Hello fellow posters.
I want to state that I have no predilection of Sweden over Poland/Lithuania, nor do I have an agenda; I just believe that events of this war occured more so from how the Swedes have
basically presented them, judging by the resulting events. But we can never know for sure.
"Here strive God and the devil. If you hold with God, come over to me. If you prefer the devil, you will have to fight me first."
-
Gustavus Adolphus
We do have a problem, one within the bounds of historical tradition, regarding the wars waged by
Gustavus Adolphus against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1617-1629: the details of this war are indeed very nebulous. History is based on both truth and deception, and certainly colored by nationalism. But I will never believe that events can be thoroughly concocted.
Sweden indeed had a standing army by the mid 1620s, but its population was 1/5 of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Among other things,
Gustavus gave war a new look by altering the equipment and tactics of his cavalry. Whether his cuirassiers galloped or sped at a trot (they perhaps galloped then trotted upon impact, as formation is more easily maintained at a trot), they achieved success when charging home, firing their pistols, in a tight formation with cold steel supported by infantry fire. In essence, they were often an effective battering ram. Swedish discipline became exemplary, religious duties strictly observed, and crime virtually non-existent.
Gustavus Adolphus' actions during the 30 Years War determined the political and religious balance of power in most of Europe at this time.
Before 1626,
Gustavus' army was still basically, as he put it,
"My troops are poor Swedish and Finnish peasant followers, it's true, rude and ill-dressed; but they smile hard and they shall soon have better clothes."
Gustavus' army became a paradigm of one element from the classic military Byzantine manual, the
Strategikon, written, according to tradition, by the emperor-general
Flavius Maurikios Tiberius,
"Constant drill is of the greatest value to the soldier."
Gustavus formed military tactics centered around increased firepower, including mobile field artillery. His army was in peak form by 1631, and his system of cavalry charges, influenced by the Poles, initiated with pistol fire, integrated with infantry and field artillery, supporting each other in self-sustaining combat groups, was the 1st time this had ever been seen in modern warfare. Much like
Philip II of Macedon and
Chinggis Khan in their day,
Gustavus was a great forger of an army for his time. But perhaps more than any other great commander of history, his reforms touched on every area of military science.
But a topic of
Gustavus' reforms must include the influence impressed upon him by the great
Maurice of Nassau: the brilliant Dutch innovator and his staff created a military system of drill to train officers and soldiers, and began to move away from the dense column of the omnipotent
tercio, developing a more extended and elastic formation. He equipped his cavalry with pistols and began to concentrate artillery pieces in batteries. Moreover,
Maurice put supply, training, and pay on a regular basis. The
tercio, an innovation for its time, was doomed after the Battle of Rocroi in 1643, but it was
Maurice at Nieuwpoort (1600) and
Gustavus at Breitenfeld (1631) who presaged that doom. Basically,
Gustavus refined what
Maurice did to a broader scale.
But things take time, and not without trial and error;
Amrogio Spinola, another brilliant leader of this age, reversed this innovative trend for a while against the Dutch, and the Swedes, sans
Gustavus, suffered a defeat at Nordlingen in 1634 against an army with the Spanish
tercio on hand. But
Johan Baner won victories thereafter.
The Swedish disasters at the hands of the Poles/Lithuanians at Kircholm (modern Salaspils, about 12 miles SE of Riga) and Klushino (Kluszyn) were in the past, and
Gustavus would not let that happen again; no Swedish force would ever again be fooled by a feint to pull them out of a strong position (at least under him); his earthworks were not to 'hide' behind, in my opinion, but to provide security to fall back on if things went awry. This was sound war-making. It is opined by some that he waltzed into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth while their backs were turned, and easily captured towns to set up his entrenchments. But I am inclined to think the Baltic ports of Pilawa (Pilau) and Konigsberg (modern Kaliningrad) could not have been vulnerable to the degree it was child's play for the Swedes to take them, and there was also much diplomacy involved. They probably were defended by the
trace italienne system. The town of Zamosc, for example, though further to the SE, saw the construction of new walls and 7 bastions by 1602. But it seems quite accurate the Swedish onslaught in the 1620s initially made good progress because of an overall vulnerable scenario of the enemy.
Dr. Geoffrey Parker, an expert on the 30 Years War, wrote in his
The Military Revolution, Pg 37,
"...Several outraged books and pamphlets were promptly written by Polish propagandists, excoriating the invaders for their 'unchivalrous deceit' in raising ramparts around their camps 'as though they needed a grave-digger's courage to conceal themselves', and deploring their painstaking siege techniques as 'Kreta robota (mole's work)'. But, mole's work or not, Crown Prince Wladislaw was immediately dispatched to the Netherlands to learn about these deceitful tactics at first hand. he was followed by Polish engineers, such as Adam Freitag who, in 1631, published at Leiden an international classic on developments in military fortification..."
This is from
Richard Brzezinski, an authority on this chapter of history, who wrote a book on the Polish Hussars (possible red flag: Osprey Publishing),
"...if you take an UNBIASED (as in non-patriotic) view of Polish-Swedish actions from 1622 onwards through to the Great Northern War they are characterised by a consistent reluctance of the Poles to charge when the Swedish cavalry is deployed in formal battle-order backed by their infantry and artillery firepower. Take away the fire support, and the hussars are far less hesistant, and generally victorious..."
That may not be completely true, as some
husaria did penetrate Swedish musketry formations at the battle of Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava) in 1622, and again at Gorzno (Gurzno) in 1629 - but only initially; the threats were quickly closed. Excellent details are provided by experts on Zagloba's Tavern.
Radoslaw Sikora, who denounces
Brzezinski, and is a prime source for this topic, is working to right what he thinks are wrongs etc. He provides figures from the Polish army register, and
Daniel Staberg, the Swedish expert, gives figures from some battle draws by
Gustavus himself. But
Sikora writes something peculiar, on the topic of the Polish
husaria fighting Swedish regiments of musketeers,
"...Unfortunately I noticed that this selective and partial treatment of primary sources appear in Richard Brzezinski's work quite often. It is most apparent in the quoted descriptions of the hussaria fighting against the Swedish army (Kokenhausen, Mitawa/Mitau or Tczew/Dirschau). Anyone who knows what truly happened there grabs his head when reading how these battles are used to support false thesis of alleged considerable efficiency of firearms of the Swedish cavalry against the husaria."
