The Mexican American War debate

As result of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexico lost
California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and portions of Colorado, Wyoming, Oklahoma, and Kansas to the United States at the end of the war in 1848.



I will post some articles and info about the negaotiations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and how the policy of All Mexico failed to prevail, as well as the conflicts between the US Negotiator, Nicholas Trist and the Pres. James Polk.

Raider:

Jalisco may know more, but I recall that the Mexicans expected a night attack, both forces being encamped close by to each other.  Santa Anna may not have been Napoleon, but I doubt there were no sentries.  Most likely, a large prtion of his force remained on alert all night.

Movies are rotten sources of historical information.

 

I saw The Alamo back in 2004 and yes that movie covers also the Battle of San Jacinto including the capture of Santa Anna.

Originally posted by Raider Originally posted by Jalisco Lancer April 20, 1836 -- Houston lets his force be "trapped" by Santa Anna's column, near the San Jacinto ferry crossing. There is a brief skirmish, and then the Texan force returns to its camp, grumbling at Houston. Santa Anna keeps his men under arms all night, assuming a night attack was coming. Nothing happens. April 21, 1836 -- Santa Anna's force of about 1,200 is over-run in broad daylight by a sudden attack on its camp by Houston's entire Texan force, then numbering 918. With the Texan camp only about a mile way over open terrain, Santa Anna had apparently posted no sentinels before retiring for a siesta and letting his tired troops do the same. The Texans lost nine dead and 30 wounded. Houston, who led from the front, lost two horses and was shot in the foot. Santa Anna, captured the next day in the bushes, agreed to recognize Texas independence and ordered all Mexican forces to evacuate Texas. Yesterday evening I saw a movie about Alamo. In the end the Texans frontaly charged the fortified camp of Santa Anna, who waited for them. According to the movie the Texan broke Mexican resistence in 18 minutes. I knew that something is wrong with the story, it was totally unbelievable.

Well, at El Alamo the texicans were completelly overwhellmed and slaughtered inside the Mission.
At San Jacinto, the Texicans attacked frontally Santa Anna's camp. But those were completelly 2 different battles as well as the outcome.

Originally posted by Jalisco Lancer April 20, 1836 -- Houston lets his force be "trapped" by Santa Anna's column, near the San Jacinto ferry crossing. There is a brief skirmish, and then the Texan force returns to its camp, grumbling at Houston. Santa Anna keeps his men under arms all night, assuming a night attack was coming. Nothing happens. April 21, 1836 -- Santa Anna's force of about 1,200 is over-run in broad daylight by a sudden attack on its camp by Houston's entire Texan force, then numbering 918. With the Texan camp only about a mile way over open terrain, Santa Anna had apparently posted no sentinels before retiring for a siesta and letting his tired troops do the same. The Texans lost nine dead and 30 wounded. Houston, who led from the front, lost two horses and was shot in the foot. Santa Anna, captured the next day in the bushes, agreed to recognize Texas independence and ordered all Mexican forces to evacuate Texas.

Yesterday evening I saw a movie about Alamo. In the end the Texans frontaly charged the fortified camp of Santa Anna, who waited for them. According to the movie the Texan broke Mexican resistence in 18 minutes. I knew that something is wrong with the story, it was totally unbelievable.



Edited by Jalisco Lancer

Call to Arms !!!


The Organization of the Mexican Army
A Conversation With William DePalo, Jr.
The University of New Mexico

The Mexican army of 1846 rostered 18,882 permanent troops (permanentes) organized into 12 infantry regiments (of two battalions each), eight regiments and one separate squadron of cavalry, three brigades of artillery, one dragoon brigade and one battalion of sappers. Supplementing the permanentes were 10,495 active militiamen (activos) apportioned into nine infantry and six cavalry regiments. Commanded by permanent army officers, the militia was supposed to be activated only in times of emergency; in reality, however, most units were retained on active duty indefinitely. Posted along the northern periphery, presidial companies (presidiales) reported 1,174 additional troops. Poorly trained and inadequately outfitted, these frontier units were too far removed to affect the correlation of forces in the main theaters of war.

These standing formations were allocated among five territorially delineated military divisions and five commandancies-general. A general staff was in place to coordinate the concentration of brigade and division-size units to practice the linear tactics necessary for conventional battlefield success. The regional dispersal of forces, however, impeded centralized military authority and abetted localism. Proposals to regroup scattered permanent army formations into single garrison divisions where units could train routinely under the supervision of experienced officers were not realized before the outbreak of hostilities with the United States.

This regional force distribution scheme compelled the war ministry to confront foreign aggression with extemporaneous armies assembled from the most readily available formations. Generally, the ranks of these hastily assembled composite armies were filled with conscripts impressed into service via the detested levy (leva). Prone to desertion, mutiny and larceny, such draftees were difficult to train and discipline, but fought reasonably well when led resolutely. The repetitive creation of improvised armies kept Mexican units from acquiring the cohesion and esprit necessary to persevere under trying circumstances. On battlefields where small unit leadership and individual initiative were keys to success, such melded organizations were decidedly disadvantaged.

The lone exception to such improvisation was Division General Mariano Arista's 5,200-man Army of the North. Created in the wake of the loss of Texas to guard the extended R�o Grande frontier, it was Mexico's most experienced military formation and the one that engaged General Zachary Taylor's Army of Occupation in all four of the northern campaign's major battles. Redeployed to the Valley of Mexico in July 1847, under the command of Division General Gabriel Valencia, the Army of the North bore the brunt of the action at Padierna and, thereafter, ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.

General Winfield Scott's impending advance into the Mexican heartland prompted the war ministry to activate the Army of the East in March 1847. Commanded by General President Antonio L�pez de Santa Anna, this 11,000-man force was an amalgamation of units posted in central Mexico, fragments from the Army of the North and remnants of the defeated Veracruz garrison. Following its disintegration at Cerro Gordo, the Army of the East was reconstituted under the command of Brigade General Manuel Mar�a Lombardini with the survivors of that battle and selected national guard (guardia nacional) battalions. Comprised of both middle and lower class residents of the valley, these national guard troopers had a vested interest in preserving their homes and fought tenaciously to defend the capital's perimeter strongpoints.

Responsibility for interdicting Scott's communications with Puebla and guarding the line from Acapulco to Mexico City was entrusted to the 3,000-man Army of the South. Commanded by the obdurate southern cacique Juan �lvarez, this predominately cavalry formation influenced the war only minimally, until Molino del Rey, when �lvarez' unwillingness to commit his cavalry likely affected the outcome of that engagement. A 3,800-man contingent under the nominal leadership of Division General Nicol�s Bravo rounded out the valley campaign's force structure. Designated the Army of the Center, this ad hoc organization was initially positioned to protect the Mexicalzingo-San Antonio line. Thereafter, elements of the Army of the Center participated in the Churubusco bridgehead fight and the defense of Chapultepec.

Lacking established government depots, Mexican soldiers routinely procured supplies from nearby communities or foraged off the land. Since local purchases were habitually compensated with unredeemable drafts on the treasury, troops often went hungry. The army's systemic logistical deficiencies were recompensed, in part, by soldiers' wives and girlfriends (soldaderas) who invariably accompanied each campaign. By performing essential sewing, cooking, maintenance and foraging duties, and ministering to the sick and wounded of both armies, soldaderas made a significant contribution to the Mexican war effort.

