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QuoteReplyTopic: Top 100 Generals Posted: 15-Aug-2007 at 09:48
Indeed Seko: the Asian steppes are not that monotonous.
rider, I think it becomes relative; unorthodox to whom? The main, very broadly speaking, distinguishing feature of the steppe warrior to that of the littoral was indeed affected by geography. One could argue that Timur's vast conquests, never an intent of consolidation, were indeed so successful not only because of the force of his leadership, but because of the ability of his army to extend their force over great distances. This came due to the nature of the army he led - one of mounted men.
The Mamelukes, a professioanl force developed from a sedentary state, accomplished what the Chinese, Khwarezmians, Russian principalities, eastern Europeans, and Persians could not. I don't think they defeated the Mongols because Mamelukes were necessarily better than the best Mongols per se (what if Subotai with three tumen had been the opposed force to the Mamelukes at Ain Jalut rather than a rearguard led by Kitbuka?), but finally the Mongols finally faced a terriffic force composed of soldiers akin to themselves, unlike heavy Europena knights, who could ride and shoot just about as well as they could.
Moreover, they were at their pinnacle following decades of development. It will not do to undermine the genius of leaders such as Chinggis, Subotai, or Timur, but the fact is they rolled over enemies, though by no means incompetent, who were internally divided and unstable. But this was their nature; to take advantage of an opportunity of weakness in an enemy neighbor. Gustavus was no different when he entrenched himself in both Poland and Germany. But there must have been thousands of such opportunities throughout the history of the Asian steppes for warlords to exploit, and we basically have just Chinggis and Timur, at least before the so-called 'age of radical change' (a military evolution affected by firearms which came about in the late16/early 17 centuries). Thus they certainly are two leaders that must rank in the top 10, even top 5 (Chinggis is a good argument for #1). As with Alexander, a decadent empire(s) may be ripe for the picking, but it takes a brilliant leader at the helm of a brilliant army to succeed at the task of conquering it.
Another primary distinction between the steppe and the sedentary warriors etc. lay not only in the nature of their styles of fighting, but a political one; because they were shaped by their environment, they were, for the most part, limited to it. But it can work both ways: Attila entered Europe and thrived for a while because the Roman Empire at the time was a beleaguered polity, rife with usurpations. But in Attila's case, there was much conciliation, and the Huns became involved, along with many other groups, with Roman civil wars. That's all delicate and complicated, though.
On whole, the steppe warrior seemingly holds the advantage over his sedentary foe, thus the best hope for the settled peoples were either, (a) they lived in a place like Switzerland, where steppe warriors would not bother coming into in mass, or (b) ambushes, as the Volger Bulgars achieved on Subotai (but this success was usually fleeting), and (c) the nations, polities and empires of the steppe warriors would keep to themselves long enough, a condition which would result in them breaking apart after some time. There was also the issue of cultural malleability, as in the case of China, where their Mongol overlords became sinicized over some time, and in Persia, where many Mongols quickly became Persian. In Russia, the Mongol domain broke up into smaller khanates which eventually could be dealt with.
It does come down to a conflict of interests, rider. But it's all fascinating. Leaders were still individuals, and both styles developed some of the best in history. Under tactical advantages, one could beat the other. In some notable clashes, Alexander beat the Scythians and Publius Ventidius defeated the Parthians; Surena defeated the Romans and Subotai and his subordinates destroyed the flower of the European knights. All victorious leaders were superb commanders.
Thanks, Spartan
"A ship is safe in the harbor; but that's not why ships are built"
You don't have to bar modern warfare.. Perhaps from the 1900's but not from before. Some of the worst defeats were in the last decades of the 1800's.
Now, your scenario would work only with a good leader. With a good leader the steppe-people could be entrapped and annihilated. BUT it wouldn't be the first time when it isn't a good leader leading the 'European' forces. If a bad leader is in command, one who can't issue orders and so, would destroying this force be difficult?