'...what
truly happened'?. I feel one can admire something without it being a vice of 'partiality'. The battle of Mitawa was fought before
Gustavus' efficient reforms took significant effect. Poland ultimately lost this war (I would say more on a political than military scale), and the
husaria never defeated
Gustavus (his tactical rebuff at Trzciana, in which he charged into an unwinnable situation to protect his infantry, notwithstanding). Koknese was a Swedish victory, and
Gustavus clearly overcame the
husaria at Gniew (Mewe) and Tczew (Dirschau).
Sikora's opinion as to why the
Sejm (Polish diet) acquiesced to favorable terms for Sweden in 1629, if they were not losing the military aspect of this war (as some Polish apologists believe) - one in which he compares the feeling of the people of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to that of the American people in regards to Vietnam (late 1960s/early 1970s) is incredulous. Perhaps I am misconstruing him, but Polish soldiers were fighting in their own land against an invader. I am the last poster who wishes to insult people, and Mr.
Sikora, clearly a civil and intelligent man, is invaluable for providing much trivia for this period.
From a political standpoint, the death of
Gustavus amid the fog at Lutzen, 1 month before his 38th birthday, was a disaster. Looking back, perhaps we can blame him for that element of his leadership of heroic self-indulgence. But his death removed the 1 man who seemingly was capable of imposing an end to the fighting. Instead, the 30 Years War dragged on for 16 more years, witnessing hellish circumstances of disorganized and impoverished conditions. As the Dutch philosopher
Hugo Grotius, who paid much attention to the concept of 'humane' warfare, tells us,
"...I saw prevailing throughout Europe a licence in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed..."
Gustavus Adolphus' War in Livonia and Polish Prussia 1617-1629
I have done the best I can to present a balanced view of this conflict (I am still a student with opinions); modern works which are very helpful are from
Robert I. Frost,
Ulf Sundberg,
Richard Brzezinski,
Radoslaw Sikora and
Daniel Staberg. This site is invaluable for our topic:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/zaglobastavern/messages/1
The correspondence between
Sikora and
Staberg is exemplary, both for scholarship and amicableness.
Many
Gustavus detractors, perhaps mostly German and Polish Catholics etc., have the right to view him as a master propogandist, but in his mind he justified himself in terms of contemporary ideals, and plotted each move with the care of a diamond cutter.
The campaigns fought by
Gustavus in Livonia and Polish Prussia between 1617 and 1629 receive comparitively little attention. This disappoints me, as the substantial military reforms of
Gustavus were surely influenced by the fact that the superior Polish-Lithuanian cavalry, most notably the vaunted
husaria (plural for hussar), the crack heavy Polish cavalry, fighting with support from the medium/light cavalry, the Cossack (
kozak) horsemen (this name would be later changed to
pancerni to distinguish them from rebellious ethnic Cossacks in 1648), could not be beaten at this time in the early 17th century, at least in an open area, without utilizing combined arms and terrain not conducive to their style, which would diminish their ability to fight to the degree that ensured them victory. The great Polish cavalry was one result of the organizing skills of
Stefan Batory (d. 1586).
Gustavus never tactically overwhelmed the Poles, but he certainly got the better of them. It is erroneous when claimed that he was 'crushed' by the Poles, but minor defeats of his cavalry by them are what influenced some of his theories, reforms, and practices, which were realized amid his later, more famous campaign.
Gustavus' father, duke
Karl (Charles) IX of Sweden (king as of 1604), ousted Catholic officials, and repulsed an incursion into Sweden by
Sigismund (Zygmunt) III at Stangebro (near modern Linkoping) in 1598.
Sigismund III, officially crowned as the Swedish king in 1594, but reluctant to accept Protestantism as the state religion, desired to establish a permanent union between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but instead created hostilities which led to intermittent war between the 2 nations lasting until 1721 (if we include up to the fall of
Karl (Charles) XII).
Charles was, however, unsuccessful when he invaded Livonia in 1600; his army was smashed by
Jan Chodkiewicz's cavalry, of which about 1/3 was the
husaria, at Kircholm in 1605. Another army of 30,000 Muscovites under
Dmitry Shuisky supported by approx. 5,000 Swedish mercenaries under
Jakob De la Gardie was defeated 5 years later at Klushino by a much smaller Polish army, again with the ferocious
husaria. But Sweden's power was rising in the Baltic, as her fleet appeared outside Danzig (modern Gdansk) and Riga, capturing and searching ships trading with these prominent ports. Due to Danzig's neutral status at this time, the Swedes were able to provision their troops in Livonia from there. Aging and overwrought,
Karl IX died in October, 1611, while war with
Christian IV of Denmark, known as the Kalmar War, which broke out the previous April, was looking bad for Sweden. As a ruler,
Karl IX, basically a practical man, was the link between his great father
Gustavus Vasa and his even greater son. The
Vasa kings in the 16th century laid the foundation of a national regular army.
Gustavus perfected it.
At 16 years of age,
Gustavus Adolphus inherited the wars his father began, and only by exerting himself to the utmost was he able to achieve peaceful settlements with Denmark (Treaty of Knarod, January, 1613) and Russia (Treaty of Stolbova, February, 1617). He had to restrict himself due to the terms involving indemnity with Denmark, but his treaty with Russia altogether shut out Muscovy from the Baltic, and its trade became dependent on Sweden. It was clear that
Gustavus would resolve to take up the struggle with the Poles in Livonia if necessary. The
Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish parliament) consented to this in spite of financial concerns.
Hostilies had already begun in 1617, though a truce had been formally agreed upon in 1613 and prolonged for 2 years the following year. The king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
Sigismund III, whose unwavering claims to the throne of Sweden (by birth he was united along the royal lines of the
Vasa and
Jagiello) would involve Poland in a whole series of unprofitable wars with Sweden spanning 6 decades, instructed his government to not renew the truce. The Swedes captured Pernau (modern Parnu), and by the autumn of 1618
Gustavus was willing to arrange an armistice, but
Sigismund III rejected every proposal in that course, keeping unflinchingly to his claim to be acknowledged King of Sweden. Finally a truce was arranged on September 23, 1618, and
Jan Chodkiewicz, who had conducted himself with such esteem on the Livonian front, was sent against the Ottoman threat from the south. The great Polish hetman died in September, 1621, amid his successful entrenched defense against the sultan
Osman II's huge invading army, perhaps numbering 100,000, at Khotyn (Chocim), in the Ukraine. During this time the rivalry between
Gustavus and
Sigismund III transposed into a very different and higher plane.
