The Mexican American War debate

Battle Reports

The Battle of Palo Alto

The Battle of Palo Alto, the first major engagement of the U.S.-Mexican War, was fought on May 8, 1846, just north of present-day Brownsville, Texas. Weeks earlier, U.S. General Zachary Taylor had led 3,000 troops to the Rio Grande and established Fort Texas opposite the Mexican City of Matamoros, as well as a supply base, Fort Polk, at Point Isabel about forty miles away on the Gulf Coast.



Mexican General Mariano Arista countered by bringing a 4,000-man force, the Army of the North, to Matamoros. He crossed the Rio Grande to the west and headed east to place his army between Taylor and his supply base, while putting Fort Texas under siege. Taylor managed to slip past Arista�s trap with the bulk of his forces on May 1, but left behind a small American garrison in dire straits. Taylor moved to Point Isabel, gathered all available supplies and reinforcements, and moved with a column of 2,200 men to the relief of Fort Texas. Arista, catching wind of this move, left forces to continue the siege while he led 3,400 troops north to intercept Taylor.

The two armies located each other at the scrubby crossroads of Palo Alto in the early afternoon of May 8. Each side deployed their troops, and the American troops stepped boldly forward to within 800 yards of the Mexicans. Almost immediately the superiority of the U.S. cannons and artillery tactics came to bear. Over the next three hours, the battle consisted mostly of a lopsided artillery duel. Attempts by the Mexican cavalry to turn the U.S. flank proved unsuccessful, and Arista ordered his troops out of action and moved to a strong defensive position at Resaca de la Palma. Arista lost between 250 and 400 men at Palo Alto, double the number of American losses.


The Capture of Monterrey

The Capture of Monterrey occurred on September 25, 1846, after a week of maneuvering, skirmishing, brutal assaults, and deadly house-to-house fighting. General Zachary Taylor moved his 6,640 many army into position north of the city on September 19, scouted its approaches, and captured the road leading to Saltillo the next day. A Mexican army of 5,000 men under General Pedro Ampudia waited behind fortifications, effectively cut-off from reinforcements.


The Battle of Monterey

Taylor planned a two-pronged assault for September 21, with General William J. Worth�s Division to attack from the west and southwest while the regulars under the temporary command of John Garland demonstrated against Monterrey�s eastern defenses. Worth�s assault carried the important positions atop Federation Hill, then moved on to capture redoubts on Independence Hill, as well giving U.S. troops command of the heights overlooking the city.

Fighting east of the town bogged down, and Garland�s command required the assistance of General William O. Butler�s reserves to finally carry the Mexican positions at La Tener�a, Fort Diablo, and Pur�sima Bridge. With American forces east and west, Ampudia drew in his lines in the following day, fortifying the houses around the central plaza, the cathedral, and the imposing citadel, Black Fort.

Fighting resumed on September 23 with the Americans making impressive gains before being ordered to fall back at sundown. The following day, U.S. artillery began a systematic bombardment of the Mexican positions, leading to Ampudia�s request for a parlay. The two generals agreed on an eight-week armistice and the Mexican forces marched away with their weapons on September 25, giving the city over to the Americans. President James K. Polk grew furious over these terms, and subsequently plotted the end of Taylor�s career. The U.S. lost 450 men killed and wounded in the battle. The Mexicans suffered an equal number of losses.

The Battle of Buena Vista
The Battle of Buena Vista on February 23, 1847, was perhaps the most dramatic fight of the U.S.-Mexican War. After the Battle of Monterey in September 1846, President James K. Polk ordered the bulk of Taylor�s veterans and regulars to join an expedition under General Winfield Scott, who would land at Vera Cruz and march on Mexico City. Taylor was to defend his position near Saltillo with 5,000 inexperienced troops.



Mexican General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, recognizing this as a military opportunity, moved quickly to catch the Americans while they made their transition. Santa Anna and an army of 20,000 hurried north from San Luis Potosi to crush Taylor before turning south to deal with Scott. Taylor, hearing of the Mexican movement upon his position, deployed his outnumbered command in a mountain pass near the Hacienda Buena Vista, where his small numbers might do the most good.

