Seljuk Ottoman Shock Cavalry?

It would seem, then, that these tactics left nothing to be desired;taking a closer look, however, one may discover weaknesses which,though covered up by the strong points, eventually spelled catastrophe. First of all, the combat formation did not have a closed, massive,thrusting nucleus capable of shock attacks, like that of the armoredknights in European armies. The light cavalry was not fit for shock;it could do no more than harass, tire out, and finally disperse theenemy on the verge of disintegration. A closed attack could havebeen the task of the janissaries, but they were reserved for defense.Yet the defensive attitude of the janissaries was no solution to thedefense of the army as a whole either, because the light cavalry wasby its very nature entirely useless for defense. To use a simile, theOttoman combat formation was like a castle where the janissariesrepresented the citadel that makes a last stand possible, but whichhas no bastions, curtines, or forward positions. The Ottoman troopswere never able to withstand the assault of the armored knights.But, since the western cavalry was unable to carry out any othermaneuver, they could not exploit their initial success in battle. Howeffective the assault of the Christian cavalry was and how defenseless the Ottoman army facing it becomes obvious not only fromthe course of specific battles, as reconstructed from the sources, butalso from the candid admissions of Turkish historians regarding thefear which seized the Ottoman troops in the face of the massive cavalry assault. [82] Ottoman military leaders, recognizing the dangerof the assaults by armored knights, attempted to break up the solidranks of the Christian forces. One means employed was the archercavalry, which sent a shower of arrows on the enemy from all sides.Another, even more effective device was suddenly to open up theranks, so that the shock assault would hit nothing but air. [83]

The balance was somewhat restored when with the passing offeudalism the \Western armored cavalry began to decline and theknights could not well withstand the fire of the janissaries who, inthe meantime, had acquired muskets. But then, the fighting potential of the timariot sipahis and their ability for maneuvers derivingfrom nomadic tactics and requiring quick, precise execution, greatdiscipline, and thorough training, decreased as well. Mercenarytroops might have offered an alternative, as they had in Europewhere they became a concomitant of the new tactics that developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. [84] There are indications thatthe Ottoman leaders were well aware of their army's tactical inferiority, and this was probably the explanation for the enormous increase in the number of professional soldiers in the seventeenthcentury. [85] Yet this could only be a partial solution as long as thetimariots remained a substantial proportion of the military setupwhile, in the rest of Europe, the role and significance of the feudalforces dwindled drastically after the evolution of a standing army ofregular soldiers. But social and political considerations seem to haveprecluded a thorough reform abolition of the timar system. [86]

The great transformations that changed military art in earlymodern Europe did not affect Ottoman tactics and military organization. The synchronization of the various services and the mutuallycomplementing utilization of shock and firepower, typical for thisrevolution, were never assimilated by the Ottoman army. Theyonly avoided catastrophe because of the strategic deadlock whichcharacterized the wars between Austria and the Ottoman Empireafter the fall of Hungary, when no more pitched battles were fought.