Makarios conversations with Henry Kissinger

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   Between July and November 1974 Archbishop
Makarios had three meetings with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
during which they discussed US policy on Cyprus, US involvement in the
coup and the invasion, and the initiatives which Makarios wanted the
United States to undertake so that Turkey would withdraw from the
island. )

PRESIDENT MAKARIOS was in New York on 20 July 1974, the day of the
Turkish invasion. He had gone there to denounce before the UN Security
Council the Greek junta for staging the coup of 15 July 1974. In
Nicosia, Nikos Sampson, who became president after the coup, resigned
and was replaced by House Speaker Glafcos Clerides as acting President.

A ceasefire was agreed on 22 July; by now Turkish forces had seized
about 10 per cent of Cyprus’ territory, but continued to expand their
territorial gains. At a conference of the guarantor powers (Greece,
Britain and Turkey) taking place in Geneva from 26 to 30 July agreement
was reached on establishing a security zone between the occupied areas
and the territories under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. It was
also agreed to hold another conference on 8 August, again in Geneva,
with the participation of Clerides and Denktash, in order to discuss
the new constitutional regime for Cyprus.

The US government secured the consensus of Greece (the junta had
collapsed and Karamanlis was now in power) for Makarios to remain out
of Cyprus and for Clerides to negotiate a federal solution. This
effort, which lasted until November 1974, ended in failure.

On 29 July, while the first Geneva conference was in progress, Makarios
met with US Secretary Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey, to whom he handed
a memorandum outlining five conditions for a political solution on
Cyprus. Makarios asked that the memorandum be forwarded to the Turkish
government.

Kissinger sent the memorandum to the US ambassador in Ankara, with
instructions to forward it to a low-level Turkish official and explain
that he [Kissinger] was doing this simply because he had promised to.
Makarios’ proposals effectively called for an immediate return to the
Zurich-London agreements, which up until 1974 he had been striving to
revoke, arguing that they were impossible to implement.

Kissinger sent a copy of Makarios’ proposals to Athens and to Nicosia,
with instructions to US Ambassador Roger Davis to record any comments
Clerides might make. Davis handed the document to Clerides who, having
read it, remarked: “Makarios is dramatically out of touch with reality.”

‘Right now there are too many cooks’

29 July 1974, 5pm Washington DC

Participants: Cyprus - Archbishop Makarios (AM), Ambassador Dimitriou 

US -The Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (HK) Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey

AM: I have been telling Henry Kissinger that the Soviets are trying to
exploit the situation and that their interest in this problem is not
genuine. Yesterday they asked for a Security Council meeting and we
were greatly disappointed at what proved to be a waste of time. But, as
I said, to some extent the United States is giving ground to the
Soviets. 

HK: We have three parties to consider and therefore our policy is more
complex than for someone who backs only one of the parties. 

AM: We don’t want to do that. 

HK: We succeeded in bringing about the ceasefire. I don’t see any
reason now to take an anti-Turkish position publicly because it will
only aggravate the situation. 

AM: I am not asking that. I am interested in results, I believe only
the United States can influence Turkey - and Greece - and Cyprus.
Greece and Turkey are both members of NATO and both receive military
aid from the United States. The Cyprus problem is only a small one for
the United States and it is not proper to say that the United States
must do this or that. We are not in a position to say anything to you
about pressure. 

HK: We will not do anything under pressure, in no circumstance, and it
is in our interest to make this clear. This is a fact of life, not a
threat. You would do the same thing. I am not accusing you. 

AM: We are not... 

HK: You’re an able person. What do you see as a solution? 

AM: I am not satisfied with the position of the United States. It is in
your interest to stop the Turkish invasion. I don’t say you should
exercise pressure and in the process develop anti-U.S. attitudes. I
don’t know what you’ve conveyed to Turkey. But, despite this, Turkey is
continuing its invasion without showing any respect for the Security
Council Resolution. 

HK: Turkey is not advancing any further. 

AM: They are now seeking to impose themselves in Cyprus. Greece is
weakened. I don’t know whether Karamanlis can survive. The Turkish
demands are unreasonable. 

HK: What? 

AM: 1) They won’t go back to the lines called for in the Security
Council Resolution. 2) They are calling for federation. 3) Ecevit is
saying “our troops will stay.” This is blackmail! And the airport is
under their control. Furthermore (in the inter-communal negotiations)
they are demanding that the Vice President should have veto power. 

HK: I thought you had agreed to the latter in the 1960 agreements. 

AM: Yes, they want changes. We also want changes. Talks have been going on for years. 

