Top 100 Generals

If you're top 5 are locked in I'll avoid commenting on it.  In regards to the top 10 belisarios should be above heraclius, in fact I wouldn't object to him being listed as number 5.  Allow me to explain;  Belisarios fought the persian empire with at most equal forces and was legendary for confusing and tricking his enemy.  A persian envoy entered his camp to sue (during the second war against persia) for peace but really to spy on his camp.  Belisarios suspected this and he had his best soldiers line up in front of the route this diplomat was taking to the tent of belisarios acting as confident and cocky as they could as the envoy was lead into camp making it seem as though their numbers were much greater by their high confidence level, belisarios was waiting in his tent with all of his goths and other rather impressive guards with an air of indifference.  (He had fought against these same goths and defeated them, now they loyally fought for him, a testament to his leadership even if they weren't given much of a choice originially) The envoy told the persian king of the great host under belisarios' command and the persians concluded peace and left, when in reality they could have crushed belisarios' meager forces.  He invaded the vandal kingdom of africa with 12,000 men, majority cavalry.  The vandal army consisted of roughtly 80,000 to 100,000.  Long story short belisarios completed defeated the vandals at incredible odds.  He invades the goths of italy from sicily with an army of similar size with another lead against the gothic kingdom of italy from pannonia.  The goths could field 200,000+ men.  Belisarios captures rome by coming through an aqueduct.  The legendary siege of rome; belisarios leads repeated sorties against the enormous horde of goths surrounding him and eventually the goths are forced to withdraw saving rome.  Belisarios has to deal with the court intrigues surrounding his fellow general narses and his troops close to near mutinying time and again if he didn't attack the enemy when he knew it unwise to, of course usually these encounters would end in defeat. (these were the only times that he would lose an engagement) 

 

This probably is not making a lot of sense but basically belisarios fought multiple enemies who were considerably superior in quantity and equal in quality, often times superior in both.  He was personally brave, insanely loyal to the emperor Justinian.  I almost forgot, the capital of Constantinople was besieged by barbarians and the retired and forgotten belisarios was once again called upon to defend the empire.  He takes a rabble and somehow defeats the superior barbarians forcing them to withdraw across the danube.  Like I said after Hannibal, Belisarios could easily be placed above any other general on the list.  Lord Mahons book is a good unbiased source to understand the greatness of belisarios.

 

We could probably open a separate topic on the marlborough/prince eugen debate.  Basically prince eugene fought very different adversaries such as the ottomans and french, he won in varying terrains such as hungary and italy as well as the danube against superior numbers and quality generals.  Also the victory of blenheim was as much eugene's victory as marlboroughs.  For some reason he seems to be forgotten time and again when the living legend that is marlborough is discussed.  I'll review some books and give a more in depth response to these two.

 

I would suggest swapping aurelian and narses.  Narses was a very good general when he had full control, though aurelian was a true roman in the sense that he always won the war.  He took over the empire when spain, france and england had broken away, as well as most of the east under palmyra.  When he was killed the empire had been strengthened greatly and re-unified.  A testament to his skill indeed.

 

I don't know about von rundstedt, the problem with world war II generals is that so many of them were good generals.  If he is on the list you would have to consider von kluge, heinrici, hoth and a ton of others. 

 

Pyrhhus of Epirus is being rated awful low.  I wonder if its because the name for a victory at great cost is named after him?  He defeated the romans on numerous occasions at a high price yes, but he still won time and again.  If he had been able to get numerous enough re-enforcements who knows what might have happened.  Also you need to consider the context of his wars.  I will have to come back later when I can articulate my pyrhhus argument better.

 

Have we discussed Sun Tzu in depth?  Is he being included because of his theories on warfare?  If that is the case then I have no argument with him on the list, just wanted to be clear.  Perhaps he should even be higher if that is the case.

 

Well thats all for now.  Again my compliments on compiling something of this magnitude.

 

Here I would totally agree with you about Chandragupta Maurya.  I feel like I may be posting too often but I cannot emphasis enough about the Mauryan king.  By the time he was 20 he was able to carve out a very big empire and only expanded on it later to make it one of the largest empires seen during that time.

