PROCONSUL TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMINIUS AND ROME'S WAR WITH THE EAST

By Sam Edwards, 3 August 2007;

General context and introduction

"‘Hardly had peace been signed with Carthage when the Roman people were asked by the senate to declare war against Philip, King of Macedon. Doubtless the ordinary Roman citizen was somewhat surprised and wondered what Greek politics had to do with Rome, but he was soon to learn that Rome’s interests and obligations were no longer confined to Italy’“


The period of 200 BC in the context of Classical history is one of great importance and of great significance for the Roman republic in particular. Not only did it represent (as I will show) the beginnings of a Hellenisation of Roman culture, politics and society that was to culminate in high Byzantine and late Roman culture, but it was the first time that Rome had ever politically intervened in (or indeed taken an interest in) Greek affairs since the first decades of the republic. It was only after Rome had secured her borders in the successful Latin and Samnite wars under adept commanders such as M. Furius Camillus, D. Junius Brutus and L. Papirius Cursor, that she was fit to show her face with any confidence on the larger world stage. The early years of the republic were plagued with public strife, war and political unrest. These years preoccupied the Roman republic to such an extent that even huge affairs in Greece such as the Persian wars, Alexander’s conquests, the wars of the successors and the Peloponnesian wars went unnoticed, as did probably most Greek events. This was because the Roman state was literally fighting for its survival in these shadowy centuries, surrounded by many hostile peoples. Again, when Rome had dominated Italy, and naturally (by controlling various ports around Italy) the commercial links of the Mediterranean, she began to fight those three famous wars with Carthage, again under “self defence”. As will be shown in this essay, this almost cultural Roman self-denial of imperialism (almost no imperialist rhetoric of any considerable nature was used in Punic wars) began to transfer itself even into theatres where Rome’s interests were blatantly imperialistic. Even in the three Macedonian wars (almost contemporary to the Punic wars, Rome embarked upon these ventures to defend itself from Hannibal’s ally, Macedon, which might invade at any time across the Adriatic just as Pyrrhus did), Rome still used the “victim mentality” which for so long, on Italian soil had been legitimate. It is this period of 200 BC – 197 BC where the first seeds of imperialism were set and the watchful eye of the Hellenistic Greek saw Rome for what it was – a growing superpower.
For this “tug of war” for Greek sovereignty between Rome and between the Diodachs, it is important to understand exactly why Greece was so important in this period and why it played such a large focal point for the propaganda war between the Romans and Diodachs. The motive was not, as might be expected, economic – Rome had her massive spoils from the Punic wars, and the Diodachs collectively owned the massive wealth of Persia, Western India, Egypt, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. The motive was probably antiquity. Greek stood for so much for both Roman and Diodach (whichever of the kingdoms they came from…) – for the Roman, it was one of the main players in their great myths such as the Aeneid and the Iliad (which were generally taken literally as historical documents), and for the Diodach (despite their attachment to Macedon as their “father nation”), it was the source of much of their culture. Macedonian culture and art was heavily influenced by the (for a long time) more civilized and developed Greeks. Also, although Greece was certainly much reduced in it’s power, it still had influence, however, this influence was nothing like what it was in the “glory years” of Athens in the 5th century BC. The previously “pseudo-Barbarian” areas like Athamania, Phocis, Aetolian and Locris began to form unified leagues and/or autocracies, that by a mutual recognition of their common interest to keep Greece independent, managed to do so. The reason for this shift of power to the established city-states of Corinth, Athens and suchlike, is mainly because of Diodachi intervention. The Ptolemies and Macedonians were constantly “playing off” Greek cities against each other, fighting each other via proxy, and the proud but stubborn city states were naïve enough to trust whichever one allowed them the most independence. The Chreomondiean and Lamian wars (just two examples of these wars via proxy) effectively stripped Athens of what little naval and commercial power that it had left. This occurred to practically all the ancient and respected Greek city-states who, stripped of their larger commercial and territorial assets by Diodachi aggression, probably had to resort to the old military hoplite system and/or mercenaries for military power rather than the “special forces” deployed in the Peloponnesian wars. Although this “puppet” period of Greece shifted power massively from the old cities to the new leagues, it rather ironically heralded a burst in philosophical progress, which culminated in the likes of the Stoics and the development of the two Neo-Socratic schools: the Cyrenaics and Cynics. It was this Greece - the puppet weakling – that the Roman legionaries in the Macedonian wars marched into, but a Greece that in it’s period of most humiliation further developed Hellenic culture to unseen heights.

"“Greece was important to the Hellenistic kingdoms as a source of trained man-power: poets, doctors, philosophers, engineers and, above all, soldiers. Ultimately, much of the population seems to have been drained away. In the third century B.C., a united Greece could still have been powerful; but the same disintegrating competitiveness which had lost better chances in the past was still operative. Nevertheless, steps were taken which were intelligent, and remain interesting: federalism among small communities, modernisation at Sparta; only too late”"

-- A.R. Burn, penguin/pelican history of Greece, chapter 17.1

It is this period that creates the one of the largest debates in classical history – was the Roman republic imperialistic? Scholars have pondered over this point for the best part of half a century, and have still yet to come to a conclusive answer. The two giants of
this debate in more recent times are N.G.L Hammond and H.H. Scullard. Hammond maintains that the Roman and Macedonian states were both imperialist in “the modern sense of the term”, whilst Scullard believes that the “imperialism” of the Roman republic was fundamentally due to a complex net of social, political and economic factors which marked the era. Although one may drift to various stances in this debate, any dogma is pointless as the debate is, and probably will continue to be, frustratingly inconclusive. The author personally drifts towards Hammond’s school of thought on this subject, as will be seen in the essay below, but either side holds many logical and brilliant arguments. Although almost all of Rome’s wars before those with Pyrrhus were primarily defensive, there is no better period in republican history to illustrate the debate on “imperialism” than the string of wars that were fought against the Hellenistic “allies” (it is thought) of the Carthaginians.

Titus's Consulship Begins and the Aftermath of the Second Punic War

Titus Quinctius Flaminius began his life in Rome, but as yet historians are unsure who his parents were. From examining earlier consul’s heritage, it would seem that Titus’s “gens” or clan – the Quinctii – was indeed a prosperous and highly political one that had Senatorial roots deep in the republic’s past, as were his immediate genetic family – the Flaminii. Sources would seem to indicate that at beginning of his career, he was the patrician (family head) of the gens Quintii. This meant that he was head of the family and had powers of life and death over the young in it. The origins of this family are not fully known, but some scholars have put forward a hypothesis based on the etymology of the word “Flaminius” that it has a reference to the Flamen Dialis” – the chief priest of Jupiter. If this hypothesis is correct, then it would show that Titus’s family would definitely have had an immense amount of influence in the senate. Throughout the period 437-431 BC, Titus Quinctius Pennus and Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus both stood as consuls, and marriage had brought Titus’s family into the “Posthumius Gens” - another well respected family – through the Consul Aulus Posthumius Tibertus. There were many other illustrious members of the Quinctii gens, but they would be far too numerous to list here. All three were respected soldiers and public servants in their day, so thus Titus came from a highly respectable and wealthy background. What is known is that he began to learn the rudiments of military command and obedience sometime during the second Punic war, where he served as a military tribune under Consul Marcellus. Marcellus’s emphasis on defense during his command of the Roman army against Hannibal must have had a dramatic effect upon Titus’ understanding of military strategy, as throughout his military commands, we can see a very cautious commander whose tactics were exercised with the utmost precision. For example, much to the distress of the Aetolians, Titus put more emphasis on creating a peace treaty with Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, after the short lived war with that city. He was reluctant to storm Sparta and seek vengeance for Nabis’s (supposed) tyranny of the Greek people, which is what many commanders of the time would have done, and what the Allied Commanders would have wanted.

One great mystery about this man is his mastery of Greek culture and language – not many Roman nobles (despite popular belief) spoke Greek until later in the republic, and if they spoke Greek at this period, they were ashamed of it and spoke it badly. Titus probably didn’t visit Greece in his youth or at any other time, as Greece was politically an area of much turbulence, and Romans considered much culture to be too exotic and strange for many of their tastes (despite their culture being fundamentally
Greek!). So where did Titus learn his Greek from? some sources, such as those of Mahaffy's “Alexander's empire”, say that he knew about Greek "on account of his culture", perhaps indicating that he himself was of Greek ancestry. This theory is very unlikely, however, because most famous Roman "Gens" were (unlike many famous European monarchs who would claim that they were…) actually descended right down to the founders of their nation – in this case, the noblemen who founded the republic in 509 BC. Rome and Latium were in the Geopolitical sphere known as “Greater Greece”, and so thus were certainly subject to large amounts of Hellenic influence from colonies in southern France, Sicily and Southern Italy, but although this explains Rome’s general connection with the Hellenic civilization, it still doesn’t explain why Titus was so fluent in Greek language and knowledgeable in Greek culture when travel to such areas wasn’t readily available and everyday, personal Greek influence in Rome was negligible.

However, there was a large movement during the second Punic war within the Roman government of “Philhellenism”. The Flaminii and Scipii families both seemed to support this movement heavily, probably because both families saw the need to get Rome as many allies as they could in an age where Rome was threatened by many large, powerful enemies to the east and south. The largest opponents of this policy were the Claudii. Although party politics didn’t exist in Rome fully, and Roman citizens didn’t vote for Consular candidates because of a general political agenda, there were often cases where families and social groups would unite for one particular purpose for a short time (these political alliances usually broke up quite quickly in the dangerous and fluctuating world of Roman republican politics). At this time, Rome’s agenda on foreign policy were divided on one thing – how Rome should survive against the combined powers of the Diadochi and Carthaginian states. The Flaminii group suggested a policy of military, diplomatic and economic aid for Greece against Rome’s enemies, whereas the other opinion was the Rome should remain fundamentally isolationalist until she had re-gained her strength after the numerous military defeats and economic stagnation that had marked the 2nd Punic war. Although the Claudii’s suggestion of isolationalist policy seems to be the most logical when considering Rome’s position at this time, the swift intervention into Greece did produce the desired results to Rome, and not the political chaos which the Anti-Philhellenists would have expected. Whether or not this success of the philhellenic policy of Rome was due simply to the luck of Titus being Consul and would have failed if another less able man was instead of him, it is very hard to say. In the long run, however, the philhellenic policy was the most viable because at one time or another, Macedon and the Seleucids, supported by their some of their puppet Greek allies, would have attacked Italy indefinitely. Political affairs were very long and drawn out, and consular candidates had to spend years (a little less in Titus’s case, as is explained below) preparing to office and winning the goodwill of both the plebeians and the nobles. Titus, therefore, in order to have become Consul at so early a stage, must have been considerably involved in the philhellenic movement of the time, giving a little evidence about his early career. By the time he achieved the rank of consul, the philhellenic movement must have won because firstly, the plebs voted him in to the post, and secondly, because the senate (which would have vetoed and thus destroyed his philhellenic legislation if they were anti-philhellenes) didn’t object to his operations in Greece, granted him a triumph on his return and voted him amble supplies, thus practically encouraging him.
Titus’s actions as a military Tribune in the 2nd Punic war contributed greatly to his understanding of military tactics - Marcellus’s principle of starving out Hannibal during the second Punic war was remarkably similar to Titus’s tactic of leaving Nabis to gradually disintegrate rather than fully attack his holdings. Titus must have achieved numerous honours during that war, as he soon after gained enough public and senatorial support to be appointed Governor of Tarentum and in 204 BC was elected Pro-Praetor with Gaius Hostilius Tutulus. His administration of justice was renowned, and this can also be seen in the Macedonian war through his highly skillful diplomatic skills with the Greek allied command and the Greek people. He was given the right to found two colonies, Narnia (later under the administration of the famous Pliny the Younger) and Cossa. This gradually accumulation of power saw him rise rapidly through the ranks of Tribune (representative of the people) then Curule Aedile (one of the many types of governmental public servant) and finally Quaestor (treasurer) His aspirations then moved to the highest post in the republic – the Consul. Oddly enough, he did not, like many previous and later Consuls, follow the Cursus Honorum; a custom which expected an aspiring politician to have served in most previous governmental ranks before setting himself up as a consular candidate for the elections. This apparent inobservance of traditional Roman republican custom angered the two tribunes of the people, Marcus Fulvius and Manius Curius, who were heavily opposed to his candidateship, but the senate overruled their opposition. One interesting point to make at this juncture is the contradiction of their post – the post of Tribune was supposed to be a mechanism to allow the people to represent their wishes to the senate. The people had not voted in Titus and supposedly in accordance to republican law had their objection voiced legitimately by the two said consuls. The rejection of the senate of a legitimate veto of their vote for Titus Quinctius Flamininus as Consul doesn’t only show an inobservance to the principle of the “Cursus Honorum” which had not been followed by Titus, but also the fundamental republican principles of the Roman republic – the senate had overrode the wishes of the people, showing a society that was run at this time fundamentally by the “Optimates” of the republic. Moreover, the wishes of the Tribunes need not have been those of the people, as the Tribunal post was used in the later centuries of the republic as little more than a post through which designing Optimates could ascend the “Cursus Honorum”, and the historical context could imply that this was the case with the two tribunes mentioned above – the “Curii” and “Fulvi” were both highly respected “gens” that had been some of the leading consular families for generations. Therefore, the reason for this is probably because of the decadence of the late republic (as maintained by Ronald Syme) – by this stage, many posts which were democratic in theory were used by the rich of Rome to advance their status and not to aid politics. As was usually the case in most Roman republican elections, Titus’s was probably rigged – a political candidate must have followed the Cursus Honorum if he wished to rise up the political ranks, and the fact that one exception was made for him clearly shows some kind of political interference took place. It is doubtful that even Titus’s eloquence was enough to convince the senate (as I have shown, it would seem that even the Tribunes – the representatives of the people – were not on his side) to abandon the entire principle behind the Cursus Honorum, but when we consider how influential the Quinctii were as such a large gens, it is no surprise.

