The Battle of Quatre Bras

Wellington didn't. He was late in getting his army together and sent his army in all directions. He initially lied to Blucher that he was coming to aid him. It was only on the initiative of the subordinate Prince of Orange that Wellington realized that he had to link up with Blucher. On the eve of the Battles of Quatre-Bras and Ligny, Wellington decided to to meet Blucher in person to ask him what he should do. Apparently he was still clueless. I would have loved to see what Blucher's reaction was like.  But he was too late to aid Blucher. He let Ney's tiny army stop him from aiding the Prussians at Ligny.

Wellington never lied in his life. He told Blucher that he would come to his assistance PROVIDED he himself was not attacked. Certainly he was well served by The Prince of Orange's staff who deployed at Quatre Bras. There they blocked Ney's force which heavily outnumbered them from going to the aid of Napoleon. Wellington's arrival helped stabilise their defence as did the gradual arrival of reinforcements, which arrived in the nick of time to hold off the outnumbering French. Eventually Wellington's forces grew to outnumber the French and pushed them back by the end of the day. Inso far as each thwarted the plans of the other the battle was more of a draw possibly than a British victory. Blucher's defeat by the French at Ligny then forced the British to fall back intheir turn to Waterloo where Wellington stated to Blucher that he would fight provided Blucher could provide a Corps in assistance.

The idea of Wellington being clueless and asking Blucher what he should do is so riculous that it isn't even worth commenting on. That Blucher recovered well and overruled his own Chief of Staff and agreed to support Wellington speaks highly of his determination. His tactical ability at Ligny however is definitely in question as to his troop deployment .

One might also note that the 'forward defense' not only kept the 'attention' of Ney's original forces (which was by Napoleon's design), but also resulted in Ney calling on d'Erlon's I Corps.  As a result, the bulk of I Corps spent the day marching and countermarching back and forth between Quatre Bras and Ligny and thereby failed to engage in either battle.

No that is not what this says: (this was copied and pasted from theNapoleonSeries):
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/hundred/c_chapter2.html

Wellington had made an agreement with Bl�cher well before the 15th that he would concentrate to the southeast of Brussels in case of a French attack. With this concentration to the west-southwest, he actually increases the distance between his army and Bl�cher's; thus unwittingly assisting napoleon to defeat them in detail.

Luckily for Wellington, two Dutch-Belgian generals correctly assessed the situation. At about 1400 Constant-Rebecque, the Prince of Orange's chief of staff began concentrating Orange's corps around Quatre-Bras. General Perponcher, one of Orange's division commanders decided that it would be much wiser to defend the strategically important crossroads at Quatre-Bras instead of concentrating near Nivelles as ordered by Wellington. With this act of insubordination he saved Wellington's reputation and Bl�cher's army because it prevented Ney from taking Quatre-Bras and marching on Bl�cher the next day.

I like how it politely says that Wellington had an "agreement" with Blucher. He more likely lied to Blucher or he is even more incompetent than I thought.

The idea of Wellington being clueless and asking Blucher what he should do is so riculous that it isn't even worth commenting on.

That is exactly what he did. He went to Blucher and asked him in French "Que voulez-vous que je fasse?" I don't have time to find the source of the link. Find it yourself. Just trust my word. I am no novelist.

Have read your suggested link. Not wholly unbiased I suspect

I repeat Wellington never lied. Other sources pay tribute to his rectitude and to suggest otherwise amounts to defamation

I suggest you reread your suggested source and see why Wellington deployed as he did. He kept on balance until he knew when and where Napoleon was going.

Yes, he was well served by the Dutch General Perponcher and his colleagues. They were however saved from destruction by Ney's much larger force by Ney's dilitariness and by the timely arrival of British reinforcements under Wellington. The first (with Wellington) arriving an hour after Ney's first attack.

You will see from your source (and most others) that it was Ney's job to attack the Prussian's flank not stop Wellington. Wellington clearly frustrated those plans and by the end of the day had recovered all ground lost.