 

Maybe list members are not aware of him.  Here is some more information about him, if Wiki info is ok:

 

He really deserves a higher position.  A great general, a strategist, and an empire builder all in one.

 

Of course, there is no solid ground for 'ranking' generals of 1-100, let alone 1-10; it's like assessing what the best doughnut is, or what the best car is. We'll come to a loose consensus, but the paramount issue is the amalgam of wonderful scholarship exuding throughout the thread.

 

A pleasure to read everyone. Let's keep in mind that opinions and values are neither right nor wrong.

 

Let's see. I agree with your comment about modern generals compared with ones from earlier times, Challenger. But the basic essence of war has never really changed; ancient and medieval commanders indeeed had more personal control, thus they come across 'flashier'. If we are going to judge commanders by their actions (and inactions), the modern ones are handicapped by this. But I doubt the good ones possessed any less understanding of the art of war than their predecessors. 

 

I don't completely agree with your comment on Hannibal, though. Fabius hampered Hannibal, but contained him?

 

The Roman army was not as 'raw' at Cannae, as many seem to intimate, thus undermining (I'm not accusing of anyone having unfair agendas) the battlefield genius of Hannibal (IMHO, of course); Polybius tells us, leading up to the Battle of Cannae, Book 3.106,

 

 

The Boii ambushed Postumius in the winter/early spring of 215 B.C. (near modern Modena, SW of Milan, SE of Venice) after he was elected consul, for which he would take office on March 15, 215 B.C. His army had grown to 25,000, according to Livy (these numbers are always paper-strenght, and probably always magnified). It was bad luck for Hannibal that the Gauls didn't swarm south of their now supreme position; Rome couldn't send any forces intom this area until some 3 years. Peculiarly, they would take action in 200 B.C., when Rome could counter them with substantial forces. The debate concerning the efficacy of the Fabian strategy, one of containment and indirect action (yes, Bertrand du Guesclin was a master at conducting such a policy), is more tenable if one thinks Hannibal was resolved to win the war quickly. Remember, for the strategy proposed by Fabius to succeed, it entailed much time, enormous sacrifices, and tenacious efforts by the core allies in men and material - something Hannibal was hoping to enervate. Furthermore, many Italians would suffer in the process, an issue admirably considered by Gaius T. Varro, who would go down in infamy as the loser at Cannae. Nobody could have predicted with certainty that after Cannae, with Hannibal established and militarily supreme, that Rome's allies wouldn't have wavered. The test of pressure couldn't have been stronger, something under Hannibal's direct control. 

 

Superfluous to state, hindsight is 20/20, and Hannibal made the best choices in the exigencies of every moment a big decision was made. Unlike the other great commanders of history, he faced an enemy that could absorb massive tactical defeats, and a suprememly strong body-politic. Probably only the Soviet Union in 1941-1943, under the German onslaught, suffered as bad (far worse, actually) yet won in the end.  

 

As Fabius Maximus saw the situation against Hannibal in 217 B.C., the key was to avoid open battle, hamper his army, keep control of the major fortresses, and prevent Hannibal from foraging as much as possible. The Hannibalic army was the invader on foregin soil, with Rome superior at sea. Fabius possessed considerable skill and composure in keeping close enough to harass Hannibal without affording him the opportunity for a field engagement, which is what Hannibal greatly desired, but Hannibal marched faster and devastated the land, causing Rome to deem the Fabian policy quite questionable. Many think Fabius outwitted Hannibal in some form or another, but I think it's the other way around: Hannibal's classic breakout from the ager Falernus, in which he extricated himself from a seemingly hemmed in positon (Oliver Cromwell exercised similar ingenuity at Dunbar in 1650, but with outright tactical brillaince and improvisation; we'll discuss him too, but a little later) by a classic of stratagem, humiliated Fabius. Basically, Hannibal had 2,000 oxen, with their horns bound with pieces of wood, driven up the ridge that lay between his camp and the Roman detachment guarding the narrow exit of the pass. Upon ascenting the hill, the horns of the oxen were set ablaze. Hannibal's men played the role of cowboys, keeping a stampede going up the hill. The Romans abandoned their position to strike at what they thought was Hannibal's men trying to break out over the hills, but instead found 2,000 or so writhing cattle with their heads literally ablaze. Fabius couldn't budge in the darkness, taking into consideration the danger of fighting at night and the relative inexperience of his own troops. Not only did Hannibal lead the main portion of his army out unharmed, replete with all his booty, but sent back some Spaniards, used to fighting in rugged terrain, to help the 'cowboys' in the fighting taking place between them and some Romans. The Romans were mauled and most of the spearmen (the 'cowboys') returned to Hannibal. By all the rules of orthodox warfare (if there is such a thing), Hannibal was caught. Fabius' caution, patience (he knew Hannibal had to prepare his army for winter), and ability to discourage the allies from revolting was seemingly going to end the war. But Fabius had been thoroughly outthought here, and ultimate Roman victory would be delayed for another 15 years, due to the genius of Hannibal, including his stratgey of breaking the federation.

