The Battle
of the Standard, 22 August 1138
King Henry
I of England
died heirless in Normandy on 1 December 1135. Twice before his
death Henry had extracted an oath from his leading barons and clergy that they
should respect the rights of his daughter Mathildawidow of emperor Henry V and
presently wife of Count Geoffrey of Anjouto the succession of the English throne. It is
pointless to discuss here the legal implications of an oath extracted in the 12th
c., an era where the rules of inheritance where just beginning to become formalized.
Whatever the case might be Stephen, Count of Boulogne, nephew of Henry I and a
grandson of William the Conqueror, decides to disregard his own oath, leaves Normandy
for England, and is crowned de facto king of said country in London by William,
archbishop of Canterbury on 22 December 1135. This arbitrary coronation will not
be recognized by a large number of the English and Norman barons. Whether this
is done out of a sense of legitimacy and obligation to their oath or the
nobilitys self-serving ambition is beyond the scope of this short essay. The
fact of the matter is that for the remaining 19 years of Stephens reign
England will be ravaged by annual conflicts along the width and breadth of the
country that will pit Stephen and the forces of the crown against Empress
Mathilda, the Angevine camp, and their supporters in England and Normandy.
Within the
context of this wider conflict David, King of the Scots, invades the northern
English counties in 1136 in the interest of the Empress but is induced to negotiations and the signing of an
agreement by the arrival in the north of king Stephen at the head of a
formidable array. Displaying the same ease with which Stephen had violated his
own oath to king Henry, King David will nevertheless return to the north of
England in April of 1138, besiege the castle at Wark with part of his force,
and proceed to lay waste most of Northumberland and the land around Durham. These
deprivations of the country-side and its folk are lamented in the chronicles of
Richard of Hexham who interestingly describes the Scots as pagans and heathen.
This perhaps can be understood if we keep in mind that Richard is the prior at
Hexham, whose own church is apparently violated and pillaged by the ruffian
Picts. The implication here is clear: such men who violate some monasteries
and extort blood money from othersthe monastery at Tynemouth having been
obliged to pay twenty-seven marks of silver in order to avoid the fate dealt at
Hexhamcannot possibly be Christians, regardless how Christianized their names
and their kings court might be. With king Stephen tied up fighting the barons
in the south of England, the Scottish host will continue their ineffective
siege of Wark throughout the Spring and early Summer, having been augmented in
strength by the defection of a prominent Norman, Eustace fitz John,and his
forces to the Scottish standard, as well as levies from the west of the
Penninesthe old kingdom of Strathclyde. With his forces thus increased, King
David will turn over the siege at Wark to the turncoat fitz John and proceed
south, reaching the line of the Tees sometime in
mid-August. Here he is further reinforced with Picts from Galloway his army now
reaching considerable strength for the era; however we must assume that it is
much less than the 26,000 mentioned in the chronicles of Richard of Hexhameven
half as many is probably still a little too big for the standards of the time. What
about the English response to the threat from the north? Up to this point the
highlight of English resistance seems to be the spirited defense of Wark by its
garrison under the leadership of its gifted commander Jordan de Bussey whose
determined efforts set at naught and rendered useless all of the
kingsDavidendeavors. The first action is taken not by a military person but
by Archbishop Thurstan of York who
summons a council of local magnates attended by prominent Norman tenants of the
English crown such as Ilbert de Lacy, William de Percy, Count William of Aumale
as well as Scots such as Robert Bruce and Bernard de Balliol. Apparently during
this council the Archbishop called for something close to a religious crusade
against the barbarous Scots who up to this point have been ravaging the
country-side and desecrating its religious shrines. The barons, heartened by
the words of the Archbishop and the arrival of a small contingent of troops
sent by King Stephen as reinforcements, decide to fight. The English host
assembles at York and consists of
the feudal mounted contingents of the barons as well as the civic militias of
York, Beverley, and Rippon. The religious nature of the whole enterprise is
reinforced by the three great banners hoisted on a wagon that flew over the
entire English host: the banners of St. Peter of York, St. John of Beverley,
and St. Wilfred of Rippon. The army will set out from York
marching north along the Great North Road
as far as Thirsk where an attempt will be made to reach a compromise with the
Scottish king. The Scots, being in position to acquire the entire
Northumberland by force, reject the English offer. It is now that further
Norman reinforcements will arrive from Derbyshire and
Nottinghamshirepresumably the mounted contingents of the barons in
commandlead by Robert de Ferrers and William Peverel, a veteran of Henry Is
campaigns to pacify his own baronsanother example of the strange mixing-up of
allegiances and nationalities to be encountered on both sides of the conflict.
