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Stanislaw Koniecpolski vs Gustav II

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    Posted: 09-Apr-2007 at 18:55
Originally posted by ataman


 
Originally posted by Captain Gars


If we look at the 1620's the only other army to consistently do so was the army of the Cathlic Leauge led by Johann Tserclaes Tilly. .

 
But if you look at Swedish army before GA's reign, you will find that Swedish army wasn't so 'cautious' and if it only outnumbered enemy, it fought in the open field.
 

And lost every battle for their troubles.
Furthermore the reasons the Swedish army fought those battles in the Livonia are a bit more complex than them simply outnumbering the enemy. For much of the 1600-1609 period the Swedish armies were forbidden by Royal order to engage in a major battle and at least one battle was fought in direct disobedience of such an order. Johann von Nassau-Siegen who was in overall command for much of 1601-1602 actively avoided battle.

Kokenhausen 1601
Gyllenhielm was under orders to break the Lithuanian siege and intentionaly engaged in a field battle.

Mexhof (Bialy Kamien) 1604
Arvid Stlarm had strict orders not to fight a battle but was driven to do so by being outmanouvered by Chodkiewicz. The battle was a desperate move by a poor commander. Stlarm was sentenced to death by a Court Martial after the battle.

Kircholm 1605
When the Swedish attempt to surprise the Polish army by a night attack failed the Swedish commanders wanted to avoid battle. Despite the strong objections of Anders Lennartsson Karl IX impatiently ordered the Swedish army to attack after being provoked into doing so by Chodkiewicz.

Dnamunde 1609
Mansfeld had orderns not to fight any large battles but had persmission to strike at exposed Polish forces. An attempt to capture the Lithuanian camp turned into a major engagement when Polish troops returned to camp and forced the Swedish army to fight a large scale battle. 

Klushino 1610
De la Gardie and Evert Horn was forced to fight this battle.
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  Quote pikeshot1600 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 09-Apr-2007 at 19:37
I have been interested in the era under discussion and in the Swedish army for many years.
 
Really, what does all this minutiae have to do with anything?  The Swedes were experimenting; finding their way with new theories of military organization, and with tactics that they might not have thought would work.  These military attitudes were learned from the Dutch.  The offensive thinking of the Swedish king was different than the defensive attitudes of the Dutch.  He didn't know the tactics would work.  Caution was required, especially considering the limited resources of the Swedish monarchy.
 
   
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  Quote Joinville Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Apr-2007 at 12:09
Originally posted by pikeshot1600

I have been interested in the era under discussion and in the Swedish army for many years.
 
Really, what does all this minutiae have to do with anything?  The Swedes were experimenting; finding their way with new theories of military organization, and with tactics that they might not have thought would work.  These military attitudes were learned from the Dutch.  The offensive thinking of the Swedish king was different than the defensive attitudes of the Dutch.  He didn't know the tactics would work.  Caution was required, especially considering the limited resources of the Swedish monarchy.
Well, I have the impression Ataman wants to say something about the virtues and moral quality of Gustavus and the Swedish army (and probably not something complimentary), but is a bit too circumspect to just blurt it out.Wink
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  Quote Majkes Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 10-Apr-2007 at 15:25
Originally posted by Joinville

Originally posted by pikeshot1600

I have been interested in the era under discussion and in the Swedish army for many years.
 
Really, what does all this minutiae have to do with anything?  The Swedes were experimenting; finding their way with new theories of military organization, and with tactics that they might not have thought would work.  These military attitudes were learned from the Dutch.  The offensive thinking of the Swedish king was different than the defensive attitudes of the Dutch.  He didn't know the tactics would work.  Caution was required, especially considering the limited resources of the Swedish monarchy.
Well, I have the impression Ataman wants to say something about the virtues and moral quality of Gustavus and the Swedish army (and probably not something complimentary), but is a bit too circumspect to just blurt it out.Wink
 
You are probably rightLOL. Gustav Adolf doesn't seem to be one of his favourites. He prefers Karl X Gustav and Karl XII just like me.
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19-Apr-2007 at 04:30
Originally posted by Captain Gars

A close study of the situation in 1621 and 1702 will reveal that it is not possible to compare the two campaigns.