Another blow for the Poles was the death of
Jan Zamoyski in 1605. It had been the firm conviction of this great szlachcic and magnate that Poland could not achieve any long term success against Sweden without a navy. But his efforts to prevail upon Danzig (modern Gdansk) to produce a fleet were in vain, as the neutral city didn't want to displease the Swedish sovereign at the time (among other reasons).
A Protestant coalition, including the Dutch Republic, Lubeck (the anchor of the Hansaetic League), and Sweden, was formed amongst the Northern countries, while
Sigismund III fixed his attention on the Hapsburg monarchy, a land power firmly Catholic in its policy. An 'eternal' alliance, very vague in principle, was concluded.
Sigismund III now geared his thoughts to far-reaching plans for winning Sweden back (he always believed Sweden was rightly his). Attacking
Gustavus by propaganda in his own kingdom, he endeavored, with the help of Spain and other external enemies of Sweden, to create a constant menace to his adversary.
Gustavus proposed peace, including the right for
Sigismund III to use the title 'King of Sweden', but this was rejected.
Gustavus then obtained from the
Sveriges Riksdag the funds for renewing the war.
Essentially,
Gustavus' war against Poland was for control of the Baltic coast. He viewed Catholic Poland as a threat to Protestantism - a threat that perhaps barely existed, but one he thought existed, and the Scandinavian monarchies certainly symbolized the pillars of Protestantism. It was very prudent on the part of
Gustavus to form an alliance with Denmark in 1628 to defend Stralsund (NE Germany), as a divided Protestant Scandinavia would result in their defeat by the Catholic states. Like Danzig (modern Gdansk), Stralsund was a principal strategic base on the Baltic.
Sigismund III, the son of the Swedish king
John III (d. 1592) and
Catherine Jagiellon (
Katarzyna Jagiellonka d. 1583), lost his title as the official Swedish king in 1599, deposed by the
Sveriges Riksdag. His politics of support for Catholic Reformation (
counterreformation) and personal ambition were among the reasons for the wars to come. This, of course, can be viewed in other ways by his apologists, which is totally understandable.
In 1617,
Gustavus indeed took advantage of Poland's involvement with the Muscovites and Ottomans, gaining hegemony on the eastern Baltic in Livonia, compelling the Poles under Prince
Krzysztof Radziwill to conclude an armistice until 1620. The 30 Years War had begun 2 years earlier, and
Gustavus clearly saw Sweden would be drawn into the vortex. He vainly tried to renew the truce with Poland, as
Sigismund III, influenced by the Jesuits and feeling safe from the central and north-east with a newly agreed truce with Russia, could not be influenced. After thorough preparations,
Gustavus sailed for the mouth of the Dvina (Duna) in July, 1621 with about 18,000 men aboard 148 ships. The fort commanding the mouth of the Dvina, Dynemunt (Dunamunde), was taken, and the siege of Riga began on August 13. Terms were refused by the garrison, which numbered 300 and supported by a citizen militia of 3,700.
Gustavus was thus compelled to open a bombardment. On August 30, a small relief force under
Radziwill, perhaps just 1,500 men, was beaten back; Swedish entrenchments were too firm and gunfire too solid to overcome, and
Radziwill withdrew by August 31. After mining was resorted to, in which
Gustavus threatened to explode all the mines at once, Riga surrendered on September 25, 1621. To isolate Poland still more from the sea, he marched south across the Dvina, took Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava) and, leaving ravaged Livonia to its fate, stationed his troops in Courland. The conquest of Riga meant there was no longer any possibility for Poland to establish herself as a Baltic power. Through Riga passed 1/3 of her exports. With it
Gustavus gained political and strategic advantages and a base for equipping his fleet. At the same time, the Poles and Ottomans opened talks, and an honorable peace was agreed upon.
The east part of Livonia and the important town of Dorpat remained, however, in Polish hands. In the autumn of 1622 both sides were again ready to accept an armistice.
Gustavus was too eager for a truce to grudge
Sigismund III the kingship of Sweden, so long as he did not call himself Hereditary King.
Krzysztof Radziwill had advised
Sigismund III to ask for an armistice, but, as usual, he hesitated to the very last. This gave Sweden's Chancellor,
Axel Oxenstierna, an opportunity to seperate the interests of Poland and Lithuania, and to offer the latter peace and neutrality in the struggle between Sweden and Poland. This was the 1st Swedish attempt to drive a wedge between the 2 halves of the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy. But the plan did not succeed, and
Gustavus personally conducted the campaign in the summer of 1622.
Radziwill retook Mitawa, and a battle was fought on August 3, 1622. Initially, it seems Swedish infantrymen, positioned in thickets with swampy ground between them and the Lithuanians, fired upon the enemy, refusing to come out in the open, a condition which
Radziwill proposed. The Swedes overwhelmed the outnumbered
haiduks (mercenary foot-soldiers of mostly Magyar stock from Hungary) in an infantry clash. Some companies of
husaria then displayed some recalcitrance, as there existed serious financial problems with the Lithuanian forces, which was more a private army than a state one at this time, which led to a lack of loyalty and morale amongst many. But 2 banners, perhaps about 400
husaria (numbers for these banners, more properly known as
Choragiews, vary) did intrepidly charge into the Swedish ranks and, despite unfavorable ground, penetrated through with minimal loss (the Swedish army was not yet the drilled, disciplined force of a few years away, but vastly improving). The Swedes reinforced their positions which precluded the
husaria from turning around (there was also no support for the
husaria either).
Radziwill built solid fortifications around Mitawa (Mitau) which precluded a resolved effort by the Swedes to recapture it by military means. But
Radziwill was again forced to conclude an armistice, as adequate forces could not be sent to stop
Gustavus from continuing his conquest, as the serious war with the Ottomans was too recent to not keep forces on the lookout further south. From a Swedish viewpoint, this establishment by
Gustavus wiped away much of the shame caused by the disaster of the Battle of Kircholm 16 years earlier, and Mitawa (Mitau) was occupied on October 3, 1622 by
Gustavus. But so severe was the sickness which afflicted the Swedish forces that some 10,000 reinforcements had to be called. Renewed in November, 1622, the truce was prolonged year after year until 1625, though the sole object of each side was to gain time to prepare for more impending war.