Despite this opposition, in the year 198 BC, Titus Quinctius Flamininus was elected along with Sextus Aelius Paetus as Consul of the Roman republic. He would prove to be a decisive figure in the second Macedonian war (200-196 BC) against Philip V and
the latter developments (such as his victory over the Spartan tyrant Nabis in 195 BC), which would gradually lead to the outbreak of the Syrian war (191-188 BC) against Antiochus III of Selucus. He concerned himself mainly with the Macedonian war, naturally being of grave importance to the security of Rome and Latium because of its close proximity to them. Events such as the Pyrrhic wars (which, in 283 BC showed to Rome that their eastern seaboard was in fact open to invasion from Greece) and the first Macedonian war showed the danger, which Rome was in from the Hellenistic kingdoms and city-states. The crumbling nation of Macedon had been looking at these wars between the two new superpowers with some interest, and realized that by joining the victor; they could gain considerable advantages, both economically and territorially. From a geographical perspective, Rome was the most plausible target for the Macedonians, as they were only separated from it by the Ionian and Adriatic seas to the west, and had Seleucid support in the Middle East. Many of the most illustrious Roman historians have illustrated this pro-Punic pondering on Philip’s part, such as Livy –

"This war, a struggle between the two wealthiest peoples of the world, had attracted the attention of kings and all nations elsewhere. Philip, king of Macedon, was particularly concerned in its progress because of his proximity to Italy and the fact that he was separated from it only by the Ionian sea. His first reaction to the news that Hannibal had crossed the alps was a simple one: he was glad that war had broken out between Rome and Carthage, but still doubtful, while the resources of the two nations were as yet unknown, he hoped that he would be victorious"

-- Livy book 22.33

This was firmly cemented in a diplomatic alliance that placed Macedonia as an official enemy in the eyes of the Roman republic-the treaty of military alliance with Hannibal Barca of Carthage in 215 BC. In that year, Livy reports offhandedly in his books concerning the second Punic war (218-201 BC) how Philip finally made up his mind–

"When there had been three battles and three Carthaginian victories, he sided with success and sent a deputation to Hannibal"

-- Livy book 22.33

The three Carthaginian victories that Livy is alluding to here are probably the battles of Cannae, Trebia and Lake Trasimene, all of which were decisive Carthaginian victories in the earlier stages of the war which, until around 216 BC, gave the impression that the Carthaginians were winning to the onlooker. It would seem that Philip made his decision to join the side of the Carthaginians far too early – only the 3rd year in a 17-year war. When Philip signed the treaty with Hannibal, the brilliant commanders and statesmen of the second and perhaps most famous of the punic wars such as Cato the Censor, Quintus Fabius Maximus “the delayer” and Marcellus had not shown their true abilities yet. These were all die-hard radicals and dictators who came in a moment of crisis to assist the republic, and perhaps Philip’s ultimate defeat in the Macedonian wars can be attributed to his inappropriately quick judgment.
The Macedonian Cold War

This diplomatic siding with the enemy of Rome, finally lead to the first Macedonian war that lasted from 215 BC to 205 BC. Rome feared that their intervention in 215 BC had not been decisive enough, and Philip’s power was once again growing too strong. It is quite possible that Philip felt threatened by the 211 BC “Anti-Macedonian alliance” between the Aetolian confederations (who had been involved in a full scale war with Philip V), Republican Rome and Attalus I of Pergamum. It is obvious from Philip’s point of view that he was being threatened, and needed to defend his interest. It is consequently of no surprise that an arms race with Rome and the Macedonians had been steadily progressing throughout this period, and in the year 207 BC, Philip V built 100 new warships. This shift of allegiance towards Carthage manifested itself in the support that Philip V had to the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca throughout the war.

Philip had taken an active step in the opposite direction from the Romans by firstly signing a treaty of allegiance with the Carthaginians, secondly by initiating an arms race and thirdly by skirmishing and later actually attacking Roman forces. Naturally, this was all the Roman senate needed as a pretext for war with Macedon. Military movements had already commenced, with Pro-Praetor Marcus Valerius Laevinius taking 38 warships to Macedonia, and legate Marcus Aurelius building up Roman military muscle in the region. Both feared that Philip would take the same step as Pyrrhus and attempt to cross into Italy over the Adriatic and had thus sent a message to the senate emphasizing their concerns and asking for war. Finally, in 201 (in the same year that the final peace treaties were drawn up for the Carthaginian surrender) the Senate declared war on Macedon for the second time in just 15 years (the third would come when Perseus, Philip’s successor and incidentally, the last Dynastic Macedonian king would attempt to re-gain what his predecessor had lost from the Romans). The Greek city states were also getting increasingly concerned with Philip V’s actions, which culminated in Philip’s attack of Athens and Attalus’s appeal to Rome in 200 BC. Finally, in those years, the Athenians and many other cities also declared war upon Philip. One of the largest dilemmas about this string of wars that emerged in the east was their purpose, for many reasons which will be discussed later on. Philip was further provoking the Romans by attacking one of major allies of the Romans in the 1st Macedonian war (214-205 BC) when the legions were preoccupied fighting Hannibal in Italy- the Attalids of Pergamum. Polybius gives an account of another less ambitious attempt by Antiochus to conquer parts of Caria for his domains, which we can place around 200 BC through comparing Livy and Polybius’s accounts. It would seem that Philip was counting on the 2nd Punic war to drag on for much longer than it did, because in 200 BC, the final touches were being added to the peace treaties with Carthage. He was relying on Roman preoccupation to enable him to annex Eastern Greek land without fear of reciprocation. Philip’s wish to annex some of these colonies of Asia minor seems to draw a strikingly similar parallel with Antiochus III’s wish to do the same – this perhaps further supports the conclusion that the two had some form of military alliance, for when Macedon was in grave peril at the end of the 2nd Macedonian war (discussed later in this essay), Antiochus had already begun to encroach suspiciously near to the Greek territories of Asia minor…

However, for all general purposes, the senate did not need to aid the Greeks. Their decision for war is even more confusing when their fundamentally isolationalist
attitude toward foreign policy is taken into account. They viewed over seas communications and annexations as both a nuisance and an expense. Indeed, many of Rome’s wars at this time were fought primarily for defensive reasons against hostile enemies, but the benefits that Rome gained from this war are simply far too great to assume that it was only looked upon as defensive. Elizabeth Rawlinson summarizes this on going debate in her section of the “Oxford Classical history” – the expansion of Rome:

" It was further argued that the historians always showed Rome to have declared war for defensive reasons, or to assist allies to whom she had obligations and a reputation for “fides” (good faith) to keep up. For the idea of “Bella Iistrum” or “Just war”, undertaken in, say – defence or to aid her allies obsessed her. Rome perhaps wrongly believed that she was under threat there has been an argument over whether there was, or Rome though there was, a secret pact between Antiochus and Philip in 200 BC… “

--- Elizabeth Rawlinson The Oxford history of Greece – the expansion of Rome – Roman imperialism

As is later demonstrated in this history, the enormous gains that this war had for Rome must have played some part in the senate’s decision. “Bella Iustrum” cannot have been constantly followed, despite Livy’s apparent insistence, during these wars, which so much expense and manpower would have been needed from Rome to continue. From a financial perspective, Rome could not have afforded to keep these wars going without taking something off the side to ensure that their coffers were re-stocked with gold. Although, for example, Carthage had been a dangerous enemy in the Punic wars, which were a genuine threat to Roman existence, the dominance that they had over Roman markets and economic influence was enough to fight over in itself. Rome became considerably richer after the Punic wars, and became an economic giant through all the new trade routes they could dominate. It is hard to see why the second Macedonian war could have been any different when we consider the gains that the Romans got from it. Much of the cold war between Macedonia and the Roman republic can be seen occurring in one province – Illyria. In 229 BC, Illyria was occupied by Roman forces under the pretext that it was to protect the Adriatic from pirates. However, as far as we know, no Roman fleet was stationed to prevent such activities, and none of the forts in the area were mobilized against such pirates, and when considering Illyria’s strategic position in relation to northern Macedonia, it is perhaps a little too coincidental. This is just one example of Roman imperial intervention, but there were many incidences where Roman forces occupied a settlement in this politically volatile area under some similar poorly disguised pretext. Other such activities that lead up to war were the Macedonian opportunistic attacks on Apollonia in 214 BC when the Roman army was occupied against the Carthaginian forces and the Macedonian occupation of Dassaretis. This provoked an earlier war against Macedon which was to rage until 205 when the treaty of Phoenice ended the hostilities. It was, on this occasion, Macedonian imperialism, but each side did blatantly provocative actions, which did not help the deteriorating diplomatic situation. Rome helped to speed up the rot by aiding Macedonian fugitives such as Scerdilaidas and Demetrius. Rather than “Bella Iustrum”, the war was fought for a variety of imperialistic concerns rather than purely ideological and diplomatic ones.
The concept of “Bella Iustrum” may appear to be the acts of a philanthropist ideally, but in reality, “Bella Iustrum” in its pure form could not have occurred, or Rome would simply not have had the money to continue growing. In short, the gradual rise to dominance of the Roman state in direct equilibrium with these republican “Bella Iustrum” wars is enough to show that there was more behind it than simple aid to allies. Livy’s belief that Rome was genuinely being a benefactor of freedom by offering to help the Greeks is naive and (when considering the Punic wars) immature. His views on the matter are idealistic rather than realistic. However, as can be seen in many histories and discourses on the Roman republic, he is one of our only sources available. Many of Rome’s records were stored in a pseudo-religious capability by the “Pontifex Maximus” or the chief priest, whose secondary duty is was preserve the annals of Rome. After the Gallic invasion of 390 BC, many of the earlier records of the republic were lost, and many noble families, hoping to re-write history to brighten their forebears, fabricated a great deal of these annals. For this reason, Livy had to use a mix of legend, assumption, popular belief and earlier Greek sources such as Polybius. However, despite all of his merits, Livy essentially wrote for the dual purposes of political propaganda and entertainment, and although he was dedicated to his work, he not a serious historian and lacked the historical skills of his main source; Polybius. This can be illustrated in a below source:

“Essentially a literary artist and court historian, without a fundamental grasp of Geography, military science, or politics, Livy brought to bear upon the historic traditions of Rome an unexcelled narrative skill, a superb prose style, and all the techniques of rhetoric and drama, to create what was virtually a prose epic of the glories of Rome’s past. His basic aim was not critical enquiry, but moral reform through lessons to be drawn from an idealized past, through emphasis on ancient virtues, heroism, patriotic sacrifice and religious piety. Insufficiently critical of his sources, and making no pretension to a systematic philosophy of history, Livy selected and emphasized what suited his purposes, infusing his history with his ethical aim and a prosenatorial bias. Eloquent but fictitious speeches and elaborate but generically similar descriptions of battles about in Livy’s history, and in the early books he recounts at great length many traditional Roman legends. Nevertheless, for many periods of the republic Livy is our best or only authority”


Although Livy’s work parallels Virgil’s “Aeneid” in its role in the Augustan period as political propaganda, Livy hardly prostituted his work for this purpose. Augustus’s patronage of such artists and writers was helpful in his image of “re-creating” the republic after it’s turbulence in the late 2nd and 1st centuries BC, but it did not intrude fully on their work and artistic license. P.G. Walsh, who wrote a highly-acclaimed book on the historiography of Livy, gives this good example of Livy’s considerable independence in the face of the new “regime”:

“Augustus obviously made a determined attempt to befriend the historian, and from Tacitus one learns that they were on intimate terms. The evidence is important:
“Titus Livy...praised Cnaeus Pompey to such heights that Augustus called him a Pompeian, but this did not detract from their friendship”

-- P.G. Walsh, Livy – His historical aims and methods, 1 – the Personal background

Therefore, we cannot be sure in this essay if Livy is being entirely truthful, or is injecting his work with a sufficient dosage of patriotism. Some critics have even gone as far to say that he equates figures such as Numa (an early king of Tarquin Rome) and Hercules to Augustus in an obsequious attempt at flattery. Whilst this is one extreme, it does hold some truth in that Livy – like all historians of the age – had no previous historiography of any real kind to base his work on, and thus cannot be held responsible in his lack of watching for bias. He lived in an age of internalization and xenophobia, meaning that many of the events portrayed in this history based on Livy’s sources will be very critically examined, as a healthy dose of skepticism is needed in dealing with this particular historian.

**Proconsul Titus enters Macedonia and the First Major Victories of the War**

When Titus Quinctius began his Consulship, the war had been raging for some 5 years, with limited results. There had been some minor successes for Philip against the Aetolians, Athamenes and the Dardani, but there had been a few victories for the allies. The legate Marcus Aurelius and king Attalus of Pergamon captured a variety of walled towns, including the port of Oreus, which was a particularly notable victory. A.R Burn in his history of Greece describes the contrast between the old and this brilliant new commander-

"Very unwillingly, the war-weary people were induced to vote for the campaign. Legions were raised, consisting of volunteers only; and after three indecisive campaigns a new, young and brilliant commander, Flaminius, beat the Macedonian Phalanx by sweeping away its flank guards, with help of Aetolian cavalry, and taking it in the rear"

-- A.R. Burn, penguin/pelican history of Greece, chapter 17.3

The Macedonians soon took to the defensive in Aetolia and Thessaly by fortifying the Northern passes such as the Aous, which lead to Epirus. Roman fears were confirmed, and it looked that the Macedonians were going to make a move for a crossing over to Italy, prompting the allies into action. The senate allotted him the command of Macedonia and the Greek situation, and after taking with him 3000 legionary infantry and 300 legionary cavalry, along with 5000 infantry and cavalry of Auxiliary status. During his recruitment, many of his troops that he selected for his command were veterans of the various Spanish and Gallic campaigns; those who had served with exemplary courage, or had won the golden (first to go over the wall in a siege) or grass (for saving the life of a fellow citizen during combat) crowns during combat, for example. Exactly how much of his success can be attributed to the crack troops under his command is debatable. When Hannibal crossed the alps, the composition and type of troops that his army then possessed after that long and dangerous trek was not at all what he needed nor wanted for his attempted attack against Italy. But does that necessarily mean that the general was, theoretically any less brilliant? When Hannibal had the troops that he needed (for example, in the first part of the march in Spain), he
achieved much. This same approach can be applied to Titus. Although he may have had crack troops under his command, they could only be utilized by a brilliant general in the way that they were. The opposite view can be illustrated by H.H. Scullards’ “A History of the Roman world 753 BC to 146 BC”:

"The troops employed by Flaminius were largely composed of Scipio’s veterans from Spain and Africa and there can be little doubt where the tribune had learnt his lesson in tactics. Flaminius was the victory of Cynocephale, but he was building on the foundations laid by another. And he was soon to realize that it was almost more difficult to make peace than war amongst the bickering states of Greek”


According to secondary sources such as Plutarch, Flaminius didn’t serve in Africa under Scipio Africanus, but there could obviously have been other ways that he learnt some tactics from Scipio. In any case, the majority of his military service in the Punic wars was spent with Consul Marcellus in Northern Italy, and the majority of his tactics seem to bear the hallmarks of being those of Marcellus’s than Scipio, but since almost all supreme commanders in the war shared their tactics and frequently liaised, Titus could easily have picked up some tactics from Scipio. In fact, when looking from another perspective, it could be said that Titus’s approach to the strategic situation at Cynoscephalae was similar to the typical approach that Scipio might have attempted in his place.