The Swedish armies
In 1621 Gustav Adolf invaded Livonia with 18.000 men out of an army of 24.000, supported only by the meager resources of Sweden-Finland. They army had decent training but was not well equipped. The infantry was poorly clothed which led to lots of disease among the troops in the winter of 1621-1622, 50-75% in Swedish infantry and 25% of Finnish infantry was lost to dieseas in that period. The native cavalry had poor horses and lost many to disease in the winter and of top of that the toops were not well equipped and suffered from a shortage of  pistols and armour. Following a capture of Riga only some 11.000 to 12.000 troops would be available for an invasion of the PLC.
 
It was still many times more than Radziwiłł had at his disposal. Moreover Radziwiłł's army was composed of the worst soldiers PLC had.

Originally posted by Captain Gars


In 1702 Karl XII invaded the PLC with at least 34.000 men out of any army of about 80.000 men.
 

Were there 34.000? Polish historian Jan Wimmer in his book claims that Karl XII's army counted only 22.000 (+ 6000 soldiers under Stenbock and Mrner).

Anyway, opposite to 1621, Swedish army in 1702 had to divide its potential, because PLC wasn't the only one enemy of Sweden. Sweden was at war with Russia too. Apart from other armies the Russian army, which was dislocated close to Livonia, counted about 60.000 soldiers.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

This force was supported by the entire Swedish Empire and could invade by land from two strategic directions. From Livonia as the main army of Karl XII and it's supporting Corps (Stuart, Mrner, Maydel) . It could also advance from Pommerian province as the army of Gyllenstierna did. This army was supported by the wealth of the Swedish Empire i.e not only Sweden-Finland but also the Baltic, Russian and German provinces. It was probably the best trained army of the time and it was very well equipped.
 
I agree that the morale was good and that Swedish soldiers were well trained. But I don't agree that they were well equipped. Polish sources claim something opposite. For example Otwinowski claimed that Swedish soldiers were: almost naked, ill-looking and they used poor horses.

Originally posted by Captain Gars

The Polish &Lithuanian armies.
 
In 1621 the Polish army was justly regarded as one of the strongest in Europe both in numbers and in combat efficiency.
  

Ok, but in 1621-1622 armies of PLC were in Southern Poland. Livonia and other Northern and central provinces of PLC were vulnerable.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

Off their contemporaries only the spanish and the Dutch enjoyed smiliar reputations. In 1621 the PLC mobilized close to 100.000 combat troops from various sources, historian Radoslaw Sikora has deitaled the PLC effort in an two part article about the Chocim campaing.
   

I don't know this article, but in the book 'Wojskowość polska w dobie wojny polsko-szwedzkiej 1626-1629. Kryzys mocarstwa' Sikora explains how many forces were used in Ukraine and how many soldiers were mobilized. He also explains why PLC could use so many soldiers in Southern Poland, while it was imposible to use such big army against the Swedes.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

About 35.000 Regulars (paid troops), 2000 facing Sweden in Livonia, 3000 as garrisons in southern Poland and 30.600 at Chocim. The Noble levy and the private armies of the magnates provided 27.400 troops that were retained as a reserv at Lwow. The registered Cossacks numbered 3000 but altogether the Cossacks raised over 40.000 troops of whom some 30.000 were at Chocim.  
While almost all of these troops were commited to the southern theatre of war they would hardly have disapered from the face of the earth simply beacuse Swedish troops took Vilnius and/or Warsaw. Furthermore as I'll show below the fighting at Chocim was over by the time that any Swedish offensive into the Commonwealth.  
  
 
Let me explain something. First of all, after the battle of Chocim, mercenary amies of PLC were in catastrophic form. Infantry was so poor that was dying during the march to Lww. Cavalry lost most of their horses (some primary sources claim that cavalrymen lost 70% of their horses). Horses, which survived, were in catastrophic form. Moreover, the soldiers, who reached Lww rebelled. Therefore for a long time Radziwiłł wasn't supported by any unit, which participated in the battle of Chocim. The rebellion finished only in August, 1622.

After the battle of Chocim, Cossacks came back homes. They did it so late only thanks to prince Władysław Waza, who hold them in the camp at Chocim until the end of the battle. It was impossible to hold Cossacks after the battle at all. Moreover using of Cossacks in Northern PLC wasn't possible for many other reasons.

Private armies depended on their owners, who (like Polish magnate Tomasz Zamojski) had to defend their estates in Souther Poland. The only one support for Radziwiłł's army could be (but only in theory) armies of Lithuanian magnates. In practice Lithuanian magnates weren't able to pay more for soldiers. They already paid huge costs, when they became rotmistrzes of regular army (the army, which fought at Chocim). AFAIK there wasn't any Lithuanian private army at Lww. There were only Polish magnates.