However, when things are like you said, destroying it is difficult. Then the steppe commander who could destroy it should be granted honors. Although obviously not when the tactic for winning would be just plainly sending men against the European formation and so overwhelming the enemy. That isn't tactics - it is a meat grinder.
Wouldn't you agree?
Modern warfare could be included in another hypothetical scenario.
Tactics are numerous. The example I provided is a broad generalization from ancient to medival times.
Assume that both sides have 'good' and equal leaders, the bulk of the battle process would be carried on by military traditions from each side.
Originally posted by Challenger2
Someone been playing "Total War" again?
Europeans advancing in perfect formation until the charge?!! We talking knights here? BTW European organisations tended towards the decimal so I don't get the relevance. Infantry drawn up in perfect lines? not in medieval times.
Steppe wouldn't bother dealing with europeans in this way. Horse archers would pepper the infantry and run from any cavalry counter, until the enemy cavalry was "blown", then let the heavies close in for the kill. detatchments would be sent on wide outflanking manoeuvres to hit the Europeans in the flanks or rear, once they'd been sufficiently weakened by the arrow storm.
Check out the Mongol campaigns in Europe to get an idea of how they'd deal with such an army.
Computer games have interesting features.
Assuming the best from each army, perfect formations are a good place to start before the first charge. I was being generaous perhaps.
Battle tactics would follow the general norm. Of course within each style you could find many variations on this theme. A common flanking move is part of the feigned retreat btw.
... A common flanking move is part of the feigned retreat btw.
I was referring to wide "unseen" flanking moves which surprised and demoralised the victim who suddenly found the enemy behind them. Feigned retreats tended to be used to draw the unwary into pre-prepared ambushes, to front flank or rear.
...descrediting
Rome in the eyes of its Italian allies: the message was clear Rome
would not defend you but still expected your support. In this field too
he had considerable success.
So how many of Romes allies actually defected? Capua, along with a few minor towns, a few Samnites [there's a surprise!] and Lucanians. After Nola, any wavering allies saw that Rome was far from beaten and decided to stick with the devil they knew.
Originally posted by Praetor
...thanks largely to the
great majority of Rome's army bieng employed in the attempt after
Cannae to merely contain not even defeat Hannibal, and they struggled
to achieve even this.
Not really. In 215, one year after Cannae the Romans had about 140,000 men in the field. They concentrated about half that to contain Hannibal. They were, as you well know no longer interested in beating him, just containing him. Rome, as far as I'm aware, did not recall a single army or garrison outside Italy to aid against Hannibal; they were that sure of ultimate victory. By 213 Rome had about 200,000 men in the field, but the troops containing Hannibal remained roughly the same as in 215. Hannibal, although still dangerous, was a spent force as far as Rome was concerned.
Originally posted by Praetor
Napoleon...lost his entire empire in the end and
last time I checked lost a number of battles, whilist Hannibal only
ever lost one at a disadvantage to another genius. Yet you still do not
question his position.
Yes he did. But at least he had an empire he had created, to lose. Napoleon achieved virtually all his his ambitions, albeit for a short time, but Hannibal failed to achieve any of his from the outset.
I've never said Hannibal was a bad general, far from it. But in a list of 100 military "geniuses" you have to find some way of differentiating between them to be able to rank them.
Sorry to interrupt the discussion but I think I have something to add to the discussion about Hannibal.