In 198 BC, after a short spell in Rome, Titus crossed over from Brundisium in South-Eastern Italy to Corcyra in Northern Greece, where he gained a further 8000 infantry and 800 horse of auxiliary status. He then crossed over to the Roman camp there in a Quinquereme to the nearest part of Epirus that was not in the hands of the enemy. He sent Publius Villius Tappulus back to Rome having replaced him as Consul. Publius had not achieved anything worthy of note during his consulship in Macedonia (199 BC), and, apart from a few minor sieges and battles, had done nothing to further the allies’ prospect of victory. Before Publius’s consulship in Macedonia, however; the Roman forces under Gaius Claudius (the second consul for the year 200 BC) had captured Chalsis (a large Macedonian-held fort which was threatening the naval activities of Athens), but this victory was soon forgotten due to Philip’s attack of Athens (which then had only a small garrison of Pergamene troops and a mercenary force under the command of Dioxippus) and the earlier siege of Abydus. That year, Athens declared war upon Macedonia…

The Consulship of Claudius had shown some improvements in the war, but Titus had observed the previous consul’s meager progress of skirmishing, and decided to bring the Macedonians to the field as soon as was plausible. He requested that his brother, Lucius Quinctius Flaminius be given permission by the senate to be commander of the Roman naval force in Greece. According to Plutarch, Lucius was diametrically opposed to his brother in every way, and he rather sternly remarks-

"Titus had a brother, Lucius Flaminius, very unlike him in all points of character, and, in particular, low and dissolute in his pleasures, and flagrantly regardless of all decency"
Lucius had already been granted a Praetorship the year before and as a result held a
significant amount of influence in the republican government. Lucius also brought
with his navy around 3000 young soldiers who had defeated the Carthaginian general
Asdrubal in Spain under Scipio Africanus.

Soon after Titus had struck camp, Philip camped upon the nearby Aous Mountains
with his army and engaged in some small skirmishes, thus denying Titus access into
mainland Greece except from the sea. However, some cattle farmers came to Titus’s
camp and showed him a route, which Philip’s men had neglected to guard. To
reinforce their story by showing their allegiance to the allied cause, they told him the
name of a pro-Roman Greek in Epirus – Charops, son of Machatas, who held a large
amount of influence in the city. Titus took this information as true and sent 4000
infantry with 300 cavalry through the pass, which the farmers had reported. When it
was deemed safe, the main body of the army quietly followed, and hid by day in the
woods. That night, they flanked the Macedonian positions overlooking Epirus on the
mountains, which was where the Macedonians still believed them to be. The
Macedonian Phalanx could not keep up its decisive advantage when being attacked
from three sides, in hill terrain with woods around – the phalanx was a military tactic
more suited to the open field. Plutarch sums up this decisive advantage that the
Phalanx could have in his "lives":

"For the Macedonian Phalanx is like some single powerful animal, irresistible so
long as it is embodied into one, and keeps its order, shield touching shield, all as in a
piece; but if it be once broken, not only is the joint-force lost, but the individual
soldiers who composed it; lose each one of their single strength”

Three parties of legionaries and auxiliaries attacked the Macedonian camp, pushing
them into a general rout, chasing them down from the Aous Mountains. It was in this
manner that Titus secured the first bridgehead into Northern Greece from which he
could transport troops from Italy. The Greek Auxiliary and allied forces under
Alcaeus’s command composed this poem –

"Naked and tombless see, O passer by, the thirty thousand men of Thessaly, Slain
by the Aetolians and the Latin band, that came with Titus from Italia’s land; Alas for
mighty Macedon! That day, Swift as a roe, King Philip fled away"
Philip marched the remnants of his army through Thessaly, burning and pillaging many of the Greek towns and cities, which were directly on the road to Epirus to deny Titus the chance to gain more supplies. Many of these towns, such as Phacium, Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria and Palaepharsalus were completely destroyed. Throughout the war, Philip attempted to use a “scorched earth” policy to gain the upper hand against the allies’ large army. This tactic can be seen throughout almost the whole of the war and was a common practice of many armies of the time in many conflicts. After the Roman victory, Roman allies began to capture various strong points held by the Macedonians around their region – Amynander, king of the Athamenes began to move towards the town of Gomphi and the surrounding region after receiving confirmation from the Consul, and the Aetolian forces captured the fortress of Cyphaera.

Soon after these events, as multitude of Greek peoples, such as the Achaeans, the Opuntians, and the Aetolian confederation were all eager for an official Roman military alliance against Philip V. Titus was renowned for his diplomatic skills and ability with people, so much so that Plutarch calls him “A Greek in voice and language”. Plutarch, being a Greek living under the Roman yoke some 250 years later, would have given the more generally accepted heroic view of Titus when writing his lives. Titus’s evidently impressive oratory and political skills, when combined with his natural charisma, military excellence and knowledge of the Greek world gave him the position of a natural leader against Philip for the allies. After this, most of Greece began to engage in diplomatic negotiations with Titus’s forces – even another Diadochi (decedent states of Alexander the Great) king - Attalus of Pergamum- followed the general consensus and joined the Romans. Philip attempted to reverse this process by sending his delegate, Clemedon, to convince the Aetolians, Phocians and Locrians to leave the king’s alliance with little success.

In the year 197 BC, the annual election for the Consuls commenced in Rome, with Gaius Cornelius (Cethegus) and Quintus Minucius (Rufus) being elected Consuls for that year. So successful was the Macedonian campaign under Titus, that the senate and people voted him a proconsul, allowing his consular powers to be extended for the duration of the war. The senate also voted him more reinforcements to join his now vast allied army; 6000 infantry, 300 cavalry and 3000 seamen, according to Livy, but this does not take into account the various auxiliaries, mercenaries and divisions put under his command in Greece. Lucius, Titus’s completely opposite brother, was also given senatorial permission to command the Roman fleet in Greece for the continuation of the war with Philip. Lucius seems to have used this permission to maximum and devastating effect – he was a competent naval commander and this permission greatly swung the maritime theatre of the war to Rome’s favour.

That year, after returning from the elections in Rome and receiving his reinforcements, Titus wintered in Phocis and Locris. His army by now would probably have been very cumbersome and because of its’ enormous size, logistic problems were probably (we can assume) encountered. The evidence for this lies in, as has been said, the size of his army, the amount of fronts that he had to defend and fluctuating Greek loyalties from some states. These “fluctuating loyalties” can be seen
most clearly in an internal dispute broke out in Opus, where one faction called for Aetolian support, but the other Roman. This was just one example of the widening gap in relations and friendly dispositions between the Roman republic and Aetolian confederation. The Aetolians arrived before the Romans and shut them out of the city, and neither Titus’s appeals nor threats would make the Aetolians leave the town. Just before the situation became drastic, a messenger arrived from King Philip calling Titus and his Greek allies to a meeting at the shore of the Malian gulf near Nicaea. King Amynander, King Attalus, Titus and many other Greek leaders were there. The Romans demanded to Philip that he should withdraw from all the Greek states, which he had captured, restore all the temples that he had desecrated and sacked, and return to the Romans the province of Illyricum, which had been a focal point of the cold war some years earlier. Pergamum asked for nothing more than the return of the prisoners, which Philip had captured, from them in numerous naval battles, as well as the unanimous demands for withdrawal. Almost all the Greek states that had taken part in the war or those that had been affected by it asked for the withdrawal of Macedonian garrisons from Greece and to have their lands returned to them. Philip refused the majority of these demands, but he did respect the request of the Romans for the return of Illyricum, and returned to them almost the entire coast. At this juncture, virtually all the Greek states in Greece proper went over to the Roman side, except for Thebes (which agreed to join the Roman cause after Titus appeared with his army) and Sparta, under the rule of the tyrant Nabis.

The Seleucids Watch from Afar and Hannibal Returns

All over Greece, Macedonian held towns and cities were falling to the combined might of the Greek and Roman armies. Philip had suffered a string of defeats at the hands of the Dassareti (and later, the Romans) that Titus offered a peace treaty. Naval operations were also taxing Philip’s forces to the limit- the fleets of Lucius (Titus’s brother) and Alattus III (the king of Pergamon) were beginning to press hard on some ports such as Eretria, and had devastated large tracts of land. Titus’s terms were that the war would end, as long as Philip respected Greek self-determination, customs and laws. The treaty also demanded the he withdraw all his forces from Greece, and that he should pay according to Plutarch, 1000 Talents, but according to Livy, 200 Talents, and all his shipping except for ten vessels, and that one of his sons, Demetrius, should be sent to Rome to assure the compliance of the terms of the treaty. Other nations apart from the Macedonians, however, also sent deputations. It is important to notice that in the Aetolian deputation, there was a degree of uncertainty if they should either joins a defensive or offensive alliance with Rome. The language of this deputation and the demand for a thousands talents from the Senate is reminiscent of the diplomatic troubles that Titus had experienced with them in Greece.

Titus was, however, at a loss for official action – his hands were tied without the agreement of the senate, so a truce was arranged for four months for the journey, and to see if the senate wished for peace with Macedon. Titus was aware that because Antiochus III was preparing for war in Asia, creating a state of security in Greece was vital. Many cities in the Western districts of Asia Minor such as Ionia and Caria, had been highly alarmed at his encroachments, and had sent pleas for help to Greece proper. Cities such as Lampsacus and Smyrna requested direct intervention. By 196 BC, Antiochus had a foothold in Thrace, and war seemed inevitable.
However, this was not the first time that Greece and Rome had experienced diplomatic tensions with the Seleucids—they had been an irritant to many nations for some time—seemingly endless invasions of Ptolemaic Egypt (the most recent being in 217 BC, but was repulsed by Ptolemy IV Philopator’s victory at the battle of Raphia), constant threats to Armenia (in 212 BC he forced Xerxes of Armenia to accept his authority over the region), his invasions of Parthia (Commencing in 209 BC, when he reached the capital, Hecatompylus, leading in the Parthian king, Arsaces II to sue for Peace). With regards to Philip’s involvement in Antiochus’s imperialistic designs, there were several joint military commands between Antiochus and Philip to oust Ptolemy V Epiphanes from the Egyptian throne in 204/205. They also co-operated in that same year with the systematic attacks of Ptolemaic strongpoints throughout the Aegean. When these joint commands are placed in the context of a “secret alliance” between the Macedonians and the Seleucids, the Roman accusation suddenly becomes more credible. If the alliance with Philip—an enemy of Rome—was not enough provocation, then it was even more when we regard the attacks into Ptolemaic Egypt—which was more or less the only Diadochi state that Rome was relatively well-disposed towards (this shows the contradiction of Bella Iustrum yet again—the senate would have argued that they were defending Ptolemaic Egypt against senseless aggression, which would be credible if only Rome had not depended on North Africa and Egypt for corn and other supplies…). However, this piece of evidence, plus both Philip and Antiochus’s endorsement of Hannibal and his wars are more than enough to support the hypothesis of a secret military alliance. Perhaps most importantly, though, in the provocation of Rome to declare war on Antiochus was his aid of the fugitive Hannibal Barca, who he made his military advisor, placed him under an uncomfortable amount of suspicion from Rome (He was under a considerable amount already for his actions in Egypt which have been previously discussed).

Hannibal’s slide from the power of Carthage began with the anger of his people and the betrayal of his government. Hannibal had been almost personally responsible for prompting two wars with Rome—both of which Carthage lost. In the second—and perhaps most famous—Punic war, Hannibal attacked the Roman-allied Spanish town of Sagnatum despite protestation from the Carthaginian assembly. At the end of the third Punic war, Carthage was in ruins—economic sanction and repeated military action had left it’s infrastructure in ruins, which is more than can be said for the fighting spirit of it’s people. Oddly enough, the people elected Hannibal to restore Carthage and attempt to curb many of the domestic and economic problems that were ravaging it. Despite this, Hannibal decided to ally himself with the Seleucids for another war with Rome. The Carthaginian senate got wind of this, reported it to Rome. Livy reports the he fled from Carthage in disguise for fear of his life. It would seem that Hannibal kept his pledge to destroy Rome until the day he died, on 183 BC, of suicide, trying to escape from Roman agents sent to apprehend him.

Thus, Antiochus’s granting of sanctuary to a dangerous Roman enemy was placed him among not just possible Roman enemies, but also Carthaginian and possibly Numidian ones (although the Numidians had provided Hannibal with cavalry and would at later points go at war with Rome in the late republican Jugerarthine war, and the imperial Tacferinian war, they were at this point on good terms with Rome, and were probably not well disposed to the man that had lead their country to near ruin) Hannibal seems, from many accounts, to have had a great deal of influence of Antiochus. Perhaps Antiochus believed that having a strategist like Hannibal in his
court could save his crumbling kingdom. In any case, he managed to convince Antiochus to make more and more offensive actions towards Roman areas of influence. The Diadochi as a whole clearly imperialistic, but we can clearly see from various sources that Hannibal had a large part to play in influencing Antiochus’s decision. In this case, it is Appian of Alexandria who provides us with this information:

"As Antiochus intended to invade Greece first and thence begin his war against the Romans, he communicated his design to Hannibal. The latter said that as Greece had been wasted for a long time, the task would be easy; but that wars which were waged at home were the hard ones to bear, by reason of the scarcity which they caused, and that those which took place in foreign territory were much easier to endure. Antiochus could never vanquish the Romans in Greece, where they would have plenty of home-grown grain and all needed material. Hannibal urged him to occupy some part of Italy and make his base of operations there, so that the Romans might be weakened both at home and abroad. "I have had experience of Italy," he said, "and with 10,000 men I can occupy some convenient place and write to my friends in Carthage to stir up the people to revolt. As they are already discontented with their condition, and harbor ill-will toward the Romans, they will be filled with courage and hope if they hear that I am ravaging Italy again." Antiochus listened eagerly to this advice, and as he considered a Carthaginian accession a great advantage (as it would have been) for his war, directed him to write to his friends at once."

