How Consistent Was Bismarck In His Aims And Methods

Originally posted by Temujin you forget the reason for France, Britain and Germay itself to even enter this war was the Berlin-Vienna alliance, the alliance established by Bismarck and the key of his much valued but completely pointless alliance system. without this alliance, there would have been no ww1 as we know it, just a major Balkan war.

I must disagree here.  The intersection of vital interests in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean can't be over-emphasized.

The only real alliance Bismarck cared about was the Austro-German....an Austrian counterweight to Russia if needed.  He could not have cared less about the Balkans, and that was the problem.  If he and later German statesmen had not been so myopic in competing with Britain, perhaps they might have paid more attention to their ally's vital interests in the Balkans.

I do not think Bismarck thought much about the Balkans after Berlin in 1878.  He felt Germany had no interests there, but all the other Powers did.  Too many conflicting problems.  The Balkan Wars, 1912-13 were not the type of thing that could have been isolated once the Great Powers asserted their interests.

Edited by pikeshot1600

Originally posted by Temujin you forget the reason for France, Britain and Germay itself to even enter this war was the Berlin-Vienna alliance, the alliance established by Bismarck and the key of his much valued but completely pointless alliance system. without this alliance, there would have been no ww1 as we know it, just a major Balkan war.

Pikeshot suggested above that it was in the interest of Western powers to keep Austria as buffer. It rather seems like the Berlin-Vienna alliance shouldn't have bothered them.

I think the reason behind all is that Britain mastered the alliance system better in order to keep it to its favor and that's obviously a weakness of German post-Bismarkian diplomacy.

WWI. The war of 1870 was an obvious success for Prussia/Germany. What puzzles me is the lack of a succesful alliance system for Germany after that. Bismark managed to do something of the like but his alliances with Britain and Russia had major long-term dificulties, as it's been discussed above. But I don't see why Germany should insist in being confronted with France. It should have looked for mutually beneficial friendship, specially to counter Britain and to prevent the double-front war. I also don't see any major reason for France to be confronted with Germany (except maybe its dependance on the protection/benevolence of the major naval powers, i.e. Britain). 

I didn't mean to exclude war, just that you must seek the most favorable situation (alliances, power balance) before war happens. And there's where logic failed. Germany went into a war that was lost from the beginning. 

Originally posted by giani_82 About F-G for once there was the religious issue, second the Napoleonic wars, and the expansion of French ideology around the world after the Revolution (which despite bringing in the national issue still didn't completely overthrow the religious arguements). Second, France is just a step for German expansion, it's not the final goal. After all at that time rapidly growing industrial capacity and population turned out to be quite an issue exactly around that time (still France had some population advantage, but in the years to follow that changed). The Napoleonic wars brought out something else - the fall of the Holy Roman empire - historically german royalty lost signifficant territories. IMO, it's just a constantly growing tension between the two countries, and the fast growth of Germany's economical power. It was reasonable as well that Germany seeks in one way or another unity and expansion of boundaries. And about France being a secondary power, I believe that got cleared out just after 1870-71. German's war doctrine also hides some of the reasons for this conflict - von Moltke's prediction is that his country can't afford to lead war on two fronts - a.k.a. if Russia attacks (due to constantly changing position it has in Europe), France might as well try to expand their territory. So France, which is not the power it used to be will search with every means getting back it's position, even on the expense of Germany. Furthermore, by that time calling to arms and winning on the battlefield was still seen as the best demonstration of power - either getting one, or holding it.

The only political entity in Germany looking for unity in the mid XIX c. was/were the mostly western German Liberals.  None of them held power in a land of monarchies and principalities.

As far as the religious issue, Bismarck did have a nervous fear of some Papal "conspiracy."  France had been the support of the Pope in his resistance to Italian unification, and Bismarck never understood the Catholic Church.  In 1871, Pius IX declared the Papacy infallible (since he lost out to Cavour and the Piedmontese Crown), and Bismarck saw that as intentionally trying to turn German Catholics against the new Reich.

The expansion of any important power was a politically sensitive issue at that time.  Any expansion was looked upon as a disturbance of the balance of power.  Britain's initial view of German unification was not favorable, nor was Russia's, and certainly not Austria's.  Bismarck sought security for Prussia/Germany, and the unification came at a politically convenient time for that end.  I really don't think it was ever a long range plan of any kind.

The French can be excused for their view of the new Germany.  If your obnoxious neighbor trades in his Poodles for a pack of Dobermans, it can make you nervous.

Maju:

How to explain the Fr-Gr issue....a real problem.

Looking at photos of French and German statesmen hugging each other these days, it is certainly hard to relate.

Alsace and Lorraine were certainly emotional issues for the French.  Lorraine had been part of France since Louis XIV, and mostly saw itself as French.  Alsace not so much, but it was strategically sensitive...Rhine crossings at Breisach and Strasbourg.

Since this thread is Bismarck driven, we need to look at it from his perspective.  Security was the issue....Keeping the main enemy at a disadvantage, especially after the revolutionary activity of the Paris Commune.  Aristocrats and monarchies on one hand, and republicans and revolutionaries don't make the best fit.  France was still looked at as the hotbed of revolution in 1871.