Noble levy was almost worthless. Moreover there was the right, which limited their activity only to 6 weeks.

That is why over a year after Swedish invasion of Livonia, Radziwiłł's army was still so small.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars


In 1702 the PLC armies were weak. According to historian Robert I Frost the Polish army numbered barely 13.000 men while the Lithuanian army had an actual strenght below 4.000 i. e well below their paper strenght.
  
 
But:
1. PLC wasn't at war with any other country
2. These numbers above are correct only for the time of peace. Karl XII knew (and probably expected) that PLC could raise much bigger army against him (in fact it happened, thought later).
3. After victorius war with Ottoman Empire (finished in 1699), armies of PLC had a good name.
4. Together with Saxon army, August II Sas had in the battle of Kliszw (the decisive battle of this campaign) more soldiers than Karl XII had.
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars


To this one must add the Saxon army which had a main field force of roughly 16.000. The Saxon-Polish troops were effectively outnumbered by the Swedes by a small margin. On top of this the PLC leadership was divided by bitter internal struggles and the will to resist the Swedish invasion was low. In the field the PLC troops were still well equipped in 1702 but their military effiectivness was at an all time low.
 
Anyway poor army is still better than army, which doesn't exist :).
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars


The Polish army performance at Kliszow was poor, after two charges the entire Crown army left the field, an action which cost the Saxon-Polish forces the victory. Had the Polish troops fought like the men at Kircholm, Kluszyn and Wien the career of Karl XII would have been over then and there.
 
Ok, but when Karl XII invaded PLC in 1702, he couldn't be sure that:
  1. the invasion won't unit the country against him

  2. the internal struggles in Polish army won't stop

  3. Polish army in the battle of Kliszw will fight so poor

Originally posted by Captain Gars

Comparison of the armed forces of 1621&1702
As can be ssen above the balance of forces in 1621 and 1702 was very diffrent. Karl XII invaded the Commonwealth with forces that were 42% greater than the entire army of Gustav Adolf in 1621(!) and almost twice as large as the army with which Gustav Adolf invaded Livonia. Karl XII probably outnumbered the PLC and Saxon army by a small margin or at least ha parity of numberes. Gustav Adolf on the other hand faced an enemy which fielded over 5 times his own invasion force when one looks at the strategic level.
 
As I have already written, it is not so simple. Karl XII invaded PLC with army which was much smaller than the potential of PLC and Saxony (and in fact he fought with PLC-Saxon army, which outnumbered him in the battle of Kliszw). Moreover Sweden was at war also with Russia, while PLC was at war only with Sweden.

On the other hand, in 1621 Sweden wasn't at war with any other country, while PLC had to divide its potential between Sweden and Ottoman Empire. Thanks to this, GA outnumbered enemies many times.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

In 1702 the Swedish army was probably the best in Europe and it would prove it's superiroity of the Saxon and PLC troops time and again.
 
Well, the participation of Polish or Lithuanian army in the GNW before 1702 was really insignificant. In fact Karl XII couldn't know if his army is superior to Polish one.
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

In 1621 the Swedish army was still an untested force, following the numerous defeats in Livonia, Russia and against Denmark it was regarded as one of the worst armies in Europe. It had to face an army which was acknowledged as one of the best in Europe, as far as battlefield success was concerned only the Spanish army had a reputation equal to that of the PLC army. (The Dutch had a great reuptation for siege warfare but had only won one major victory over the Spanish in the open field.)   
 
In the end it is not possible to make a valid comparison between 1621 and 1702, while superficialy similar the balance of forces was so diffrent as to render a factual historical comparison impossible. But this is only one of problem with the proposed scenario.   

Marching speeds
It would have been impossible for a Swedish army to reach Vilnius in only 10-14 days, that would require the army to march 32 to 23 kilometers a day, such speeds were not possible over a long periof of time for large combined arms army in eastern Europe.
 
Impossible? I don't agree. Combined army could march very fast. When Polish army marched to rescue Vienna in 1683 it had a marching speed about 30km per day (although Sobieski's army was bigger than Swedish one in 1621).
 
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

Reaching Warsaw in one months time from Vilnius was beyond even Karl XII who ha a faster army. Karl XII who marched almost without artillery and whose pikemen did not wear armour could only average just below 9 kilometers a day on his 'rapid' march from Kowno to Warszawa. And Karl XII moved in the spring and summer, Gustav Adolf would have to move in the fall and winter.
 