Army Life: Mexican Army
by Donald S. Frazier

Life in the Mexican Army The Mexican army of 1821 to 1854 was composed largely of peasants who were either drafted or dragooned into service. Thus, the culture and social life of the Mexican rank and file while under arms reflected that of Mexico as a whole. Like their civilian counterparts, the soldados of Mexico enjoyed music, paid dutiful attention to Catholic ritual, if not tenets, were self-reliant in terms of medicines and food, maintained a healthy cynicism toward their government, and pursued various forms of recreation including talking, drinking, and games of skill and chance. Largely illiterate, the common soldiers who fought for Mexico spent little time keeping diaries, writing letters, or reading books; rather, these were activities that distinguished the officer corps. One of the aspects that had the most profound effect on the culture of the Mexican army in the first three decades of independence was the large number of women accompanying the troops.

Music abounded. From the fairly sophisticated brass bands that accompanied every army to the simple wooden flutes of the privates, the tunes of Castilian marches and Indian corridos floated from the midst of every encampment. In 1836 when Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna marched north to suppress the rebellion in Texas, his advance guard of 2,000 men was accompanied by a band numbering 150 members. The band book included tunes inherited from the Spanish Armv, revolutionary airs like the Marseillaise, and campesino waltzes that reminded them of home. One observer from the early stages of the siege of the Alamo noted that the band frequently played selections from the opera The Barber of Seville.

For a Catholic army, priests were required on the march. These men were more than the obligatory chaplains of the U.S. armies and served the dual role of confessor and enforcer. The Catholic calendar was respected in the field to varying degrees depending on the forcefulness of the army's clerics. Before battle, priests offered prayers and blessings; after the fight, they offered rites and absolution.

The true keepers of the soldiers' morale, however, were the ubiquitous soldaderas. These women had no official role in the army but tagged along with their husbands, brothers, customers, and lovers as they had since the earliest days. These women served a variety of useful roles, including those of laundress, cook, nurse, and maid. This informal relationship became such a part of Mexican war planning that logistics often were neglected by military officials with the expectation that the soldaderas would make up for any deficiencies.

Mexican soldiers had to endure the effects of a poor system of logistics and medical care. Food was often scarce and had to be pressed from local residents as the army passed. Animals, too, were often requisitioned. As a result, troops often spent time away from camp foraging for supplies. In combat, the rank and file's weapons and ammunition were unreliable. Powder and shot were often in short supply throughout the Mexican military, and soldados often faced U.S. forces with less than a full cartridge box. Men wounded in battle faced a grim future. The medical corps of the Mexican army was virtually nonexistent, and even a modest injury could result in weeks of agony and death. Soldiers who did not receive attention from relatives or friends were often abandoned by their officers.

A reality of the Mexican army was the gulf that separated the enlisted ranks from their officers. Considered a bastion of wealth and privilege, the officer corps was filled with aristocrats who had little concern for the welfare of their men. These leaders, more often than not, saw their position as an opportunity for personal glory and financial gain. As a result, payrolls disappeared, phantom soldiers remained on rolls for pay and supply purposes, and food and ammunition often became "lost." While on campaign, Santa Anna referred to his men as "mere chickens" and viewed their lives simply as tools for advancing his career. Military justice was often arbitrary, and punishments in camp, for crimes real and imagined, were severe, ranging from execution by hanging or firing squad to flogging, branding, and cropping. Ever so, when called on by these same officers to perform heroically, the soldados did their duty to the best of their ability.

Another feature of the Mexican army of 1821 to 1854 is that it spent more time fighting other Mexicans in the various coups and in the service of the various caudillos than it did fighting foreigners. As a result, battles were not as lethal and campaigns not as protracted as those that would be experienced when fighting the United States, Texas, France, Spain, or Indians.

When out of the watchful eye of priests and officers, the men of the Mexican army enjoyed the universal pastimes pursued by soldiers worldwide. Gambling was commonplace, from cards to dice to horse races in mounted regiments. Mexican soldiers often composed poems and songs as satire of their plight. Fandangos, impromptu dances accompanied by drinking, were favorites in an army in the field.



source:
http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/war/mexican_army.html

The American Army in the Mexican War: An Overview
A Conversation With Richard Bruce Winders
Historian and Curator, The Alamo

The United States had two armies during the 19th century. The first, a standing army commonly referred to as the U.S. Army, had been authorized by the Congress in 1789. Designated the regular army, this force was composed of officers commissioned by Congress and enlisted men who joined for a five year period. In 1792, Congress created a second army intended as an auxiliary to the regulars called the militia. One major difference between the regulars and militia was the first was a national force while the second was the armies of the various states. Congress stipulated three instances when the militia could be called into federal service: to execute the laws of the United States, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions. This two-tiered arrangement formed the basis of the American military establishment during the Mexican War.

The U.S. Army was unprepared for war. While Congress had authorized a strength of 8,613 men and officers, the actual number of soldiers in uniform was fewer than 5,500. Many of the regimental commanders had entered the service before the War of 1812 and were too elderly and infirm for active duty. Companies were far below their authorized strength of forty-two privates with many carrying only half that number on their rolls. Reacting to the poor state of the army once war broke out, Congress increased the number of privates within individual companies to one hundred. It also created a company of the U.S. Engineers as well a new regiment of U.S. Mounted Rifles. These measures turned out be stopgaps at best.

The presence of a large number of graduates from the United States Military Academy worked in favor of the U.S. Army. These officers, mostly lieutenants and captains, formed a tight knit corps whose leadership ability and training helped offset the initial shortage of manpower. Historians point out that their ranks included men such as George G. Meade, Ulysses S. Grant, George B. McClellan, P.G.T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, Joseph E. Johnston, and Robert E. Lee, officers who later went on to command the great armies of the Civil War.

The militia system had already proven unreliable by the time of the Mexican War and had undergone substantial revision. Two issues emerged during the War of 1812 that demonstrated its flaws. First, many states prohibited their troops from participating in military operations on foreign soil. Second, by law a militiaman could only serve for a period of ninety days, meaning that recruiting, training, and marshaling occupied most of a unit's time with little left over for campaigning. As a solution to this problem, Congress created a subclass of militia called volunteers who were not confined by these two restrictions. On May 13, 1846, Congress authorized President Polk to raise 50,000 12-month volunteers.

Although both composed a part of the American Army, regulars and volunteers were notably different. Observers noted little interaction between officers and men, with each occupying a clearly defined station within the military establishment. Most Americans avoided enlisting in the regulars, guaranteeing that a high percentage of privates, corporals, and sergeants were foreign born. The combination of aristocratic officers and foreign "hirelings" made many Americans suspicious of the regulars. After all, what American citizen would settle for $7 a month as an army private unless forced to by dire circumstance? The volunteer, on the other hand, seemed to fit the spirit of the young republic because he was a citizen-soldier. Politics entered into the system as most volunteers elected their own officers. Volunteer units were raised locally, allowing friends, neighbors, and relatives to serve together. Although nominally under federal authority, volunteers maintained strong ties to their home states. The democratic nature of the volunteers meant that discipline in this corps was more lax than in the regulars.

More troops were needed as the war progressed. In November 1846, Congress issued an additional call for volunteers after realizing that most of the one year men would leave at the expiration of their terms. This second wave of volunteers was enlisted for the duration of the war. On February 11, 1847, Congress created ten additional regiments of regulars to serve for the period of the war. In all, 26,922 regulars and 73,260 volunteers served at some point during the Mexican War.

The combat elements were the same for both the regulars and the volunteers. The majority of troops were raised and trained as infantry and armed with flintlock muskets. The regulars maintained two regiments of light cavalry called dragoons with a third created for the war. Several regiments of mounted volunteers were raised that served mainly with Taylor's Army of Occupation and Kearny's Army of the West. Artillery formed the third branch of service. Just prior to the outbreak of the war, the army equipped several companies as "flying artillery" in which each cannoneer had his own mount. The innovation meant that the unit could gallop around the battlefield, bringing its guns to bear wherever they were most needed. This style of artillery was instrumental in several U.S. victories.