First, it seems that our friend challanger2 have forgotten a very huge difference between Hannibal and the commanders that he mentioned and that is that Hannibal was a general in the Carthaginian army, nothing more nothing less. On the other hand, Napoleon, Alexander, Genghis khan et al were both generals and emperors, that is having both military as well as political powers and the last thing was what Hannibal lacked. After crushing Rome at Trebia, Lake Trasimene and finally at Cannae it was obvious to everyone that Hannibal had the upper hand and despite the remarkable return of the Romans after each crushing defeat he still managed to defeat them despite being against overwhelming odds, he was fighting a tough enemy on its own land and an enemy that can quickly replenish any losses it suffers no matter how huge they are taking advantage of the huge population of Italy during those times and the numerous Roman allies who were given citizenship, and thus right to join the legions, whenever Rome needed their help. On the other hand Hannibal knew that the only way to end Rome is to destroy the city itself, and to do that he not only must rally the foes of Rome but also he must convince the Gallic tribes that are under Roman over lordship especially in Lombardy and do not have the citizenship of Rome to join him. The only way to do that is to get support from home which NEVER came. Politicians at Carthage were afraid that the success of Hannibal would make him go for more ambitious goals; most importantly political office, and since he will be immensely popular after such victory he might even do what Caesar will do almost 200 years later, destroy the semi-democratic institutions of Carthage and declare himself king. Hanno the Great led the efforts in the Carthaginian Council of 104 to stop any kind of reinforcements from reaching Hannibal in Italy while giving him strict orders not to leave it too and he succeeded in both tasks.Hannibal was powerless. If he aimed directly at Rome he would certainly lose since the Romans will either evacuate the City or put a fight to the death and if he withdrew he would be portrayed as a traitor and will lose all the capital that he had built with potential allies that could join him when the war turned in his favor. To make the matter even worse, the ingenious Fabius Maximus developed what may be considered the worlds first successful containment strategy against Hannibal. Knowing that political rivalries will prevent help from reaching Hannibal in time he denied Hannibal pitched battles and dragged his army through Italy, Hannibal know Fabius game and developed the scorched earth policy of his to counter the effects of his containment and he succeeded in forcing the Romans to fight him in a pitched battle (at Herdoniac) which he one again despite the objections of Fabius. Finally, after the disaster of Metaurus and him completing 15 years in Italy with almost the same Army that he entered Italy with he was forced to withdraw from Italy; and thus politics was the real reason for his strategic failure not him and in that he was not the only one, many generals were defeated or were forced to fail because of politics not because they are not great and it is because of that I prefer Hannibal on Alexander. Alexander had both the political as well as the military power to do what ever he wanted, nobody could oppose his views or else they would lose their heads, Hannibal on the other hand was nothing more than a general, he had to wait for support from politicians who know nothing in military affairs, and he was doomed if he didnt get that support in time.
And that, my friends, is why I have Hannibal so high. He nearly defeated one of the greatest military machines in history (albeit in its infant stages) DESPITE the government. He outfitted the army he invaded with from his own resources in Hispania, for the most part. And that was actually conquered by his own father. Essentially, it was the Barcas and their friends who nearly defeated Rome, not Carthage. A family versus a militaristic city. Is it any wonder that Hannibal lost? It wasn't his fault--he did all he could do. He kept putting Carthage in a position to win the war, and the politicians refused to take advantage fully, instead thinking of political expediency rather than simply victory.
It is amazing how history repeats itself, as in the present time political expediency often trumps military prudence. It were one thing if political prudence trumped military victory, but this is rather opposite.
I think you'll find that it wasn't solely Hamilcar who conquered the
Iberian Peninsula, but Hannibal also. For starters, he took Saguntum,
and thus gaining the support of neighbouring tribes. Here are some
extracts from Livy, outlining a few of Hannibal's conquests in Iberia:
(And I'm going to do it Spartan style )
(Book XXI.5)
"As there could be no doubt
that by attacking them the Romans would be excited to arms, he first led his
army into the territory of the Olcades, a people beyond the Iberus, rather within
the boundaries than under the dominion of the Carthaginians, so that he might
not seem to have had the Saguntines for his object, but to have been drawn on
to the war by the course of events; after the adjoining nations had been subdued,
and by the progressive annexation of conquered territory. He storms and plunders
Carteia, a wealthy city, the capital of that nation; at which the smaller states
being dismayed, submitted to his command and to the imposition of a tribute.
His army, triumphant and enriched with booty, was led into winter-quarters to
New Carthage. Having there confirmed the attachment of all his countrymen and
allies by a liberal division of the plunder, and by faithfully discharging the
arrears of pay, the war was extended, in the beginning of spring, to the Vaccaei.