September and October is not a winter Wink. Moreover, when GA captured Riga, armies of PLC still were fighting at Chocim. And remember that the distance from Riga to Warszawa isn't bigger than the distance from Chocim to Warszawa.

I will write the rest of my reply later...


Edited by ataman - 19-Apr-2007 at 04:53
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19-Apr-2007 at 04:34
Originally posted by Majkes

Originally posted by Joinville

Originally posted by pikeshot1600

I have been interested in the era under discussion and in the Swedish army for many years.
 
Really, what does all this minutiae have to do with anything?  The Swedes were experimenting; finding their way with new theories of military organization, and with tactics that they might not have thought would work.  These military attitudes were learned from the Dutch.  The offensive thinking of the Swedish king was different than the defensive attitudes of the Dutch.  He didn't know the tactics would work.  Caution was required, especially considering the limited resources of the Swedish monarchy.
Well, I have the impression Ataman wants to say something about the virtues and moral quality of Gustavus and the Swedish army (and probably not something complimentary), but is a bit too circumspect to just blurt it out.Wink
 
You are probably rightLOL. Gustav Adolf doesn't seem to be one of his favourites. He prefers Karl X Gustav and Karl XII just like me.
 
Majkes, Joinville, anyone
I am just trying to be objective.
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  Quote Joinville Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19-Apr-2007 at 06:53
Originally posted by ataman


Majkes, Joinville, anyone

I am just trying to be objective.

Yes, but there seems to be very little real dissension about the basic facts of the situations involved.

And then it boils down to interpretation. With you essentially saying that Gustavus was a bad commander of a bad army, and others pretty much saying sure, or whatever, but it got the job done.

And you come back insinuating that getting the job done, achieving the limited but realistic war objectives of Gustavus and the Swedes in 1621, somehow just isn't good enough.

Why isn't the limited but realistic Swedish objective of taking Riga in 1621, which they blithely went an did pretty much unmolested, somehow not good enough for you? Why should Gustavus and the Swedes have been more ambitious and more aggressive at the time?

And aren't you making assumptions about what you, and modern historians, know about the state of the Polish army in 1621, and then browbeating Gustavus for not possessing this information? He was a careful commander. The trick isn't just taking stuff, but not over-extending and holding on to it. Riga was the objective. It remained Swedish until 1710, in one blow giving Swedish a major city four times the size of Stockholm, and a major cash-cow for the Swedish government. Seems a fair profit for the stakes involved, no?
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19-Apr-2007 at 10:30
Originally posted by Joinville

 
And then it boils down to interpretation. With you essentially saying that Gustavus was a bad commander of a bad army, and others pretty much saying sure, or whatever, but it got the job done.
 
Joinville, you have got me wrong. I have written a couple of times in this forum (though maybe not in this tread), that Gustavus was a good commander, but - opposite to many people, who think that he was one of the best commander in history - IMHO, he wasn't a brilliant commander. That's my point.
 
I also think that Karl XII was much better than GA. It's true that Karl XII finally lost a war, but:
- although Napoleon finally lost, nobody doubts that he was one of the best commander in history. So, although Karl XII lost a war, he can't be judged only from this point of view.
- GA was killed in the battle and it wasn't his achievement that Sweden didn't lose TYW.
Originally posted by Joinville

 
And you come back insinuating that getting the job done, achieving the limited but realistic war objectives of Gustavus and the Swedes in 1621, somehow just isn't good enough.

Why isn't the limited but realistic Swedish objective of taking Riga in 1621, which they blithely went an did pretty much unmolested, somehow not good enough for you? Why should Gustavus and the Swedes have been more ambitious and more aggressive at the time?

And aren't you making assumptions about what you, and modern historians, know about the state of the Polish army in 1621, and then browbeating Gustavus for not possessing this information? He was a careful commander. The trick isn't just taking stuff, but not over-extending and holding on to it. Riga was the objective. It remained Swedish until 1710, in one blow giving Swedish a major city four times the size of Stockholm, and a major cash-cow for the Swedish government. Seems a fair profit for the stakes involved, no?
 
Riga wasn't the main aim of Polish-Swedish wars in 1620's. The aim was a profitable peace. AFAIK, GA in 1620's wanted to give back Livonia (and Riga) to PLC. But GA demanded a relinquishment of the right to Swedish throne by Zygmunt III Waza.
Zygmunt III Waza didn't relinquish this right. Maybe because GA captured only Riga Wink? So, GA involved his country in next wars against PLC. These wars (1625-1629) finally didn't get Sweden nothing more except experience. Remember that the truce in 1635 wasn't better for Sweden than the truce in 1622. And I think that temporary profits (I mean the truce in 1629) can't compensate costs (I mean monay and died and wounded soldiers) of years of expensive wars against PLC.
 