 

One aspect, in my opinion, of Hannibal's genius was his ability with 'double-bluff': here he knew he was not facing an impetuous and aggressive opponent, but one who wouldn't fall for any tricks. But Hannibal's oxen stratagem was intended to be recognized as a trick. He had informed himself of the mind of his opponent (the best he could procure) and taken sound measures. The consuls at the Trebbia and Trasimene were rash, who fell into elaborate traps prepared by Hannibal. Hannibal knew Fabius was not, so the measure he applied was a maneuver that precluded a cautious and more prudent commander from attacking - a measure of a ruse carried out in the middle of the night. Even if Fabius was vigilant for some sort of trick, he wouldn't attack 'whatever' or 'whoever' it was bearing burning brands marching up the hill under such conditions. One can argue that a more traditionally Roman-minded would have attacked Hannibal's extricating column and defeated him. But that commander wouldn't have refused battle earlier, as Fabius had done, and surely would have suffered a crushing defeat against Hannibal, thus Hannibal wouldn't have been trapped in the ager Falernus in the first place if faced with an opponent not akin to Fabius.

 

Whatever the situation, Hannibal compelled his enemy to do what he wished them to do, and came out in the favorable position. Every military action has a form of counter-reaction, if a state is still fighting back, and finally Scipio in Africa 14-15 years later, who didn't endure the 'learning process' against Hannibal (at least in supreme command of an army), achieved success with similar strategy against Hannibal himself, but due to circumstances (he was already established in Africa) more than possessing any superior 'smarts' than Hannibal. But that's part of being smart - not doing too much to keep one's advantage.

 

It was shortly after the incident at ager Falernus that Polybius tells us that the loyalty to Rome of the inhabitants of Apulia began to waver, and Rufus Minucius, the subaltern to Fabius, was mauled by Hannibal near Gerunium, only to be saved from Fabius, who arrived on the scene while Minucius was being ambushed. Hannibal withdrew from a precarious position in good order now before substantially superior numbers of Romans. Minucius was in a position to fight Hannibal because Fabius had fallen out of favor.

 

Anyway, I believe Hannibal was not counting on a 'quick' victory over Rome. The events of 218-216 B.C. in Italy that may suggest this were probably more the result of Hannibal's exploitation of opportunism. The 1st Punic War lasted 23 years, before it ended with Carthage's defeat. Why would Hannibal, the ever-determined and composed calculator he was who seemingly overlooked nothing, think it would take less time to defeat the Roman Republic, now even stronger than before? He knew that the only way he could bring Rome down was to beat them in Italy, and not necessarily by solely winning a few quick victories. He knew they were nothing if not a state of immense resilience. It is very likely it wasn't so much a lightning strike that would crack the morale of Rome's allies he thought would work, but the long, drawn-out misery of continued war, centered around the devastation of fields and farms. If the Romans refused battle, they couldn't protect their provincial protectorates, if they did accept field battles, they would suffer the destruction of their armies. Again, every successful military action will produce a corresponding reaction, particularly from a determined, militant state such as Rome at this time. Once they found his measure, and absorbed his genius, they were able to triumph. But it took time, and they stiil were in a troubling situation as late as 208 B.C. If we compare the contestable figures from Polybius for Rome's resources in manpower in the mid 220s B.C. with Livy's list of defections after Cannae, it seems that Hannibal had caused over 40% of the allies to be no longer available to Rome. There were also rumors of trouble in the northern regions of Etruria and Umbria, certainly more for religious and social reasons than any interest among them for Hannibal's cause, but it was wrought because of the cohesion he was breaking. This is what he was hoping to effectuate.