A few years earlier
Gustavus had found support in Brandenburg-Prussia, which might, under favorable conditions, become very useful. East Prussia had been inherited in 1619 by the Elector of Brandenburg, and his sister,
Hedvig Eleonora, had married
Gustavus in 1620. But the Elector
Georg Wilhelm was himself afraid of Poland and not yet willing to comply immediately with the demands made by
Gustavus, now his brother-in-law. Inactive and not willing to be decisive,
Georg Wilhelm tried to avoid difficulties and therefore added an element of uncertainty to the political situation amongst the Northern countries.
Sigismund III's phlegmatic temperamant had a similar effect, who carried a fear of losing the leading elements of Prussia into the arms of Sweden. For
Gustavus, it was very important that
Sigismund III didn't gain a firm footing in Ducal (East) Prussia.
When
Gustavus renewed hostilities against Poland, it was partly for national reasons and partly to assist the German Protestants. During the preceding years,
Sigismund III had constantly showed a desire to attack Sweden on a large scale, although the Polish
Sejm at this time expressed no desire to support him and the funds at his disposal were insufficient. Two factors important for
Gustavus were the change of
James I of England's policy and his desire to arrange, with the help of Cardinal
Richelieu of France, a coalition of Protestant powers against the Hapsburgs and their Catholic allies.
Christian IV of Denmark, whose relations with Sweden had again, in the fall of 1623, been strained to the utmost, and with the support of England and the Dutch Republic, he led Protestant action against the Hapsburg coalition in Germany, and this at last made
Gustavus feel safe with regard to Denmark. He would have preferred to land in Polish Prussia, but probably out of consideration for his brother-in-law and the Dutch, who grudged him Danzig (modern Gdansk), he resumed the struggle in Livonia.
Gustavus' earlier strategic successes in 1621-1622 marked a shift in the balance of forces within the Baltic, and denied
Sigismund III a port from which he could launch a legitimist invasion of Sweden, though he was fortunate he was able to establish this valuable footing here in Livonia and Courland scarcely opposed. But he did beat back the small relief force at Riga; he wouldn't have been able to take the city if he hadn't overcome this force, perhaps just 1,500 men; the garrison of Riga was very valiant in its defense, spurred by the hope for
Radziwill to make some headway. Polish apologists stress the Ottoman threat as being more serious. While this is true for before autumn of 1621, the Ottomans were repulsed (as I already mentioned) with great loss by
Jan Chodkiewicz in September-October, 1621, at the fortress of Khotyn (Chocim), and internal strife soon broke amongst the janissaries, during which the sultan
Osman II was murdered. A peace was agreed upon and the Polish/Lithuanian-Ottoman border would be fairly quiet until 1633.
Gustavus was now seemingly the threat to be dealt with. But
Stanislaw Koniecpolski, a superb commander, was busy dealing with the Tartars from 1624-1626, but certainly not 100,000 of them.
A permanent peace could not be reached between
Gustavus and
Sigismund III to replace the existing truce, so
Gustavus again arrived with his army at the mouth of the Dvina in May of 1625 with some 20,000 men aboard 76 ships (?), his army now in a rapidly-advancing phase of a newly forged instrument of war. His forces attacked at 3 points - (1) Courland, on the Baltic shore, taking the ports of Ventspils (Windau) and Liepaja (Libau), (2) Koknese (Kokenhausen), further inland, and (3) Dorpat (modern Tartu), to the north. No major field engagements occured, but Koknese was taken on July 15, 1625, followed by the castle of Birze (modern Birzai) a month later, after a valiant defense by the garrison. The attempt of a Polish colonel to retake Riga with 2,000 men was repulsed, and a 2nd attempt by the Chancellor of Lithunia,
Jan Stanislaw Sapieha, with 3,000 men (these figures are not confirmed) was driven off with a loss of all their guns. Around the same time, Dorpat was taken by
Jakob De la Gardie, and in late September Mitawa was taken by Swedish forces. But Polish forces prevented
Gusav Horn from capturing Dunaberg (modern Daugavpils).
Gustavus would now resolve to take the initiative against enemy ground forces, concentrated to his south.
By 1626, reloading speeds in
Gustavus' army were improved to the point where 6 ranks of musketeers could maintain a continuous barrage; his musketeers were trained to fire by
salvo - the discharge of an entire unit's supply in 1 or 2 volleys to produce a wall of bullets, and they waited until their enemy was not more than a distance of 35-70 yards. Firepower was greatly increased by the addition of a copiuos field artillery. In 1626, the 3 lb. leather guns were introduced, which could fire at a rate not much slower than a musketeer. It was named the 'leather gun' because the external casing (frame) of the barrel was made of leather. The bore (tube) of the gun was made of copper. Every effort was made to curtail weight, and without its comparitively light carriage, and the gun weighed 90 lbs. (about 400 lbs. including the carriage). The 'leather gun' could easily be manuevered on the battlefield by 2 men and 1 horse. It possessed the asset of mobility to the highest degree, and albeit it was a major technological development, it turned out to have a major drawback: the gun sacrificed too much to lightness and mobility, and upon repeated fire it became so hot that a new charge would often ignite spontaneously, which could lead to disaster amongst its crew, who could still be in the recoil path. Ultimately, the 'leather gun' was a failure as a regimental field piece, but certainly the advent of light mobile artillery in the field. Once
Gustavus entered Germany in 1630, the 'leather gun' had been replaced by the 4 lb.
Piece Suedoise, made of material of heavier substance, if slightly less mobile (a 3rd man was required with but still 1 horse to handle it). This regimental gun was supreme, and could fire 8 rounds of grapeshot to every 6 shots by a musketeer. This was possible because its design involved a new artillery cartridge, in which the shot and repellant charge were wired together to expedite holding. The science of mobile field artillery (ie, movable amid battle) may be arguably said to have been invented by
Gustavus and his engineers.