Readers who like military history will find the battles and leaders of the Mexican War extremely interesting. The American military is fascinating, too, because it reveals much about society in the Age of Jackson. Several works are recommended to those who want to learn more about the American Army in the Mexican War. John Porter Bloom's 1953 Emory University Ph.D. dissertation, "With the American Army in Mexico, 1846-1848," remains an outstanding study of the American soldier in Mexico. More accessible to most readers will be James M. McCaffrey's Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846-1848. A more recent work which examines the army is Richard Bruce Winders' "Mr. Polk's Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War." Also recommended are the many volumes of published letters and diaries that place the war on a personal level, giving the reader a "soldier's eye view" of the war.

Life in the U.S. Army
by James M. McCaffrey

At the outbreak of war with Mexico the U.S. Army had only 8,600 officers and men, and almost half were assigned to frontier defense. In addition, more than thirty years had elapsed since the last war, and, except for those with experience fighting Indians, most of the soldiers had no combat experience. In response to the manpower shortage Congress authorized the president to call up 50,000 volunteers, who, after receiving a bare minimum of training, left for Mexico.

These additional troops were necessary for victory, but even though they were subject to the same regulations as those in the regular army their arrival caused friction with the regulars. During peace time, many saw the army as simply a place of refuge for those men who were unable to earn an honest living anywhere else. Although most of the regular officers were professionally educated, the enlisted men came from the low end of the socioeconomic ladder; approximately 40 percent were immigrants and a third of them were illiterate. Now, suddenly, it was fashionable to be in the army, and the regulars resented these newcomers for their absence of training and their appalling lack of discipline.

The volunteers quickly learned that soldiering was not all flag waving and martial glory. The food was often bad, the housing primitive, and the threat of disease always present. The soldier's basic ration consisted of beef or pork, hard bread (or flour or cornmeal with which to bake bread), peas, beans, or rice, and a little salt, sugar, and coffee as available. Each member of a squad took his turn preparing the food. Often the various articles were put into a camp kettle and boiled for hours into an easily digestible soup. There were ways to supplement this meager fare. Some men sampled the local cuisine, but many found it too spicy. Others patronized civilian sutlers who set up shop wherever the army was. Many raided local gardens and orchards, although army regulations strictly forbade all uncompensated foraging. The volunteers soon earned an unsavory reputation for this practice.

Upon arrival in Mexico, most of the troops lived in canvas tents. These simple affairs, each designed to accommodate six men and their bedrolls, offered far less protection against the wind and rain than even the rudest log cabins back home. As the war progressed and U.S. forces occupied towns, Mexican government buildings served as barracks. Yellow fever, malaria, dysentery, smallpox, measles, and various other diseases prevalent in Mexico were a constant scourge to the U.S. soldiers and killed far more than did Mexican bullets. The lack of attention to hygiene exhibited by many of the volunteers left them particularly susceptible to illness. Treatment of the sick and wounded in army hospitals was probably comparable to what was available in the United States. Army doctors were, on average, as capable as their civilian counterparts, but the general state of medical knowledge was such that treatments offered were not always beneficial to the patient. When the overworked surgeons encountered a wounded soldier with a limb shattered by a heavy musket ball, they often did not have time to do mud more than amputate it quickly before moving on to the next patient.

On the march, the U.S. soldier traveled as lightly as possible, since every ounce of extra weight made it that much more difficult to continue in the heat and dust. Still, with a nine-and-a-half pound musket, ammunition, a bayonet, a canteen of water, a haversack in which to carry food and small personal items, and a blanket, even soldiers carrying the bare essentials often plodded along with thirty or more pounds of gear.

Soldiers in camp sought various means by which to reduce their boredom. Some attended Mexican fandangos where they sought the company of young women. Some found solace in drink, and this often led to violations of military rules. Soldiers committing offenses faced court martial proceedings, but the Articles of War gave the courts considerable leeway in assessing penalties. Consequently, two soldiers committing identical crimes but tried by different courts might receive vastly different sentences. These sentences ran the gamut from a few hours in the guardhouse for drunkenness to death by hanging for desertion.

In many ways, the U.S. soldiers who fought in Mexico were the same as their brothers in arms of other periods. They complained about their food, they groused about incompetent officers, they belittled the ethnic character of their enemies, and they believed in their ultimate military success.


source:
http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/war/american_army.html

Hi Pikeshoot, here's where the history gets complicated.

The cou ntry was deeply divided since the achievement of the independence. The economy was collpased due the multiple internal wars and the foreign wars agaisnt Spain and France, plus the failed Texas campaing.

Yucatan Peninsula ( comprising Yucatan, Campeche and Quintana Roo states ) secced from Mexico in 1840.
Yucatan signed an agreement of Commerce and Mutual Assistance Agreement with Texas and when the war against the US started, Yucatan declared neutrality and even offered to be annexhed to the US.

Texas which independence was never recognized by Mexico was annexhed by the US as another state in 1845. The short lived republic boundaries with Mexico were delimited by the Nueces River. However, the US claimed the border to be stablished at the Bravo River or Rio Grande.

The Federalist and the Centralist factions were in continuous clashings.

In 1844, General Jose Joaquin Herrera removed from office to Gen. Valentin Canalizo and exiled to Santa Anna to Cuba

President Jose Joaquin Herrera ordered to have dispatched troops to the limits with Texas, while Taylor stablished his headquarter on the regio.
Gen. Paredes y Arrillgada revolted at San Luis Potosi agaisnt the goverment and used the troops under his command to stop the American invasion in order to remove from power to Pres. Herrera, claiming that he was negotiating with the US to give up the northern territories.

Mexico was expecting that the US and the UK could go to war in regards the US interest on Oregon. However, the US and the British goverment settled the terms for Oregon to be another US State.

Paredes y Arrillaga sent an army north to Matamoros, which put 5,000 men across the Rio Grande from Taylor's army. And, on April 23, Paredes y Arrillago proclaimed that Mexico had begun a defensive war against the United States. On April 24 the Mexican commander at Matamoros, General Mariano Arista, had the courtesy to inform Taylor that hostilities had commenced, and on the 25th he sent 1,600 men on patrol across the river. Taylor that day sent a party of 60 mounted infantry (dragoons) on patrol. Taylor had failed to have scouts about maintaining an awareness of enemy positions, and Taylor's men rode into a trap. Sixteen of Taylor's men were killed or wounded before they could withdraw.

Taylor sent a message to Washington that blood had been spilled, that the war had begun, and on the 28ththe Mexicans attacked a patrol of Texas Rangers, with nine Texan-Anglos being killed or taken prisoner.

On May 8, President Polk received Slidell, back from Mexico City. On May 9, Polk received the message about fighting from Taylor. On May 11, President Polk went before Congress to ask for a declaration of war, in response to what he said was Mexico's initiation of hostilities. "American blood," he said, "had been spilled on American soil."On the 13th, the U.S. Congress declared war, the Senate voting 40 to 2 in favor, the House voting 174 to14.

U.S. citizens were alarmed, fearing that the men under General Taylor would be overwhelmed by Mexico's larger and more experienced military. Meanwhile on May 8, back in Texas, fighting between the armies of Taylor and Arista had broken out in earnest - on Taylor's side of the Rio Grande. It was to some extend an artillery duel - artillery being the weapon with the greatest range. And Taylor's artillery was more effective. The Mexicans fought well in what became known as the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca del la Palma, two battles in two days, about five miles apart, after which the Mexicans withdrew to their side of the Rio Grande, with many killed as they crossed the river. The Mexicans lost approximately 320 killed and 700 wounded. Taylor's army lost 9 killed and 47 wounded.