Joinville, I'm talking about an alternative history. I'm talking about history in which GA could gain a profitable peace in 1621 or in 1622. But if sombody wants to force his enemy to any concession, he has to have a strong arguments. IMHO a half of PLC (with 2 capitols and the richest cities and ports) in Swedish hands were fairly enough to make a concession by Zygmunt III Waza.
GA didn't take advantage of the unique situation in 1621. He could finish the war in 1621-1622, but instead of this, he captured only Riga. That's why IMHO he was only a good commander, but he wasn't a brilliant one.


Edited by ataman - 19-Apr-2007 at 10:32
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 22-Apr-2007 at 19:42
Originally posted by Captain Gars

Destroying Radziwill's army
First of all the 900 men Radziwill supposedly had at Riga were not his only troops, after all according to Radziwill himself he had 650 infantry, 550 hussars, 200 kozacky style cavalry and 120 dragoons in the field army in July. And you youself has shown later on the number of troops rose to 2171. In an article about Chocim Polish historian Radoslaw Sikora puts the the Lithuanian army facing Gustav Adolf to 2000 troops. (Obviously an simplification since the article is not focused on Riga but on Chocim.) So clearly more troops were available.

Secondly as shown in the Livonian & Prussian campaigns of 1625-1629 it was essentialy impossible for a Swedish force to destroy a Polish army even it the Polish army was defeated. As at Wallhof and Gorzno the Lithuanian or Polish mounted troops would run away, leaving their infantry & artillery to face the Swedes alone. The superior quality of the Polish horses allowed them to outrun any pursuers. Even if Cobron or Gustav Adolf had defeated Radziwill he would have got away with most of his cavalry to which he could add the new troops being raised.  Do note that not even Karl X Gustav could effectively pursue a defeated Polish force and his cavalry was vastly superiro to anythign that Gustav Adolf had in 1621.
  

Captain Gars, a couple of messages above you have stated that Radziwiłł's army didn't disturb the Swedes quite efficient. I mean that Lithuanian army, which in reality, after reinforcement, had about 2000 soldiers.

So, why do you think that smaller Lithuanian army could do anything? Why do you think that the army composed only of a few hundreds cavalry (if we agree that Lithuanian cavalry could survive the battle of Riga) could be any obstacle for 11.000-12.000 Swedish soldiers?


Originally posted by Captain Gars

Earlier surrender of Riga
The failure of Radziwill to break the Swedish blockade
  

It is possible to talk about 'failure', only if there is a will to do something. I've already explained that Radziwiłł didn't try to break Swedish blockade of Riga. It was impossible with only 900 soldiers. And Radziwiłł knew about it very well. I have already explained what Radziwiłł's goal was.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

already had a significant effect on the morale of the defenders of Riga. They had had front row seats when itwas s clealry demonstrated that the Lithuanian army was incapable of taking on the fortified Swedish positions. For all intents and purposes Radziwill had been defeated, wether his losses were low or high the actual losses would have had little impact on the defenders.
  
 
Radziwiłł's army wasn't defeated at Riga. Radziwiłł's army defeated Swedish one in the first day of 'the battle' and couldn't provoke Swedish army to leave fortified position in the second day of the battle. In fact it is the Radziwiłł's failure to provoke the Swedes to the open field fighting. It is not a defeat of Radziwiłł's army.
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

Capturing Gdansk would have been out of the questions, Gdansk was the greatest fortress city of Northern Europe and quite able to defend it self.
  

It's a wrong assumption. It is enough to check the campaign in 1626 to see that Gdańsk wasn't able to defend itself without the help of the state army. The situation in 1621 was even worse than in 1626, because in 1621 Gdańsk didn't have mercenary army.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

It's milita alone wwoudl have outnumbered any Swedish attackers. While not at it's best in the open field it was quite suitable for manning Gdansk's modern fortifications.
  

The modern fortifications of Gdańsk weren't finished in 1621, but only in 1628.

 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

Add to this the mercenary forces that Gdansk could raise thanks to it's wealth. 
 
