…Hello everyone…

…I am part of the way through reading a book by Qiang Zhai called The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio) 1994…which is by the way, an excellent, informative tome and very well explained….there are many interesting topics covered by this book and any number of single instances that provide food for thought….

..however, I would just like to share a brief outline of one set of circumstances that I found quite intriguing and it features the nature of Anglo-American differences over representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in 1950...Given that the United Kingdom and the United States have been, and are generally viewed as compliant bedfellows, it was fascinating to see that the two countries adopted competing approaches to Chinese representation in the United Nations….    

….On January 13^th 1950, the Soviet Union put forward a resolution requesting the ejection of the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang/KMT) representative from the United Nations Security Council. The motion was defeated with the United States casting a negative vote and Great Britain abstaining. Britain had been trying to establish formal diplomatic links with the People's Republic of China ever since London had recognised the creation of Mao’s new regime in the same year. Britain saw PRC representation as a way forward in Anglo-Chinese relations…..The Beijing government were unhappy with Britain’s decision to abstain from voting  even though London explained that ‘abstention did not indicate support for the KMT’ over the People's Republic of China (p.100)….

….In March 1950, Britain made attempts to break the impasse and secure PRC representation by working ‘behind the scenes to secure a majority on the issue of admitting the People's Republic of China into the United Nations’ (p.100). It was believed that the task would be made easier by the fact that five out of the thirteen members of the Security Council had already recognised the People's Republic of China. These countries were the USSR, India, Yugoslavia, Great Britain, and Norway. Earnest Bevin, Foreign Secretary in Attlee's Labour government, instructed diplomats to approach Egypt, Ecuador, and Cuba to try to persuade them to cast a positive in the next round of voting. Nonetheless, Bevin understood quite clearly that any success would depend on the United States. However, Washington was also preparing their own manoeuvres by putting pressure on other countries to prevent the formation of a majority vote in favour of admitting the PRC into the United Nations….

…..The US State Department, through their Ambassador, sent a memorandum to the Ecuadorian Foreign Office requesting that Ecuador should consider put off the breaking of relations with the KMT, pointing out that the cessation of relations with the KMT may have ‘important effects’ in relation to Soviet efforts to unseat the KMT representative (pp.100-101).

...Britain and the United States found themselves directly involved in competing diplomatic manoeuvres in order to secure what both felt were the best solution to each countries problem…. Even though the UN Secretary General Trygve Lie was unhappy at United States pressure, and concerned that Moscow might quit the United Nations, and with the People's Republic of China establish a ‘rival world organisation,’ the British failed to secure a majority in the Security Council in favour of admitting China because of American opposition….

…In June 1950, the British government decided to take a more drastic step and support China’s admission by casting a positive in the next round of voting...However, the onset of hostilities in Korea meant that this did not take place and the whole issue was put aside for the time being (p.101)……Nevertheless, the British continued to try to resolve the problem despite American objections that the issue could not be approached until the end of the fighting in Korea…the Soviet Union had approached the British government with a proposal to end the war, but the US argued that Moscow would use the initiative to seek Western agreement on PRC entry into the United Nations (p.101-102)…for the United States, the two issues could not be separated…However, Bevin and Attlee believed that the Korean conflict and Chinese admittance into the United Nations were unrelated and that the representation issue could be considered separately (p.102)…

...On September 19^th 1950, in the fifth Session of the General Assembly, Zhou En-lai put forward a request to have the KMT delegate replaced by PRC representatives….Adopting their new approach, the British voted for an Indian resolution to admit the People's Republic of China into the United Nations…However, Britain abstained from voting for a motion that called for the expulsion of the KMT representative…. Both resolutions were defeated…. (p.103) …The Chinese were not impressed by Britain’s positive vote and thought London’s’ abstention on the Soviet resolution a ‘demonstration of British duplicity’ (p.104)….

…Britain continued to vote for China’s place in the United Nations until the middle of 1951 when Washington proposed a suspension on any discussions relating to the Chinese representation, and for a number of reasons, Britain decided to support the United States proposal (p.104)….The British initiatives failed to provide any constructive results in their efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, but in trying, they caused a considerable degree of discord in UK- US relations….

..it is interesting to note that some twenty years later, Sino-American rapprochement would effectively adopt British policy circa 1949-50…

..anyway, I thought it was interesting…all the best..AoO…