Mexico had plans to blockade the Texas coasts, but those plans did not considered a war agaisnt the US.

Mexican troops stablished at Mazatlan were supposed to be sent to California. The garrison instigated by the liberals, rebeled agaisnt Paredes y Arrillaga, calling for the return of Santa Anna. The militar commnader of Guadalajara rebelled as well.

Santa Anna and Polk had an approach. Polk allowed to Santa Anna to return in a US vessel to Verazcruz and was able to cross the US blockade.

Santa Anna took the command of the Army and denominated to Valentin Gomez Farias, as President, while he prepared the defense of the country.

Taylor advanced towards Monterrey and Saltillo and fought at La Angostura. Santa Anna had to retire from the field to fleed to Mexico City.

Gomez Farias in an attempt to collect more funds for the war, declared the expropiation of properties of the Church. The conservatives rebelled and instead of marching to assist the garrison at Veracruz, revolted in Mexico City agaisnt Gomez Farias ( Rebellion of the Polkos ).

Santa Anna at Cerro Gordo ( Fat Hill ). Santa Anna did not fortified the positions on the hill, becuase accordingly with him, not even the rabbits could climb the hill.

Scott was marching from Veracruz to Puebla and Tlaxcala were he found no resistance after giving all kind of warranties to the Catholic Church that her properties will not be touched.

Scott's troops were stationated now at Valley of Mexico. Gen Valencia resisted at Padierna and Contreras. He made a brilliant defense and his flank was reinforced. Santa Anna ordered to Valencia to retire from the field and join him to defense Mexico City.

Gen. Valencia was ordered twice to leave the position and still continue to refuse. Santa Anna ordered in secret to the cavalry dispatched to cover his flank to retire without advise to Gen Valencia. The US troops then met no resistance at Valencia's flank and attacked his uncovered position. Santa Anna observed the disaster from a safer position and stated: That's what you wanted ? Now F... yourself.

Scott then advanced towards the convent of Churubusco. The position was held by the troops of Gen. Pedro Maria Anaya. It was reinforced by the Bataillon of San Patricio, the US desserters that joined the mexican army. They were incorporated as infantry instead of artillery.

The garrison soon ran out of ammo. The ammo sent by Santa Anna was not of the caliber requested and the battle soon became a melee fight.
Anaya, wounded and without ammo, ordered the surrender. When he was interrogated where the ammo and the powder was, he replied, if we had ammo, you should not be in here.

   Scott moved towards Mexico City and the last bastion on his way was the Castle of Chapultepec ( Montezuma Halls ).
The position at the bottom of the Castle was defended by a Naval Bataillon ( San Blas ) that was overwhelmed and annhiliated. The castle was defended by sappers, infantry and 200 cadets of the Militar Acdemy. This battle is remembered as an epic episode in our national history.

   Gen Juan Alvarez was observing the battle with 5,000 cavalry men and did not participated on the battle. Trying to keep his resources for the war aftermath.

   There were examples of cowardice and uncompetence. Brave soldiers eager to protect Mexico, but also the interest of local warlords, the Catholich Church and the Army that interfered on the defense of the Fatherland. A shameful episode. Only the French Mexican War could redime our history and make us whortly as a nation.


Edited by Jalisco Lancer

The ten-year existence of this sovereign state further complicated the disputed border. Mexico never recognized the independence of Texas and therefore claimed the 1819 borders as intact. The United States, as well as Great Britain and France, however, did approve of Texas's claim to nationhood. The question remained as to the precise western and southern borders of the nation. In 1836, Texas pressed a frontier claim south to the Rio Grande and west to its source in spite of the lack of historical precedent. This put into dispute the Trans-Nueces region, or the Seno Mexicano, long a part of the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, as well as most of Nuevo Mexico. In subsequent years, Texas legislatures claimed even more Mexican territory, eventually laying claim to the Californias. Starting in 1841, Texas attempted to press its claim to eastern New Mexico militarily, but without success.

Diplomacy would intervene to settle the issue, or so it appeared. An armistice between Texas and Mexico in 1844 hinted at recognition of Texas independence, but the boundaries remained at issue. Meanwhile, Lone Star agents worked for annexation to the United States, a goal sought by the vast majority of Texans. Their efforts, however, were themselves retarded by the vagueness of Texas borders as the issue aggravated fears of abolitionists that slavery would be extended across the continent.

In 1845, the United States had worked out its own reluctance regarding the expansion of slavery and intervened in the question of national boundaries once again by annexing Texas through a joint resolution of Congress. That same year, it settled its dispute with Great Britain over the Oregon country. When Gen. Zachary Taylor's army moved from U.S. territory to Corpus Christi, Texas, all observers realized that the issue of borders between the United States and Mexico would be resolved at the point of the bayonet. Indeed, by the end of the U.S.-Mexican War, not only had Texas been secured, but so had a large swath of territory including Alta California, Nuevo Mexico, and large portions of the Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora in a vast tract known simply as the Mexican Cession. Even with this enormous acquisition, many in the United States advocated the annexation of all of Mexico and grumbled at their government's failure to do so.

http://www.pbs.org/kera/usmexicanwar/war/palo_alto.html

Hi Pikeshoot, indeed the motives of the war was not to absorb Catholic/Spanish population, but that's what prevented to entire Mexico being absorbed as part of the policy All Mexico. I will show some sources to back up this during the debate.
Basically letters fron Nicholas Trist to Pre. Polk in 1848 during the negotiations that ended into the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

Regards

Edited by Jalisco Lancer

Mexico, Texas, The Republic of Rio Grande, The Republic of Yucatan, San Antonio Expedition of 1842

In 1839 a series of federalist revolts of considerable proportions broke out in different sections of Mexico and for two years the centralist regime was in almost constant danger. General Urrea, who had directed the massacre of the Texans under Johnson and Grant in 1836, was one of the outstanding leaders of this movement, and for a time he was very successful. Gomez Farias, who had been vice-president during the early part of Santa Anna�s administration, returned from exile and also took a hand in the effort to restore the constitution of 1824. In Coahuila and the adjoining territory General Canales headed a movement, which culminated in a declaration of independence and the establishment of the "republic of the Rio Grande." Yucatan and Tabasco, two states bordering on the gulf, at the extreme southern end of Mexico, also set up for themselves as the republic of Yucatan. Bustamante found himself continually menaced from some quarter or another, and his authority became only nominal in many sections of the country. Santa Anna, using his new popularity with a calculating discretion, managed to inject himself into the situation from time to time in such a way as to attach glory to his own name without increasing the prestige of Bustamante. By these tactics he finally succeeded in creating a widespread demand for his return to power, and in accordance with a plan, known as the Bases of Tacubaya, he was declared provisional president of the republic on October 9, 1841.

The "Republic of the Rio Grande," though shortlived, was viewed with favor in Texas. General Canales made overtures to Lamar looking to an alliance, but the latter�s vision of the great nation of the future did not extend south of the Rio Grande, and he declined to have anything to do with the new "republic." Many Texans, however, on their own responsibility, enlisted as volunteers in the service of the "republic of the Rio Grande," and participated in several battles in Coahuila before the project finally collapsed.