Santa Anna demanded Taylor�s surrender on February 22, but was refused. The Mexicans then skirmished with the Americans to ascertain their positions and numbers. Santa Anna ordered an all-out assault the following morning and had broken the U.S. line by mid-day. Taylor rushed forward his only reserves, the 1st Mississippi Rifles under Colonel Jefferson Davis. These troops stabilized the U.S. line by routing a Mexican cavalry breakthrough. Santa Anna�s attack stalled.

Taylor unwisely ordered his men to counter-attack the still-dangerous enemy that afternoon, and the U.S. troops ran headlong into withering fire. The audacity of the attack threw off Santa Anna�s planned final blow and the Mexican attack stumbled to a halt by dark. More than 3,400 of Santa Anna�s men lay dead or wounded; Taylor lost 650. The Mexican Army declared victory the following day and retreated to sofocate the Polkos rebellion at Mexico City.

The Capture of Veracruz
The vitally important Mexican port and stronghold of Veracruz fell to American forces on March 28, 1847, after a two-week siege. General Winfield Scott, with the assistance of Commodore David E. Conner�s Home Squadron, landed an army of 10,000 men at Collado Beach to the south of Veracruz on March 9. Covered by the guns of Conner�s ships, the U.S. troops moved north to invest the defenses of the city, eventually bottling up 3,000 Mexican troops under General Juan Morales behind its defenses. They also isolated another 1,000 troops inside the nearly impregnable walls of harbor fort San Juan de Ul�a.



Scott finished his lines by March 12, severing ties between Veracruz and the rest of Mexico. Engineers then created approach trenches, while Commodore Conner sent ashore a half-dozen heavy guns and crews. On March 21, with his most of his guns and earthworks in place, Scott requested that non-combatants be allowed to leave the city. General Morales refused. The next day the combined guns of the army and fleet began to pummel Veracruz and San Juan de Ul�a, joined by the naval battery ashore on March 24. The American shelling caused little damage to Fort San Juan de Ul�a, but the three-day bombardment had breached the city walls, smothered counter-battery fire, and collapsed buildings inside Veracruz.

Unwilling to take credit for the disaster, General Morales turned over command of the garrison to General Juan Landero, who surrendered his army, fort, and city on March 28. From that point forward until the end of the U.S.-Mexican War, Veracruz served as a vital supply base for Scott�s invasion of Mexico and became crucial to U.S. victory.

The Battle of Cerro Gordo
In April 1847, U.S. General Winfield Scott moved his army away from Vera Cruz and down the national road toward the interior. Mexican forces under General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna occupied the strategic mountain pass of Cerro Gordo to block the way. The collision of these two armies on April 18 began a string of American victories that lead, ultimately, to the capture of Mexico City.



Santa Anna made his stand at a point where the national road climbed the highlands near Jalapa by traversing a narrow defile dominated on the west by two major hills, La Atalaya and El Tel�grafo. Twelve thousand Mexican troops dug in to block the road and waited for the Americans. The vanguard of the 10,000-man U.S. force arrived on April 11, and scouts sized up the enemy position. They concluded that a costly frontal assault was the only option until an April 17 reconnaissance by Captain Robert E. Lee revealed that Santa Anna had trusted the terrain on his left to be impassible, and therefore had only lightly defended that approach.

On April 18, Scott ordered General David Twiggs to lead 7,000 men around the Mexican left along the path discovered by Lee, while a smaller force of about 3,000 men under General Gideon Pillow demonstrated against the Mexican front. General Santa Anna, alerted to the American plan by a U.S. deserter, repositioned his forces to intercept Twiggs� attack. The Americans still worked their way around the Mexican line, cut off their line of retreat, and captured their camps. Santa Anna�s forces, fearing encirclement, fled. U.S. troops killed or wounded an estimated 1,000 Mexican soldiers and captured another 3,000, as well as the artillery, baggage, and supplies of Santa Anna�s army. U.S. losses were a little more than 400.