The cities Hermandica and Arbocala were taken by storm. Arbocala was defended
for a long time by the valour and number of its inhabitants. Those who escaped
from Hermandica joining themselves to the exiles of the Olcades, a nation subdued
the preceding summer, excite the Carpetani to arms; and having attacked Hannibal
near the river Tagus, on his return from the Vaccaei, they threw into disorder
his army encumbered with spoil. Hannibal avoided an engagement, and having pitched
his camp on the bank, as soon as quiet and silence prevailed among the enemy,
forded the river; and having removed his rampart so far that the enemy might
have room to pass over, resolved to attack them in their passage. He commanded
the cavalry to charge as soon as they should see them advanced into the water.
He drew up the line of his infantry on the bank with forty elephants in front.
The Carpetani, with the addition of the Olcades and Vaccaei amounted to a hundred
thousand (NOTE: Probably an exaggeration, but still possible), an invincible army, were the fight to take place in the open plain.
Being therefore both naturally ferocious and confiding in their numbers; and
since they believed that the enemy had retired through fear thinking that victory
was only delayed by the intervention of the river, they raise a shout, and in
every direction, without the command of any one, dash into the stream, each
where it nearest to him. At the same time, a heavy force of cavalry poured into
the river from its opposite bank, and the engagement commenced in the middle
of the channel on very unequal terms; for there the foot-soldier, having no
secure footing, and scarcely trusting to the ford, could be borne down even
by an unarmed horseman, by the mere shock of his horse urged at random; while
the horseman, with the command of his body and his weapons, his horse moving
steadily even through the middle of the eddies, could maintain the fight either
at close quarters or at a distance. A great number were swallowed up by the
current; some being carried by the whirlpools of the stream to the side of the
enemy, were trodden down by the elephants; and whilst the last, for whom it
was more safe to retreat to their own bank, were collecting together after their
various alarms, Hannibal, before they could regain courage after such excessive
consternation, having entered the river with his army in a close square, forced
them to fly from the bank. Having then laid waste their territory, he received
the submission of the Carpetani also within a few days. And now all the country
beyond the Iberus, excepting that of the Saguntines, was under the power of
the Carthaginians"
Saguntum of course was taken later, at the beginning the Second Punic War. Hence, it is evident that Hannibal also conquered a large portion of Spain, invoolving the storming/sieges of multiple cities, and several engagements, the key one being at the River Tagus.
Hannibal achieved his task for as long as Napoleon I'd say. Both were
eventually defeated but clearly, Hannibal is better of the two. Should
we say Pyrrhus was an idiot because he won and yet lost? I'd consider
him worthy of a Top 20 position.
no he was not the better. Napoleon deserves this list alone for his camapigns in 1805, 1806 and 1814 taken individually. and no, Napoleon did NOT lose in the end contrary to popular believe. France could remain in the borders before the war and lost only minimal amoutn of colonies (most major colonies were lost already in the 7 years war anyways). Napoleon won over 4 campaigns/wars, hannibal didn't even won one. Napoleon dominated his enmies for almost ten years, hannibal never forced his will on any enemy. in 1814 napoleons army was only seriously defeated at Arcis-sur-Aube btu was still fit enough to fight another battle. napoleon was tricked into followign Wintzigeraodes corps who pretended a retreat to draw him aways from paris while the Coalition forces which outnumbered him significantly bypassed him to capture Paris. there was no Zama were he was defeated on his own soil by his own tactics and Hannibal really showed no skill in Zama at all, it clearly betrays his limited scope.
Originally posted by Praetor
Hannibal contrary to popular belief had many victories against the Romans after Cannae (see Spartans excellent posts
for details). As to Roman overconfidence playing a crucial part in
Hannibal's victories that is true to an extent but I have noticed in my
studies of Hannibal that one of the maxims he fought by was
no-thy-enemy. He was able to judge his enemies and manipulate events to
fight who he wants to where he wanted too. When faced with aggressive
glory seekers (or those just behaving as Roman commanders were expected
to behave) he goaded them and often showed them what they wanted to
see....waited for them to take the bait then sprung his trap( eg.