But Lamar took a different attitude toward the Republic of Yucatan, which had a considerable coast line to defend. The vessels for the new Texas navy were delivered in 1839, and when the government of Yucatan proposed to Lamar a plan of naval cooperation he consented to the arrangement. The Yucatan government agreed to supply the money for the support of the Texas navy if it would enlist in a war upon Mexican vessels and provide adequate protection to Yucatan�s coast. As this would relieve the Texas treasury of a considerable burden, apparently without diverting the navy from its main business, Lamar regarded it as a favorable arrangement for Texas. It did not turn out to be so favorable for Texas in the long run, but for a period the Texas navy was practically transferred to the service of Yucatan. In passing, it should be said that the republic of Yucatan maintained its independence for three years, after which it peacefully acknowledged the authority of the central government of Mexico again.

Lamar declined to form an alliance with the "republic of the Rio Grande" for the reason that he was not particularly interested in extending the influence of Texas south of that river. But he was very much interested in extending, not only the influence, but the actual jurisdiction of the Texan government in another direction. The boundaries of the Republic of Texas, as understood by the Texan government, were set forth in an act of congress, approved by President Houston on December 19, 1836. This act provided that from and after its passage "the civil and political jurisdiction of this republic be and is hereby declared to extend to the following boundaries, to-wit: beginning at the mouth of the Sabine river, and running west along the Gulf of Mexico three leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande, thence up the principal stream of said river to its source, thence due north to the forty-second degree of north latitude, thence along the boundary line as defined in the treaty between the United States and Spain, to the beginning." The act also authorized the President to "open a negotiation with the government of the United States of America, as soon as in his opinion the public interest requires it, to ascertain and define the boundary line as agreed upon in said treaty." No difficulty had been experienced in negotiating a treaty of limits with the United States, but, because of the continuance of a state of war with Mexico, there had been no agreement with respect to the rest of the boundaries. The boundaries, as set forth in the act, included a line running from the mouth of the Rio Grande "up the principal stream of said river to its source," and this constituted an assertion of jurisdiction over territory which had never been within the province of Texas during the Spanish regime, and much of which had never even been part of the state of Texas and Coahuila. Lamar proposed that this doubtful territory should be brought under the actual jurisdiction of the Texan government.

The town of Santa Fe, the principal settlement in New Mexico, was on the east bank of the Rio Grande, and consequently within the limits of the Republic of Texas, as defined in the act quoted above. During Houston�s administration no attempt was made to enforce the jurisdiction thus declared, for there really was no legal basis for this boundary, other than the claim of the Texans, and it was generally recognized that the line was subject to modification through negotiation with Mexico, whenever formal peace should be agreed upon. When Lamar became president, however, he took the position that the government of the Republic of Texas should adopt measures to extend its authority to the upper waters of the Rio Grande, which would include Santa Fe. In his annual message in 1839 he urged upon congress the importance of some action in the matter. This was in keeping with Lamar�s "ambitious nationalism" and his dream of "an empire extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific." Bills were subsequently introduced in both houses of congress, appropriating money to defray the expenses of an expedition to establish Texan authority over the territory, but in both cases the proposal was decisively defeated. In spite of such legislative disapproval of the project, however, Lamar persisted in the belief that it should be undertaken.

On April 14, 1840, Lamar addressed a letter to "the citizens of Santa Fe," calling their attention to the fact that Texas had entered the family of nations, that the new republic had been recognized by the United States and France, and that its commerce was extending "with a power and celerity seldom equalled in the history of nations." He tendered to them a full participation in these blessings, and expressed the hope that he should be able to send commissioners to visit them in September to explain more minutely the condition of the country, the seaboard, and the correlative interests "which so emphatically recommend, and ought perpetually to cement, the perfect union and identity of Santa Fe and Texas."

This letter was inspired by information Lamar had received to the effect that the people of Santa Fe and adjoining settlements in New Mexico were restless under the rule of the governor of the territory. That dignitary, one Manuel Armijo, was a local despot, who had been the sole executive, legislative and judicial authority of the place for a number of years. Under the federal constitution of the Mexican republic, New Mexico had been classed as a "territory," and in theory was subject directly to the authority of the national government. But, due to its remoteness from the capital, Armijo was the absolute ruler of New Mexico, and the chief beneficiary of the profitable trade which Santa Fe had carried on with St. Louis ever since the latter place had passed from Spanish to American jurisdiction in 1804. The evident purpose of Lamar�s communication was to plant in the minds of the people of Santa Fe the idea that should they choose to throw off the yoke of their petty tyrant, they would be afforded support by the Republic of Texas. However, Lamar received no reply to his letter and, due to legislative opposition, he did not send the promised commission in September.

But the project of sending an expedition to Santa Fe continued to occupy Lamar�s mind in the face of the disapproval of many of the most influential men in Texas. It took such hold of his imagination that he finally came to the decision to undertake it without congressional authority. Nor was it the mere wish to extend the jurisdiction of the government that impelled him to this course. The trade with Santa Fe, of which St. Louis enjoyed a practical monopoly, was considerable and very profitable, and if it could be diverted to Texas great economic benefits would be gained. It was true that the region between the settled portions of Texas and Santa Fe was an unknown wilderness to the Texans, but Lamar believed that a practicable route, over which ultimately a military road might be built, could be found, and that in time this might become a great highway of commerce which would bind to the Texan government all the territory which it traversed. In the spring of 1841, therefore, he began forming plans to send an expedition to Santa Fe.

Lamar�s plan was to send a government commission, consisting of three members, whose duty it would be to invite the people of Santa Fe to place themselves under the protection of the Texan flag. A military escort would accompany the commission and a delegation of merchants and traders would be invited to go along for the purpose of establishing commercial relations with the people of the town. When his plans were complete in outline, Lamar announced the appointment of William G. Cooke, R. F. Brenham and Jose Antonio Navarro as commissioners, and issued an invitation to merchants to join the expedition. He then named Gen. Hugh McLeod to command the military escort, which should consist of two hundred and seventy men, and provided that merchants and others intending to accompany the expedition should rendezvous at Austin.

In the papers of Anson Jones there is a letter from A. C. Hyde, written from Austin on May 27, 1841, which gives an idea of how Lamar�s action in sending out this expedition was regarded by some of his contemporaries. "�Everything here," wrote Hyde to Jones, "is alive with the Santa Fe expedition, which will probably start about the 10th, and cost the government about a half million. Things are getting on worse than ever in the departments, they paying no attention to the acts of congress. . . . They have sent to New Orleans for another half million of the notes, which are to be given out before the next congress meets, in addition to what may be collected." Jones inscribed the following endorsement on this letter: "The Santa Fe expedition was not only unauthorized by congress, but, in effect, positively inhibited. I voted against it on all occasions, and the project received but few votes. The appropriations for its expenses were made without the authority of law, and by the despotic exercise of executive power, which no monarch would have dared venture upon in these times. This administration will be described by the poet in two lines, as �a chase of silly hopes and fears begun in folly, closed in tears."�

Whether the couplet quoted by Jones justly characterizes Lamar�s administration or not, it certainly describes the Santa Fe expedition very aptly. It was indeed "begun in folly" and "closed in tears." In two comprehensive paragraphs, Rives sums up the folly of its conception and inauguration. "President Lamar and his friends," he says, "believed that if a strong party of Texans showed themselves in New Mexico the inhabitants would gladly revolt and put themselves under the protection of the Texan government. They did not, however, reflect that grumbling at a governor of their own race and language was a very different thing from welcoming alien rulers, and that the people of New Mexico might possibly be familiar with the fable of King Log and King Stork. Under these impressions, therefore, the Texan government committed the same blunder that the Spaniards had committed in sending their absurdly inadequate expedition to Mexico in 1829, and again exemplified the truth of the military maxim that no expedition should be sent into a foreign country, no matter how dissatisfied the inhabitants may be with their own government, which is not fully adequate, of itself, to the object proposed."