The Battle of Contreras
The U.S. launched two major assaults on August 20, 1847, as part of General Winfield Scott�s sophisticated strategy to neutralize the 36,000-man army assembled by General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to defend Mexico City. The principal Mexican positions covered two roads heading to the city. A fortified Hacienda in the town of San Antonio covered the easternmost approach, while the town of San Angel covered the westernmost. Between them to the south lay a vast, seemingly impenetrable lava field, El Pedr�gal.



General Gabriel Valencia, on the Mexican right flank, abandoned his assigned post and moved four miles down the road to the town of Contreras, placing this rough terrain between him and the Mexican left. A premature, ill-advised, and unsuccessful August 18 attack by generals Gideon Pillow and David Twiggs revealed American intentions to isolate and destroy Valencia. Santa Anna rushed Valencia reinforcements rather than recalling him to the more defensible positions at San Angel.

The next day, American scouts found a way to emerge from El Pedr�gal a little farther north, thus cutting the road to Mexico City and isolating Valencia from additional reinforcements. Scott realized that once Valencia�s command fell, Pillow and Twiggs could race north to the Rio Churubusco and gain the rear of the Mexican forces facing the rest of the American army. Scott prepared to advance.

At dawn on August 20, Pillow renewed his attack on Valencia�s front and elements of Twiggs� command attacked the rear position of the Mexican force. Valencia�s 5,000-man army quickly melted away, a portion heading toward San Angel, the bulk simply quitting the field. By 6 a.m. Pillow and Twiggs started their troops toward the Rio Churubusco, and Scott ordered an attack against the Hacienda at San Antonio.


The Battle of Churubusco, fought on August 20, 1847, was part of a larger operation by U.S. forces under General Winfield Scott against Mexican General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna�s defense of Mexico City. U.S. troops faced a daunting challenge of rooting out these forces from several carefully prepared defensive positions. Scott wanted to eliminate these positions in detail. He divided his army, sending half to eliminate a Mexican force on the westernmost of these roads, while he faced the Mexicans at San Antonio.

The destruction of Mexican General Gabriel Valencia�s force at Contreras in the early morning hours of August 20 uncovered a route to the Mexican rear. Santa Anna ordered his forces to abandon San Antonio. He ordered General Pedro Anaya to cover this retreat by occupying the fortified convent, town, and river crossing at the village of Churubusco three miles north of San Antonio.



Scott�s forces, in close pursuit, attacked Anaya at Churubusco, but were checked by its defenders. The Americans regrouped and continued a relentless battering of the Mexican position throughout the day. To the west, forces under generals Gideon Pillow and David Twiggs fought their way across the Rio Churubusco. Anaya, aware that he would soon be surrounded, slipped away across the river, his retreat covered by the timely arrival of reinforcements. The two battles�Contreras and Churubusco�had eliminated 10,000 Mexican troops from the defense of the city, and resulted in the loss of 1,000 killed, wounded, and missing Americans.


The Battle of El Molino del Rey (Attack upon the Molino)
In August 1847, after the twin defeats of Contreras and Churubusco, the Mexican army fell back to defensive position just two miles from the gates of Mexico City, and the last line before the city itself. Key to this position was the castle at Chapultepec, the earthwork fort at Casa Mata 2,000 yards to the west, and the fortified stone buildings and of Molino del Rey half way between. On September 8, U.S. General William J. Worth tried to take these last two strong points by frontal assault.


The Battle of El Molina del Rey
Worth�s 3,400-man division advanced in two column advance against this position, with Brevet Brigadier General John Garland leading his brigade on the right against the Molino del Rey, Lieutenant Colonel James S. McIntosh leading his brigade on the left toward the Casa Mata, and Brigadier General George Cadwalader commanding the reserves.

The spearhead of Garland�s column was an ad hoc, 500-man storming party composed largely of soldiers from the 8th infantry, and backed by the Battalion of Voltigeurs, or light infantry. The advance that Worth had intended as a reconnaissance in force soon became a bloody nightmare. Brigadier General Antonio Le�n unleashed a storm of artillery and small arms that bucked the Americans and sent them back in disorder. The heavy guns of Chapultepec 1,000 yards to the right added a heavy enfilading fire that caused the U.S. attack to falter.