In late 1625,
Gustavus could be fairly sure of his ground. Sweden was more prepared for war than ever; the unity of king, ministry, noble class, and people was in marked contrast to the condition of any other European state. The ordinary soldiers were given a personal stake in their country, as
Gustavus provided land as compensation for service, and for the officers, usually farms on crown lands, form which they collected rent from the tenant-farmer. When not on campaign, the soldier worked on these farms in exchange for board and lodging. I'll spare these details, but basically the soldiers of Sweden under
Gustavus' reign became bound to the land, assisiting with its maintenance. Thus the civilian population was involved with the army and its support, and
Gustavus was supported to utilize Swedish commerce and industry to fully subsidize the wars he would fight. Moreover, a system of regulated conscription and administration was established, in which each province raised regiments which were supported by local taxes. These provincial regiments would remain permanent. Also by 1625, the
Sveriges Riksdag was operating on a regular annual budget with a reformed fiscal system. Drafts to supply men to the regular army were drawn from the militia, which was the home-defence force in which all able-bodied men over the age of 15 were liable to serve. However, the population of Sweden was too small to provide all the soldiers
Gustavus needed, once war thinned his ranks; after all, he would be fighting countries vastly outnumbering Sweden in population. This void was filled by soldiers of fortune (mercenaries), but not the cut-throat bands which ravaged central Europe; the professional mercenaries who fought for
Gustavus accepted the stern discipline in return for treatment as good as that recieved by native Swedes. The
Green Brigade (brigades in
Gustavus' army were named after the color of their flags), composed mostly of Scottish soldiers, was among the finest units of the Thirty Years' War, and led by the likes of
Robert Munro,
John Hepburn,
Alexander Leslie, and
Donald Mackay.
To reiterate,
Gustavus integrated the activity of lighter mobile artillery, cavalry, and infantry to a science which produced a radically different, balanced, and superior army than any other in Europe (probably anywhere at the time). Artillery was no longer an insitutional appendage, but a regimental branch of his balanced army. The Battle of Breitenfeld, fought on September 17, 1631, against the able
Johann Tserclaes von Tilly, brilliantly realized the basic military theory of
Gustavus - the superiority of mobility over weight, something the likes of
Alexander and
Hannibal showcased amid their triumphs from 2 millennia earlier. But now
Gustavus applied the concept with the technology of his day. It took some time, and not without trial and error (he didn't turn field artillery into a battle-deciding arm, but a significant support to his cavalry and infnatry in the field). But the heroic example of
Gustavus' Alexandrian style of leadership would later cost him his life. Some may say he was too rash, but leading by personal example will do wonders for the moral of one's troops.
The Polish forces in the region of Wallmoja (Wallhof) probably numbered some 6-7,000 men, between
Jan Sapieha (the son of the Lithuanian chancellor),
Radziwill, and
Aleksander Gosiewski. Marching swiftly SW from Koknese (Kokenhausen) to the region around Wallmoja (Wallhof), near Birze (modern Birzai), in a forced march with perhaps 3,000 picked men (2,000 Finnish
Hakkapeliitat, plural for a
Hakkapeliita, and about 1,000 musketeers), of over 30 miles in 36 hours in difficult terrain,
Gustavus swiftly fell upon the larger force of about 4,000 (at most) under
Sapieha and routed them in what
B.H. Liddell Hart describes as perhaps the earliest example in modern military history of the principles of
concentration, both strategical and tactical, and of the combination of
fire and movement, which forms the burden of every military manual nowadays (
Hart wrote this in 1927).
Gustavus, now with complete control of Livonia, and the fortified line south of the Dvina no longer threatened, wanted to make peace (albeit favorable to his position), and sent an embassy to Warsaw. But part of it was seized, and due to the difficulty to procure their release, peace was not in the cards.
Jakob De la Gardie, who would later advocate peace with Poland, was left in Livonia to secure the Swedish position, and
Gustavus returned to Stockholm.
Important note: Polish accounts claim
Jan Sapieha's army was surprised in a non-fortified position with merely 1,500-2,000 men, and that the total troop strength numbered merely 5,000. But that 1st figure is more likely the casualties he suffered.
Sapieha fled, understandably, from the field (the victorious cavalry charge was enormously effective), and the Swedish hold on Birze (modern Birzai) was never compromised (unless I am mistaken). Shame can lead a man to downplay his infamy (I would).
Radoslow Sikora, the current Polish historian, provides Polish army records which state that it was possibly a higher number than
Sapieha claimed - 2,000, but no higher. Well, it could very well have been higher, and
Sapieha clearly didn't give an accurate count - a count smaller than the probable amount from the Polish view. There were no longer some 45,000 Poles/Lithuanians fighting the Ottomans to the south, and the truce agreed in late 1622 was in probably to gain time to prepare for assured upcoming hostilities; this comes from one from
F. Nowak in his contribution to the
Cambridge History of Poland to 1696, Pg. 480,
"...summer of 1622, a preliminary agreement was concluded in August. Renewed in November, the truce was prolonged year after year until 1625, though the sole object of each side was to gain time for war preparations."
Thus, unless one chooses to disbelieve professor
Nowak,
Krzysztof Radziwill and
Sapieha would surely not have divided their forces (unless they were mobilizing them for the 1st time) after
Gustavus' invasion with such miniscule numbers. After all, not more than 20 miles seperated them (one force is claimed to have been 6 miles away from
Sapieha), and if we are to believe the scenario that
Gustavus destroyed a force of merely 2,000 at most, what became of the other forces in the region, numbering another 3,000 (according to them)? There is no explanation that I can find. Why would
Gustavus be compelled to force-march and ambush a force about 2/3 of his size? He constantly tried to achieve truces. I believe his force was about 2,000 cavalry, including the terrific, light Finnish
Hakkapeliitat and 1,000+ musketeers. From some accounts I have studied, the Poles and Lithuanians numbered about 2,600 cavalry and about 1,300 infantry. I have read some accounts claiming their infantry alone numbered more than 3,400, but this is perhaps an elaboration to sweeten
Gustavus' victory. One account states that
Jan Sapieha's army was deployed on a ridge with the expectation the Swedes would would emerge in march formation. But
Gustavus appeared in battle formation, with the infantry in the center and cavalry on the flanks. The Poles were scattered from
Gustavus' amalgam of cavalry charges supported by musket fire. The Poles/Lithuanians were indeed surprised by
Gustavus' formation, and he exploited some disorder in their ranks, but I don't believe they were totally surprised in a non-fortified position, with only 1,500-2,000 men. To believe this would be to believe they were incredibly stupid, knowing an invader had recently come, even though it was the winter. The other commanders in the area were
Radziwill and one
Aleksander Gosiewski, who commanded smaller forces of perhaps 1,000+ each. I do believe the figure of 6-7,000 attributed to
Jan Sapieha's force by some accounts is perhaps the number for all 3 combined, and they were divided, but close to each other;
Sapieha's defeated army at Wallhof probably numbered no more than 4,000. Thus t was
Gustavus who was outnumbered, and he achieved the decisive victory after a forced march of over 30 miles in 36 hours in difficult wintry conditions, and the other forces, comparitively small, must have withdrew or surrendered. The Ottoman threat was now subordinate to
Gustavus' presence, and to leave such a scant amount of troops in the wake of
Gustavus' invasion was manifestly inviting disaster.