During a peace Gdańsk indeed could raise numerous mercenary army, but it couldn't do it so fast. The situation in 1621 was much worse than during a peace, because PLC had already mobilized almost everything it could. There weren't enough soldiers to raise new and numerous army. Radziwiłł in Livonia had huge problem to raise any new unit, because there weren't enough soldiers. Even the army which fought at Chocim was smaller than it was planed, because the shortage of soldiers didn't permit to raise bigger army.
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 22-Apr-2007 at 20:05
The 1621 what-if scenario reconsidered.
 
History shows, that in reality GA had huge numerical superiority in Northern PLC for over a year. Thanks to rebellion of mercenary soldiers of PLC, thanks to other factors, Radziwiłł's army was in that time outnumbered by GA's army many times. If GA had defeated Radziwiłł's army at Riga, the disproportion would have been even bigger.
Cities in Northern Poland were vulnerable for over a year. Even the biggest and the richest Gdańsk wasn't able to defend itself in 1621-1622.
GA's army was able to capture every city in Northern PLC in that time. The conquest of Vilnius, Warsaw, Gdańsk could be enough to negotiate a profitable peace for Sweden.
Both Sweden and PLC had limited resources, but with these 3 cities in Swedish hands and with a will to negotiation, Sweden was able to finish the war in 1622. PLC in that time didn't have neither monay, nor will (nor soldiers) to fight Sweden. It had other problems, like rebelled soldiers or possible attack of Russia. Sombody should also take into consideration an influence of Swedish offensive in Northern PLC on sultan's decisions. It is possible that sultan could decide to fight much longer at Chocim.


Edited by ataman - 22-Apr-2007 at 20:12
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  Quote Guests Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 22-Apr-2007 at 20:59
Originally posted by ataman

 

Captain Gars, a couple of messages above you have stated that Radziwiłł's army didn't disturb the Swedes quite efficient. I mean that Lithuanian army, which in reality, after reinforcement, had about 2000 soldiers.

So, why do you think that smaller Lithuanian army could do anything? Why do you think that the army composed only of a few hundreds cavalry (if we agree that Lithuanian cavalry could survive the battle of Riga) could be any obstacle for 11.000-12.000 Swedish soldiers?

  
 
"Quite efficient" is the same as writing completly effcient or 100% efficent, i.e it denotes an extremly high degree of success. There are more levels of efficiency than "quite efficient" and "inefficient".
 
Secondly there is a marked difference between harassign a Swedish army holdign fortified postions with small but mobile force of predominantly cavalry and harassing an army on the march.   On the march the Swedish army would have been vulnerable to the kind surprise attack which shattered Cobrons corps when it attempted to take Kokenhausen.
 
The Lithuanians could have adopted the kind of light cavalry operations that were so successfull against the Swedes even in 1656, a time when the Swedens held the upper hand in most large scale battles.
Karl Gustav with a much more effcient and 5 times larger army still lost over 40% of his troops under such conditions.
Given that the Swedis cavalry of 1621 was much poor in quality than that of 1656 and on top of that much fewer the Lithuanians coud easily have destroyed the Swedish cavalry as a fighting force through a series of raids an ambushes. Once the cavalry was rendered ineffective the infantry would be lost.  Which in a nutshell is why there was no Swedish offensive deep into the PLC.

Originally posted by ataman

 

It is possible to talk about 'failure', only if there is a will to do something. I've already explained that Radziwiłł didn't try to break Swedish blockade of Riga. It was impossible with only 900 soldiers. And Radziwiłł knew about it very well. I have already explained what Radziwiłł's goal was.

 
(...) 
Radziwiłł's army wasn't defeated at Riga. Radziwiłł's army defeated Swedish one in the first day of 'the battle' and couldn't provoke Swedish army to leave fortified position in the second day of the battle. In fact it is the Radziwiłł's failure to provoke the Swedes to the open field fighting. It is not a defeat of Radziwiłł's army.
 
Regardless of Radziwiłł's intentions his apperance was precived as an attempt to break the blockade by the Rigans. On the 2nd Day they even launched a dangerous amphibious assault on the Swedish position on the west bank to aid Radziwiłł in breaking through. It failed and cost Riga irreplacable resources.
 
Hence his withdrawal was seen as a defeat of the Lithuanian army by the Rigans and they reacted accordingly.
 
That Radziwiłł's mission was reconaissance, not a breakrhough  and that he was undefeated is true but this the Rigans did not know at the time.
 
Originally posted by ataman

 

It's a wrong assumption. It is enough to check the campaign in 1626 to see that Gdańsk wasn't able to defend itself without the help of the state army. The situation in 1621 was even worse than in 1626, because in 1621 Gdańsk didn't have mercenary army.