The U.S. troops, reinforced by the Voltigeurs and some of Cadwalader�s men, made another run at the position and managed a breakthrough. Eventually the steady success of the regulars on their right carried the Mexican position, but only after Worth had lost nearly one-in-four of his attacking soldiers.


The Battle of El Molino del Rey (Attack upon the Casa Mata)
General William J. Worth�s September 8 attack on the Casa Mata and Molino del Rey complex became one of the bloodiest days for American forces in the U.S.-Mexican War. These two positions, part of a chain of strong points just two miles short of the gates of Mexico City, were supposed to be lightly held. Worth shelled the Mexican positions without response, and then ordered his columns forward. These included Brigadier General John Garland�s command on the right against the Molino del Rey, a storming party to capture an angle in the center, Lieutenant Colonel James McIntosh�s brigade to carry the Casa Mata on the left, and General George Cadwalder�s brigade in reserve.

Worth�s 3,400 troops were marching steadily into a Mexican ambush. Garland felt it first when hidden Mexican cannons and the guns of Chapultepec butchered his attacking column. McIntosh, spared the chaos on the right, was himself encountering a hail of small arms from the men of General Francisco Perez�s Brigade to his front. At this critical point in the battle, a 4,000 man Mexican cavalry division under General Juan �lvarez threatened to swoop in and roll up the American left. Quick thinking by a mixed command of U.S. mounted troops caused the Mexican horsemen to veer off, saving McIntosh from certain disaster.

Chastened by the resistance ahead and spooked by the Mexican cavalry beside, McIntosh fell back. The hard-won successes of Garland�s command eventually penetrated the Mexican line at the Molino del Rey, making the Casa Mata untenable, and the Mexican troops retreated. McIntosh�s infantry followed at a prudent distance. The day�s casualties included 800 killed and wounded Americans, and nearly 2,000 killed, wounded, and captured Mexicans


The Storming of Chapultepec (General Pillow�s Attack)
The successful storming of Chapultepec Castle on September 13, 1847, struck the final blow to the Mexican defense of their capital and precipitated the collapse of General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna�s defensive line. The imposing structure - a complex including a large castle-style fort, a manicured park, landscaped grounds, outbuildings, and all surrounded by a high wall - commanded a rise that towered over the surrounding plain. American General Winfield Scott ordered his army to take that position, directing General Gideon Pillow and his 2,500-man regular division to spearhead the assault, starting from the Molino del Rey to the west of Chapultepec. General John Quitman would lead his 2,500 troops in from the south and cut Chapultepec off from reinforcements, while General David Twiggs demonstrated against positions further east.
Inside the walls, General Nicol�s Bravo realized that his 1,000 men were too few to hold the castle. Even so, Bravo was determined to defend Chapultepec.

U.S. artillery pounded the Mexican position for more than a day before Pillow launched his attack at 8 a.m. on September 13. Mexican troops on the western slope of the castle held for a while, but gave way in the face of mounting U.S. pressure. Pillow�s men followed, capturing a redoubt below the castle, and then gained its walls, disarming several powder mines as they advanced, avoiding a potential disaster. By 9:30 Chapultepec had fallen.

The Storming of Chapultepec (Quitmans�s Attack)
When U.S. General Winfield Scott ordered the capture of the Mexican citadel of Chapultepec, he envisioned coordinated assaults by two divisions. General Gideon Pillow would attack east from Molino del Rey, and General John Quitman would head north up the Tacubaya causeway to isolate the Mexican garrison from reinforcements. While Pillow would carry the brunt of the attack on the Mexican fort, Quitman would have the important task of pinning down two nearby Mexican brigades to the east.

U.S. guns pummeled the Mexican positions for more than a day before Pillow launched his assault up the slopes to the west of Chapultepec on September 13. His advance signaled a similar movement by Quitman�s command, which pushed up the causeway a half-mile from Tacubaya. A dug-in brigade under General Joaquin Rangel stalled Quitman�s advance a few hundred yards short of the intersection leading to the gates of Mexico City. Quitman ordered General Persifor Smith to shuttle his brigade to the east, while General James Shields veered to the west to join the attack on Chapultepec. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Watson and his battalion of marines held the causeway and attempted to fulfill Quitman�s original mission.