Gustavus' army was swiftly becoming a disciplined, balanced force, whose morale was superb. He took measures to properly plan for transport and supply; the fact
Gustavus was better equipped to conduct a winter campaign than his enemy, in their own territory no less, illustrates his sagacity amid war. During the siege of Riga in 1621, he enthusiastically dug the trenches with his men. True,
Gustavus established his position in Livonia and Polish Prussia by attacking while the Polish/Lithuanian forces were dealing with Ottomon (until 1621) and Tatar (Tartar) threats.
Koniecpolski didn't arrive on the scene against
Gustavus until November, 1626 due to his fighting with the Tartars, whom he crushed. Though
Gustavus' entrenched positions in Polish Prussia wavered back and forth, his grip was never completely lost.
Furthermore, the Poles and Lithuanians knew
Gustavus had just taken the towns of Mitawa (Mitau, modern Jelgava)) and Bauske (modern Bauska). They must have been in a 'time of war' frame of mind, regardless of the winter conditions. However, claims that
Gustavus lost
not one man is untenable. But it suggests that, if he was barely scathed, he did indeed surprise them.
When the way was clear for a new theater of operations for
Gustavus in Polish Prussia, he resolved to secure control of the Vistula, as he had already secured the Dvina. The mouth of the Vistula poured into the Baltic at Danzig (modern Gdansk), and was the vital artery of Poland's economy. With the Vistual blocked, and Danzig captured or neutralized, the Polish magnates would certainly compel
Sigismund III to make peace. This campaign would also relieve much stress, hopefully, on the Protestants in Germany, as Imperialists would come to the aid of
Sigismund III.
Gustavus landed near Pillau (modern Baltiysk) on the Vistula Lagoon (the Zalew Wislany, or Frisches Haff)) on June 25, 1626 with about 14,000 men, aboard about 150 ships. He took Pillau after negotiations failed with his brother-in-law,
Georg Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg. This action threatening Poland's access to the Baltic. He discerned that he needed to occupy as much of the Baltic coast as he could before joining the struggle in Germany, and do it quickly; the Poles had been lax in concentrating forces to deal with him, and this he would take full advantage of. After the fall or surrender of Braniewo (Braunsberg), Elblag (Elbing), Frombork (Frauenburg), Orneta (Wormditt), Tolkmicko (Tolkemit), and Malbork (Marienburg) by early July, 1626, he was in possession of the fertile and defensible delta of the Vistula in Prussia, which he viewed as a permanent conquest.
Axel Oxenstierna was commissioned as the region's first governor-general. Communications between Danzig (modern Gdansk), which was his hope for a valuable base and depot, and the Polish interior were cut off by the erection of the first of
Gustavus' famous entrenched camps around Tczew (Dirschau). Putzig (modern Puck), NW of Danzig was captured, and by storming Gniew (Mewe) on July 12, 1626, the Poles were further threatened with losing access to Danzig from the interior. Again, the terrific
Koniecpolski was at this time fighting the Tartars in the Ukraine, and
Zygmunt (Sigismund) III was slow (such criticism is in hindsight, of course) to mobilize against
Gustavus' landing on June 25, 1626 at Pilawa (Pillau, modern Baltiysk).
Gustavus never attempted a major storm or siege of Danzig, but remained content to try to blockade the great port, which clearly was viable, being he cut its communications from both sides. But he could never completely prevent it being provisioned by the sea, and the city's ability to hold out practically neutralized
Gustavus' successes throughout the 4 year campaign. Due to the impracticability that the city could be reduced to straits, he sought to secure its neutrality. This is where he might have been a little rash and lost patience; he was already eyeing the situation in Germany nad might have been hoping to bring the Polish war to a speedy end, which depended on the submission or neutrality of Danzig. A less hectoring style of diplomacy might have procured Danzig's neutrality. It is indeed mentioned in one of my sources that he reconnoitred the fortress of Wisloujscie (Weichselmunde), and he began recruiting from his newly acquired territories, including the procurement of valuable, indigenous horses.
At the battle of Gniew (Mewe), fought in September, 1626,
Gustavus and his officers, most notably
Heinrich Matthias von Thurn and
John Hepburn, won an impressive but not overwhelming victory. The wooded terrain around Gniew was utilized by
Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon. It was in late September, 1626 when
Sigismund III finally arrived upon the theater of operations, now commanding a field army in the vicinity of Grudziadz (Graudenz). After conscriptions were carried out from Grudziadz and Torun (Thorn), his force totalled some 15,400, of which about 9,000 were cavalry (about 4,000
husaria). Torun lies on the Vistula about 30+ miles south of Grudziadz.
Sigismund III resolved to blockade Gniew, with the intention of drawing
Gustavus further south, away from his base at Tczew and the vicinity around the Danzig perimeter. The Poles had recently retaken the fortress of Orneta (Wormditt), perhaps proving other fortresses
Gustavus had easily taken earlier could not serve as a permanent defenses. Thus he had to march out against
Sigismund III. Led by
Sigismund III and his son
Wladyslaw, the Poles advanced towards Malbork; on meeting the Swedes, whom they outnumbered, some skirmishes broke out, and the Poles withdrew south, crossed the Vistula at Nowe (Neuenburg), and began to siege Gniew from the town's south side. Though
Sigismund III established himself on high ground to the west, the terrain did not lend itself well to the Poles against
Gustavus' deployments.
Gustavus had an assembled force around Tczew of about 7,600, including nearly 1,300 cavalry. He headed for threatened Gniew (Mewe) with about 3,500 men (3,000 foot and 500 horse). The relief of Gniew was a necessity for carrying out the campaign he intended, so he devised a tactic to effectuate its relief. With some light horse and artillery, the Poles had occupied a position athwart his path.
Gustavus resorted to a ruse, making his movements appear as a reconnaisance, and proceeded to withdraw. After this clever disposition apparently deceiving the Poles, he then ordered
Thurn and
John Hepburn to create another diversion and cut a passage over a strongly fortified hill defended by the Poles, who vastly outnumbered them.