Trasimene, Cannae)! When faced with opponents of the likes of Fabius
Maximus he did not force an engagement at terms dictated by his enemy
but on occasion took advantage of his caution (Ager Falernus) to
humiliate him and for the most part tried to discredite his leadership
and strategy to the Roman senate by terroising the Italian countryside
at will right in front of the Roman army (to his credit Fabius didn't
bite but it weakened his political position in Rome) and descrediting
Rome in the eyes of its Italian allies: the message was clear Rome
would not defend you but still expected your support. In this field too
he had considerable success.
Finaly I would like to state once again that thanks to Hannibal
Carthaginian commanders in other theaters of the war had a considerable
advantage over thier Roman opponents (which unfortunately For them,
Hannibal and Carthage they largely squandered) thanks largely to the
great majority of Rome's army bieng employed in the attempt after
Cannae to merely contain not even defeat Hannibal, and they struggled
to achieve even this. Hannibal had the misfortune of having at LEAST
three good opportunities of reinforcement's not materialising and he
could hardly have forseen or controled these events (or lack there of).
Napoleon never had to deal with a petty "senate" (well at least not
after he became first Consul) lost his entire empire in the end and
last time I checked lost a number of battles, whilist Hannibal only
ever lost one at a disadvantage to another genius. Yet you still do not
question his position.
Hannibal Ad Portas!
Regards, Praetor.
last time i checked Hannibal held the office of "prime minsiter" of this senate, and even then, if the senate had not claled him back from Italy, what was he supposed to do if the Romans captured carthage and took aways his last opportunity of reinforcement and supply. it seems you live the same daydreams as hannibal back then. Hannibal is in every way like Pyrrhus, sucessfull in battle but eventually a strategical failure.
He was able to judge his enemies and manipulate events to
fight who he wants to where he wanted too.
yeah obviously zama is the perfect example for this... and unlike Hannibal, Napoleon fought well over 60 battles, unlike Hannibal so its really tedious to hold against him that he lost more than one battle because he fought much more battles than Hannibal! and unliek Hannibal, Napoleon won at least one battle in Africa...
I think you'll find that it wasn't solely Hamilcar who conquered the
Iberian Peninsula, but Hannibal also. For starters, he took Saguntum,
and thus gaining the support of neighbouring tribes. Here are some
extracts from Livy, outlining a few of Hannibal's conquests in Iberia:
(And I'm going to do it Spartan style )
Yes, I know about the campaigns that Hannibal undertook in Spain. The beginning of the conquest was done by his father, and he completed it. The fact remains--Spain was conquered by the Barcas, rather than by Carthage per se. If I remember correctly, the whole idea of conquering Spain to provide an additional source of recruits and resources was developed by Hamilcar.
OK, sorry, I was just clarifying. It was indeed Hamilcar's vision to establish a second power base in Spain, and thus he made Carthago Nova. Hamilcar and Hannibal (with the assistance of Hasdrubal, the Fair...I think) went on to conquer much of the Iberian Peninsula - a monumental effort, but it paid if in terms of mineral and resource wealth.
Btw Kursk or more propperly Operation Citadel was just that - an operation, otherwise Operation Barbarossa or Fall Gelb & Rot would have been the largest tank "battles" in history
as about Model and von Kluge at Kursk, i'll have to chekc my sources, i'm at the moment not familiar with their operations & directives. i'll come back later on that.
and i'll grant you Archduke Charles was good, he was among the top 3 most celebrated generals in the Habsburg realm, together with Eugene of Savoy and Radetzky.
Originally posted by Al Jassas
Hello to you all
Sorry to interrupt the discussion but I think I have something to add to the discussion about Hannibal.
