a moment on what you did in fact contend:

Where is the evidence that, as you claimed, Laffargue's pamphlet was 'widely circulated' by August 1915 or that Rohr had access to it and based any of his ideas on it?

So now you're giving 'credit' for 'running' to the attack and 'taking cover' using local terrain to the British and French? I suppose you've scoured German divisional histories and determined that the Germans didn't 'run' or 'take cover' until after they had seen the British and French do it, have you? In any case this hardly establishes your claim that Laffargue's pamphlet was �widely circulated along the Western front by August 1915� or that Rohr had access to it and based anything that he did on it.

Nor were they as (relatively) slow as you seem to want to think or believe. The standard pack early in the war was at least 60 lbs, so an otherwise unburdened assault trooper with armour would have been no more encumbered.

It was the starting point. Obviously they didn't start off with the full blown 'infiltration' tactics that would eventually be developed. However, it was clearly a manifestation of the intention to develop such. How many dedicated 'stormtrooper' units did the French and British form and when did they form them?

None of which contradicts what I've said.

Really? Are you sure about that? No 'n' in G-u-d-m-u-n-d-s-s-o-n? Perhaps you should take a closer look.

Of course you label any study of what Germany did as �Teutophile�, so in your simplistic view there is only ignorance or 'pro-German' bias. Meanwhile you're blind to your own 'anti-German' bias.

The Allies 'were often far ahead of the Germans'? Another totally unsubstantiated claim. Care to back that up with something?

Once again, just more immature silliness from you. All it does is detract further from your credibility, to the extent that your consistent inability to connect together your claims with proper cites supporting them leaves you with any to detract from. Remember this?

Does anything you've posted here support this claim?

It doesn't appear as though the timing was very 'debatable' in your view when you posted that. So have you come up with anything that supports your claim that Laffargue's pamphlet was 'widely circulated' in the time frame you claimed it was? Do you have anything that supports the claim that Laffargue's pamphlet itself was 'widely distributed throughout the German army'?