HK: What concretely do you want us to do? 

AM: Take a more decisive role. You are in a position to play this role.
You can make certain proposals. Turkey will accept. When you sent Sisco
to Athens and Ankara I have read that you used strong language. And now
you are very cautious. 

HK: You don’t know what we say privately. There was an improvement in the situation last week as a result of what we did. 

AM: The situation is worse now. People have been uprooted and a great number of refugees have been created. 

HK: While the UK is negotiating with Greece and Turkey it is not proper
for the United States to attempt to take over the negotiations. 

AM: But, behind the scenes... 

HK: It depends on what you want. You have addressed the important
problem of the long term attitude of Turkey. From the point of view of
the Geneva negotiations it is not necessarily decisive whether there
are 20 or 23,000 troops there as far as this round of negotiations is
concerned. It is important though whether agreement can be reached in a
political context to reduce that number. Now, what we want is to settle
this in terms of implementation of the ceasefire and thereby have that
contribute to the further political negotiations. 

AM: What disturbs me is that the Turks will not be in for settlement.
As time passes they will be consolidating their position there. The
talks will take months or years... 

HK: I think they want a quick settlement, although it might have been their purpose to delay. Maybe we’re wrong. 

AM: Have they accepted a UN corridor? 

HK: (After checking by telephone.) Yes, they seem to have accepted that. 

AM: I understand the Turks will not withdraw unless there is a final agreement. 

HK: Yes. 

AM: If the talks are prolonged what will the situation be? Our people
are suffering. They say they will accept the 1960 Constitution only
with changes. 

HK: They haven’t said this to me. My impression is they may want to keep troops there. 

AM: Until a solution or forever? 

HK: Between a solution and forever. But I’m not here as their lawyer. 

AM: They invaded they say to restore order and safeguard the Constitution. 

HK: During the first week we knew once they got there it would be
difficult to get them out, but we didn’t want to sanctify Turkish
invasion. 

AM: Suppose Greece and the UK do the same? 

HK: The result will be double enosis. I don’t believe this should be
the permanent solution. It is not being supported by the United States.
There should be no Greek troops or that would lead to permanent
partition. 

AM: What are the prospects for settlement? 

HK: Right now there are too many cooks. Callaghan needs a quick
success. The Soviets have their own motives. The Government in Greece
has its problems. And, Ecevit... We have been encouraging a settlement.
We have not been all-out active. We can’t be the only country to
produce a settlement, but this may change. In this phase of the Geneva
talks the prospects are good. In the next phase Turkey will have to
change its position. There are still too many cooks. 

AM: I prefer an American cook.

AM: Recently I read about military aid for Turkey announced in the New York Times. 

HK: We explained that if Greece and Turkey had gone to war neither
could count on U.S. military assistance continuing. Some thought was
given to cutting aid to Greece under its military regime. This could be
used against Sampson. 

AM: What should I say my impressions are about our meeting today? 

HK: I wouldn’t presume to tell you what to say. 

AM: You will play a role? 

HK: Certainly, we will play a constructive role. 

AM: You can play a decisive role. 

HK: It is a question of timing. 

Ambassador Dimitriou: (Referring to conversations in the UN) All
believe if you were more active you could bring about a settlement. I
have talked to members of the British and other European delegations.
They all believe this and therefore the Geneva talks would be
successful. 

HK: We can’t conduct those negotiations. We have someone there and in
each crucial development we have been asked our view and we have given
it. We have been helpful in a quiet way. We have made major efforts in
Geneva but it isn’t our style to do it so vocally. Nobody has yet put
all his cards on the table, either the Greeks or the Turks. 

AM: We have no cards.

HK: We know your views and have studied your six points.2 Unless you have others, we will send them to Turkey tonight. 

HK: You can say that I told you we will play an increasingly constructive role. 

AM: Am I satisfied? 

Ambassador Dimitriou: You’d be justified in saying that. 

HK: If I say you’re not, I will be popular in Turkey. Frankly, it is better for me internationally if you’re not satisfied. 

Ambassador Dimitriou: (To Makarios) Are you satisfied? 

AM: I didn’t get a clear answer. 

HK: Frankly, I can’t say. I had to study your 1960 Constitution. I
didn’t know anything about it. Let me say we are in favour of
independence. We are not in favour of partition. We are in favour of a
solution agreeable to all three parties.

nThe minutes of these meetings, published by the US National Archives
Administration, comprise a vivid description of US policy on the one
hand, and of Makarios’ intentions vis-a-vis the Cyprus crisis on the
other.

http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/main.php?id=47255