As for Wellington asking Blucher what he should be doing that is so laughable and so out of character that I simply don't believe it. I have never ever heard it alleged.

It is another wrong statement to say that Napoleon's troops were exhausted and badly put together. His artillery and cavalry was superb, His guard were superb and his infantry had one of the highest proportion of veterans in the ranks that he had had for some time.

He outnumbered Wellington and his polyglot army so defending a position (which Wellington had reconnoitred before) was no mean feat. As said without Wellington there they wouldn't have done it.

Wellington had no Prussian troops under his command.

Wellington did not suffer any battle defeats whilst he was in command

I commend to you the thoughts of the French Generals as to his abilities

I commend to you the study of Wellington's offensive battles and campaigns. (See list I provided for starters)

Don't know where you are coming from but you appear to have a remarkably blinkered approach

Judging by the mistakes the Prince of Orange made both at Quatre Bras and at Waterloo the result would have been disastrous. Until Wellington arrived to take command the Prince of Orange was in fact in command of the whole army much to the horror of the British contingent!!!

The Prince of Orange and his vastly outnumbered Dutch army was able to hold off the French until reinforcements arrived.

The Prince of Orange was basically a poor commander and wouldn't have lasted 5 minutes without Wellington or  the support of his good subordinates.

At Quatres Bras they had been forced back by the first French attack and if the French had not delayed would have been routed. As it was the French hesitated then Wellington arrived with the first of the reinforcements and took command. 

Damn! Peteratwar got there first, but as I've prepared it I may as well post it anyway!

Assuming of course, Orange had had the military acumen to spot the inherent advantages of the position, and assuming Blucher would have had sufficient faith in Orange�s ability as he had in Wellington�s to risk his army to come to his aid [and contrary to the views of his own chief of staff] Even Napoleon thought Wellington had made a mistake giving battle on the ridge of Mont St. Jean. More likely Orange would have still been enjoying the Duchess of Richmond�s Ball while Napoleon destroyed Blucher and occupied Brussels.

Was there a �Dutch Army� at Quatre Bras? Two or three brigades, as I remember it, but I�ll stand corrected.

That�s probably because a large chunk of Wellington�s army was composed of unreliable Dutch-Belgian and Hanoverian militia, most of whom were on Napoleon�s side the previous year. Orange didn�t help by sacrificing battalion after battalion to no advantage. I can imagine a collective sigh of relief from his men when he was shot. [Did anyone ever discover if it was a French or Allied bullet? Perhaps �Fragging� is not an American invention after all? ] At the end of the day, the British Army did most of the fighting throughout most the battle

another British made myth. those unreliable Hanvoerian milita never served under Napoleon and it was this unreliable Hanoverian milita which captured general Cambronne. it was the crappy unreliable KGL which held on la Haye Sainte, it was the Nassau troops which held on la Papelotee (two of the three fortified places). it was the unreliable Belgian Carabiniers who charged the French from the battlefield. when will British Waterloo myths finally die out?

3 popular myths of old in one post alone...

Not sure what you're saying here.  Are you saying that your original claim of Wellington's force being only 35% 'British', and then later claiming only 25-30% is 'bad semantics'?

Are you sure that I am quick to do that?  Please go back and quote, in my own words, where I have 'highlighted' the 'foreign elements' when they didn't do well but 'automatically' assumed they were British when they did well.  All I have done is consistently referred to the whole combined force as 'the British army'.

No, it was a 'British army' with British, German and Dutch components.  You seem to want to hold me to a higher standard of preciseness than you follow yourself.  First you referred to the 'German' components as 'Prussian'.  Now you insist on using the collective term 'German', even though there was no 'Germany' at that time.  Rather than referring to the 'German' contingent as a collective whole, you should refer to so many Brunswickers, so many Hannoverians etc.