There is not a single reference as to the numbers involved in the English army
but we assume that they are roughly equal to that of their opponents. Upon
receiving word from scouts that the Scots are moving south, the unknown overall
commander of the northern English army orders the array to break camp and march
out from Thirsk on the night of the 21st. Since the battle starts in
the early hours of the 22nd we can asses, based on conjecture alone,
that perhaps the English embark on a forced night march through dense fog in
order to surprise the unsuspecting Scottish host and thus gain a tactical
advantage. At any rate, the Scots either had warning of the English advance or
had themselves set off as early as their adversaries because no such surprise is
achieved. Whatever the case might be, both armies are now set on a collision
course along the Great North Road,
certain to run into each other in a few hours time. The English will arrive
first on the battlefield and start deploying some time before 6 am on the 22nd to the right of the road along
the crest of a flanking hill. How long the deployment takes is lost in
historical obscurityi.e. lack of sources. Richard of Hexham informs us in
regards to the English order of battle that The greater part of the knights,
then dismounting, became foot soldiers, a chosen body of whom, interspersed
with archers, were arranged in the front rank. The Hexham chronicler goes on
to relate that the remainder of the knights and barons are arranged in a sort
of guarde d honor around the
wagon-standard which is positioned on the very top of the hill and behind the
main formation in order to provide an obvious point of inspiration and rallying
for the troops: Some of them soon erected, in the center of a frame which they
brought, the mast of a ship, to which they gave the name of the Standard;
whence those lines of Hugh Sotevagina, archdeacon of York: Our gallant stand by
all confest,/ Be this the Standards fight;/ Where death or victory the test,/
that proved the warriors might. It is
reasonable to assumeOman
and Beeler also seem to concur on thisthat the English formed a deep,
dismounted rectangle with knights/archers on the front ranks, the rest of the
knights around the Standard in the middle, and the shire levies on the flanks
and behind them. About 400 yards to the rear and on the reverse slope a small
number of knights were placed to guard the horses of the now dismounted Anglo-Normans.
The disposition of the English deployment is totally defensive and makes clear
that this is a stance on their part with no intention to pursuit a victorious
outcome.
King David
and his army arrive shortly thereafter and begin to deploy under the gaze of their
enemies across the road. Initially, the Scottish king plans to match the
English deployment by dismounting his own knights, place them in the front rank
and, supported by archers behind, use them as an armored fist to punch a hole
in the Northumbrian formation which then could be exploited by his lesser-armored
but furiously impetuous Galwegian and Pictish warbands. The Picts from Galloway,
however, are having none of this: they insistently demand that they be put in
the front line despite their total lack of armor and heavy weapons. Their
claims to their ancient right of occupying the very center of the attacking
formation must be so vociferous that eventually King David reluctantly and with
great irritation has to concede to a very unusual development in the annals of
ancient/medieval combat: a complete re-deployment in the field of battle and in
the presence of the formed ranks of the enemy army. One cannot help but wonder
what thoughts must have been going on in the minds of the individuals in the Anglo-Norman
ranks as they watch their opponents shuffle and shove on the plain below them.