First, it seems that our friend challanger2 have forgotten a very huge difference between Hannibal and the commanders that he mentioned and that is that Hannibal was a general in the Carthaginian army, nothing more nothing less. On the other hand, Napoleon, Alexander, Genghis khan et al were both generals and emperors, that is having both military as well as political powers and the last thing was what Hannibal lacked. After crushing Rome at Trebia, Lake Trasimene and finally at Cannae it was obvious to everyone that Hannibal had the upper hand and despite the remarkable return of the Romans after each crushing defeat he still managed to defeat them despite being against overwhelming odds, he was fighting a tough enemy on its own land and an enemy that can quickly replenish any losses it suffers no matter how huge they are taking advantage of the huge population of Italy during those times and the numerous Roman allies who were given citizenship, and thus right to join the legions, whenever Rome needed their help. On the other hand Hannibal knew that the only way to end Rome is to destroy the city itself, and to do that he not only must rally the foes of Rome but also he must convince the Gallic tribes that are under Roman over lordship especially in Lombardy and do not have the citizenship of Rome to join him. The only way to do that is to get support from home which NEVER came. Politicians at Carthage were afraid that the success of Hannibal would make him go for more ambitious goals; most importantly political office, and since he will be immensely popular after such victory he might even do what Caesar will do almost 200 years later, destroy the semi-democratic institutions of Carthage and declare himself king. Hanno the Great led the efforts in the Carthaginian Council of 104 to stop any kind of reinforcements from reaching Hannibal in Italy while giving him strict orders not to leave it too and he succeeded in both tasks.Hannibal was powerless. If he aimed directly at Rome he would certainly lose since the Romans will either evacuate the City or put a fight to the death and if he withdrew he would be portrayed as a traitor and will lose all the capital that he had built with potential allies that could join him when the war turned in his favor. To make the matter even worse, the ingenious Fabius Maximus developed what may be considered the worlds first successful containment strategy against Hannibal. Knowing that political rivalries will prevent help from reaching Hannibal in time he denied Hannibal pitched battles and dragged his army through Italy, Hannibal know Fabius game and developed the scorched earth policy of his to counter the effects of his containment and he succeeded in forcing the Romans to fight him in a pitched battle (at Herdoniac) which he one again despite the objections of Fabius. Finally, after the disaster of Metaurus and him completing 15 years in Italy with almost the same Army that he entered Italy with he was forced to withdraw from Italy; and thus politics was the real reason for his strategic failure not him and in that he was not the only one, many generals were defeated or were forced to fail because of politics not because they are not great and it is because of that I prefer Hannibal on Alexander. Alexander had both the political as well as the military power to do what ever he wanted, nobody could oppose his views or else they would lose their heads, Hannibal on the other hand was nothing more than a general, he had to wait for support from politicians who know nothing in military affairs, and he was doomed if he didnt get that support in time.
Thank You
Al-Jassas ibn Murrah
so what? a good general would not have wasted 15 years in italy while his enemy was active in bringing down his country on other fronts. second, the roman empire had a senate too, so you can say Roman generals & hannibal had no prticular advantage or disadvantage. Hannibal had more than enough time to subdue Rome as he planned but he failed so because he invaded Italy without knowing how to defeat it. defeating armies was not enough, he was unable to take Rome and apparently he had 15 years (!) at his disposal to acquire siege engines, even if they are only basic. if he was such a genious he could at least lay siege to it, or try to enter the city by trick or found other methods to overcome this obstacle.
but taking Rome was his logical goal, or what was the purpose of getting Romes allies away from them? that wouldn't stop them anyways, only the capture of Rome could lead to victory.