Shields�s command breached the southern wall of the Mexican stronghold and linked up with Pillow�s men pushing in from the left. Together, these co-mingled commands pushed to the walls of the castle itself, raised scaling ladders, and completed the capture. By mid-morning, Chapultepec had fallen. While Shields and his men were attacking, General Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Watson, and their supporting batteries at last drove Rangel from his position, and the fall of Chapultepec caused the entire Mexican line to give way and fall back to the gates of Mexico City. The combat resulted in 2,000 Mexican and 450 American casualties.


Choose a Battle from this menu: The Battle of Palo Alto The Capture of Monterrey The Battle of Buena Vista The Capture of Veracruz The Battle of Cerro Gordo The Battle of Contreras The Battle of Churubusco The Battle of El Molino del Rey (Attack upon the Molino) The Battle of El Molino del Rey (Attack upon the Casa Mata) The Storming of Chapultepec (General Pillow's Attack) The Storming of Chapultepec (Quitmans' Attack) Entrance into the City of Mexico Occupation of Mexico

Entrance into the City of Mexico
The final blow to General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna�s defense of Mexico City came on September 13 and 14. U.S. forces followed up the victory at Chapultepec by pursuing the retreating Mexican forces to the west-side gates of the city. In fighting that lasted throughout the afternoon of September 13, American troops under General William Worth carried the fortified Garita San Cosme, while those of John Quitman�s division captured the Garita de Bel�n. Americans killed or captured some 3,000 Mexican troops in this close, brutal, and deadly combat, while suffering 800 casualties of their own. That night, U.S. General Winfield Scott ordered his commands to reorganize, consolidate, and prepare for savage house-to-house fighting the next day. The Americans - tired, shot up, but victorious - anxiously awaited the coming dawn.

As a result of the disasters at Chapultepec and at the garitas, chaos reigned among the Mexican army and government inside the city. With the Americans inside the gates and in control of the roads to the south and west, officials believed that their cause was lost and that the capital city would soon become a battleground. Santa Anna, persuaded that the struggle was no longer worth the costs in lives and property, led the battered remnants of the Mexican national army out of town to regroup, rearm, and plot their next move.

In the early hours of September 14, instead of having to fight his way through town, Scott instead received a delegation of Mexican politicians who surrendered the city unconditionally. The U.S. army that had begun the campaign to capture Mexico City in early March now marched triumphantly to the national plaza.


Occupation of Mexico
Despite the doubtful legitimacy of the U.S. war against Mexico, in general the regular U.S. Army behaved with respect toward the institutions and the populace of the country it occupied. This was exemplified in Matamoros, where Gen. Zachary Taylor recognized the city council in office at the time and defended its continuance based on the right of jus gentium. This became a pattern in other Mexican towns, although in some municipalities, such as Tampico and Vera Cruz, the councils dissolved and the U.S. forces became military authorities with civil functions.



While in Jalapa before advancing into central Mexico, Gen. Winfield Scott calmed the population by assuring local authorities that private property, civil liberties and guarantees, as well as the church and religious freedom would be respected and that crime - even that committed by U.S. troops - would be punished. He did, however, declare martial law in order to control relations between his army and the Mexican authorities and population. Nevertheless, in its military actions, the U.S. Army did not hesitate to use its force to the fullest, even if it brought devastating consequences to the civilian population, as was observed in Monterrey, New Mexico, and Vera Cruz. The siege of Monterrey involved ferocious combat that inflicted great material losses on the population. When the inhabitants of New Mexico, led by native Tomas Ortiz, rebelled and killed Governor Charles Bent and five Anglo-Americans, Colonel Sterling Price reacted quickly, attacking the rebels at Taos. The principal leaders were killed and the rest of the rebels dispersed. In confronting resistance and fortifications at the port of Vera Cruz, the U.S. Army and marines implemented an intense bombardment of the city from March 22-26, 1847, causing about five hundred civilian deaths and significant damage to homes, buildings, and merchandise. General Scott and Commo. Matthew C. Perry capitalized on this civilian suffering; by refusing to allow the consulates of Spain and France to assist in civilian evacuation, they pressed Gen. Juan Morales to negotiate surrender.