"Not only was the expedition inadequate in size," he continues, "but it turned out also to be inadequately equipped for the hardships of the journey. The fact was that nobody knew anything about the country to be traversed. Apart from the latitude and longitude of Santa Fe, they had no notion of where they were going. A Mexican who accompanied them had been a trapper on the headwaters of the Red river, and had been in New Mexico, but he was utterly lost long before he reached the Mexican settlements."

Armed with an official proclamation, in which President Lamar invited the inhabitants of Santa Fe and the vicinity to cover themselves with the protection of the Texan flag, the expedition left Brushy Creek, about fifteen miles above Austin, on June 21, 1841. Besides the commissioners and the military escort, it included about fifty others, chiefly merchants and traders, and was accompanied by George W. Kendall of the New Orleans Picayune, who afterwards wrote an exhaustive account of the expedition. For about six weeks the journey was pleasant enough, for its course lay through country which afforded a plentiful supply of game for food, and in which there was an abundance of water and grass for the horses and cattle. But after that they entered country of a very different character. It was mountainous and arid, and when the last of the cattle was slaughtered and provisions ran short, the party began to encounter difficulties. To obtain food in a wilderness for a company of more than three hundred men would have been no small task under the best conditions. But in a country where there was neither vegetation nor game, and where even water was extremely scarce, it was practically impossible. Realizing that starvation would soon be an impending danger if provisions were not obtained, the commissioners decided to send three men ahead to announce the approach of the expedition and to return with food. Accordingly, the three chosen�Howland, Baker and Rosenberry, by name�set out for San Miguel, which was believed to be the nearest settlement, and the rest of the party continued their weary march, losing their way at times and being compelled to retrace their steps, and subsisting on such food as could be found in the barren country through which they passed. They were reduced to the necessity of eating snails and lizards, and to make matters worse, many of them were compelled to proceed on foot, their horses having been lost in a stampede. Kendall says that "every tortoise and snake, every living and creeping thing" was snatched up and devoured by the men "with a rapacity that nothing but the direst hunger could induce." Three weeks of such conditions brought the unhappy pilgrims to the verge of starvation and, no word having been received from Howland, Baker and Rosenberry, it was decided that the best mounted men should push on ahead, while the rest established camp and remained in the wilderness until relief could be sent.

Col. William G. Cooke, one of the three commissioners, took command of the advance party, and he set out with about ninety men. After experiencing much hardship this party finally reached a sheep ranch on Rio Gallinas, and here they feasted on mutton, the first wholesome food they had eaten for weeks. From this place Capt. William P. Lewis, who spoke Spanish, and four others were sent on toward San Miguel, bearing a letter to the alcalde announcing the approach of the expedition and declaring its friendly character.

Meantime, Howland, Baker and Rosenberry arrived at the Mexican settlements early in September. They were promptly placed under arrest, in spite of their protestations that the mission was a peaceful one, which claim they supported by displaying copies of President Lamar�s proclamation, printed in the Spanish language. Armijo set about immediately to alarm the people by circulating the report that the Texans were coming to conquer the country, and that they would kill them all and burn their homes. A condition of general excitement was created and soon the whole population was ready to join in repelling the "invaders." Howland escaped from his captors with the intention of making his way back to the main party to warn them of the situation, but he was recaptured and shot.

Captain Lewis and his four companions spent the night of September 14 in the little village of Anton Chico. On their way thither they had learned of the arrest of Howland, Baker and Rosenberry, and of the general excitement of the people, and during the night information was brought to them by persons in the village that they also would be arrested the next day and shot. Next morning, however, they resumed their journey toward San Miguel, but were soon met by a force of Mexican soldiers, who compelled them to dismount and took them into custody. The Mexicans then turned around and started with their prisoners toward Santa Fe. The prisoners were bound together with ropes and were required to walk, surrounded by their captors. After passing through San Miguel and proceeding all day in the direction of Santa Fe, the company encountered Governor Armijo himself and a force of about six hundred men on their way to meet the Texas expedition. Armijo questioned the prisoners, and finding that Captain Lewis understood Spanish, he ordered him to accompany his force as interpreter.

By this time Colonel Cooke and his party had arrived at Anton Chico, where it was decided to await the return of Captain Lewis. When Lewis did return he was accompanied by Armijo and the force of Mexican soldiers. It would have been useless for Colonel Cooke, with only eighty-five men, to have attempted resistance in the face of such great odds. The Mexicans outnumbered his little company by more than seven to one. However, it is a fact that should be recorded that Lewis had made terms with Armijo by the time the governor came upon Cooke�s company, and he represented that Armijo and the people were friendly and thus induced Cooke to surrender. It may be that the governor deceived Lewis, though this is contradicted by the warm terms in which Armijo afterwards commended Lewis�s services in an official report to the Mexican government. But whether he was a traitor or merely an unsuspecting tool, Lewis assured Cooke that if the Texans would give up their arms they would be permitted to remain at Santa Fe for several days for the purpose of trading, after which their arms would be returned to them. Cooke surrendered, but discovered immediately that he had been made the victim of treachery. He and his whole company were taken to Santa Fe as prisoners. A few days later the two hundred men who had been left in camp, most of whom were now weakened and ill from want of food, dragged their way to the Mexican settlements. They were promptly made prisoners by a superior force of Mexicans. Thus the entire expedition was captured by Armijo without the necessity of firing a single shot.

In the official report of the affair to the Mexican government, however, it was represented that two great victories had been gained over the Texans, and the announcement of these "glorious triumphs" was made the occasion of universal public rejoicing at the national capital. The news was received on the eve of Santa Anna�s election as provisional president, and his partisans among the newspapers capitalized it by making it appear that in some way it magnified the glory of their idol. It was decided that the prisoners should be sent to Mexico City and placed at the disposition of the national government. On October 17, 1841, therefore, the unhappy Texans were started from San Miguel on the long journey to Mexico City on foot.

From the moment of their surrender the prisoners were treated with great cruelty by Armijo�s soldiers, and the march from San Miguel to the border of New Mexico at El Paso was one of almost constant torture. Many of the men were ill from privation in the wilderness and some found it extremely difficult to keep going. The commander of their guard had no sympathy for such men, and those who faltered in the march were brutally treated and in many instances they were shot down in their tracks and their bodies left by the wayside. During the three weeks consumed by the journey to El Paso, the prisoners were in constant fear for their lives. But at the border they were turned over to troops of the national government and thenceforth they were treated more humanely. However, the journey was a long and arduous one. To add to their other miseries smallpox broke out among the prisoners and a number of them died from this disease. A rather amusing aspect of the journey was the fact that it soon became evident to the prisoners that they were on exhibition. They were paraded through the principal streets of every city and town between El Paso and Mexico City, the object being to display before the gaping crowds this evidence of the great power of Santa Anna�s government. American prisoners constituted a spectacle worth going miles to behold, and the very most was made of the opportunity which the moving of the captives to Mexico City afforded. For three months this march was kept up, and finally the survivors of the expedition which had left Texas in high spirits eight months before arrived at the Mexican capital early in February. There they were thrown into prison.