The problem is that your argument is predicated on a number of erroneous assumptions.  Ney and his 'tiny army'?  Ney's 'tiny army' heavily outnumbered the British forces at the start of Quatre Bras.  Ney plus d'Erlons I Corps clearly outnumbered the entire British force present  by the end of the day.  Wellington had promised to join Blucher at Ligny if he was not attacked himself.  He was attacked himself, so that objective was null and void.  What Wellington did do to 'support' Blucher was hold the crossroads, prevent use of the key lateral road for the day and 'tie up' a superior French force (Ney's original forces plus d'Erlon's I Corps) for the entire day, which were therefore not available to Napoleon at Ligny.  Wellington also managed to avoid being defeated himself.  I will elaborate on this in a subsequent post.

So, you are 'sure' that Col. Elting actually supports your theory, but presumably he just has a little trouble expressing his support for you clearly when he writes his books on the subject?

That I do not disagree with.  Blucher's support at Waterloo was critical in defeating the French

Without Wellington's support, Ney and d'Erlon's Corps would have headed down the lateral road on June 16 and finished off Blucher completely at Ligny.  There then would have been nothing preventing Napoleon's (re)-conquest of Belgium and the Netherlands.  In fact Wellington played a critical role in the decisive Allied victory in the '100 Day Campaign' (as did Blucher).

Well, the French were outnumbered by the combined British and Prussian forces.  However, Napoleon could win by doing exactly what he tried to do, which was to concentrate on one force, then the other.  Napoleon manoeuvred himself into an advantageous position, then tried to concentrate on Blucher, but Wellington interferred at Quatre Bras, thus neither Ney's force nor d'Erlon's I Corps were able to use the lateral road to take Blucher in the rear.  At Waterloo, Napoleon tried to concentrate on the British, but Blucher's forces intervened.  So Napoleon tried to do what he needed to in order to win, and he was partially successfully.  However, ultimately both Wellington and Blucher managed to avoid allowing the French to concentrate their entire force against the other.

No correction is necessary.  There was no 'Dutch army'.  The Dutch units first on the scene did do a great job of positioning themselves and holding those advanced positions until reinforcements arrived.  At no point have I attempted to denigrate the role played by the Dutch or 'German' components of Wellington's force.

Ney was ordered to prevent the Army of Netherlands from linking up with Bl�cher. Ney, like later Grouchy at Waterloo, was never supposed to fight at Ligny. Napoleon from the outset planned to march with two columns throughout the campaign (Ney beign the left and Grouchy the right). so he achieved his goal even though not tactcially beating Orange/Wellington. thats what can be called a strategical victory.

I never suggested that the nationality of the commanding general is the criterion either.  The term 'British army' may not be very precise, but its meaning is clear in the context.  I'll tell you what, if you convince me that the 'Austrian' army was clearly majority 'Austrian' in composition, then I will start using the term 'Anglo-Dutch' or British / Dutch / Brunswick / Hannover / Nassau Army or whatever more cumbersome term is considered 'politically correct'.

Fair enough, there is alot of back and forth in this thread. 

Again, I've already agreed that Napoleon succeeded in 'stealing a march' on Wellington, as Wellington admitted himself.  However, we are talking about what was actually available for the Battle of Quatre Bras on June 16th, not what could have theoretically been available if the manoeuvres of the preceding days had gone differently.  Furthermore, Wellington was heavily outnumbered early in the battle and only managed to gain an advantage late in the day.  Finally, Wellington's entire force at Quatre Bras did not outnumber Ney's original force plus d'Erlon's I Corps.

Yes, Ney's 'tiny' 24,000 man force was 'opposing' Wellington's initial force of 8,000.  Then there was d'Erlon's 20,000 man force which was between the battlefields at Quatre Bras and Ligny.  Ya, what a wimp Wellington was, clearly all he hand to do was destroy 2 forces, each of which heavily outnumbered him, and then drive through to Ligny to engage the even larger French forces there.  I'm sure the Dutch division would have had no problem handling the Old Guard at Ligny after finishing off Ney and d'Erlon.  All in an afternoon's work!