Somewhere back in this thread we discussed the colonial issue, and I do feel that Bismarck had no real interest in that.  Others did, but he just harnessed what he could from it to use politically when it was advantageous.  Any colonial adventures just complicated things for Germany.

As far as logic, what logic is there in Serb-Croat conflict?  You may have better insight into Spain of course, but what logic was there in Castilian-Catalan conflict when Castile bore the burden in the imperial era?

History, and people, are not always logical.

Edited by pikeshot1600

Pikeshot: fine with what you say. But this last is something I don't share:

Originally posted by pikeshot1600 As far as France, it is hard to see anything other than a momentary and fragile solution there.  France was the enemy.  Germany knew it; France knew it, and so did everyone else.

It seems more a prestige question than anything else. Alsace-Lorraine wasn't such an important region and, for the rest, the Franco-German colonial rivalry was limited to the Cameroun-Congo region, with no friction elsewhere. France wasn't the main economical rival of Germany (it was Britain) and their spheres of influence didn't clash but in very limited regions.

Late history has shown that F-G cooperation is much more productive for both than such an absurd confrontation on Alsace-Lorraine and the coal or Saarland and the Ruhr. Germany had ofered Britain a customs union. When britain declined it and leaned towards France, it seems logical that Germany should have tried to atract France as well.

I really can't see the logic behind the F-G conflict, as France was deemed to be a secondary power anyhow, Germany should have ofered it the best of conditions, in order to balance Britain and supress the risk of a two-front war, the main fear of Germany military. A customs' union with France would have given both countries many advantages: Germany would have got access to the French colonial products, while France would have got access to German coal and affluent markets.

Maju:

All the Powers understood that Austria-Hungary was the buffer between Russia and Western (Italian, French and British) interests in the Mediterranean.  These Powers had both vital strategic and commercial interests there.  Any disruption of the delicate political and military position of A-H risked a more generalized conflict.  The German Empire was not anxious to incorporate large national minorities to complicate their lives, and also to surrender the initiative to Russia in the south which would upset too many powerful states. 

For instance, what if A-H expired; Russia moved closer to the straits (1880s) and France established a presence along with Britain on Germany's southern flank to protect their interests.  No Austrian ally; Russia stronger than ever, and the possibility of two other powerful states to contend with south as well as west.

(As a collateral matter here was the "equilibrium" between Austria and the Hungarian kingdom......Hungary fronted the entire Balkan frontier of the empire.  It is hard for us to realize that A-H was not a unitary state, but a two part federation of Germans and Magyars each virtual minorities ruling and controlling other nationalities in the two parts of the empire.  Very often the two were trying to undermine each other politically.)

Turkey held no strategic interest for Bismarck other than to siphon off Russian strength if that were ever needed.  It was later, and after Bismarck's time, that the harebrained "Hamburg to Basra" strategy and commercial pressures caused the political-strategic 'aneurism' that drew Germany into the Balkan vortex...and by proxy (A-H).

As far as France, it is hard to see anything other than a momentary and fragile solution there.  France was the enemy.  Germany knew it; France knew it, and so did everyone else. 

Edited by pikeshot1600

giani:

Try these:

Otto Pflanze.  Bismarck and the Development of Germany (1990)

A. J. P. Taylor.  Bismarck: the Man and the Statesman (1955)

Edward Crankshaw.  Bismarck (1981) A good picture of the man rather than the Chancellor.

 

Edited by pikeshot1600

giani:

You are a man after my own heart.....The eternal Eastern Question.

Bismarck's personality was complex, like most interesting people.  From my reading, his main thrust was the service he owed king and Prussia, and later emperor and Germany.  His main goal in his direction of foreign policy (and HE ran it, not the foreign office) was Germany's security.  Not upsetting Russia was the key as he saw it.  The ageless animosity between Germans (unified or not) and France was neither doubted nor ever really addressed.

As a secondary goal was the preservation, as far as possible, of the peace in Europe between the Great Powers.  The Berlin Congress was the same technical tool as the Congress of Vienna....get the big people together to make choices for everyone else.  The goal was to defuse possible conflict among the Powers, and also to put the brakes on Austria's aspirations in the Balkans.....strategic not commercial.

Bismarck saw Russia's southern direction as taking pressure off Germany.  All the better, but not at the cost of a general war.

None of the Powers thought too much about Balkan nationalities.  Their thought process was more territorial and strategic, and also commercial due to political pressure from bougeois constituencies.  I doubt that in 1878 the diplomatic types knew much about the Balkan peoples or their histories.  Most of them were viewed as someone's subjects...it was a question of whose  subjects.

Bismarck never really got comfortable with this "public opinion" that became so important after 1870.  His universe accomodated monarchy and aristocracy much easier.

Having said that, Bismarck had no specific ill will toward the Balkan peoples.  He simply did not think Germany had any vital interests there.  If there was a weakness in this it was that the Austrian ally DID have vital interests there, and neither Bismarck nor any of the succeeding German leadership could fully understand that.  Consequently, inevitable Austro-Russian competition (and slavic/pan-slavic/pan Serbian forces that could no longer be short stopped) dragged Germany along into a war where they had no vital interests.

Bismarck may have forseen some of that, but he felt that he could only do what he could, when he could, within the framework recognized by other Powers, and anything that happened after he was gone had to be up to God.