Members of the party who claimed citizenship of other countries appealed to their respective diplomatic representatives for aid, and through the efforts of the foreign ministers at the Mexican capital these were released in the course of a few months. The affair created great indignation in the United States, and the newspapers printed vivid accounts of the sufferings of the prisoners. There were demands that the government take prompt steps in their interest, and as a result Waddy Thompson of South Carolina was sent to Mexico to procure their release. The Mexican government reluctantly released those who could claim the protection of the United States or of European governments, but the rest were kept confined in military prisons for four months. At the end of that time, Santa Anna decided to utilize the prisoners in treating his countrymen to another display. So on June 16, 1842, in celebration of the feast day of Santa Anna�s patron saint, most of the Texans were released. Jose Antonio Navarro, one of the commissioners, was kept in prison at the capital until December, 1844, the object being to make an example of him, inasmuch as he was of Mexican blood, a native of San Antonio. He was then moved to Vera Cruz, from which place he escaped and returned to Texas early in 1845.

President Lamar�s administration came to an end while the Santa Fe prisoners were being marched to Mexico City. Vice-President Burnet, who had served as president during a few months in the winter of 1840-1841, while Lamar was absent in the United States for medical treatment, was a candidate to succeed his chief, but he had to bear the onus of Lamar�s alleged extravagance and his opponent was the popular "hero of San Jacinto," Sam Houston. There was now as great a demand for retrenchment as there had been for protection of the frontier at the beginning of Lamar�s administration, and Burnet was decisively defeated by Houston. Houston was inaugurated in December, 1841, and immediately he announced a complete reversal of the policies of Lamar. He declared that three-fourths of the money consumed in Indian wars during Lamar�s administration could have been saved by following a policy of conciliation with respect to the Indians, and advised the establishment of peace with them as soon as possible. How successful this policy proved has already been recounted. Houston advocated extreme economy in the administration of the government, a reduction of the number of officers and the adoption of a pay-as-you-go policy. And while admitting that it would be futile to renew efforts to establish formal peace with Mexico, he recommended that no aggressive attitude should be assumed and that steps be taken to establish trade with the Mexicans on the border.

Houston, however, was destined to reap where Lamar had sown. The aggressive attitude displayed by the sending of an armed expedition to Santa Fe seemed to the Mexican leaders to call for retaliation by Mexico. Accordingly plans were started for an expedition into Texas. On January 9, 1842, Gen. Mariano Arista issued an address to the inhabitants of "the department of Texas" from Monterey, announcing that he would shortly undertake an invasion of the "department." He promised amnesty and protection for all who would refrain from taking up arms to oppose the invading army, and pointed out that the struggle for independence was hopeless. While Mexico held out "the olive branch of peace with one hand," he said, "she would direct with the other the sword of justice against the obstinate."

The copies of this address and the news of the fate of the Santa Fe prisoners reached Texas about the same time. There was great grief among the relatives of the Texans who had gone on the expedition, and general excitement prevailed. Congress was in session, and the opinion was expressed on all sides that "something should be done." The "something" which congress decided upon supplies one of the most striking instances in history of a futile "blowing off of steam" by a legislative body. For it immediately passed an act extending the boundaries of the Republic of Texas to include the two Californias, the whole of the states of Chihuahua and Sonora and the territory of New Mexico, and parts of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Durango and Sinaloa. The futility of the action may be judged from the circumstance that the territory thus "annexed" contained a population of nearly two million people, whereas Texas had not yet attained one hundred thousand! Houston, of course, vetoed the bill. He pointed out that the act could serve no purpose but to make Texas a laughing-stock among the nations, and that even if it were possible to undertake such an invasion of Mexican territory as the act, if regarded seriously, must contemplate, it would be very injurious to the interests of Texas abroad. But congress was determined to "do something," so it passed the bill over the president�s veto. That, of course, was the last heard of it, for the establishing of such boundaries as the act set forth was unthinkable.

But the Mexican threat of an invasion of Texas was not quite so idle a boast as the action of the Texas congress. On March 3, 1842, a small company of Mexicans appeared suddenly at Goliad and occupied the town, and two days later a force of five hundred, under command of General Vasquez, captured San Antonio without meeting resistance. At the same time another detachment occupied Refugio. It looked as if a formidable invasion was under way, and great excitement prevailed throughout Texas. "The war, after great preparation on the part of the enemy, is upon us," wrote Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, to a friend, "without the slightest effort having been made by us. Our people are, however, turning out well and hastening westward, for the purpose of concentrating to meet the enemy. and notwithstanding every advantage has been given, we rely upon the energy and courage of our people to achieve most brilliant results." The people were indeed hastening westward. In a few days, more than three thousand men were under arms and moving from all sections of Texas in the direction of San Antonio. President Houston, after issuing a proclamation calling out the militia, wrote to the Texan consul at New Orleans to accept volunteers in the United States, provided they were equipped with arms and supplies. But the enemy had other plans of warfare. Santa Anna evidently had no intention of conducting a campaign on the soil of Texas. Vasquez, acting under orders, held San Antonio for only two days and then retired from the town as suddenly as he had advanced. Within a week all the Mexican detachments had quitted Texas and withdrawn to the south of the Rio Grande. The "invasion" proved to be merely a raid. But the country was aroused and by March 15 there were about three thousand Texans gathered at San Antonio. The general sentiment among them was in favor of a counter-march into Mexico, but the Texan government was in no condition to sustain such a campaign. Houston dispatched Gen. Alexander Somervell to take command of the volunteers, with instructions that in no circumstances should an invasion of Mexico be attempted. He declared that it would require four months of preparation to insure the success of such an expedition and fixed July 20 as the earliest date for starting such a move. He then issued a call for a special session of congress to meet at Houston on July 27. President Houston had seized upon the first opportunity to discredit Austin as a proper site for the capital and, shortly after the receipt of Arista�s address threatening an invasion, had moved the seat of government to Houston again. This action was opposed by the people of Austin, and they organized an armed force and prevented the transfer of the archives from that place. This incident came to be known as the "archive war."

Somervell reached San Antonio on March 17 and found the men there clamoring for invasion. Moreover, they refused to accept Somervell as their commander and insisted upon their right to elect one of their own. They chose Gen. Edward Burleson as leader, but in the face of President Houston�s opposition to an immediate invasion, Burleson could do nothing but disband the men. In doing so, however, he took occasion to criticize Houston severely for his stand. There was some partisan politics mixed up in this incident, and Somervell reported to the secretary of state that the next presidency was involved in it. "I have no doubt political intrigue has been at work," he wrote, "with the view to block out the next President. It is a rough concern, and no glory that can be won in the field can ever polish it. I think there is a move for the Vice-Presidency also. The hobby on which they ride is �invasion of Mexico� to give peace and happiness to poor suffering Texas, and thereby achieve immortal glory for themselves."

Meantime, the Texas minister at Washington also wrote the secretary of state, informing him that the report of a contemplated invasion of Mexico was injuring Texas in the United States. "President Houston, I perceive," he wrote, "has issued his proclamation convening congress. . . . War or no war, I suppose, is the question. We can get men, but no money, for invasion. Our friends think the measure impolitic. The excitement is doing us great injury here. Men with property will not emigrate to Texas. They know Mexico to be utterly powerless, and dread the result of the excitement. They think us partaking too much of the revolutionary character of the Mexicans." Considering that the United States had just emerged from a controversy with Mexico over the Santa Fe prisoners, the feeling reported by the Texan minister is not difficult to understand.

When congress met Houston submitted a message recommending war. While he expressed the belief that Mexico could never reconquer Texas, he said he had become convinced a counter-invasion was advisable in order to implant in the Mexicans a desire for peace. Congress voted for a declaration of war and appropriated ten million acres of land to prosecute it, but Houston took the position that an invasion could not be adequately organized and supported by this means, and vetoed the measure. So the war scare came to an end for the time being.