The U.S. Army, as a warning to cities, townships, and whole vicinities, held civilian populations responsible for damages and losses to its war machine. One such case occurred in the township of Guadalupe, near Mexico City, when the town council was arrested for divesting a U.S. soldier of his weapons and his horse.

After Mexico City was occupied, General Scott officially recognized the city council, which was headed by Reyes Veramendi. He also allowed the continued functioning of the local police and granted that the civil administration continue to take charge of routine court cases, except when U.S. forces were involved or when they took on a political nature. He appointed Gen. John A. Quitman military governor. In consideration for its protection, the U.S. Army charged the city council 150,000 pesos, which was used to care for U.S. soldiers wounded during the campaign. To cover this cost, the city council pledged money from district revenue sources that remained under its control such as customs, the post, tobacco, and direct contributions. As the occupation continued, the U.S. Army increased its authority in some towns by assuming control of public works, jails, and judicial administration and by taking over the collection of various public revenues. In Mexico City, the U.S. military governor authorized gambling and assessed one thousand pesos per table per month.

At the end of 1847, U.S military authorities allowed for the renovation of city hall in Mexico City. This went against Mexican laws and was done purposely to cultivate a city government that would collaborate or accept peace terms, thereby putting pressure on the national government of Mexico, headquartered in Queretaro. Some Mexican politicians were under the impression that if the country were not to lose its autonomy altogether, it must submit to the new U.S. order. One of these was Francisco Suarez Iriarte, who began the movement to renovate Mexico City's city hall. He was named president of the new municipal assembly, one of the first functions of which was to change the city's political definition to that of state. These advantages did not prevent the U.S. occupiers from demanding a new loan of 668,000 pesos, which the municipal assembly was obliged to pass on to the people in the form of a 6-percent tax on revenues and other payments.


Foreign trade, formerly heavily taxed under the Mexican fiscal system, was simplified under U.S. control of maritime customs. The U.S. military levied a low tax, which helped the government finance war costs. The state monopoly on tobacco was also abolished, as well as the tax on domestic trade. During the occupation, the U.S. forces paid for their provisions, which caused a flow of dollars in occupied areas and facilitated the circulation of foodstuffs and merchandise.

U.S. forces caused little disturbance among the locals and conducted themselves well in the churches. They developed a curious language to make themselves understood, especially with the peddlers of fruit and trinkets.

Nevertheless the conduct of the U.S. volunteers left much to be desired. After an area was occupied, and there was little left to do, they often resorted to theft and treated the Mexicans abusively. This was plain from the outset of the war, when Texas volunteers preyed on the ranches in northern Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon. The U.S. Army installed public pillories in Mexico City to punish soldiers and volunteers who disobeyed the law. There, U.S. culprits were flogged along with Mexican offenders.

To amuse themselves in the Mexican capital, U.S soldiers enjoyed the shows at the Nuevo Mexico Teatro and frequented the dance halls on Coliseo and Betlemitas Calles. In the Hotel Bella-Union, they set up a canteen where there were gambling tables and prostitutes. U.S. citizens published various newspapers during the U.S occupation of Mexico, in which they reported the progress of the war, promoted factionalism among Mexicans, and advertised various businesses and shows.


source:



http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/war/occupation_of_mexic o.html

Edited by Jalisco Lancer

Understanding the internal disputes in Mexico and the Mexican nation before the Mexican American War.

Liberals and conservatives had radically different visions for the political organization of the country. The Mexican American war happens almost at the mid point of this five-decade struggle. This long political fight frames the loss of Texas and the West. The centrist constitution, favored by conservatives, was one of the issues which encouraged Texans to leave Mexico. And the sharp political differences proved fatal when organizing a defense against the American invasion.


What follows is a more detailed explanation of the differences between the two factions, the features and arguments in favor of a centrist government, and its final repercussions.


