The Battle of Nordlingen

 

Well thanks for the vote of conficence,  but i did look it up between football games this afternoon.

 

I was aware that the Swedes had made the decision to reserve their own troops as much as possible after Lutzen, as well as the Scots who they so valued as reliable soldiers and co-religionists.  I was not aware of the extent to which the decision turned the army into a German army. 

 

The Swedes had born a very high cost in the wars of the 1620s losing perhaps 50,000 soldiers out of a national population of about 1,200,000 - 1,300,000.  After the death of the king, policy was mostly in the hands of the Rad and the chancellor Oxenstierna.  As there were plenty of experienced, willing soldiers in Germany, and with French and Dutch subsidies, it was decided that the bulk of the fighting would be taken over by German mercenary troops.  The Swedes and the Scots would garrison areas, towns and fortifications that were crucial to Sweden's interests in north Germany - the "strategic redoubt" that would protect Sweden's interests along the Baltic and make them a "German" political factor.

 

At Nordlingen, there were very few Swedish or Scots troops.  The Swedish Yellow Brigade of around 1,400 men was annihilated, losing over 1,000.  Count Thurn's brigade also lost about 800.  There were several regiments commanded by Swedish officers that were composed of German soldiers - those of colonels Taupadel and Sperreuter, who had served in the Prussia campaigns, and there were six companies of Scots under colonel Ruthven, and 100 dragoons that were Scots.

 

Even Field Marshal Horn's life regiment was German, as was his Dragoon "regiment" of about 100.

 

Of about 25,000 men, these were very few.  The general officers and the artillery of course were under Swedish control (except maybe Bernhard  )

 

 

 

There are two volumes on the Battles of the Thirty Years War by William Guthrie (who sadly died I think last year [cancer]).  He was not an academic historian, so of course there was a lot of bashing of his work.

 

However, he did consult the army lists (Vienna/Munich, Sweden, France, others) used in previously published works. His is about the only  large source, secondary though it is, available in English on these matters. 

 

Since I don't read 4 or 5 languages, and don't have either the time or the stipend to travel to the archives, I am taking Guthrie's books for what they are worth - the only thing I have.  

 

The army lists and the index of regiments are both quite extensive.

 

 

 

Of course there were some Swedish soldiers at Nordlingen in 1634, but the 'Swedish' army by this time was one of a nominal nature only. Remember, Gustavus landed in Pomerania 4 years earlier with only 13,000 of his core Swedes, which were immediately supported by the garrison of Stralsund, mainly Scots. But as pikeshot has stated, there weren't many here at Nordlingen; many would have been with Gustav Horn on the Protestant right (south), who stormed the Allbuch hill (initially capturing it), and practically the rest would have been with Thurn's unit, which was sent, form the Protestant center line, by Bernhard to help Horn's plight, as he was failing in repeated cavalry attacks. It didn't help, and ultimately, we are told, the 'Swedes' lost 8,000 killed and 4,000 prisoner. Of those 12,000, how many can we conservatively guess were native Swedes? Half of them? Less than half? Some accounts say the army was 19,000 total, but more seem to state 25,000 (16,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry) total.

 

Whether Gustavus' personal presence, which so much was centered around, could have made a difference, the actuality that manifested was the Swedes were unable to establish sufficient support for his great army in Germany by 1632. After all, a primary impetus for their arrival was French subsidizing; Armand Richelieu woked hard to get Gustavus out of Poland and into Germany, and formed an alliance with Bernhard in 1635, bringing France into the 30 Years War. In May of 1633, Axel Oxenstierna 'admitted' that the wages of the Army in Germany were more than quadruple the amount of local contributions. Basically, what befell the Swedes was akin to what happened to the Spaniards in Flanders a generation earlier: a problem of distances covered and the cost of military intervention in foreign lands. Moreover, the premium of marshalling infantry firepower and improved artillery became more costly than ever. Geoffrey Parker tells us, in his The Military Revolution, Pg. 21,

 

 

Not long after the Battle of Lutzen, Oxenstierna extracted Swedish national troops, placing them back in the Baltic, and sending most of the mercenaries in Swedish service, here since 1630, back to Germany. Thus the Swedish conquests in the Rhineland were too be primarily maintained by Germans; resentment of Sweden didn't take long to foster; who can blame the peoples of Germany for resenting their lands being constantly overrun by foreigners. Furthermore, Bernhard, it seems, was claiming Lutzen as his personal triumph (fair argument: he did assume command and charge home tactically after Gustavus' death). Though he was denied the title of generalissimo of the Swedish forces, obviously his influence wasn't too weak, as the Protestant army at Nordlingen attacked a resolute and well-entrenched enemy, reinforced with the Tercios Viejos, with no supporting artillery barrage (the unlucky explosion in the ammunition wagons happened after they were thrown back, and then attacked by the imperial cavalry). Horn, the Swede, advocated a delay until 6,000 approaching Germans under a Rheingraff arrived.  

 

By 1635, the Swedes were mutineering for pay arrears, but Oxenstierna conciliated them with land grants, which included a license to loot. Bernhard benefited greatly form this policy. For better or worse, he was becoming another Wallenstein.     

