Sweden as a great power, 1570s to 1721

The Swedes (as did the French) held on to the pike longer than other armies.  It had been part of their success, so why change?  In the case of the French, the same can be said of the match lock musket.

I am unaware of any extraordinary length of bayonette used by the Swedish infantry.  It seems unlikely that either pikes or bayonettes would be double-length as that would make them unwieldy.

The Swedish army was still noted for the application of the salvo as an infantry tactic.  Firepower had been an important infantry factor for the Swedes since the 1620s.

Not sure about artistic license.

Allow me a little summary on this topic Styrbiorn - from a danish point of view that is:

1563 - The nordic 7 year War initiated by the Swedes attacking Halland (Scania, Halland and Blekinge is danish territory)
1570 - The peace in Stettin, establishing Denmarks superiority in the Baltics.

1613 - Two year Kalmar War ends - moderate Danish victory.

1625 - Denmark (Chr. IV) enters the 30 year War (bad choice)

1646 - The peace at Bromsebro - Denmark must give up Gotland and �sel to Sweden.

1658 - Peace of Roskilde - Denmark must give up Scania, Halland and Blekinge to Sweden.

1659 - Swedish attack on Copenhagen failed. Sweden defeated at Nyborg.

1676 - Denmark lose the battle at Lund.

1700 - Karl 12. attacking Sealand - Denmark surrenders.

1720 - End of The Great Nordic War - Sweden defeated by a koalition.

My point is - the superiority of Denmark is ending around 1650. Sweden becomes the stronger part.

However, we still can beat you in soccer  

The troops of the Swedish king (Swedes, Finns, Balts and Scots) rarely exceeded about 15,000 in Germany.  Sweden was not capable of fielding large armies as yet.  The army was swollen by the huge influx of experienced former enemy troops.

By the time of G II A's German intervention, Wallenstein's army had been disbanded, Tilly had been put in command, and many regiments were "out of work."  To a lot of mercenaries, war was war; it was all the same to them, so quite a number of these regiments enlisted en masse under the Swedish king's colors.  As territory was secured in north Germany, and as Imperial/Catholic League troops surrendered, many joined the king.

There are all kinds of numbers cited as to the size of the armies, but the huge army strength didn't last that long (1631-32), and, importantly, the numbers were always widely dispersed in garrisons and in other areas of operation.  Too many troops and camp followers in one place for very long would have starved to death.

The vast majority were Germans.

Not quite accurate...
Denmark held �sel as well as Gotland until 1646, or 76 years after the war ended.
Scania, Halland and Blekinge remained Danish until 1658.
The war ended - not because it had any clear winner, but because neither side had any strenght left to continue.
My remark about superiority is founded in the fact that Sweden had to withdraw its claim on Scania, Halland and Blekinge - with Denmark controlling the waterways to and from the Baltic Sea.
On the other hand, Denmark withdrew its claim on the Swedish part of the mainland.
The construction of the castle Kronborg, can be seen as a Danish attempt to continue the war in morter, cupper and limestone -  and to maintain the superiority.

However, the main task for Kronborg to block �resund for foreign navy's proved quite unsuccessfull. In 1658, a Swedish crew on the castle couldnt stop a Dutch fleet sailing by, and again in 1801 the Danes tried to stop Lord Nelson on his way down towards Copenhagen - in both cases utterly invain.

In the following years after the 7 years War, Sweden sought revance by expanding and develop more strongholds in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea - which later on became a power that Denmark-Norway couldnt match.

Working from the earlier efforts of Erik XIV, Gustav Adolf developed a "file" system to provide a base and replacement system for the Swedish army.

Under Karl XI, the Indelningsverk system was regularized and lasted until the twentieth century.  This tied military service to proprerty and income benefits for the soldiers and their families.  In the GNW, Karl XII was able to call on about 66,000 Swedish regular soldiers and also about 25,000 mercenaries in the north European lands across the Baltic.  The fleet also had manpower needs, and 15,000 or so seamen were provided from the maritime provinces of the kingdom.

This was a very large number for a population that probably never even approached 2,000,000.  A great strain on the economy, as well as the child bearing generation for the future.

This was a long term problem for a country with a limited population and difficulty in replacing losses.  Most likely, the rate of deaths was due more to disease and exposure, etc. than to deaths in battle.

Early in their Thirty Years War experience, the Swedes understood that the scale of warfare they were now committed to was far greater than they had experienced before.  After the death of GA, Swedish and Scots troops in the army were held more in reserve and as garrisons, and the bulk of the fighting fell to the German mercenaries.  Swedish commanding officers had made their reputations leading Swedes and Finns, and carried that forward leading Germans in the second half of the war.

The losses in Swedish manpower were very heavy in the Polish War, 1621-29.

Almost all armies had contingents of mercenaries.  In the case of Sweden, with a small population, this allowed them to garrison the German and Baltic possessions without taking Swedish farmers and tradesmen away from their homes and from the fatherland.

AFAIK, standards of training, and regulations for all regiments Swedish and mercenary, were the same.