(...)
The modern fortifications of Gdańsk weren't finished in 1621, but only in 1628.
(...) 
During a peace Gdańsk indeed could raise numerous mercenary army, but it couldn't do it so fast. The situation in 1621 was much worse than during a peace, because PLC had already mobilized almost everything it could. There weren't enough soldiers to raise new and numerous army. Radziwiłł in Livonia had huge problem to raise any new unit, because there weren't enough soldiers. Even the army which fought at Chocim was smaller than it was planed, because the shortage of soldiers didn't permit to raise bigger army.
Since Swedish troops didn't approach with in 20 kilometers of Gdansk in 1626 and indeed neither intended nor made any attempt to attack the city the 1626 campaign tells us exaclty zero about Gdansk's ability to defend itself. (Since it was not called upon to do so.) 
 
I have extensive drawings & information of Gdansk's fortificatiosn in the 1620's, even in their less than ideal state in 1621 they were far stronger than those of Riga and even without sizeable force of mercenaries the small standing force of troops mantained together with the milita would have been more than enough to defend the city against 3000-4000 half-starved and ill equipped Swedes.
 
Gdansk could have done what it did both before and after 1621, hired foreign mercenaries. The PLC mobilization effort had no impact what so ever on the availability of German mercenaries. Rasing an enitre amry wpudl have taken time but enough troops could have been recruited make the defences impregnabel against any possible Swedish attack.
 
(Of course the possibility of a Swedish attack was nill since the Swedish army would have been destroyed by strategic consumption before it arrived at Gdansk.)   
 
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 25-Apr-2007 at 23:02
Originally posted by ataman

Originally posted by Captain Gars

Marching speeds
It would have been impossible for a Swedish army to reach Vilnius in only 10-14 days, that would require the army to march 32 to 23 kilometers a day, such speeds were not possible over a long periof of time for large combined arms army in eastern Europe.
 
Impossible? I don't agree. Combined army could march very fast. When Polish army marched to rescue Vienna in 1683 it had a marching speed about 30km per day (although Sobieski's army was bigger than Swedish one in 1621).
 
I've checked the real marching speed of Polish army in September-October 1621. It shows what was possible in those weather conditions.
 
Zygmunt III Waza's guard (3000 soldiers; combined army of cavalry and infantry) marched from Warszawa to Lww (that is about 350 km) in 17 days. It gives an average speed of about 20-21 km/day. In fact the marching speed was 20-25% higher, because I've measured the distance (350 km) in a straight line direction.
 
The distance from Riga to Vilnius is about 275 km (in a straight line direction) = about 13-14 days
The distance from Vilnius to Warszawa/Warsaw (in a straight line direction) is about 390 km = about 19 days
The distance from Chocim to Lww (in a straight line direction) is about 250 km = about 14 days
 
The distance from Riga to Gdańsk depends on winds Wink I suppose that it might be a week of voyage (by the Baltic).
 
So, even if marching to Warsaw could be risky for Swedish army (because Swedish army could meet the Royal guard - the only one real force, which was at Polish disposal in October 1621), capturing vulnerable Gdańsk and Vilnius certainly was possible.


Edited by ataman - 26-Apr-2007 at 01:48
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 25-Apr-2007 at 23:35
Originally posted by Captain Gars

 
Originally posted by ataman

 

It's a wrong assumption. It is enough to check the campaign in 1626 to see that Gdańsk wasn't able to defend itself without the help of the state army. The situation in 1621 was even worse than in 1626, because in 1621 Gdańsk didn't have mercenary army.

(...)
The modern fortifications of Gdańsk weren't finished in 1621, but only in 1628.
(...) 
During a peace Gdańsk indeed could raise numerous mercenary army, but it couldn't do it so fast. The situation in 1621 was much worse than during a peace, because PLC had already mobilized almost everything it could. There weren't enough soldiers to raise new and numerous army. Radziwiłł in Livonia had huge problem to raise any new unit, because there weren't enough soldiers. Even the army which fought at Chocim was smaller than it was planed, because the shortage of soldiers didn't permit to raise bigger army.
Since Swedish troops didn't approach with in 20 kilometers of Gdansk in 1626 and indeed neither intended nor made any attempt to attack the city the 1626 campaign tells us exaclty zero about Gdansk's ability to defend itself. (Since it was not called upon to do so.) 
 