 

In 209 B.C., 12 of the 30 Latin colonies announced they could not supply any contingents of men and material. These were the Latin colonies - the largest and most important, strategically placed to provide Rome. Again, don't be misled - they were not supporting Hannibal or Carthage in any shape or form, but were bled white because of Hannibal's calculated onslaught upon Italy, one which did not involve any gratuitous horror on Hannibal's part - a srategic efficacy (making 'friends'). Again, there were 2 edges to Hannibal's ability to defeat the Romans in the field, as Polybius tells us in Book 3.90,

 

 

Moreover, Hannibal still won victories in the field after Cannae. In 212 B.C., and again in 210, 2 battles were fought around Herdonea, in which the Romans were wiped out. Hannibal also scattered the Roman army the first time they threatened Capua, and followed the consul who headed south, in the process destoying another brave but impetuous Roman army in Lucania near the Silarus River, albeit not the one he pursued (following Livy). In 210 B.C. near Numistro, he crossed swords with Marcus Marcellus, a clash which Livy says was a draw, but Sextus Julius Frontinus says was a victory for Hannibal. Remember, at this stage Hannibal wasn't attempting to win significant field victories, but rather win over the fortresses. Around Canusium in 208 B.C., despite Livy's (or his sources') patriotic rhetoric, Marcellus was beaten twice, and later the same year Marcellus and Crispinus, received mortal wounds in an ambush while reconnoitring near Venusia and Bantia, the first time in Roman history both consuls had been killed (Crispinus died later of his wounds). Directly preceding this, Hannibal scattered away a legion sent from Tarentum (recently recaptured by Fabius) to aid a Roman force, which came from the opposite direction from Sicily, to attack Locri; he skillfully ambushed them near near Petelia, about halfway between Tarentum and Locri, along the 'instep' of Italy. Shortly thereafter, Hannibal's mere arrival at the walls of Locri compelled the besiegers, allegedly a bunch of rag-tag malcontents, to flee. But Hannibal's actions with Marcellus in Apulia allowed Fabius to retake Tarentum. Shortly after keeping Locri in his hands, Hannibal prepared an ambuscade which didn't ultimately fool the cautiously composed Fabius (Livy tells us it almost did). These indecisive actions, as far as significant strategic gain, was an outstanding and swift use of the interior lines by Hannibal.  Again, none of this materially helped Hannibal strategically, but probably because of circumstance, not any inability on his part as a commander. We also have to be careful when placing emphasis on this part of the war, as Livy may have inflated things in dramatic fashion. But he is all we have!

 

But the element of this war which became one of marches and counter marches, generally over the same regions, probably a form of flag-waving to foster rebellions and maintain loyalties etc., could be well sustained by Hannibal's ability as a leader. Yes, Hannibal's army decayed because of the Roman strategy of isolation and containment, but it came at no trivial price to them, and it was good fortune that they intercepted the correspondences betweeen both Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon in 215 B.C., and with his brother Hasdrubal Barca in 207 B.C. They weren't looking for these messages, which put them on supreme alert, but merely fell upon them. But things happen simply 'happen', don't they? Actually, the message from Philip V got through to Hannibal; it was on the return they were caught. But the Romans were certainly ready for certain contingencies, and exploited situations much better than the Carthaginians, as a whole, in this great conflict.

 

It is a little sad concerning Fabius in his later years, as he was overcomne politically by Scipio's supporters (mainly Metellus), but more so because he passed away before the defeat of Hannibal, something he surely aided, being that his policy finally influenced Roman strategy against Hannibal before his death. No Roman commander, perhaps ever, was as great as Hannibal as a masterful battlefield commander. But the corporate ability and heroism they achieved was too much for him to overcome. Fabius was an integral part of that team.