The Mexicans, however, were evidently watching the course of events in Texas and governing their actions accordingly, for no sooner had congress adjourned than preparations were set under way for another raid. On September 11, 1842, while the district court was in session at San Antonio, Gen. Adrian Woll and a force of infantry, cavalry and artillery, about fourteen hundred strong, appeared before the town and demanded its surrender. The small body of Texan troops stationed there refused to comply with this demand and, reinforced by men in attendance at the court session, made a show of resistance. The struggle was hopeless, however, and fifty-three Texans, including the presiding judge, Anderson Hutchison, and all the attorneys present, were made prisoners. Again the country was aroused and a march of volunteers to the relief of San Antonio was begun. On March 18 a force of Texans, about two hundred strong, which had reached Salado creek, on the outskirts of San Antonio, enticed Woll and part of his men into an ambush. The Texans, who were commanded by Col. Matthew Caldwell, were more than a match for the superior force of Mexicans, and the latter suffered a loss of nearly one hundred killed and wounded. However, a small band of volunteers, under Capt. Nicholas Dawson, which was en route to reinforce Colonel Caldwell, was surrounded by a force of four hundred Mexicans at a point about two miles away from the scene of battle, and slaughtered. Keeping out of rifle range, the Mexicans poured artillery fire into the ranks of the Texans, heedless of their efforts to surrender. Of a total of fifty-three men, forty-one were killed, ten were taken prisoners, and two escaped. Woll then retired into San Antonio, but two days later he evacuated the place and began a retreat to the Rio Grande, taking all the Texan prisoners with him. He was closely pursued by Caldwell, but he reached the Mexican side of the border without further difficulty.

The "invasion" had again proved to be only a raid. But this time the demand for retaliation in the form of an invasion of Mexico was so pronounced that Houston could not ignore it. He issued a call for volunteers to rendezvous at San Antonio for this purpose, and again he ordered General Somervell to take command. Somervell complied with the president�s orders without enthusiasm. He proceeded to San Antonio, where he found about twelve hundred men. They were poorly organized, being divided into several camps, and were without proper equipment or supplies for an expedition. Somervell was reluctant to begin an invasion of Mexico with such a force and in such circumstances, and he procrastinated for more than a month before making a move to carry out Houston�s orders. Meantime about five hundred of the volunteers had left for home, and when the march for the border was begun on November 18 Somervell had only seven hundred and fifty men under his command. At Laredo two hundred of these decided to go no further, and left the expedition. With the remainder Somervell marched along the Rio Grande on the Texas side until he came to a point opposite the town of Guerrero. Then he crossed the river to the Mexican side, but, having become convinced by this time that the enterprise was futile, he decided to abandon it. Accordingly he recrossed the river and, on December 19, 1842, issued an order to the men to return to Gonzales and disband. Six captains and their companies, consisting of about two hundred and sixty men, refused to obey this order and, after electing Col. W. S. Fisher to command them, marched against the Mexican town of Mier. Somervell and the others returned home.

Mier was defended by a force of fifteen hundred Mexican troops, under command of Gen. Pedro Ampudia, but the Texans, remembering the defeat of General Cos at San Antonio by a small force of Texans under Johnson and Milam, were not daunted by the great disparity of numbers. They decided to adopt the same tactics which had been employed on that occasion. On Christmas night, 1842, they entered the town and took possession of a number of outlying houses. Their plan was to work through the walls from house to house, in the same way that Johnson had done at San Antonio. But the odds were too great. On the afternoon of December 26 the Texans surrendered to Ampudia after having been given written assurance that they would be treated with due consideration as prisoners of war. Two hundred and twenty-six men were taken into custody and, as in the case of the Santa Fe prisoners, were started on a march to Mexico City. Thus within twelve months after the Santa Fe affair, Texas found itself faced with another of similar character.

The Mier prisoners, however, did not propose to go supinely to the Mexican capital. On the contrary, they decided to watch their opportunity to escape and return to Texas. After traveling under guard for six weeks, therefore, on the morning of February 11, 1843, at a point about one hundred miles south of Saltillo, they suddenly overpowered their guards, seized the Mexican cavalry horses and rode furiously in the direction of the Texas border. In order to evade pursuit, however, they left the main road and soon lost their way in the mountains. Here the experience of the Santa Fe expedition was repeated. The Texans were entirely without supplies and food was not to be found in that barren, mountainous country. Even water was scarce and in a few day they were frantic from hunger and thirst. Several died of starvation, and when the others were overtaken by Mexican troops they surrendered gladly.

In punishment for their attempt to escape it was decreed that one in every ten of their number should be executed. The number of the prisoners had now been reduced to one hundred and seventy, for in addition to those who had died a few had escaped and subsequently made their way back to Texas. The order required, therefore, that seventeen of the remaining prisoners should be selected by lot and executed. Accordingly, a jar containing one hundred and seventy beans, seventeen of which were black and the rest white, was brought forward, and each of the prisoners was blindfolded and directed to draw a bean from it. A black bean was a sentence of death. The operation was carried out, and the seventeen Texans who drew black beans were lined up immediately and shot. During the Mexican war, Gen. Walter P. Lane and a scouting party made a special trip to the Hacienda del Salado, where this barbarous order was carried out, and exhumed the bones of these unfortunate men. They were then sent to La Grange, Texas, where they were interred on Monument Hill with military honors.

After the execution of their companions the rest of the Mier prisoners were sent to the Mexican capital. By Santa Anna�s orders they were imprisoned in the castle Perote, where most of them remained until September, 1844, when they were released in connection with the celebration of the anniversary of Mexican independence. A few had died in the meantime, and a number of others, led by Thomas Jefferson Green, had escaped and returned to Texas.

Thus ended the last attempt of Texas to send an expedition into Mexico. The only other hostile move made during the existence of the republic was the sending of a force of one hundred and eighty men, under Col. Jacob Snively, to intercept a party of Mexican traders returning to Santa Fe from Missouri. This occurred in the spring of 1843. It failed of result for the reason that the Mexican party was guarded by two hundred United States cavalry under command of Capt. Philip S. Cooke. Cooke disarmed the Texans, leaving them only ten guns to protect themselves from the Indians on their return journey to Texas. The American government subsequently paid the Texas government for the confiscated arms.

The policy of Texas thenceforth was in line with Houston�s original one--that of letting the Mexicans alone. Houston had been diverted from this policy only by the public clamor caused by the raids of 1842, and, as has been seen, never really made any serious attempt to invade Mexico. The general outlines of this policy may be summed up in the words of Anson Jones, who, as Houston�s secretary of state, drew up recommendations covering this and other questions and submitted them to a cabinet meeting on December 22, 1841.

"The civil expenses of the Government," wrote Jones, "can easily be estimated, and those for the defence of the country approximated.

"Our policy, as it regards Mexico, should be to act strictly on the defensive. So soon as she finds we are willing to let her alone, she will let us alone.

"The navy should be put in ordinary; and no troops kept in commission, except a few rangers on the frontiers.

"The Indians should be conciliated by every means in our power. It is much cheaper and more humane to purchase their friendship than to fight them. A small sum will be sufficient for the former; the latter would require millions.

"By a steady, uniform, firm, undeviating adherence to this policy for two or three years, Texas may and will recover from her present utter prostration. It is the stern law of necessity which requires it, and she must yield to it or perish! She cannot afford to raise another crop of �heroes.�"

This policy was bearing fruit before Houston�s second administration came to an end. Texas was learning to live within her means and there was no further increase of the public debt. Moreover, as shall be seen, she was making progress toward commanding the respect of other nations, including that of the United States.

source:
http://www.kwanah.com/txmilmus/wortham/477.htm










Edited by Jalisco Lancer