A mounted charge by the Anglo-Norman cavalry followed by a general advance of
the whole army might have wreaked havoc amongst the disorganized Scottish ranks;
however no such action is undertakenpresumably the re-organization of the
English army in order to charge might have taken as long as that of their
opponentsand finally the Scots will organize in three distinct groups: in the
center the wild Galwegians intermixed with some archers for support; the right
wing is commanded by the kings son Henry and it seems to have been intended as
the main striking force. It comprises of the levies from Cumbria,
some archers, as well as the majority of the English and Norman knights from
the Lowlands. It seems probable that these latter remain
mounted. The left wing is made up entirely of Lowland and western Highlands
foot while King David, in an unusual for the era move, maintains a reserve
directly behind the main line consisting of the crack knights of his own bodyguardnow
dismounted to match their Norman counterparts on the hill, including the King
himselfplus foot from Moray and the eastern Highlands. Thus arranged, and at a
predisposed command, the Scottish host will start to slowly move forward
towards the hill. The battle opened with a charge uphill of the Pictish center
to the accompaniment of wild screams and yells. Though the archers among them
must have taken a tremendous toll, the impetus of the charge carries them all
the way up the hill to the English line and for a moment a penetration is made;
however, the mailed Norman knights seem to have repulsed the initial charge and
now the Galwegians retreat back down-slope. Time and again the Highlanders will
charge the English line with the same fatal results. At this point in the
battle, and seemingly at no orders from anyone, Prince Henry launches the
Scottish right wing against the English left. The cavalry will outdistance its
infantry support, crash into the line of the shire levies behind the knights,
cut their way through them, and emerge greatly diminished in numbers at the
back of the northerners line. Here a critical opportunity is missed by the
Scots: had the knights reined in and attacked from behind, the Northumbrians
could have broken. But instead the Scottish cavalry will head straight ahead
towards the picketed horses and the small horse guard that lays 400 yards
behind the main English line. In the meantime the English will close their
ranks and repulse Henrys infantry who are now, panting and out of breath,
finally coming to blows with their enemies. Henry and his few remaining
knights, realizing that the opportunity has been lost and in order to get away,
will throw away their insignia and mingle with their opponents from whom they
are indistinguishable in arms and equipment. Meanwhile the Galwegians in the
center are in head-long retreat having lost both their chiefs, Donald and
Ulgerich; the Scottish infantry on the right will soon follow them after their
half-hearted attempt to keep up with Henrys impetuous cavalry. The day is now
lost for the Scots. King David will order his reserve forwardway too late to
have any real impact on the battle--only to find himself deserted by the
infantry who, having witnessed the fate of their center and right, have no
stomach for any further fighting: they simply turn around and begin to withdraw
from the field. Soon the king and his Anglo-Norman bodyguard will be the only
Scottish forces left on the field. Seeing the hopelessness of their situation,
theyll send for their horse, mount, and depart. By 9 am it is all over. The defensive disposition of the
English deployment is the only thing that prevents a general slaughter of the
Scottish army: there will be no attempt to pursuit and the disorganized Scots
will be allowed to fall back towards Carlisle with all
semblance of organization gone from their ranks. Had the English pursuit, few
of the invaders would ever see their homes again. Casualties among the English
seem to have been insignificant with only one man of note having been killed, a
brother of Ilbert de Lacy.
From the
point of view of the military historian this is a battle of lost opportunities
for the Scots: twice King David failed to commit the reserve at critical points
during the battle, first upon the initial penetration of the Galwegians and
secondly after Prince Henry managed to break through the English line with his
knights. Had the reserve been committed then against the shaken English line or
had the Scottish cavalry turned to hit from behind instead of going for the
horses, the outcome would be unknown. What would have happened had King David
followed his initial deployment plan also lies in the realm of conjecture;
instead, the battle commenced with courageous but undisciplined charges against
heavy infantry with missile support entrenched on high ground: rarely the
recipe for success in a situation like this. On the other hand the battle is a
testimony to the fact that eleventh and twelfth century Normans
were not committed to always fighting on horseback and were likely to adopt the
tactical disposition that best suited the particular situation.
As an
aftermath, and since the English army disbands quickly after the battle despite
the few casualties, King David will rejoin his forces who are still besieging
Wark. The garrison reaches such severe straights from the ongoing siege that by
the beginning of November the only provisions left within Wark consist of one live
horse and one preserved in salt. Recognizing the impossibility of the situation
the lord of the place, Walter Espec, orders the garrison to surrender and the
heroic defenders are allowed to leave the castle under arms in recognition of
their valiant efforts at defending the place. The fact that King David lost a
major pitched battle but still managed to reorganize the Anglo-Scottish
frontier to his favoron the other end of the border the town and castle of
Carlisle are also in Scottish hands by virtue of the treaty of 1136-- testify towards
the inadequacy of the Anglo-Norman fortifications along the northern border as
well as the extent of King Stephens involvement in the south. In 1139, and in
order to pacify his northern neighbor, King Stephen will grant King Davids son
Henry all of Northumberland with the exception of the castles at Bamborough and
Newcastle. The situation will
remain as such in the north until an energetic Henry II will take advantage of
the minority of the Scottish king Malcolm IVson of David I who dies in 1153to
restore English ownership of Northumberland, Cumbria, and Westmoreland as well
as regain the key fortress of Carlisle all of which had been extracted from
Stephen at the height of his difficulties during the civil wars.
Works Cited List:
Beeler, John. Warfare in England,
1066-1189. New York: Barnes
& Noble, 1966.
Stevenson, Joseph. Richard of
Hexhams Battle of the Standard. www.deremilitari.org. 01/22/07.
http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/hexham
Gravett, Chrisropher. Norman
Stone Castles: Europe 950-1204. Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2004
Edited by konstantinius - 22-Jan-2007 at 03:24