Thurn and his cavalry diverted the Poles' attention by demonstrative actions, and held up in some serious skirmishing with their lighter
kozacs - probably the 'Cossack Cavalry', though not necessarily ethnic Cossacks. The Poles were given the impression the Swedish garrison was going to be drawn from within Gniew, and that the place would fall to them in any event, so they made no immediate advance, but failed in a cavalry charge against
Gustavus' carefully prepared infantry positions, whose firepower was too strong; though loss of Polish life was apparently minimal, the Swedes were trained to fire more at horses, thus many more were dismounted. Perhaps they should have attacked sharply in significant numbers and closely observe the region to ascertain
Gustavus' real intentions. If they had, perhaps the campaign for
Gustavus might have ended here for good. But that's 20/20 hindsight.
Simultaneous with
Thurn's diversionary activity, the infantry column commanded by
Hepburn, which had started at dusk and unseen by
Sigismund III's men, approached the enemy position by working around it and ascending the hill by a narrow and winding path, which was encumbered by difficult terrain. Weighed down with muskets, cartridges, breastplates, helmets, and defense obstacles (I'll explain in a bit), they made their way up through the enemy's outposts unobserved, and reached the summit, where the ground was smooth and level. By tactical surprise, here they fell at once upon the Poles, who were busy arranging their trenches. For a time,
Hepburn and his men gained a footing here; but a deadly fire, mostly musketry, opened upon them from all points, compelling them the to fall back from the trenches. But the now they were charged upon by armored
husaria under
Tomas Zamoyski, thus they certainly would have been soon repulsed.
Hepburn drew off his men till they reached a rock on the plateau, and here they made their stand, the musketeers occupying the rock, the pikemen forming in a wall around it.
Gustavus had provided them with valuable defense items, which were utilized effectively here on this emminenece held by the Poles - a portable
Cheval de Frise (Fr. = 'Frisian horses'), and the
Scweinfedder ('Swedish feather', or 'Swine feather'). The bayonet was not yet in use, and musketeers often adopted defensive weapons to protect themselves from cavalry. This small version of the
Cheval de frise consisted of a portable frame, probably a simple log, with many long iron spikes protruding from it. It was erected more in camp and principally intended to stop cavalry dead in its tracks, but was not a serious obstacle to the passage of mobile infantry. But here
Hepburn was using smaller versions. The
Scweinfedder was a pointed stake (a half-pike about 7ft. long) and musket-rest combination, which had replaced the more cumbersome fork-firing rest. The stake was planted pointing toward the enemy cavalry (the musket rested upon a loop) to act as a defensive obstacle, particularly against shock cavalry.
Gustavus' Swedish army used the
Scweinfedder in the Polish campaign more so than against their enemies in Germany later probably because the terrain offered better cover against cavalry, and there was less cavalry in Germany than Poland. They quickly placed these obstacles along their front (remember, they were portable), and it aided the pikemen greatly in resisting the desperate charges of the Polish horsemen. Their German allies, armed with muskets, aided immeasurably in the effectuated defensive.
Hepburn and his force withstood the Polish army for 2 days. Soon, however, as I stated, they would certainly be overcome by an amalgam of fire and shock from a preponderance of enemy forces (the time between reloading rendered them extremely vulnerable), so they withdrew, both sides being proportionately scathed very little.
While this desperate action was taking place, and the attention of the Poles entirely occupied on
Hepburn,
Gustavus himself managed to pass a strong force of men and a store of ammunition into the town from the north side, and then turned to protect
Thurn's withdrawal, at which point the
husaria could make no headway before
Gustavus' triple-lined infantry firepower - the
Swedish salvee; 2
husaria charges were unsuccessful.
Sigismund III, seeing that
Gustavus had achieved his purpose of relieving Gniew, retired with the loss of some 500 men. It is quite possible that
Sigismund III could have thought
Gustavus was in force the entire time, and with his artillery, thus they may have thought he was trying to draw them from their good position. The Swedes did not outright beat the Poles and compel them to flee scatteringly, but the town of Gniew was re-victualed and the garrison substantially strengthened by
Gustavus. Moreover, the terrain around Gniew would surely be utilized by
Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon. Nevertheless, it was a superbly handled operation on the part of
Gustavus. The Polish historian
Jerzy Teodorczyk calls this battle the 1st defeat of the
husaria, but I think it should more appropriately be called the 1st
prevention of a defeat
at the hands of the
husaria.
Though
Gustavus would begin to endure some severe harassing from better-led enemy forces, with the terrific
Stanislaw Koniecpolski coming onto the scene in November, 1626, the object of his campaign so far was a success - to secure a base of operations encircling Danzig; the Swedes' main holdings were Putzig (modern Puck), Tczew (Dirschau), Gniew (Mewe), Elbing (modern Elblag), Brunsberga (Braunsberg, modern Braniewo), and Pillau (modern Baltiysk).
Oxenstierna was placed in overall command in October, as
Gustavus returned to Sweden to organize reinforcements. It seems
Sigismund III overtured peace, but the ministry and people of Sweden supported
Gustavus' refusal to what he deemed were unacceptable conditions, which included the kingship be returned to
Sigismund III.
At the end of 1626, probably in November,
Koniecpolski, who had arrived with great celerity from the east with a little over 6,000 men, began a counter-offensive to reopen the Vistula and relieve the blockade of Danzig. Now, the Swedes would be up against a superb commander, commanding the vaunted
husaria. Cavalry action took place around Neuteich (modern Nowy Staw) on January 7-17, 1627, resulting in Swedish
reiters heavily scattering Polish foragers. But
Koniecpolski swiflty retook Putzig and captured Gniew by stout diversionary moves, and entrenched his forces. He had quickly captured Putzig in early April, 1627, which reopened Danzig's communications with Germany. But the Swedes' lines to Pillau remained intact. Moreover, the Swedes defeated a Lithuanian force near Koknese (Kokenhausen) in December, 1626, detracting a threat to their position there. On April 13, 1627,
Stanislaw Koniecpolski decisively intercepted a force of about 2,500-4,000 recruited from Germany, marching east from Hammerstein (modern Czarne) through Pomerania for
Gustavus, and drove them back to Hammerstein, which he forced 2 days later into capitulation. Earlier sources state this force numbering 8,000, but this is certainly a magnification. I have recently read it was 4,000, and some say the figure of 2,500 was the total number, others say 2,500 was the casualty figure.
Radoslaw Sikora says
Koniecpolski's force outnumbered the force coming from Germany by very little, thus, if we sustain
Sikora's information, 8,000 is certainly incorrect. Whatever the actual number, few Swedes, if any, took place in the battle, and the captured infantry were incorporated into the Polish army. Much of the surviving cavalry rode back to Germany. As it turned out, the Swedes' plans to strike at
Koniecpolski from the other direction was foiled by the flooding of the Vistula.