— Appian of Alexandria book 11.6

Titus Livy also recalls the meeting between Antiochus and Hannibal, but in a less detailed way than Polybius. In any case, both of the above and below sources indicate that Hannibal was driving Antiochus heavily towards war. It would appear that Hannibal joined Antiochus’s court while Titus was occupied in the Peloponnese against Nabis. Although Titus and the Greek command were aware that Antiochus was pursuing his own imperialism in Asia Minor and may very soon invade Greece, they would not know that Hannibal Barca was behind it until Carthage confirmed Rome’s suspicions.

"Scarcely had they started on their mission when envoys came from Carthage with the intelligence that Antiochus was undoubtedly preparing for war with the advice and assistance of Hannibal, and apprehensions were felt as to the outbreak of a war with Carthage at the same time. As was stated above, Hannibal, a fugitive from his native country, had reached the court of Antiochus, where he was treated with great distinction, the only motive for this being that the king had long been meditating a war with Rome, and no one could be more qualified to discuss the subject with him than the Carthaginian commander. He had never wavered in his opinion that the war should be conducted on Italian soil; Italy would furnish both supplies and men to a foreign foe. But, he argued, if that country remained undisturbed and Rome were
free to employ the strength and resources of Italy beyond its frontiers, no monarch, no nation could meet her on equal terms."

-- Livy book 34.60

Polybius also mentioned in his works the character of Antiochus III “the great”, and his account of this monarch seems to fit in quite neatly with the general consensus that he grew increasingly insecure, making easy prey for Hannibal. Antiochus - according to Polybius and Livy – was a man who “disappointed general expectation”. This insecurity on Antiochus’s part made him a ridiculed and pathetic figure to many later Roman satirists and comedians such as Juvenal. The eastern despot in many classical states was almost always seen as a pseudo-Barbarian, and it is ironic that Antiochus of the Seleucids – a nation founded by Greek values and armies – should have taken on such an eastern form so as to be ridiculed in such a way. Hannibal – the traditional enemy of Rome – is also ridiculed for having to ask “petty eastern despots” for military and political assistance against his greatest enemy. Juvenal illustrates these comic values in Satire 10:

"A fine sight it must have been, fit subject for characature, the one-eyed commander perched on his monstrous beast! Alas, alas for glory, what an end was here: the defeat, the ignominious flight into exile, everyone crowding to see the once mighty Hannibal turned hanger-on, sitting outside the door of a petty eastern despot till his majesty deign to awake"

-- Juvenal, Satire 10

Antiochus’s thirst for territory and prestige was unshakable, and H.H. Scullard describes this aggressive personality viewing Antiochus III and Philip V as aids to his designs:

"Antiochus, the conqueror of the east, who had just returned from following the victorious route of Alexander to India, loomed large amid the mist of fears and rumours. What if he combined with Philip and concentrated in Greece as a base of operations against Italy? Now was the moment to intervene in Greece; not to subjugate it, which would have allowed the monarchs to pose as liberators, but to free it and then throw it over the aegis of permanent protection."

-- H.H. Scullard, Part III – Rome and Greece, chapter 3 – the causes of the war

This source is interesting because it shows that although Antiochus was indeed an imperialist in the loose sense of the term, he was also cautious. All of his commands against other nations to increase his domains were exercised with brilliant ingenuity and tactical ability. It is therefore odd that he should so reluctantly attack Greece when he was aware that tactically, it was probably not the best action to take. Although this opinion isn’t voiced at all by this source, Antiochus must have considered the options and when considering that Hannibal had to fiercely persuade Antiochus to invade, it does indicate that Antiochus was reluctant and had to be driven into the action by Hannibal Barca.
When regarding these serious issues arising in the East, we can see why it was necessary for Titus to finish the war with Macedon at this period, which is probably why he was reluctant to pursue Philip further and attack Macedonia. During the debate, however, many of the Greek commanders were so furious with Philip for the misery and hardship that he had inflicted upon their people, that they wanted Titus to remove Philip from his throne and invade Macedonia, but, taking yet again influences from Marcellus (the striking parallel that he thought that Philip’s army would now be so weak that he could leave it to disintegrate, and Marcellus thought along the same lines when facing Hannibal in the second Punic war clearly reinforces the hypothesis of this historian that he gained many of his military tactics from Marcellus), he decided to leave Macedon as a passive buffer state to the more violent tribes in the north.

The complex family relations between the Diadochi (successor states to Alexander the great) meant that many of the Diadochi empires were interrelated with each other – this is important in this context as Philip V was in fact Antiochus’s nephew through Demetrius II’s marriage with Phthia. Although Diadochi kings had and would later still (the Pontine wars against Mithradies IV Eupator is just one example out of many to come in the later years of the Roman state) intervene in Greek politics because of their historical territorial claims and imperialism, this family relation is certainly worth mentioning. It is possible that this relation was just one out of many pretexts for him to invade Greece – he was “Rescuing” his nephew and thus protecting a relative of Alexander. There is still more evidence to suggest this interlinking of the Diadochi by Antiochus III’s marriage to Laodice II, daughter of Mithrades II of Pontus. Although this is not enough evidence to suggest some kind of alliance, it does show a degree of diplomatic consideration and friendship that is suggestive. Also, Ancient empires of this period generally didn’t wed off young sons and daughters to further their political aims (at least outside of the borders) like the later medieval monarchies would. When taking into consideration that both Antiochus III and Philip V had both aided Hannibal Barca in some way, we can see some kind of informal sympathies and/or agreement taking place between them.

**Troubles Among the Allies and Phillip’s Foresight**

The fragile peace created between the Greek and Roman allies and Macedonia destroyed the hopes of an opportunistic Antiochus, who wished to use the preoccupation of the Romans and Greeks to his advantage in Asia Minor to gain land, and ultimately to invade Greece. However, it did spread dissent within the allied command concerning Titus’s behavior concerning the continuation of the Macedonian war. Some, such as the Aetolians, who had throughout most of the campaign been diplomatically difficult for the Romans, had begun to sympathize with Antiochus III, viewing him as a more just “Savior of Greece” than Titus could ever have been. They even embarked in treachery and (according to Polybius) sent Antiochus III some informants to sit with him in his court.

However, the Aetolians had never enjoyed a good reputation from the Peloponnesian and Attican Greeks, and many peoples of that general area such as the Locrians were regarded to be semi-barbaric, so perhaps it is not surprising that their sympathy would switch to a less prejudice people in the form of the Diadochi empires. This is just one
of the many issues plaguing the allied command and thus, the cohesion which had provided the united front of Greeks and Romans, which caused Philip’s downfall, was beginning to fall apart. At a time when cooperation was needed, the internal alliances were beginning to crumble – the Greeks were, it seems, to many and too differing in their opinions of the war with Philip to keep allied for longer. This in itself shows an important stage in ancient history – the final fall of the concept of the city-state, which was becoming eclipsed gradually by large multi-cultural and cosmopolitan superpowers. The fall of the Sumerian civilization occurred with the rising powers of the Babylonian, Akkadian, Assyrian, Hittite and Neo-Sumerian kingdoms. Although the contrast is vague, it does represent the same shift of power from one nation type to another in a different guise.

Despite the unsettling issue of how the commanders of the opposing Greek factions within the alliance viewed Titus’s behavior and military judgment, which they would have viewed as meek and timid, the general consensus within Greece was that Titus was a hero. On the whole, the average Greek citizen was ecstatic with Titus’s servitude to the Hellenic people, and numerous honours were bestowed upon him. Titus then requested that cities such as Corinth, Chalcis and Demetrias should still retain their Roman garrisons to maintain a force in the event of a Seleucid invasion. These gains by the Romans understandably angered Philip V who, after being accused of imperialism himself, was witnessing it before his very eyes.

Hostilities were renewed in the spring of 197 BC after the Macedonian delegates returned with no promise of negotiations. The Senate gave Titus unlimited powers in peace and war in Greece, and was granted imperium for the remainder of the war. Antiochus’s moves in Asia were becoming more and more threatening and both knew that the question needed to be settled on the field of battle. Since the senate was obviously not tired of war, Titus gave word that he would from then on receive no delegates from Philip who would not bring news of unconditional withdrawal from Greece. To secure his captured cities, Philip transferred the command of Argos and Corinth to Sparta, on the understanding that Nabis was to return control to the Macedonians if Philip was victorious on the field of battle. He also told Nabis of his desire to unite them by marrying their children. Nabis at first refused, but on closer inspection of what Philip was offering him, reluctantly agreed to take control, much to the surprise of the Romans and their allies. Nabis, however, betrayed Philip and offered to give Argos to the allies as a sign of his good will. The two leaders agreed to a conference at which Titus made two demands – firstly, that Nabis should end his war with the Acheans, which had been raging for some time, and secondly, that he should send auxiliaries to aid him in the battle that was soon to commence against Philip.

Nabis refused after consulting his citizens, but it soon came to the knowledge of the consul that Nabis’s soldiers attended the citizen’s meetings in Sparta. Titus forced Nabis to hold a meeting without soldiers where the citizens would be allowed to speak freely. After this had commenced, and the wishes of the Spartans became known to the allies rather than the wishes of the tyrant, Nabis agreed to supply a company of 600 Cretans for the battle, and then to arrange a truce of 4 months – which was granted – with Nicostratos, the Achean chief magistrate. Quinctius then set out for Corinth, which had not been informed of its occupier’s capitulation to the allies. Titus sent the 600 Cretan soldiers granted to him by Nabis to the gate to explain the situation to the Spartan commander, Philocles, who agreed to speak to Titus about the
possibility of changing his allegiance. His reply was one which suggested procrastination rather than refusal.

It is important to place this humiliation of Macedon in the larger historical context - Post-Alexandrian Macedon was never one of the most powerful Diadochi states, as it was vulnerable to the designs of the much wealthier and larger eastern states which formed the majority of Alexander’s great empire. Most of the Macedonian rulers from the very early stages after Alexander’s death were mainly second-rate when compared to the cream of his commanders such as Ptolemy, Seleucus, Perdiccias and Parmenio, who were in the east when Alexander died. J.P Mahaffy quite rightly came to the conclusion that Alexander’s capital was his camp, and naturally this meant that at his death, the best commanders were in the east and were going, in the succession, to lay claim to the rich and powerful provinces to the east. In contrast, Alexander mainly left the more incompetent generals and suchlike in command of the west. The best example of this is Philip Arridaeus, Alexander’s illegitimate brother who, weak willed, was declared the puppet king of Macedon under Perdiccias (the commander of Alexander’s Cavalry), the regent of the upcoming child of Alexander. Because Macedon was symbolically the base of power for the Macedonians, Alexander’s army was now so thoroughly easternised that the real power lay in Persia, Mesopotamia and other such lands. However, because of this image of imperial power that the land of Macedon still held, it was often the region of vicious confrontation between aspiring successors. The Lamian wars, the three successor wars, strings of smaller wars and the civil disorder created in the conflict between the two heirs after Antipater’s death, Polysperchon and Casander had caused Macedon to be one of the most devastated of the Successor states. Even right up to the battle of Ipsus in 301 BC, which effectively destroyed the Antigonid successors, and determined the domination of the Seleucids and Ptolemaics, Macedon was still struggling to keep up with the political development and internal security that it’s eastern Diadochi “brothers” were generally enjoying. Also, a failed invasion of Ptolemy’s Egypt by Perdiccias lead to a crushing defeat of the Macedonian armed forces and the assassination of their king. This ruin and internal disruption of Macedon shrunk its boarders back more or less to those in the time of Philip II, and a variety of Greek “leagues” such as those of the Aetolians, rose and ensured that the Macedonian state was in no state to take Greece back. When regarding these points, we can see how Macedon was mainly relying on the help of the Seleucids and Carthaginians to defeat the Romans, effectively “piggy-backing” on other states’ foreign policy.

**The Battle of the Dogs Hills and the Final Endgame**

Titus and the allies then marched past Thermopylae by way of Scarphea and stayed there for a council of the Aetolians to discuss the amount of military support they would give to the Romans during the immediate future. When he had heard the decision, he proceeded to Xyniae where he pitched camp and waited for the Aetolian auxiliaries, which were 6000 infantry and 400 cavalry. 500 Gortynians, 300 Apollonians and 1’200 Athamanian infantry then joined him. Titus intended to strike camp with all his assembled forces at Thebes of the Phthiotis, but the enemy held this, and thus he struck camp outside after a variety of attempts on his troops had been made. He withdrew, as he did not wish to become involved in a siege when the defeat of Philip in the field was far more important to the allied cause.
Titus, with his allies marched out towards Pherae in search of Philip, who was actually stationed in Larisa. Titus by this point had under his supreme command 32'500 to 33'400 soldiers of both Roman and Greek origin. He even had some elephants and Numidian cavalry sent to him by Masinissa, the king of Numidia. It is thought that Philip had around 16'000 infantry in Phalanx formation, 2’000 peltasts, 5500 light infantry from Illyria, Thrace and Crete, and 2000 cavalry- making around 25'000 troops overall. The two armies met at Pherae, but Philip’s troops were defeated in a cavalry skirmish outside the city. Both sides then marched towards Scotusa in search of food and supplies, but were hidden from one another because of the hills in the region.

