None of this was done

- Always dehumanize your opponent. If they are from a country you are about to exploit, make them out to be terrorists (avoid historical reference to your past dealings with them though). If you are having a hard time brainwashing your own counrtyfolk, broadcast how unpatriotic they are on TV. Open more channels like Fox.

 

- Tell your people that country "X" needs regime change. No further explanations are necessary unless you want a debate on your hands.

 

- Once you send in your troops tell your people they will help foreigners earn our trust by winning over their hearts and minds. Hey it worked. Keep on doing it.

 

- Concoct any story. Create all kinds of nifty documents that have no reliability or credibility.

 

- Don't ever talk or have the media broadcast the real reasons you are invading a sovereign nation, especially over one that has never attacked your nation in the past.

 

- Keep talking about how good you are doing when things look bad. Ignore the crimes. Ignore the damages. Focus only on how successsful you are in winnning the war.

 

- This one is tricky.  Inavsion is good for the war industry. Not always good for the economy. In such turbulent times be sure to gain your most while in power cause the next one in charge may just ruin it for you.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

What financial portfolio? 

 

How are the various markets doing on the Sekostan Exchange? 

 

 

 

Another might be that you should not expect a 'conventional' war in such a circumstance to last, and one should go in prepared for the 'insurgency'.  Further, ensure the necessary support at home from the start, and be prepared to accept losses.  Going in 'light' to start with, and trying to avoid casualties caused more problems than it solved.  The 'surge' and being more aggressive has been far more effective.  Another lesson might be to have an 'exit strategy' before going in, and try to stick with it.  The fact is that the 'objective' changed from eliminating the supposed threat from WMD's to removal of Sadam's regime to the establishment of a 'democratic regime' and the defeat of 'insurgents'.

 

Pretty much.  Or simply don't wage wars of aggression.

 

The reconstruction of Iraq need not have been such an arduous process had much of its existing infrastructure been left intact by Bush inc. - but that would have defeated one of the main motives for the invasion (to line corporate pockets), which takes me back to Paul's point.

 

Originally posted by deadkenny One 'real' lesson might be that, when you have a massive technological advantage, encourage your opponent to resist in a 'conventional' mode for as long as possible.  The initial, conventional, military phase was incredibly successful.  It has only been the 'insurgency' phase that has been costly.   Another might be that you should not expect a 'conventional' war in such a circumstance to last, and one should go in prepared for the 'insurgency'.  Further, ensure the necessary support at home from the start, and be prepared to accept losses.  Going in 'light' to start with, and trying to avoid casualties caused more problems than it solved.  The 'surge' and being more aggressive has been far more effective.  Another lesson might be to have an 'exit strategy' before going in, and try to stick with it.  The fact is that the 'objective' changed from eliminating the supposed threat from WMD's to removal of Sadam's regime to the establishment of a 'democratic regime' and the defeat of 'insurgents'.

 

I don't see that you are really disagreeing with my point though.  If the mission had been to destroy Iraq's conventional forces and topple Saddam's regime - then mission accomplished.  Allied losses during that 'conventional' phase were minimal, and a significant proportion were actually due 'friendly fire'.  It was only after the Iraqi 'conventional' forces 'melted away' as you put it, and had time to establish themselves as the core of the 'insurection' that they became effective.  Again, it points to the problem of starting off with one mission and then moving the target part way in.  Agreed that the initial force was inadequate for what later became the mission.  Given the eventual mission, many things could have and should have been done differently early on.  But that was part of the point I was making as well.  In terms of destroying the conventional arms component of Saddam's power base, the initial phase succeeded.  If the intention had been to do just that, then fine.  But certainly it was inadequate for the later objective of fighting the insurgency while setting up a new regime.  The approach was also deficit in a number of regards, as you have pointed out, given the wider scope of the later objective.