Gustavus returned to Poland, landing at Pilawa (Pillau, modern Baltiysk) on May 8, 1627 with about 7,000 recruits. When he reached the army entrenched around Tczew (Dirschau), he found his total troops strength in Poland had been increased to over 20,000 by heavy recruitment.
Georg Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg, took up arms against him, but
Gustavus made short diplomatic work of the small force, about 2,000 men, positioned near Mohrungen (modern Morag), enlisting them under his own standard.
Wilhelm would thereafter remain neutral. After some cavalry skirmishing in early May, 1627, in which
Gustavus was nearly cut down, he began to reconnoitre the redoubts around the western mouth of the Vistula, a strip of land held by the citizens of Danzig. Viewing the works from a boat, he was shot in the hip on the 25 of May, 1627. This laid him up, delaying operatons, and the Poles began to concentrate their forces.
Sigismund III threatened
Jakob De la Gardie's position in Livonia, and
Gustaf Horn was sent with men to ready themselves for any contingencies. The Swedish operational goal now was seemingly to buttress the region of the eastern side of the Vistula they held, and to defend their hold on Tczew (Dirschau). Danzig (modern Gdansk) now could only be threatened from the east, as Putzig was in Polish hands.
Koniecpolski didn't possess enough infantry and artillery to threaten Tczew (Dirschau) itself, so his operational aim was to deny the Swedes access to the eastern routes to Danzig, and lure
Gustavus into the open field quick enough to do battle before Swedish artillery could be effected, a situation which would certainly favor his
husaria.
Koniecpolski began to reconnoitre the Swedish works around Tczew (Dirschau) in early August, 1627 with about 9,000 men, of which nearly 6,000 were cavalry.
Gustavus' army was slightly over 10,000, of which over 4,000 were cavalry (many accounts say his army was 14,000 total). He possessed maybe 20 guns at most. The Swedes crossed over the Vistula River and garrisoned Tczew (Dirschau) with about 1,600 men. Knowing that the Polish cavalry was virtually impossible to beat on open ground, the Swedes expanded their bridgehead with a longline of fortifications. The route west of Tczew (Dirschau) ran through the defile of the marshy Motlawa river. The Polish moved to block the Swedes from advancing beyond this point, encamping on the western side of the river, but
Gustavus knew that the Poles didn't have enough infantry to storm his fortifications, thus he didn't need to 'breakout'. But he also was keenly aware that his cavalry was vulnerable. He had to be careful. He had some success against the Poles by using fortifications, artillery, and defiles to prevent the Poles from using their cavalry to its full potential, but he had to be cautious.
Koniecpolski was a very experienced soldier and despite his limited resources he had put the Swedes on guard. His army was faster on the march and had shown remarkable ability to outmaneuver the Swedes in the open. The Poles fortified their encampment, so it was a standoff with both armies fortified on either side of the river. Both generals knew that an all-out attack by either side would be a disaster; the answer was to probe and hopefully draw the other side out, of force them to withdraw. The Battle of Tczew (Dirschau) was set to be fought, beginning on August 7, 1627.
The Poles deployed pickets as Dutch negotiators were in
Koniecpolski's camp. These negotiations were not bilateral, as the Dutch were mostly in disfavor of
Gustavus' campaigning in Poland because it disturbed their trade with Danzig, and
Albrecht von Wallenstein's, successfull in Germany at this time, promised
Sigismund III assistance. The Poles left themselved vulnerable, a situation any good commander will exploit - to strike at one's
Achilles Heel, particularly when the enemy will destroy you with their vaunted weapon if fought under conditions viable for the utilization of that weapon. In this case with the
husaria, an open field.
Gustavus' concern of the hussars was genuine, and that fear fear of them understandably influenced his operational strategy. As devastating and impressive the Battle of Kircholm in 1605 was a display of the
husaria formidability and prowess in the open field when drawing an impetuous opponent (
Karl IX) into their favorable conditions and off their high ground (
Karl thought they were retreating), it induced a false sense of security. When
Gustavus invaded in 1621, many fortresses throughout Livonia and Ducal Prussia on the Baltic were not defended adequately.
Gustavus took advantage of this situation very smartly, and coupled with his army revisions, he would never again allow, to reiterate, a defeat like Kircholm to afflict his army.
Gustavus attacked the Polish picket lines, and retired into his entrenchments when
Koniecpolski counter-attacked in force with much of his cavalry.
Gusatvus refused to be lured out, and
Koniecpolski refused to be lured in, as
Sigismund III had at Gniew the previous year. But
Gustavus did attack the
husaria here at Tczew - simply not when
Koniecpolski wanted, or expected, him to; the remaining Poles (6
Choragiews) withdrew west along the marshy causeway, and
Gustavus fell upon them swiftly with his cavalry, catching them off-guard. Here at this point of Battle of Tczew (Dirschau),
Gustavus' unit of cavalry under
Henry Matthias Thurn attacked 6
Choragiews (Banners) of Polish cavalrmen, after
Koniecpolski left with the bulk of his horsemen when it reached a point
Gustavus seemingly wouldn't come out to fight. But the stout Polish counter-attack, which included the arrival and attack of a unit under
Marcin Kazanowski, would have most likely beaten them, as
Thurn's right wing was seriously threatened. But such a contingency
Gustavus was prepared for, as he held a reserve unit under
Erik Soop on hand, and came in and, combined with
Thurn's stabilizing of his own unit, sent the
husaria (and 2
Choragiew of lighter cavalry) into flight. The
husaria were the most formidable heavy cavalry (though 'heavy', they could move darn fast!) of their day, but
Gustavus' reformed cavalry was hardly 3 times worse than the
husaria; if the Poles had been outnumbered by such vast odds (3 to 1), as they claim, they would have been crushed. As it happened, they were thrown back, but not scattered terribly. By whatever they were outnumbered upon
Gustavus' surprise salvo, the arrival of
Kazanowski closed that gap, and they still were repulsed. A
Choragiew numbers about 200 men, but the numbers vary. Thus, I think it is possible 1,800 Swedes defeated 1,200 Poles that 1st day around Tczew (Dirschau). The Poles' counter-attack would have seemingly handled the 1st wave, but
Gustavus was prepared.
Continued...
Spartan2007-02-24 15:46:
Edited by Spartan