During the march, there was a heavy rainstorm and then, later in the morning, a fog which confused and disoriented Philip’s soldiers, who had continued marching to Scotusa, while the allies had struck camp. The Macedonian column left a strong rearguard of assorted infantry and cavalry on the hills of Cynoscephalae (the Dog’s hills) and pitched camp, as the fog was far too dense for them to continue their march. Titus kept his army camped near Thetideum, but sent out a force of ten squadrons of cavalry and 1’000 infantry to reconnoiter the Macedonian preparations, warning them to be open to the possibility of a surprise attack, which could have been devastating when concerning the weather conditions. When the Roman patrol force finally reached the Macedonian rearguard on the Cynoscephalae heights, they were each so surprised of each other’s appearance that they remained transfixed with their alarming discovery.

The fighting gradually began, not by the orders of Titus and his allies, nor by the orders of Philip. The Roman patrol force had no idea how to proceed at this juncture, and thus their officers were at a loss. A few impetuous soldiers gradually began to skirmish, with more and more joining the fray. In this first fight the Romans were gaining the upper hand, as this was only a small rearguard – the Macedonians had not yet sent a relief force to their aid. 500 Cavalry and 2000 infantry were sent under 2 military tribunes to aid the fight, which had erupted on the heights. The Macedonians sent messages for the king asking for urgent support, but Philip had not expected battle – and a substantial number of his troops had been sent out on foraging expeditions and were hard to find or send a message to in the darkness. The clouds lifted, and the Macedonian troops came into view. Philip was at a loss as to what he should do – Titus had camped and had made preparations for defenses and quick action, whereas Philip had continued marching and had only set up his camp and defenses fairly recently. Neither commander had expected the battle to take place in Cynoscephalae – the patrols and rearguards of the two columns marching to Scotusa had simply come into unexpected contact.

The Romans were gradually pushed from the top of the heights by Philip’s cavalry – this success gave Philip and his commanders more hope, and thus they promptly sent out all their available forces for battle. Titus too followed this example, although this was more by necessity that by his own design. He kept his elephants to the left wing and his assault troops (such as his legionaries and hastatii) to the right. His speech before the battle proper survives in Livy’s histories, where he reminded them of the victory of the Aous that they had encountered whilst arriving from Epirus –
There you overcame the difficulty of the terrain: you drove out those Macedonians, and you routed them in a pitched battle. Your present foes are those whom on a former occasion you defeated under the command of Publius Sulpicius, when they beset you at the entrance into the land of the Eordaei. It is because of it’s renown that the Macedonian empire has endured, not in virtue of its strength; and that renown itself has finally withered away

-- Livy book 33.8

The Macedonians arranged themselves in the Phalanx formation – the same formation which had been defeated at the battle of the Aous. The rows of soldiers with their long pikes and interlocking shields made cavalry attacks and most forward infantry attacks nearly impossible, but when attacked from the sides or the back, the troops had not enough mobility to move to repel the attack. The general action of the Phalanx would be to for the back ranks to slowly push the mass of men forward – breaking and wounding the enemy formation by this onslaught. Philip’s main tactic would have been to pin down the enemy with his Phalangites (Macedonian heavy spearmen), and then deliver the killing blow with his cavalry. This formation had been the undisputed master of the field since Sumerian times, and the first evidence we have of a Phalanx in combat is at the battle of Umma in around 3000 BC, (between the city state of Kish and another enemy over a territorial dispute), etched onto the “steele of the vultures”, commemorating this victory.

Initially the Macedonian Phalangites in the Phalanx formation bode fairly well against the Roman and allied troops, causing a division of them to withdraw, but it was when Philip attempted to send more reinforcements in Phalanx formation that the disaster occurred. A new section of the Macedonian Phalanx lines began to move its way along the rough ground of the lower ridges towards the combat (fighting was occurring all over the hills at this time, even near the Roman camp, where, according the Livy, the Romans were being routed).

It was on this ground that the Macedon Phalanx began to lose its cohesion and it was that Phalanx which Titus attacked with his Numidian Elephants (which, naturally packed a considerable punch to the Macedonian lines and were a huge bonus for his army) – the Phalanx, which was then not even in proper formation, began to split up and a rout of the phalangites that had made it up entailed. Philip’s order for his Phalanx infantry to charge at the Romans caused various elements of his line to loose their formation whilst running – the formation of the Phalanx could not be kept whilst running in the manner that Philip was ordering, especially over mountainous terrain. The left wing of Philip’s line had been broken, and the soft underbelly of the whole Macedonian line was exposed – around 20 maniples of the Roman legionaries from the front lines went around and then attacked the Macedonians from the back with their short swords, whilst the Phalanx was more or less unable to respond adequately because of their cumbersome weapons. It is not known who gave this order, but various sources give a brief reference to an unknown military Tribune.

The Macedonians had been completely flanked to the right by the combination of Elephants and Superior legionary troops. Had the Phalanx managed to get in formation when the Elephants charged, it is likely that they could have held off the elephant charge. A general rout occurred, and the Macedonian forces came streaming down the mountain. Philip and the survivors made for Tempe as fast as they could,
whilst the Romans entered the Macedonian camp in hope of plunder, but were disappointed as the camp had already been sacked thoroughly by the Aetolians and various other Greek allies who took part in the battle. Despite the advantage that the legionaries and other such troops had over the Macedonians, the Post-Alexander Macedonian army was still one of the finest fighting forces in the ancient world. The Macedonian Phalangite was amongst the first troop type of the ancient world to be drilled in the modern sense, and Macedonian developments in the Phalanx formation under Alexander the great and his father, Philip V proved devastating for Macedon's enemies. Plutarch describes the training and perfection of the Phalanx that the Macedonian armed forces had obtained in a related quote above. Because of this vigorous training regime, the Macedonians could make military manoeuvres in half the time of their ancient counterparts.

According to Polybius and Livy, 5000 Macedonians had been killed, although Livy states that other sources claim 32'000 Macedonians were killed with 4300 prisoners – probably an exaggeration from a bias Roman imperial historian, as Philip’s army at most consisted of 25’000 men. Titus supposedly took 1000 prisoners and lost 2000 men himself. According to the historian Appian of Alexandria, as late as 191 BC, the dead at “The dog’s hills” we not buried, perhaps giving evidence of an “Accused” site for the Macedonians.

Despite this great victory, many of the Greek allies - the Aetolians in particular – thought that Titus allowed Philip to escape because of a promise of gifts from the king (The Aetolian confederation had suffered horrendous losses against the 220 BC war with Philip). Livy insists that Titus’s character spoke against such behavior, and the Aetolians, according to most major sources were indeed the most difficult of all the allied Greek states for Titus to commence diplomacy with. These suspicions have been confirmed to us when, unknown to the Roman high command, the Aetolians sent a deputation to convince Antiochus to cross over and attack Greece.

King Amynander of the Athamenes commenced further betrayals of this nature, and through a complex issue of marital relations, decided that it was in his interests to ally with Antiochus. The tactical blunders that this alliance would entail when the Romans discovered it were vast – Athamania was near the province of Epirus and the Ionian – the strategic crossing point for Roman reinforcements and armies. With no allies save the Aetolians to the south, the Athamenes would not have stood a chance of victory when the Romans discovered their treachery. The Macedonians to the North who would usually have had the Northern Ionian seaboard in their general sphere of influence were in no fit state to defend it.

**The Peace Terms with Philip and the Declaration of Greek Freedom**

Philip was forced to surrender to the same terms which Titus had offered him 198 BC, with some additional clauses added to the negotiations since the last failed attempt. This time, after a major defeat in the field, he was forced to accept. The terms were supposedly, according to Livy, as follows:
"1. That all Greek cities, in Europe and Asia, should have their freedom and their own laws. 2. That Philip should withdraw his garrisons from the cities, which had been in his control: and that he should hand the cities over to the Romans, with his troops removed from them, before the time of the Isthmian games. 3. That Philip should withdraw his garrisons from the following cities in Asia: Euromum, Pedasa, Bargyliae, Iasus, Myrina, Abydus, Thasos, and Perinthius (for it had been decided that these places should be free); with regard to the liberty of the Ciani, Quinctius was to write to Prusias, King of Bithynia, telling him the decision of the senate and then ten commissioners). 4. That Philip should surrender to the Romans the prisoners and deserters, all the decked ships except five and one royal galley (of almost unmanageable size, propelled by sixteen rows or oars). 5. That he should have no more than 5’000 soldiers, and no elephants at all. 6. That he should not wage war outside Macedonian without the Senate’s permission. 7. That he should pay 1’000 talents to the Roman people, half of this immediately, the other half in annual installments. (Valerias Antias tells us that an annual tribute of 4’000 pounds silver for ten years was imposed on the king; Claudius speaks of a tribute of 4’200 pounds for thirty years, and an immediate payment of 20’000 pounds. The latter also records an explicit additional cause forbidding Philip to wage war against Eumenes, son of Attalus, who was the new king of Pergamon."

-- Livy book 23.30

Much to the anger of many Greeks (in particular the Achaean league) Philip’s kingdom was kept as a buffer state between Greece and the barbarians such as the Scythians, Dacians and Goths to the north. The battle was not only paramount in the role of initiating the official closure of the Second Macedonian war, but it made the Macedonian Phalanx – formerly one of the most powerful troop types in the ancient world - almost completely obsolete in the process – the battle of Cynoscephalae showed the agility and versatility that the Roman legionary had over more specialized troops by showing their ability to perform many roles. However, many of the theorems behind the Phalanx are known to have been adopted by the Romans in a different form – we have evidence of Julius Caesar’s troops using their “Pilae” (throwing javelins) as thrusting spears against light infantry and light cavalry, despite their training. This instinctive behavior probably came from the many decades that, by now, Roman troops had spent in Greece, doing what they would have thought of as “Peace keeping operations”. The huge military presence of the Roman republic in the East, forced first by the three Macedonian wars and lastly by the Mithradic and civil wars, had huge effects upon Roman society as a whole. Roman troops coming home to Italy brought back with them the sun-dial, the water-clock, many of the sport activities that occurred before their entry into the bath proper and finally, and perhaps most importantly, a wider appreciation of Greek arts and language, which had before then only been practiced by the most wealthy and noble members of the republic. This gradual Hellenisation of the average Roman serving in the Legions must have slowly transformed Roman society and culture, for a gradual Hellenisation – but a subtle one – without a doubt occurred. This would culminate in around 284 AD when Greek was declared the official language of the Roman Empire and the increasing power of the Eastern Empire placed Hellenic culture on a pedestal. After 1054 AD- the final break between the Orthodox Church of Byzantium and the Catholic Church of Rome, Byzantine emperors viewed Roman culture as a corrupting influence and finally, the Roman civilization was more or less Greek. This transformation begins in this period – the beginning of a long cultural exchange, starting with Republican Rome’s
One interesting point at this period in Rome’s history is the comparative lack of severity of the peace terms which Rome forced Philip to accept. Compared to those terms which had been forced upon her most dangerous enemy, Carthage; these terms were actually fairly lenient. The Roman final solution to Carthage was to – literally – destroy the city. At the end of the 3rd Punic war, the Romans decimated Carthage with such vigor and ruthlessness that they apparently “Ploughed Salt into the earth”. This obviously seems to be an idiom, but it indicates how disgusted the Romans were with the seemingly endless Carthaginian wars. If this is the case, then why were the peace terms impinged on Philip so light hearted? The Romans saw the Carthaginians and their occasional allies, the Diodachs of Mesopotamia and Macedonia, as sworn enemies. One explanation is territorial conditions. Carthage was fundamentally an isolated state. Apart from the Numidian states along the coast (who at many times were allied with Rome and didn’t prove as much of a threat as Carthage), Carthage did not have that many immediate friends or enemies in its location. The Sahara desert and Atlas Mountains – of course almost impassable to the ancients – were the natural boundaries to the south of almost any ancient state situated here. The Macedonians, on the other hand, had Illyrian tribes to the North, Greeks to the South, Romans to the West, and Thracians to the East. It was viable to secure some kind of buffer state between these peoples if Rome was to have any hegemony and hopes of future control in the region. This also indicates, yet again, Rome’s claims to being a peace-keeping power- if Rome were truly concerned for the honour and rights of the Greeks, the Roman state would have imposed harsher terms upon Philip and (as many of the Greek commanders under Titus would have wanted) would have returned to the Greeks the property that Philip V’s men had looted from Greek lands. Although Titus put this point very eloquently in his above explanation as to why the peace terms should be so relaxed, there was no real need. The Greeks had been defending themselves from northern invaders (with the notable exception of the Dorians in Mycenaean and early Archaic times…), and were quite capable of defending themselves without Macedonian and Roman assistance to the North. It might be argued that this was simply to ensure that the Roman flanks were protected in the impending war with Antiochus III of Selucus, but this theory doesn’t hold up because the terms were expected to have been implemented for decades. The Romans, unlike the Greeks, considered a treaty a sacred agreement which should never be broken. However, they also thought that a treaty should definitely be implemented for as long as the two states last, again showing a discrepancy between the Greek and Roman sides of thought. Although explained to the Greeks by Titus in their language, does this incident again show another Roman republican concealed imperialistic measure?

Titus’s ability – just like Consul Marcellus’s – to adapt to offensives whilst using an ultimately defensive approach was shown in this battle. Macedonia was ultimately broken, and from then on declined. It made one last futile attempt at regeneration in 168 BC, but this was soon squashed by Lucius Faullus at Pydna against king Perseus, son of Philip V and the last genuine Diadochi Macedonian king. Cynoscephalae was the first of these two battles, however, which sealed Macedon’s fate to ultimately become spliced into four Roman autonomous provinces by around 130 BC. In 196 BC, Flaminius appeared at the isthmian games in Corinth and proclaimed the freedom of the Greek states. His great knowledge of Greek culture, and his fluency in the language made a deep impact on the Greek people, and he was hailed as their
liberator and many coins were minted with his image, and in many cities he was deified. According to Livy, his speech went thus:

"The Roman senate, and Titus Quinctius the commander in Chief, make this proclamation, following on the defeat of King Philip and the Macedonians: The Corinthians, the Phocians, all the Locrians together with the Island of Euboea, the Magnesians, the Thessalians, the Perhaebi, The Pththiotic Acheaeans – all these peoples are to be free, to be exempt from tribute, and they are to enjoy their own laws"

-- Livy

Plutarch states that after his speech-

"A shout of joy followed it, so loud that it was heard as far away as the sea"

-- Plutarch, life of Titus Quinctius Flaminius

The feelings of the Greek people towards the Roman republics’ intervention in their political affairs are summed up as followed by Plutarch:

"Courage and wisdom are, indeed rarities amongst men, but of all that is good, a just man it would seem is most scarce. Such as Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias and Alcibiades knew how to play the general’s part, how to manage a war, how to bring off their men victorious by land and sea; but how to employ that success to generous and honest purposes, they had not known."