Until the French were expelled at the end of the Mexican Second Empire, Mexico had not fully resolved the issue of what kind of a country it would be.

There were two radical camps: the conservatives and the liberals. The liberals favored a federalist republic patterned after the U.S., with independent, autonomous states. The conservatives favored a constitutional monarchy or a centrist government, with department instead of states.

There main difference between these two kinds of governments, as proposed by Mexicans at the time, is that the centrists saw Mexico as a single country that would have regional administrators whose appointments occurred at the federal level whereas liberals wanted independent states whose governors were elected locally.

In many practical ways, the centrist government was not too different from a monarchy, making it very appealing to conservatives.

An outright centrist government would have been a good choice for Mexico. It actually reflected the political reality of the nation and had a stronger connection to the political precedent of the prior 300 years. Its main weakness was that it failed to address the problem of disenfranchised nationals living far away from the capital, but I am sure that some kind of solution could have been found had Mexico not been in civil war for five decades, and the liberal objections to centrism had been seriously taken into consideration.

In hindsight, the liberal project of mapping the American Constitution on Mexico was ludicrous in many different ways. First, it seems that most Mexican liberals ignored how difficult it was to actually come up with the American Constitution in the first place. The American Constitution reflected the historical and contemporary political reality of the American nation. The reality of the former British colonies was that there were 13 centers of power, many of them very different in culture, character, economy, and ethnic composition. The reality was that there were in fact 13 different nations�states�that were united for their best interest in a Republic, but kept a lot of power for the locals to decide. Most importantly, the American colonies were used to local self-governing and that is what came natural to them.

This was not the situation in Mexico. For 300 years, Mexico was a province of the Spanish empire, and most cities in Mexico looked towards Mexico City the way Mexico City looked towards the capital of Spain. Most of the decisions were expected to come from the center. At the same time, the regional capitals functioned also as centers of power. Local power was exercised by simply doing whatever the local leader thought was correct, even when it went against instructions from the central authority, although never explicitly going against the orders from the capital.

More pragmatic times would have democratized the already existing power structures in Mexico. A centrist government with semi-independent departments would have been a good compromise. Maybe the regional administrators could have been elected locally so that they could better represent local interests to the national government could have been included to satisfy the demands of the liberals. Conservatives should have realized that a monarchy would never work in independent Mexico because too many Mexicans were opposed to it.

But the times wouldn�t allow such a pragmatic compromise. Each side was radicalized. No side would ever grant any concession to the other. Moderates were looked with suspicion by both liberals and conservatives, and because of this, they were often ineffective leaders.

When one side seized power, they often revamped the Mexican government and expelled political enemies from the administration. In the mean time, their opponents plotted ways of grabbing power away from them, started revolts, or did anything in their power to bring failure to the projects started by those in power. The Mexican Army played a huge role in Mexican politics at the time since gaining their favor was often the deciding factor on which side was going to be in power.


It is important to stress that most Mexicans didn't care one way or the other, and that many lacked any identity as belonging to the Mexican nation. Most Mexicans saw their local regions as their true "country", (patria chica), which most were eager to defend, but didn't really care for Mexico as a country, so they were not as eager to defend it.

The issue of determining what kind of nation Mexico would be was finally resolved when liberals won the decisive political battle with the expulsion of the French forces and the end of the Second Mexican Empire. Mexico was going to be a federal republic� at least in appearance. Mexico has been run as a centrist government for the vast majority of its existence ever since, but keeping with federalist forms.