Hi Temujin. I think that you may have missed the point that I and other colleagues have been trying to prove in the past few post and that is Hannibal was betrayed by his government while Rome gave full support to their commanders even after the terrible losses aforementioned and the apparent failure of some of the counter tactics. And no, Hannibal could have never replenished his losses as fast as his foes could. At Trebia, the Romans lost 20 000 men from 36000, yet they managed to gather strength and muster up to 40 000 new troops at lakeTrasimene only to lose 30 000 dead there and this was only 6 months after Trebia. Then the Romans mustered even a larger army than ever for Cannae, 16 legions or roughly 87 000 men, this was only one year after Lake Trasimeneand they lost from 50 000 to 70 000 men which means that in two years of campaigning, Hannibal killed from 100 000 to 120 000 men and yet Rome managed to gather more and more men while, as far as I know, Hannibal did not receive not even a single soldier to help him during the same period and that whenever he lost men the only source to replenish his losses was by recruiting from the locals or calling whatever the meager amount of troop he had back in Spain. While Rome was preparing and recruiting by the day and giving its revered citizenship to every body especially in south Italy Hannibal stood their withoutenough resources nor enough soldiers to complete his mission and to make the matter worse he was denied help from his home country where politicians feared his popularity. On the other hand the Roman Senate gave full and unrelenting support to the Roman commanders including making Fabius a Dictator with all powers necessary to face Hannibal, and even when Hannibal attacked the properties of important senators during his campaign and pillaged their lands the senate kept its unity and whenever a successful commander was found (Scipio Africanus for example) they gave him all the attention he needed. Hannibal was betrayed by his own people since he never had at any one point more than 50 000 men under his command in Italy while the Romans had far more than that number and could have recruited even more. Napoleon on the other hand, and this applies to Genghis also, had both the political power as well as military prowess to continue with his vision in addition to a huge professional army and unlimited resources at home, France had 26 million people by 1800 if I am not mistaken. When ever he lost a lot of men (the Russian campaign in 1812 for example where he lost 400 000 men where de Tolly ironically used the same methods of Fabius) he quickly and some times forcibly mustered enough recruits to replenish his losses and thus we see that in Lutzen (1813) when he had 120000 men. Hannibal could not have taken on Rome directly because he did not have the logistics nor the sufficient resources to do such a thing especially if we know that Italy was much more than Rome. M. Cary in his wonderful book about Rome mentions that Italy had 30 million people by 100 AD and since population growth was slow during those times my guess is that Italy had about 10 million inhabitants c. 200 BC which meant that in the most desperate circumstances Rome could have up to 1 million men under arms more than the entire population of Carthage, for 50 000 men to do mayhem against 10 million is a feat with no parallel.
Well I read somewhere that the population of the city itself in 133 BC was about 600 000. And since the city was the biggest but not the only one to have a population of over 100 000 (Pompii had over 100 000 I think) so it is safe to say that if the total Urban population was roughly 1 million in 200 BC and 15% of the population was urban this means that the total population is roughly 6.5 million wich is still very large compared to the army of Hannibal which is about 50 000 men. I hope that someone could bring in a good scientific study of the population during that period.
Okay, I concede the field to the overwhelming numbers of the Hannibal fan club. I see my arguments fall on eyes too dazzled by the mans triumphs to look beyond and see his shortcomings.
However, the argument that Hannibal was just a general let down by his government doesnt wash. None of the other top 5 had unlimited resources at their disposal nor had they more freedom of action than Hannibal in their campaigns. All had effectively independent commands and all started off with probably less resources than they thought they needed to accomplish their aims. I hope no one intends to argue that Hannibal deliberately invaded Italy with insufficient resources; that argument in itself would imply incompetence on his part. Hannibal, like the others, had the best of what was available to them. Relative population numbers also tend towards irrelevance since these people would need to be trained and equipped. After Cannae, for example, volunteers were issued with old captured Gallic weapons. That indicates a shortage, however temporary. It wasnt so much the lack of reinforcements that hampered Hannibal, it was his own insecurity and weakness.
Since Mr Myers has locked the top 5 and is disinclined to reconsider, further debate is pointless. Ill leave you, therefore, with the opinion of a contemporary of the great man; the words attributed to Maharbal, Hannibals cavalry commander, by Livius [book XXII, 51],
Assuredly no one man has been granted so many gifts from the gods. You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victories.
Good debate. Thank you all, I enjoyed it. Ill be back [cue Terminator music, exits stage left].
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