-- Plutarch, life of Titus Quinctius Flaminius

This feeling which was seemingly replicated over a huge amount of the Hellenic world seems to be in the face of evidence rather naïve. The real motives behind the Roman intervention were to secure Greece as a pro-Roman land, and to ensure that Philip could not support their enemies like he had once supported Hannibal in the second Punic war. As eloquent and cultured as Titus may have been, he was still fundamentally a servant to the republic and his country, and he viewed Philip moreover as an enemy of the Roman state. Although Titus and the republic obviously valued the Greek states as allies, and that the intervention was by no means of a Machiavellian one in nature, it was ultimately for the benefit of Rome, not for the Greeks. Fundamentally, Flaminius’s success was built on an ambiguity in his language. For Greeks the proclamation of freedom meant self-rule, but in Roman law a freed slave became the client of his former master (a freedmen) and still owed his patron respect and political obedience, and thus, what Titus was proclaiming and what the Greeks thought he said were in actuality different things altogether. Rather than being the saviour of Greece, Titus was literally the best person for the job because of
his knowledge of Greek culture and military expertise. The only source that I have found that seems to show some kind of contrary image of Flamininus, which seems to reinforce the view that he was an arrogant man who was manipulating the Greeks is again, the varied and theoretical Mahaffy’s Alexander’s empire:

"The further proceedings of Flamininus in Greece after the battle of Cynoscephalae are recorded in every Roman history, and perhaps the best in Mommsen’s, if we allow for his contempt of the claims of small states, and his open assertion that the strongest have the right to rule. Flamininus at that time was no mere Roman proconsul, but an individual possessing great influence on the state, because he was supposed to know all about the Greek world, and was a proper representative of the senate in the east on account of his culture. The majority of the nobles at Rome were still mere outsiders as regards Hellenistic culture; they spoke Greek not at all, or badly, and they were not only very sensitive to ridicule for being barbarians, but anxious to maintain the dignity of Rome in the east. Flamininus, on the contrary, posed as a man of the new culture, and fit to talk with kings and at synods in Greek; he was very vain of this, and desired to be handed down to posterity as the benefactor and liberator of Greece."

-- John Pentland Mahaffy and Arthur Gilman, Alexander’s Empire chapter 28

As this “declaration of Greek freedom” was probably the height of Titus’ career, many ancient historians have given many different views on the matter. H.H. Scullard shows the more generally accepted view of Titus as a genuine aid to Greece:

"Flamininus, his ambition at last sated, was almost mobbed by the enthusiastic crowd. The proclamation, together with the senates’ manifesto, was the high-water mark of Rome’s philhellenic policy. She proclaimed herself to be the permanent protectress of Greek liberty throughout the world, a liberty to be respected alike by the Greeks themselves, by the conquered Philip and by the aggressive Antiochus."

-- H.H. Scullard, Part III – Rome and Greece, chapter 5 – the settlement of Greece

The majority of those who sympathized with the Romans in this period, however, were the Greek plutocrats and bourgeois, who saw the Romans as “Mediterranean policemen” who could help them in their own petty city affairs. Naturally, these were not the woes of the people, who needed allied foreign support after the devastation that they had suffered at the hands of Philip and the gradual decline that had come from the fading of the “light of Greece”. These once powerful city-states had lost all cohesion to the superpowers that were now the Diadochi and the Roman republic. Greece would soon become the middle ground in an ancient cold war between Rome and the Hellenic kingdoms. In contrast to H.H. Scullard, an earlier secondary source – J.P. Mahaffy – shows the more skeptical view that the “declaration of Greek Freedom” was little more than an imperialistic exercise, and in the below source, he uses earlier examples of seemingly manufactured Macedonian-Greek sympathies to gain support:
…The latter, finding himself in difficulties, issued one of those many absurd proclamations, “giving liberty to all the Greeks”, which were made in after years by every ruler ambitious of their support – by Antigonus and his son, Ptolemy, but always with the intent of securing a more permanent dominion over them.”

-- John Pentland Mahaffy and Arthur Gilman, Alexander’s Empire chapter 5 (note – the man mentioned in the source is Casander, one of the troublesome sons of Antipater)

The Romans had not previously intervened heavily in any other Greek affairs until after the Punic wars and the Pyrrhic wars – both of which showed them the danger that the Hellenic world could render. As the common phrase goes “There’s no such thing as a free meal”. He withdrew his garrisons from the various towns and cities, which he had captured from Philip and returned back to them their original governments and laws. In return, he was given vast amounts of honours by many Greek nations – the Acheans released all the Roman soldiers who had been taken intro slavery from the second Punic war to Titus (In return Titus sent Philip’s son back to him), huge hordes of loot from the Macedonian war (Tuditanus says, 3,713 pounds weight of gold, 43,270 of silver, 14,514 pieces of gold and a selection of Macedonian arms and helmets), Titus himself thought of his liberation of Greece more highly than anything else that he had done, and donated to Apollo a golden crown at Delphi with the following inscription –

" This golden crown upon thy locks divine, O blest Latona’s son, was set to shine,By the great captain of the Aenean name, O Phoebus, grant the noble Titus fame! "

-- Plutarch, life of Titus Quinctius Flaminius

His success was so much that the next two consuls of 196 BC (L. Furius Purpurio and M. Claudius Marcellus) and the senate kept him as a Pro-Consul and allowed him to retain his army and authority in Macedonia. Ironically, this declaration of Greek freedom would tie Rome into yet another war- because this declaration also applied to the eastern Greeks, Titus and the Western Greeks were also obliged to defend peoples such as the Ionians from Antiochus’s aggression.

The Tyrant in Sparta

Soon after these events, the eyes of the allied high command turned to Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta who still held the last few cities, which had not been proclaimed as “free” by Titus’s declaration at the isthmian games. These cities had been handed over to Nabis from Philip before the battle of Cynoscephalae on the condition that he returned them if Philip won. Nabis had never joined the allied command against Philip, and was renowned for his tyranny of Sparta. A deputation from the Senate arrived at Titus’s camp to discuss the possibility of war with Sparta. Titus called a meeting of the allied commanders to discuss the situation.

" The Romans and Greeks have waged war against Philip with a united spirit and a
common strategy, although they each had their own motives for war. For he had violated his friendship with the Romans, at one time by helping their enemies the Carthaginians, at another by attacking our allies in these parts; while towards you he behaved in such a way that your wrongs gave us adequate justification for war, even if we forgot the wrongs offered to us. Today’s discussion depends entirely on you. I put before you the question whether you are willing to allow Argos – which, as you know, has been seized by Nabis – to remain under his control, or whether you think it equitable that this most renowned and ancient city, in the centre of Greece, should be restored to freedom and enjoy the same status as the other cities of the Peloponnesus and Greece. This debate, as you see, is about a matter, which is altogether your concern; it does not affect the Romans at all, except in so far as the enslavement of one community in liberated Greece prevents their glory from being full and unqualified. However, if you are unmoved by concern for the city, or by the precedent thus set, or by the danger that the infection of that evil may spread more widely, well and good, as far as we are concerned. I am asking your advice on this question, and I shall abide by the decision reached by the majority"

-- Livy book 24.22

This speech of Titus’s was responded to with mixed approval – the Athenian representative was ecstatic with the Roman liberation of his country, whereas the Aetolian delegate, Alexander, brought a charge of fraud against the Romans on the ground that they were making too much of a show of how much they had achieved and how good natured they were, but that they were still holding Chalcis and Demetrias with their garrisons. Some of the Greek representatives, such as Achaeans, felt that they had earned the land that they had captured from Philip with the blood of their soldiers, and deserved to have the control of cities such as Echinus and Pharsalus. The real issue on the agenda, that of the recovery of Argos from Nabis, was only brought up by Aristaenus’s, the chief Magistrate of the Achaeans, who replied to the Aetolians:

"May Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Queen Juno, protectress of Argos, forbid that the city be the prize to be contended for by a Spartan tyrant and Aetolian brigands, in such as plight that it’s recovery by you would bring greater misery than its capture by him. The intervening sea does not protect us from those brigands, Titus Quinctius; and what will our future be if they establish their citadel in the heart of the Peloponnesse? They have only the tongue of Greeks, just as they have only the outward shape of men; they live according to customs and practices more savage than those of any barbarians "

-- 34.22

The general consensus throughout the delegation was one of approval that Argos should be reclaimed by force. However, when the allied army moved out, there was a revolt in Argos, when a young Argive called Damocles attempted to raise a rebellion against the Spartan occupation. This failed and the protesters were brutally massacred apart from a few who escaped to seek refuge with the allied army. It was at this time that Titus argued to his generals that:

"What could be more inconsistent than to leave the real enemy alone and attack
Argos, seeing that the war had been undertaken on behalf of the Argives against the tyrant?"

--- 34.26

The army promptly moved out, raising the siege preparations. Titus struck camp at Caryae, where King Philip sent 15000 Macedonians and 400 Thessalian cavalry. The assembly of supplies, however and troops for the long siege ahead was taking up too much valuable time, and alongside this, naval forces were assembling to blockade the Spartan ports – Lucius Flamininus and King Eumenes of Pergamon had arrived from Leucas with around 60 vessels between them of varying sizes and types. There was also a large body of exiled Spartans who had escaped from the terror of Nabis’s regime to fight for the Romans. According to Livy, the main exile was Agesipolis, the rightful heir to the Spartan throne.

It is, however important to consider the historical context of the word “Tyrant” that was ascribed to Nabis. Many of his reforms were actually those of a philanthropist and were not tyrannical in the modern sense of the word. A good comparison to draw would be that of the “Gracchi” brothers in the later Roman republic, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, who attempted to aid the plebeians through their offices as Tribunes by removing some power from the plutocrats and senators. Gibbon stated the traditional definition of “tyrant” was:

"It is sufficiently known that the odious appellation of tyrant was often employed by the ancients to express the illegal seizure of supreme power, without any reference to the abuse of it."  

--- Gibbon, Decline and fall of the Roman Empire Chap 10

The generation of Greek “Tyrannos” which Nabis belonged to was the result of the widespread destruction of Athens and Sparta after the Peloponnesian war. Sparta, Athens and many of the other city states involved soon became pawns to the whims of the emerging Pan-Continental superpowers such as the Diadochi kingdoms, the Roman republic and Carthage. The “Glory of Greece” was gradually overshadowed by these gargantuan nations, who influenced these countries, Sparta being just one, with Nabis being a pawn to Philip V. The basic similarities between these tyrants can be illustrated by this quote from A. Andrews, “The Greek tyrants”:

"Some were agents of the external power of Macedon, some headed their cities in a last desperate bid for freedom, the most were simply men of ability who in normal times would have held normal office and played the part in the politics of their city – it was the instability of their time that made them tyrants."

--- A.Andrews, The Greek Tyrants, Chapter 12, Epilogue

Nabis was not democratic, as can be seen in Livy’s accounts of him, but neither were many of the Greeks who denounced him as a Tyrant, so we must assume that the basis for this accusation is of his attack on the rich of Sparta, probably the largest domestic reform of his that would have merited such attention and outcry from foreigners. It is also possible that Spartan traditionalists who found that the old principle of Spartan
dual kingship had been abandoned called Nabis this. Sir William Tarn summed up the problem excellently:

"One must look fairly at what he did. He carried out all the four points of the social revolution. He abolished debts, redistributed land (leaving some for the wives and children even of exiled opponents), freed slaves and harlots and use money taken from the well to do to defray state expenses (including perhaps the ancient Spartan institution of common meals). Certainly, in getting rid of the class-state, as he claimed to have done, he for the last time restored Sparta’s strength in an extra ordinary way…”"

-- Embedded within A.R. Burn’s history of Greece, 17

Are the actions described by Tarn those of a demagogue? It would seem not. It is also important to consider some of Livy’s limitations as a historian at this time. He reports literally nothing of Nabis’s virtues and only his vices, painting a picture of a brutal tyrant. Since a huge proportion of the information that we have about Titus Quinctius Flaminius comes from Titus Livy, it must therefore be treated with caution and the larger perspective be seen. Most imperial-age historians such as Livy were extremely bias and needed to appease the patriotism that the emperor expected of them (Even more so for Titus Livy, who lived under the high imperial rule of Augustus). In his meeting with Titus at the final siege of Sparta (discussed later), he mentions pitifully that his reputation has been abused by the use of the word “Tyrant”:

"But however that may be, the title of 'tyrant' and the arbitrary acts of a tyrant, such as summoning slaves to freedom and settling the poverty-stricken masses on the land, are alleged against me."

-- Livy book 34.31

However, Polybius does mention that Nabis’s social programme was carried out under pain of death and torture, but if this necessarily merits his demagogic image in the ancient world, where such behavior was rifle, is a matter for debate. The absolute disgust that Titus seems to have felt towards Nabis (as can be seen from the reports from various scholars of his meetings with him and reflections upon him) does seem to be hypocritical and thoroughly unjustified. The Roman republic was culturally against the entire principle of monarchy, and thus, the Roman antipathy towards what was effectively a monarchy (Nabis declared himself a single monarch of Sparta, but this claim was not taken seriously by the Greeks) would in theory be the same toward the Roman antipathy towards any monarch. Many of the Roman allies such as the Pergamene kings and Athamene kings were monarchs, so the destruction of Sparta and other Macedonian allies must have been of more importance than the political system, which those nations had instated.