Originally posted by Jalisco Lancer Originally posted by Raider Originally posted by Jalisco Lancer April 20, 1836 -- Houston lets his force be "trapped" by Santa Anna's column, near the San Jacinto ferry crossing. There is a brief skirmish, and then the Texan force returns to its camp, grumbling at Houston. Santa Anna keeps his men under arms all night, assuming a night attack was coming. Nothing happens. April 21, 1836 -- Santa Anna's force of about 1,200 is over-run in broad daylight by a sudden attack on its camp by Houston's entire Texan force, then numbering 918. With the Texan camp only about a mile way over open terrain, Santa Anna had apparently posted no sentinels before retiring for a siesta and letting his tired troops do the same. The Texans lost nine dead and 30 wounded. Houston, who led from the front, lost two horses and was shot in the foot. Santa Anna, captured the next day in the bushes, agreed to recognize Texas independence and ordered all Mexican forces to evacuate Texas. Yesterday evening I saw a movie about Alamo. In the end the Texans frontaly charged the fortified camp of Santa Anna, who waited for them. According to the movie the Texan broke Mexican resistence in 18 minutes. I knew that something is wrong with the story, it was totally unbelievable. Well, at El Alamo the texicans were completelly overwhellmed and slaughtered inside the Mission. At San Jacinto, the Texicans attacked frontally Santa Anna's camp. But those were completelly 2 different battles as well as the outcome.

That does sound a lot more like San Jacinto.  Were both actions covered in the movie?

 

Originally posted by pikeshot1600 Originally posted by Jalisco Lancer Originally posted by Raider Originally posted by Jalisco Lancer April 20, 1836 -- Houston lets his force be "trapped" by Santa Anna's column, near the San Jacinto ferry crossing. There is a brief skirmish, and then the Texan force returns to its camp, grumbling at Houston. Santa Anna keeps his men under arms all night, assuming a night attack was coming. Nothing happens. April 21, 1836 -- Santa Anna's force of about 1,200 is over-run in broad daylight by a sudden attack on its camp by Houston's entire Texan force, then numbering 918. With the Texan camp only about a mile way over open terrain, Santa Anna had apparently posted no sentinels before retiring for a siesta and letting his tired troops do the same. The Texans lost nine dead and 30 wounded. Houston, who led from the front, lost two horses and was shot in the foot. Santa Anna, captured the next day in the bushes, agreed to recognize Texas independence and ordered all Mexican forces to evacuate Texas. Yesterday evening I saw a movie about Alamo. In the end the Texans frontaly charged the fortified camp of Santa Anna, who waited for them. According to the movie the Texan broke Mexican resistence in 18 minutes. I knew that something is wrong with the story, it was totally unbelievable. Well, at El Alamo the texicans were completelly overwhellmed and slaughtered inside the Mission. At San Jacinto, the Texicans attacked frontally Santa Anna's camp. But those were completelly 2 different battles as well as the outcome. That does sound a lot more like San Jacinto.  Were both actions covered in the movie?

Yes, but I mean San Jacinto. Above you wrote that Mexicans slept and there was no guards. In this movie they were difinitively aware of the coming attack and waited it.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0318974/

Originally posted by pikeshot1600 Raider: Jalisco may know more, but I recall that the Mexicans expected a night attack, both forces being encamped close by to each other.  Santa Anna may not have been Napoleon, but I doubt there were no sentries.  Most likely, a large prtion of his force remained on alert all night. Movies are rotten sources of historical information.

Oh I just read Jalisco's post.  he already said all that.  Sorry.

 

From the operational perspective, there were three army and two navy campaigns conducted:

Maj Gen. Zachary Taylor's corps driving the Mexican army across the Rio Bravo (Rio Grande) and away from the border recognized by the US.

Brig Gen Stephen Kearny's corps proceding down the Santa Fe Trail to sieze New Mexico.

Commodore David Conner's squadron conducting the US force under Winfield Scott to Vera Cruz, a base of operations on the shortest practical route to Mexico City.

Maj Gen. Winfield Scott's campaign to take Mexico City and force a settlement on the Mexican government.

Commodore Robert Stockton's squadron capturing coastal positions in California (land forces under John C. Fremont).  There was minimal fighting in California, and almost none in New Mexico.

Taylor's operations over the Rio Grande separated Mexican attention from Tampico and Vera Cruz.  Once Vera Cruz had been secured as a port of debarcation, after the surrender of San Juan de Ulua fortress, US forces could be resupplied by sea from New Orleans and Texas.  Much of Taylor's corps was then transfered to Scott for the campaign against Mexico City.

Jalisco gives good accounts of the actions of the war in the "battle reports."

How about assessments of the character and capability of the two armies?

 

 

 

Edited by pikeshot1600