 

As for the Battle of Cannae, from a practical point of view regarding Gaius T. Varro, who was just as willing to wait when he was in full command on July 31 as Paullus was on August 1, smartly moved the huge army to the right (east) bank of the Aufidus on August 2, where the terrain was still good for infantry and cavalry, but less so for Hannibal's cavalry. The Romans had the sea at their backs, the rising ground from the sea on their left, and the Aufidus on their right. Hannibal could not outflank them, and their infantry, they figured, would smash through him (not a stupid assumption at the time). Varro was no innovative thinker, but we can see his practical thinking; he and Paullus were mounted in personal command of the horse units, obviously to hold up as much spirit as possible, as they knew they couldn't win the battle here. The infantry would smash Hannibal, thus whatever happened on the wings, albeit the enemy horse would get away, would be of little consequence. Hannibal simply came up with the answer.

 

Hannibal's extraordinarily and novel adoption of a convex deployment with his Gauls and Spaniards in the center invited the Romans to surge forward (he knew his enemy, too). But he didn't dispose his troops the basic way the Greeks did at Marathon, who basically were just matching the Persian front in length, but held back his two blocks of African infantry on the wings (offensive reserves, so to speak), which meant that not only would the Romans, who decided to have no wings to facilitate a forward surge, tend to be lured into the center, but if things went amiss, fugitives from the Gallic/Spanish center would also be funnelled into the center, where they would become bunched, and would automatically aid in slowing the Roman advance, even if they didn't completely know what was completely happening! He also dealt brilliantly with the cavalry issue, in which he couldn't ride around the Romans, as he had done so in earlier clashes. By imbalancing his cavalry forces - the heavier shock horsemen being more numerous on one side, and the maneuverable Numidians on the other - meant he could both checkmate the allies of Rome on their left with numerically less, but more agile horsemen, and quickly vanquish the Roman cavalry with pure shock, and have them free for tasks against the infantry. Whatever Hannibal's reforms involved with his infantry after Trasimene, he developed a greater degree of elasticity into what had always been a rigidly linear deployment. Polybius uses the term speirai in connection with Hannibal's tactical units, which would be synonymous to the Macedonian syntagama - the subdivisional battalion of the phalanx of Alexander. But Hannibal achieved this with a motley force of men who had been hitherto fighting for him for a short period of time (again, Polybius, Book 11.19), and he achieved a tactical masterpiece, just a year later, which has resonated beyond its own time as an ideal for tactical study. The very name of Cannae would become a generic noun to generals, soldiers, and militarists of all ages. Scipio was at Cannae as a young tribune, and certainly was affected by such tactics; the 'stupid' Roman commanders who faced Hannibal before were never provided with such valuable blueprints. This, of course, is all arguable, and hindsight always allows a clarity they didn't have in the exigencies of the moment.
 
Nothing displays a commander's ability with leadership of men, in the heat of battle, better than Hannibal at Cannae, in the center with his infantry: his Gauls and Spaniards were more noted for their ferocity and mercurial temperament than their sustained discipline. Hannibal had them fall back before the Roman juggernaut, in a most difficult maneuver to pull of on the battlefield - to fall back under pressure without breaking. In this timeperiod of military history, the majority of battle losses were inflicted upon the enemy as they fled in rout, and those who fled first had the best chance of survival. Thus for an army to fight with success under these conditions, each soldier had to trust that his comrades would not leave them in the lurch - a level of trust which was tested to the uttermost when the battle line was moving backwards. This tactical concept was utilised by the great Dutch leader Mauritz van Nassau in his civil defence against the Spanish army of Flanders in 1600, at the Battle of Nieuwpoort. But he hardly effected a battle of destruction, and had well-drilled troops, conditioned for such a purpose. In terms of raw leadership skills, Hannibal must have possessed a level of battlefield genius rarely matched in military history (IMHO, of course).

 

Thanks, Spartan