Another important factor to consider is was the Greek political system of “Polis” (a highly complex form of government, which was both city-state and more than city-state. Much of its flavor was seemingly “socialist” in origin – although there may have been an archon, king or chief magistrate, he was not endowed with any divine right (As was common in oriental societies of this time) and although he held some power, that power was still effectively in the hands of the people – the essence of the
The polis was, in effect, based on the people that it was made up of rather than some abstract political ideology – the people over the state. The polis represented government on a scale comprehensible to its citizens – each member of the polis was a vital organ of its constant maintenance and growth. Political secrecy was not very well known in such states, and all its citizens generally knew the government in flesh, and perhaps the essence of the polis is summarized in Haemon’s quote:

"It is no Polis that is ruled by one man alone."

-- Embedded within H.D.F Kitto, The Greeks, Chapter 5

The Polis was, like the later Roman republic, strongly opposed to the principle that any individual should hold too much power, and that he should commence actions on the part of that polis without the constant scrutiny of the citizen’s assembly. By posting guards at his citizens’ assemblies, concealing his true motives from the people and executing political opponents, Nabis was breaking these fundamental rules that, to Greek Polis member and Roman republican, were repulsive. Also, Nabis’s emancipation of the Helots (the lowest class of Spartan) destroyed many of the fundamentals behind Spartan society. Sparta was one of the few Greek states to maintain a standing army, and in true Dorian tradition, they kept to this system rigorously throughout the centuries. The Spartiates, the upper-warrior class, were maintained by these Helot “surfs” (These surfs giving half their produce to the Spartiates to whom they belonged) and were expected to maintain arms permanently (and were refused any other profession under the constitution of Lycurgus). Thus, emancipation of the Helots meant that the main bulk of the Spartan army would now be unable to support itself because of a massive constitutional dilemma caused by Nabis’s actions. This is probably the reason why so many mercenaries and so few ordinary Spartan hoplites could be rallied for the siege (described below), as they no longer had any financial support from their surfs. This action of Nabis’s must have angered the upper classes considerably, and this military reason is just one more reason why the Spartan people were so disgusted with their Tyrannos – he had effectively disarmed their state of their most efficient soldiers.

When he had assembled his forces, Titus and his vast army marched through the land of Sellasia where he marched up to the river Eurotas, almost at the walls of the city. The Spartans suddenly sallied out when Titus was pitching camp and attacked, killing a few soldiers. A panic set in, as the Romans and their Greek allies had not been prepared for battle so soon. The legionaries, however, entered the fray, pushing the Spartan attack force back to the city walls. The Romans arranged in full battle formation, afraid of any more surprise attacks, but soon went back to complete to camp preparations.

The next day, Titus marched out his troops along the city walls to prepare for siege. Just as this was happening, the Spartan forces desperately sallied out again and tried to attack the allied van. The commander of the rearguard legionary force, Appius Claudius, however, was a cunning commander and had been prepared for this eventuality. He swung round his entire rearguard with ruthless efficiency and attacked Nabis’s attack force. The Spartans broke and swarmed back towards the city gates, with the Achean Greeks close in pursuit inflicting horrific casualties because of their
knowledge of the surrounding countryside. Titus then pitched camp at Amyclae, where he devastated the land surrounding the city. When Nabis moved his attack forces out, to confront Titus, he relocated his camp to the river Eurotas, where he pillaged the land as well. However, it was not just on his land front that Nabis was feeling the consequences of sympathizing with the old Macedonian enemy – naval forces were also pressing hard on his trade routes and ports, and one of particular importance, Gytheum, was being blockaded by Lucius. This large walled port contained one of the major military arsenals for the Spartan army, not to mention Spartan naval vessels, and despite its heavy defenses, Lucius Quinctius Flamininus and Eumenes of Pergamon’s triremes were not going to be an easy enemy for the Spartan garrison. It was not soon before the sailors from the two fleets had constructed a large battery of siege engines such as manlets and battering rams, which reduced a section of the wall and an adjacent tower to rubble. The Romans had almost broken through when they arrived at a stalemate with the Spartans and their commanders – Dexagoridas and Gorgopas. Dexagoridas had stated that he was prepared to negotiate surrender, but was soon executed by Gorgopas for negotiation with the enemy and the hopes of a peaceful conclusion to the siege was dashed in an instant. Gorgopas continued the defense with greater ruthlessness than before, but when 4'000 extra troops arrived with Titus from his camp, Gorgopas in desperation was forced to negotiate.

When Nabis learnt that now the whole country was hostile, he began to panic – with Gytheum under Roman control, he would have no access to the sea, or to a large proportion of his armory and supplies, which were stored there. As a result, his population began to talk of overthrowing their leader if he did not successfully manage to deliver their tyrant from danger. Livy records this episode and how Nabis dealt with the fear of the Spartan populace:

"Although Nabis was confronted by so serious a war both by land and sea, and a just comparison of his own strength with that of the enemy left him hardly any hope of success, he did not give up the struggle. He called up 1000 picked troops from Crete in addition to the 1000 he had already; there were 10,000 of his own subjects under arms including the garrisons in the country districts, and he also fortified the city of Sparta with rampart and fosse. To prevent any internal disturbance he kept the citizens in check by the fear of ruthless punishment, as he could not expect them to desire a tyrant's safety and success. There were certain citizens whom he suspected, and after marching all his forces on to a level space called the Dromos he then assembled the Lacedaemonians in front of him, ordering them to lay down their arms, and surrounding them with his armed bodyguard. He then explained briefly why he ought to be excused for feeling grave apprehensions and taking strict precautions at such a critical time, and he pointed out that it was in their own interest that any persons whom the present state of affairs brought under suspicion should be prevented from doing mischief rather than punished for having done it."

-- Livy 34.27

Moreover, the control of Gytheum meant that the Romans now had control over Spartan farmland, so it would now be almost impossible for the Spartans to collect the harvest. In his absolutely bleak situation, Nabis decided to capitulate, and the herald’s
wand was brought to the Roman camp, with the bearer asking if Titus would allow a meeting with his enemy. Titus, showing more of Marcellus’s colours, knew that it would be more strategically and logistically viable to accept a surrender. He already had Nabis on his knees begging for mercy, so any further assault would have been to a general of his instincts, pointless. Moreover, the deteriorating situation with Antiochus III in the east demanded a quick and reliable victory. Thus, Titus accepted, and soon, the two parties met in some hills near Titus’s camp attended by their routines. Many of the allied heads of state, such as King Eumenes of Pergamon and the Aetolian chief Magistrate also attended. Nabis began the meeting by this speech, stated by Livy:

"Titus Quinctius, and the rest of you here present; if I had been able to think of any reason why you should have declared war or should now be waging war on me, I should have awaited my fate in silence; as it is, I cannot restrain my desire to know, before I perish, why I am to perish. Upon my soul, if you were the kind of people the Carthaginians are reported to be, among whom no sanctity is ascribed to any pledge of allegiance, I should not be surprised that you pay little regard to your behavior in my particular case. But as I look at you now, and I see that you are Romans, who hold treaties to be the most sacred of matters of divine appointment, and regard a pledge of alliance as the most sacred bond in human relations. And I look at myself; and I trust that I am one who, like all the other Spartans, has been linked with you by a most ancient treaty, and who on his own account, as a personal matter, has renewed this friendship and alliance during the war against Philip"

-- Livy book 34.31

The “Most Ancient treaty” that Nabis is alluding too in this source is most probably, based on the context, the peace treaty in 205 BC between the Macedonians and the Romans. This treaty included within it all of Rome’s Greek allies- among them, Sparta, under Pelops. Nabis must have been searching desperately for answers, as both he and the Romans perfectly knew (even the Romans, who placed such a high philosophical and spiritual emphasis on treaties) that when a war is renewed, the treaty has been broken.

The transcript of this meeting preserved for us by Polybius and Livy is fairly long and much of it is simply eloquence, with no bearing on the real decisions being made. Simply put, Nabis stated that the accusation was that he had held Argos for Philip in the last stages of the war. This was, as we have seen true, but during the hearing, Nabis tries to go back to the argument of Argos, when what is really in question, underlying all this, is his loyalty to the allied cause. When the treaty was signed in 205 BC, it included all the allies of the Romans with it. Since Macedon has gone to war with Rome and her allies for the second time, and one of Rome’s previous allies—Sparta, has joined the opposing side, Nabis has technically alienated himself from his allies, who are stated in the treaty, and they no longer have any legal obligation to defend him.

These are two of the most important excerpts from a very long-winded discussion:

"But, you will say, I have violated this friendship and overthrown this alliance, because I am holding the city of Argos. What defense am I to offer to this charge?
Shall I appeal to the facts of my behavior or to the circumstances? The facts provided me with a twofold defense. First, the Argives themselves invited me and gave the city into my hands – I did not seize it; I accepted it. Secondly, I received it when the city belonged to Philip’s party, and was not in alliance with you "

— Livy book 34.31

To which Titus replied:

"No treaty of friendship was ever made between us and you; our treaty was with Pelops, the rightful and legitimate king of Sparta, whose rights were usurped by the tyrants who afterwards held sway over Lacedaimon by violence. They were able to do this because we were preoccupied with wars; wars against Carthage, and then you in your turn followed their example during the late Macedonian War. Could anything be less consistent that for people who were waging war against Philip for the liberation of Greece to establish a treaty of friendship with a tyrant? "

— Livy book 34.32

Titus continues to justify his war with Nabis in that Nabis had attached himself to Roman foes, placing him as an enemy in the eyes of Titus. The general consensus is that Nabis should be removed from power – thus, that the war should go on. This alarms Titus, however, because at the time of these negotiations, Antiochus is quietly making a foothold in Europe literally behind Titus’s back. The Parley is dismissed with these cutting words from Titus:

"Therefore, for heaven’s sake spare us these loud protestations about loyalty and treaty obligations. Let us have an end of this popular oratory; speak like a tyrant and an enemy "

— Livy book 34.32

Although Titus had sent Nabis a very clear message, he was not sure that his reply was the right one – although his Greek commanders wished to continue the war with Nabis, Titus did not want to spend winter around the walls of Sparta while Antiochus pressed further and further into Greek. The bulk of the allied army was around Sparta and the Peloponnesian, and not nearly enough was near Thrace, the area of Antiochus’s invasion. If Titus wished to intercept the Seleucids, he would need to leave the environs of Sparta in good time to make his march worthwhile.

Titus tried to make his Greek commanders allow Nabis to capitulate. Nabis’s terms were that he would withdraw his garrisons from Argos and that he would return the prisoners and deserters back to the allies. When viewing the situation in Greece on a larger scale, Nabis’s demands were reasonable and gave Titus the time that he needed to effectively intercept Antiochus III’s Seleucid forces in Thrace. Gytheum- the main Spartan port and armory – had already been captured by Lucius Flamininus and King Eumenes, so it was unlikely that Sparta would try any other opportunistic military moves anymore. Nonetheless, the Greek high command declared that Sparta should be besieged and Titus, who tactically resented having to besiege anywhere and preferred a quicker and far more passive option for submission of his enemies, in exasperation had to agree. It is likely that if the Greek commanders had accepted
Titus’s judgment and acted accordingly to his wishes, the interception of Antiochus might have taken place sooner.

However, some of the allied high command felt reluctant to embark upon a siege when Antiochus was so near to invading Greece, and according to Livy, the allowed Titus to draw up provisions of peace with Nabis with an advisory council consisting only of staff officers and military tribunes. The reasons for these limitations is probably that he felt that too much Greek influence would hinder the drawing up of a successful peace. It can be seen that the allied command was fragmented, and thus, based on past experience with peoples such as the Aetolians, Titus did not want to risk disturbances in this discussion. His selection of only military Tribunes and Staff officers probably indicates that the treaty was only drawn by the Roman sector of the allies. This can be concluded by Livy’s use of the term “Military Tribune”, which is a very distinct Roman governmental position. As for the nature of the “Staff officers”, we cannot be sure, but the fact that they are mentioned in conjunction with the military tribunes would indicate that they could perhaps be Legatii or other high up Roman military positions. The clauses stated in these peace terms are all primarily to the advantage of the Romans or their larger and more well established allies such as the Attalid Dynasty of Pergamon, who (as can be seen throughout this work) aided the Persians militarily on more than one occasion. Had the other allied commanders attended this meeting, it is more probable that the clauses would be like the peace terms with Philip V (see earlier), which were literally littered with minor benefits to the various Greek city-states. Much inefficiency and debate was employed during the conclusion of that treaty. The clauses of the proposed peace terms with Nabis were as such:

"There was to be a truce for six months between Nabis and his opponents-the Romans, Eumenes and the Rhodians. T. Quinctius and Nabis were each to send forthwith commissioners to Rome to secure the confirmation of the peace by the senate. The armistice was to commence from the day on which the document containing the conditions was handed to Nabis, and within ten days from that date he was to withdraw all his garrisons from Argos and the other towns in Argive territory and the places were to be handed over, evacuated and free, to the Romans. No slaves were to be removed from those places, whether they had belonged to the king or the public authorities or private individuals, and if any had previously been so removed they were to be duly restored to their owners. Nabis was to return the ships he had taken from the maritime cities, and he himself was not to possess any vessel beyond two light barques with not more than sixteen oars. All the cities allied with Rome were to have their prisoners and deserters restored to them, and all the property which the people of Messene could collect together and identify was to be given back to them. Further, he was to allow the Lacedaemonian refugees to have their wives and children with them, provided that no woman should be forced to join her husband whilst in exile against her will. Such of the tyrant's mercenaries as had gone back to their homes or deserted to the Romans were to have all their property restored to them. He was not to possess a single city in Crete, those which he had held he was to deliver up to the Romans, nor was he to form alliances with or make war against any of the Cretan cities, or anyone else. All the cities, which he had to surrender, and all who had voluntarily accepted the suzerainty of Rome, were to be relieved of the presence of his garrisons; neither he nor his subjects were in any way to interfere with them. He was not to build a walled town or fortified post either on
his own soil or elsewhere. As a guarantee for the due observance of these conditions he was to give five hostages to be selected by the Roman commander—one being his own son—and he was to pay an indemnity of 100 talents of silver at once and an annual instalment of 50 talents for the next eight years."