 

Unlike Mauritz van Nassau, whose outstanding reforms centered around improved flexibility wrought from drill and discipline, Gustavus did not fight his wars in his own land out of direct civil defense. Thus, though Gustavus brought to new heights tight discipline, extended infantry lines, the 'counter-march', mobile field artillery, and a national character amongst his core troops surrounded by soldiers of fortune etc., somebody - or something - had to pay for all this! With his death in the fog at Lutzen, the 30 Years War was destined to drag on for another 16 years. The French subsidy and the invaluable revenues gained from his Polish campaign sustained him well until 1632, but now increased suffiency was needed.

 

In 1630, for all in all, mercenaries comprised perhaps 1/2 the Swedish army; by 1631, 3/4; by 1632, when Gustavus' total forces in Germany were about 150,000 (I have read also up to 200,000), maybe as many as 9/10 were non-Swedes. After his death, in which attritional war would become more prominent, the domestic conscriptions functioned erratically, and the native replacements and mercenaries could not deliver the superb standards of drill and discipline required to effectuate the tactics of Gustavus. The Swedish Brigade was a brilliant instrument of war; never before had one faced an army utilizing its cavalry, artillery, pikemen, and musketeers in self-sustaining little combat units with such cohesion, speed, and adaptability. It was worse for the imperialists, as not only were they outgunned in quantity, the Swedish regimental guns contained fixed-ammunition cartridges, which resulted in 3 shots to 1 - on even terms! So the imperialists were really, potentially, outfired by a count of 6 to 1! But it must be stated that Gustavus' methods were quickly adopted and adapted by his enemies, as everyone began strengthening their artillery, and the Battle of Nordlingen of 1634 proved that traditional methods could still win the day.  

 

But this demanded a high degree of discipline and a superb officer corps (NCO), not to mention that such a structure was remarkably effective only under a cerebral commander capable of juggling the arms in positive conjunction. The fact the Swedish Brigade was gone by 1634 illustrates that these very qualities were absent, a result primarily wrought from the economic issues. Remember, it was mostly an economic deterioration that brought the Roman Empire down; the 'barbarians' who marched into Italy at the beginning of the 5th century were scarcely opposed by field armies.

 

In his famous historical study of the 30 Years War, Johann Schiller, no fan of Gustavus, tells us that 6,000 Swedes came directly from Sweden to join Bernhard and the Palatinate Christian of Birkenfeld, whom in turn were to junction with 4,000 from Saxony, all to meet up with the now-fugitive Wallenstein, who had recently lost the support of his army. This would have occured in early 1634.

 

For all his qualities as the finest, in my opinion, commander of his age, Gustavus' ambition for Sweden may have been sought at an unsustainable cost. As pikeshot stated, his system of conscription (Utskrivning), which brought about 10,000 men to the colors every year, saw the numbers of men betweeen the 15-60 age range fall by half - in a country vastly underpopulated for its military objective. Gustavus could have made a difference had he lived, but he certainly would have outlived, if not killed in battle or an 'accident', the condition of Germany as a Swedish province: the thought of Sweden controlling Germany for long is like a cat digesting an elephant! I'm sure he knew that. 

 

But as we know, hindsight is 20/20, and maybe those embrolied in these events we discuss have cataracts. Maybe Gustavus should have marched on Vienna after Breitenfeld, and not chase Tilly. Maybe had he not been killed the war would have ended sooner, as he must have known that the extravagances of his recruitments by 1632 could not be supported unless a rapid end to hostilities was achieved. The power of his commanding person was not unlike that of Hannibal, Caesar, or Suvorov. Maybe...maybe...maybe... 

 

The Protestant forces at Nordlingen in early September, 1634 presumably numbered some 25,000 men. Whatever figures we may come across as the number of native Swedes, they are extrapolations, which can be gauged by the probability that it was already 2 years past the point that attrition (Gustavus would have sought more battles in the field) and constant warfare had depleted the great Swedish army of its significant ranks. True, the likes of Johan Baner, Lennart Torstensson (who avenged Nordlingen of 1634 against Matthias Gallas in 1642), and Karl Wrangel (with the great Turenne) achieved successes up until the Peace of Westphalia against the imperialists, it was advanced more for Protestantism than for Sweden per se, and by now the 'Swedish army' was almost entirely composed of adventurers and now-more-dubious mercenaries. Certainly, the native Swedes at Nordlingen, 1634, were but a handful.

 

A couple of works I have browsed:

 

Cicely Wedgwood's The Thirty Years War, I thought, was an outstanding narrative on the subject, and its subjects (getting old, but some sall it 'timeless').

 

The Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IV, is invaluable.

 

Theodore Dodge's Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War... is terrific, but must be supplemented by more modern works, such as those by Michael Roberts. I love Dodge's biographies; he was a veteran soldier and officer, and was very compelling with his exceptional military judgement. he can be long and tedious, though, if one doesn't enjoy the subject matter.

 

Geoffrey Parker's The Thirty Years War and his The Military Revolution are very detailed about the 'stuff' we don't discuss much.

 

But William Guthrie's works, which I haven't yet seen, apparently are what you want for the details regarding unit strengths, positions, composition, and command quality and control. maybe he gave us a figure of how many native Swedes fought at Nordlingen. 

 

To draw from the fountainhead, Johann Schiller's classic work is online:

 

http://www.worldwideschool.org/library/books/hst/european/TheHistoryoftheThirtyYearsWar/toc.html 

 

Thanks, Spartan