You are wrong. The approaching of the Swedish army to Gdańsk was fairly enough to send imploring letters to Polish king with a request about immediate rescue. It shows the real ability of Gdańsk to defend itself in 1626. Sombody should remember that in 1626 Gdańsk had 3000 mercenary army and had better fortifications (thought they still weren't finished) than in 1621.
In 1621 Gdańsk didn't have a mercenary army and couldn't rely on any rescue.
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

 
I have extensive drawings & information of Gdansk's fortificatiosn in the 1620's, even in their less than ideal state in 1621 they were far stronger than those of Riga
 
So, you have forgoten about something. Gdańsk had really good fortifications in 1621, but they didn't protect the whole city. Eastern side was protected only by Motława river (some 50m wide). There weren't any fortifications in 1621. Opposite to Gdańsk, Riga was protected by fortifications and Dźwina river (a few hundred meters wide). It certainly was better protection than 50 m wide Motława.
Gdańsk realized that Motława wasn't a suitable defence. Therefore it had built Eastern fortifications later.
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

 
and even without sizeable force of mercenaries the small standing force of troops mantained together with the milita would have been more than enough to defend the city against 3000-4000 half-starved and ill equipped Swedes.
 
3000-4000 half-starved and ill equipped Swedes? I think you've exaggerated. Can you tell me how many soldiers GA had in last days of September 1621? Those soldiers (several thousands) could be use at Gdańsk. As I've written in my previous message, the distance from Riga to Gdańsk is only as long as the sea voyage between these cities.
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars

 
Gdansk could have done what it did both before and after 1621, hired foreign mercenaries. The PLC mobilization effort had no impact what so ever on the availability of German mercenaries.
 
The PLC mobilization effort had huge impact on the availability of German mercenaries. Do you know that PLC planed to hire 10.000 German infantrymen to the war against Ottoman Empire in 1621? The life proved it impossbile. Having almost a year, PLC couldn't hire more than 6500 German infantrymen.
If the whole state couldn't hire as many soldiers as it needed, one city (even the biggest and the most wealthy) couldn't do it too.


Edited by ataman - 25-Apr-2007 at 23:39
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 25-Apr-2007 at 23:46
Originally posted by Captain Gars

 
The Lithuanians could have adopted the kind of light cavalry operations that were so successfull against the Swedes even in 1656, a time when the Swedens held the upper hand in most large scale battles.
Karl Gustav with a much more effcient and 5 times larger army still lost over 40% of his troops under such conditions.
 
Captain Gars, Karl Gustav didn't lose 40% of his army in 1 month. And there was another disproportion of forces in 1656 than in 1621. In 1656 Polish and Lithuanian army outnumbered the Swedish one, while in 1621 it was the Swedish army, which outnumbered Lithuanian one many times.
 
 
Originally posted by Captain Gars


Originally posted by ataman

 

It is possible to talk about 'failure', only if there is a will to do something. I've already explained that Radziwiłł didn't try to break Swedish blockade of Riga. It was impossible with only 900 soldiers. And Radziwiłł knew about it very well. I have already explained what Radziwiłł's goal was.

 
(...) 
Radziwiłł's army wasn't defeated at Riga. Radziwiłł's army defeated Swedish one in the first day of 'the battle' and couldn't provoke Swedish army to leave fortified position in the second day of the battle. In fact it is the Radziwiłł's failure to provoke the Swedes to the open field fighting. It is not a defeat of Radziwiłł's army.
 
Regardless of Radziwiłł's intentions his apperance was precived as an attempt to break the blockade by the Rigans.
 
Are you sure? AFAIK, Rigans had a contact with Radziwiłł, so they should know that his action wasn't any attempt to break the Swedish blockade. I wonder what our Latvian friends can say about it.


Edited by ataman - 25-Apr-2007 at 23:54
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  Quote ataman Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 01-May-2007 at 14:50
Originally posted by ataman

Originally posted by Captain Gars

 
I have extensive drawings & information of Gdansk's fortificatiosn in the 1620's, even in their less than ideal state in 1621 they were far stronger than those of Riga
 
So, you have forgoten about something. Gdańsk had really good fortifications in 1621, but they didn't protect the whole city. Eastern side was protected only by Motława river (some 50m wide). There weren't any fortifications in 1621. Opposite to Gdańsk, Riga was protected by fortifications and Dźwina river (a few hundred meters wide). It certainly was better protection than 50 m wide Motława.
Gdańsk realized that Motława wasn't a suitable defence. Therefore it had built Eastern fortifications later.
 
Look at this
This is the sight of Riga in 1581. Riga was protected by walls even from the bank of Duna.
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