--- Livy book 34.35

One interesting Hypothesis if we look at the clauses in this peace treaty, is that Titus did not want Greek commanders to be present when he was drawing up the treaty for the fear that they would think Rome opportunistic. This becomes plausible when we examine clauses such as the payment of 100 talents to Rome at once, and 50 talents for the next 8 years. There is nothing, which indicates any kind of financial aid or repartitions to the Greeks who he had been fighting with Philip V against. These conclusions further cement the common myth, which Livy seems to circulate that Titus Quinctius was selfless and was genuinely a philanthropist. These clauses clearly contained ulterior motives for Rome’s benefit, and show “Bella Iustrum” (the principle of Roman “Just war”) to be mere Rhetoric.

When Nabis received these terms, he naturally was not incredibly eager to accept them. Domestically, Sparta was feeling the sting of losing its port, Gytheum, and having its arable land under the occupation of a large enemy force. The mercenary forces who had been employed by Nabis were not eager for peace, and had probably not been paid recently because of the effects of the siege. These troops flew to arms and Nabis demanded that a public assembly should be held. The citizens of Sparta asked Nabis to yield his hopes to fate. The demands that Rome had placed on Sparta would decimate her power and probably (when concerning the maritime restrictions and excessive tribute demanded of them by Titus and his staff in the clauses) bankrupt them almost completely. Since Sparta’s economy and military were not as based on maritime activities as, say, Athens’s or Miletus’s, one may consider that land trade would be available to revitalize Sparta. However, what has to be considered is the feelings of the other Greeks – they would not have traded with Nabis had he continued to be in power (as much as his image was corrupted by Roman and Greek sources, he was still power-hungry and wanted to keep control of Sparta), using their commercial power to get the revenge that Titus’s peace clauses would never have given them. Also, any gains that Sparta could have got from land trade would have been almost cancelled out by the excessive tribute imposed on them by the Romans. When regarding that this was the alternative to continuing the war, it is hardly surprising that Nabis chose to continue – he thought that he would gain extra military assistance from the Seleucids and Aetolians (who by now were in the process of betraying the Romans and would later fight against them in the 3rd and last Macedonian war with the Macedonian king Perseus). This belief was not unjustified – an ally of Philips was an ally of Antiochus and Hannibal’s, so Nabis technically did have an immensely powerful ally working his way across Thrace. However, it may have given him a little too much confidence – Antiochus was days away from the Peloponnese, and by the time he would have been able to relieve Nabis’s besieged city, it would have been overrun. Spartan skirmishers and peltasts picking at Roman positions erased any hope of peace in Titus’s mind – the treaty, which he had sent to Nabis, had evidently failed to make any difference, as Livy’s account of the incident clearly shows:
"As his arguments failed to make any impression on the allies he tried another
course, and by apparently falling in with their view he brought them over to his
own. "Well and good," he continued, "let us undertake the siege of Lacedaemon, if
such is your resolve. Do not close your eyes, however, to the fact that the investment
of a city is a slow business and often wearies out the besiegers sooner than the
besieged, and you must now face the certainty of having to pass the winter round the
walls of Lacedaemon. If these tedious processes only involved toil and danger I
should urge you to prepare yourselves in mind and body to sustain them. But a vast
outlay will be necessary for the siege works and engines and artillery which will be
required for the investment of so great a city, and supplies for you and for us will
have to be collected against the winter. So, to prevent your suddenly finding
yourselves in difficulties, and abandoning to your shame a task after you have
undertaken it, I am of opinion that you ought to write to your respective cities and
find out what they really intend doing and what resources they possess. Of auxiliary
troops I have enough and more than enough, the greater our number the greater our
requirements. The enemy's territory contains nothing now but the bare soil, and
besides, winter will be here, making it difficult to bring supplies from a distance."

-- Livy book 34.34

Despite a few skirmishes, not much actually happened for the first five days of the
sieges, but on the fifth day, Roman forces were forced back from the walls of the city.
Evidently, it was not long before Titus would attempt a direct assault. Although it was
against Titus’s tactical style to attempt a direct siege so early, Antiochus’s forces
creeping past Thrace and into Greece proper prompted him to get the siege over and
done with as quickly as possible.

During the time of the dual kingship, Sparta had not been protected by walls, but the
generation of “Tyrannos” which had taken power in this politically volatile time had
added various sections of wall to the city except for in three major reasons, which
instead were on high, steep ground – Phoebeum, Dictynneum and the Heptagoniae
districts. Titus realised from preliminary examination of the city by scouts riding
around the walls, that the attack would need to be simultaneous in order to succeed.
Despite the fact that he had brought up Lucius and Eumenes’ men from Gytheum,
making the army now vast 50’000 men, if the Spartans managed to defend the three
portions effectively with their small amount of mercenary troops, then the allied
forces could easily have been annihilated. The troops had to enter Sparta through the
3 places lacking defensive wall. The attack needed to be conducted in unison, from all
points and to all points around the Spartan defences so that the small number of
Spartan defenders on the ramparts could not know where the Romans were going to
strike. If Titus wished, he could easily have just smashed down the walls with his
siege equipment (both Livy and Polybius mentions the presence of such engines,
probably assembled by his sailors and Classici (marines) who had been brought up
from Gytheum) and stormed the city from one point, but firstly, that would take time
– time which, because of Antiochus, he did not have, and secondly, if he did
centrate his attack, there would be nothing to stop the defenders of Sparta
amassing at that point and massacring them. Titus would need all his men for the
impending (and now inevitable) war with Antiochus, and so could not risk any foolish
deaths.
In accordance to his plan, Titus arranged his army into three divisions to charge simultaneously at the three breaches in the wall, in the hope that at least one of them would manage to penetrate the perimeter. The Spartans were fighting a loosing battle—there was no way that they could protect a city as large as Sparta from multiple incursions by so numerous and well-armoured a foe. Livy has immortalised the sheer terror of Nabis and his doomed defenders as the legionaries, peltasts, hastii and phalangites of the allied forces began to swarm into the jumble of residential streets:

"Though the city was now encompassed on every side by so menacing a foe the tyrant was most energetic in its defence; wherever shouts arose on some sudden onset, when breathless messengers came asking for help, he either hurried to the threatened spot himself or sent others to assist. When, however, demoralisation and panic had set in everywhere, he completely lost his nerve, and was unable either to give the necessary orders or to listen to the messages that came; he not only lost all power of judgment, but was almost beside himself."

-- Livy book 34.39

As the Romans, who were evidently leading the fray, entered the city, the Spartan defenders stood on the roofs of the houses and began to throw down tiles, pottery—any kind of missile that could slow the Roman’s advance. The Roman legionaries promptly formed the “Testudo” formation (which consisted of an armoured “roof” being formed over the legionaries with their “scutum”—the large, rectangular shield, which typified early Roman legionaries. This protected them from the worst of the damage and the Spartan defenders, who were mainly town militia or mercenaries, were not heavily armed enough to stand up the Romans in hand-to-hand combat. It would appear that the Romans advanced into the city first, for Livy clearly gives a description of Legionaries entering the city and not Phalangites or Ekdromoi (light phalangites). The only infantry that possessed such a tactic and such shields described by Livy were the Roman legions, so it is possible that the legionaries lead the charge, which is not surprising when we consider that Titus, their Roman commander, had devised the plan of action that day. To prevent this gargant of steel from advancing into Sparta proper, Pythagoras, apparently a man who commanded some obedience (It is not made clear from the sources what his profession is), commanded the Spartan citizens and soldiers to set fire to the buildings either side of the Roman column advancing through the streets. This had immediate effect—tumbling masonry and wood caused the Romans to be completely repulsed, and when their path in the city was block, they retreated back to camp. This victory, although it must have been a relief to Nabis and his people, meant nothing—all it showed was that the Spartans had to resort to extreme methods to avoid capture. The Spartan defence force in the city had been proven to be incapable of defending it, and Titus could now be assured that he could finish the siege much quicker than he expected. In any case, the Romans had now established a bridgehead into the city by pushing the defenders from their posts around the three locations without any walls. While the troops prepared for the planned second assault into the city, Titus and the allied generals blockaded these locations with an ample supply of men, keeping the Spartans permanently alarmed—the siege was now effectively over, and Nabis knew that no help would arrive from Antiochus, the Aetolians, or what remained of Philip V’s army. From now on, it would be urban combat (if there was to be any meaningful conflicts in the city at all) that would be the form of this engagement.
These blockades were more for psychological warfare than anything else, and Nabis was at last compelled to send a herald to ask for negotiations between the two sides. At first, Titus Quinctius refused to accept his embassy, but when the herald fell at his feet in exasperation, a bemused Titus allowed the talks. After much deliberation, Titus finally agreed to the terms that had been proposed and complied by an exclusively Roman delegation earlier before. The Spartan forces in Argos were withdrawn, and King Eumenes’ and Lucius’s fleet collected their men and set sail from the siege.

Soon after, Titus appeared at the Nemean games (held at the temple of the Nemean Zeus at Argolis every year, supposedly the place where Hercules killed the Nemean lion) and was himself declared the master of ceremonies. He declared “The freedom of the Argives”, which was both in form and function (the same ulterior motives discussed earlier almost certainly played a part….) the same as the “Declaration of Greek Freedom” after Cynocephalae, although obviously on a smaller scale. This joy was slightly hampered by the disgust among the Argives and the Aetolians that Sparta was still under the control of Nabis and his supporters. But for all purposes, mainland Greece was now free of the influence of any foreign power save the Romans, and the Seleucid threat that they were soon to face…

Throughout the Syrian war, Titus played a more diplomatic and passive role. The Roman forces in the Syrian war were lead by Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus (the brother of the famous Scipio Africanus of the 2nd Punic war) and Manius Acilius Glabrio. Both achieved decisive victories over the Seleucids: Lucius at Magnesia in 190 BC (the final death-blow to Antiochus’s designs in Ionia due to the final charge of the Attalid cavalry. Hannibal was present at this battle) and Thermopylae in 191 BC (This is the last recorded major battle at which Titus Quinctius Flaminius was present. This battle was one of the main ones in Greece responsible for pushing the Seleucid forces out of that country). Titus was sent in 192 BC by the senate to warn Antiochus to leave Greece alone and not to threaten her interests. Antiochus did not believe that Titus had the right to speak for the Greeks, and stated that he would leave Greece alone if Rome would as well. Both imperialistic powers would not agree to withdraw from an area, which was of such political interest, and the Syrian war promptly began. In 183 BC, Titus was sent on another diplomatic mission to negotiate with Prusias I of Bithynia in an attempt to capture Hannibal, who had now lost his only base of support – the Seleucids. The net was closing in, and Hannibal – the man who had actively encouraged states to wage war with Rome for almost a decade – was
close to being captured. Thus, Hannibal committed suicide to avoid being taken prisoner by the Roman agents trailing him. Titus Quinctius Flaminius drops out of many Roman records (and almost completely out of Livy, the primary source for this essay) soon after Hannibal’s suicide. It is thought that Titus died in 174 BC and with him, the last great member of the Gens Quinctii. The last prominent member of this family was Titus Quinctius Atta the poet (c. 77 BC). We must therefore assume that at the latest, the Gens Quinctii were one of those staunchly Republican families who died with the Republic at the battle of Munda, March 45 BC, or had their remnants wiped out by the early Caesars such as Augustus, Nero or Domitian. Of the many “Optimates” Patrician families who supplied the Roman republic with Consuls for generations, Ronald Syme states that:

"Some of the patrician clans like the Furii, whose son Camillus saved Rome from the Gauls, had now vanished utterly by now or at least could show no more consuls."

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Conclusion

Statesman, general, politician – Titus Quinctius Flaminius was little more than a pawn to the whims of a larger imperialistic action by the Roman republic in the period 200-180 BC. His considerable oratory skills and knowledge of Greek is what aided the illusion of aiding the Greeks. This period is of a high amount of interest when studying imperialism and how it can be concealed from who it is inflicted upon. This period possibly represents one of the first examples in history of imperialism that is concealed under the guise of a philanthropist. The language, oratory and propaganda used in this period for the purpose of concealing imperialism from the masses in fact bears a stunning resemblance to such imperialistic methods in use today.

It would appear that from this piece, we could conclude that:

• The “Philhellenic” policy was ultimately successful and enjoyed great support from the senate, various noble families and the plebeians

• There was an informal alliance between Antiochus III and Philip V via Hannibal Barca, who they both had political sympathies with

• Nabis’s accusation of being a complete autocrat who terrorized the people of Sparta needs serious re-evaluation because the primary sources, Livy and Polybius, are so bias and fundamentally, all of Nabis’s reforms were of popular interest to all Spartans. Also, his historical image has been morphed beyond all recognition by centuries of Roman political propaganda under the guise of “history”. Much like the Plantagenet King Richard III’s image.

• “Bella Iustrum” or “Just war” was, when examining the evidence throughout this period, a mask for a much larger and highly concealed growth of imperialism within Rome. Although the Scullard vs. Hammond debate is highly complex and is very
inconclusive, the opinion of this author leans generally towards Hammond. The view that Rome and Macedon were imperialistic in the modern sense would appear to be true to a certain extent if we are to use Macedon and Illyria as an example for examination

• It was due to Titus’s oratory more than anything that he managed to convince the Greeks that they were not being pushed into the Roman sphere of influence, concealing the truth from them

• Antiochus was pushed heavily by Hannibal to invade Greece and aid Philip when regarding how careful he was about his previous imperialistic ventures and how persistent Hannibal was

It was common historical belief in the 19th century that people made history – busts of great statesmen, generals and cultural figures littered the studies and libraries of the intellectuals of that age. They believed in a romantic ideal that the man himself created history like the protagonist of some epic tale. Modern historical belief has now shifted to the context, the situation, the overall march of history into which the man slots in. Titus Quinctius Flaminius was no different – our Victorian ancestors would doubtless have viewed him and many of the great statesmen mentioned in this piece of history as being single heroes – men who changed Romes history by their own ingenuity. From this history, it can be concluded that Titus, one of the most brilliant statesmen, generals and politicians of his age, was little more than a pawn in a much larger set of events. It was this era that practically began an era of Roman imperialism and Hellenisation that would culminate in the birth of the vast Roman Empire that shaped our civilization, but this was not due to the whims of the men involved – Antiochus III, Philip V, Ptolemy V Epiphanes, Titus - they were all simply pieces on a vast chessboard who followed the great story of history which was already laid out for them.

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