It appears as though you are conveniently assigning 'primary' objectives in order to justify your conclusion.  In fact, Wellington was to move to Ligny IF he wasn't attacked himself.  He was attacked, by a greatly superior force.  It wasn't until later in the day that, as reinforcements 'trickled' in, that Wellington had any sort of advantage.  Ney's objectives were to defeat the British, capture the crossroads and use the lateral road to hit Blucher in the flank.  He failed on all counts.  Wellington's objectives were to reinforce Blucher if not attacked, otherwise to hold the crossroads, deny use of the lateral road to the French and to tie up as many French forces as possible.  True, he did fail to reinforce Blucher directly.  However, otherwise he succeeded.  Not only was Ney's original force fully engaged, but Ney was 'forced' to call on d'Erlon's I Corps for reinforcments which thereby denied the use of that force at Ligny as well.   

The British only withdrew from Quatre Bras due to the Prussian retreat.  In fact it was the British who had 'held the field' at the end of the day, and they were in no way 'defeated' and 'forced' to retreat the way the Prussians had been.

No, that is simply untrue.  Wellington was on the field, in command by 3pm.  At that time he was still heavily outnumbered by the French.  Shortly afterwards he received some reinforcements (Picton's division and a cavalry bridage) which still left him outnumbered (25,000 French vs. 17,000 British).  Some time after that Brunswick showed up with some troops which brought Wellington's force up to 21,000.  So Wellington was definitely in command while being outnumbered.  At what point was Ney outnumbered 2:1?  The final British reinforcments of the day brought the British up to 36,000, which was far short of 2:1 over Ney's original force and still less than Ney plus d'Erlon's I Corps.

No need to say 'sorry' to me, I didn't write it.  Was there any reason why you labeled it as 'not very good', other than the usual - that you don't agree with it.

That fails to comprehensively analyze the entire situation as it existed, and relies on considering only part of Ney's original orders so as to come to the conclusion.  Mr. Balkoski's article is far more thorough in its analysis.  The bottomline is that the French either needed to concentrate more forces against the Prussians to 'complete' their victory there, or to defeat the British.  The fact is that they achieved neither.  The British were undefeated and held the crossroads.  The French were denied the use of Ney's force and d'Erlon's I Corps at Ligny, a combined force which outnumbered what was available to Wellington.  Certainly NOT a victory, strategic or otherwise, in my book.

The error in your analysis here, and it is a common error, is that you are ignoring the importance of the crossroads and lateral road to the French.  As has been clearly stated previously, the 'objective' of Wellington moving to Ligny was nullified by virtue of the fact that he was attacked by a vastly superior force (Ney's).  There was another also superior force (d'Erlon) between him and Ligny.  It was only later in the day that Wellington's reinforcements gave him a numerical advantage over Ney (but still inferior to Ney and d'Erlon combined).  It was the French who wanted and needed the road.  Ney squandered his early opportunity to capture the crossroads early, and use the lateral road to send d'Erlon's I Corps, plus possibly additional forces, to hit Blucher in the flank.  That would potentially have given Napoleon the truly crushing victory that he needed at Ligny.  As it was, and as you pointed out, Blucher retreated but was far from finished after Ligny.  A French strategic victory at Quatre Bras would have involved either sending significant forces to Ligny to 'ice' the victory there, or at least inflicting a significant defeat on Wellington.  As it was, Ney's original force plus d'Erlon's I Corps were unavailable at Ligny, yet failed to defeat Wellington.  Of course you are correct that once the Prussians retreated from Ligny, the position won by Wellington at Quatre Bras was meaningless.  At that point there wasn't really much choice for Wellington other than to fall back in parallel with Blucher.   But that doesn't nullify the contribution Wellington made to the Allies' cause in fighting at Quatre Bras.  It's pretty clear that if the crossroads had been ceded without a fight d'Erlon and possibly additional forces would have headed down the Namur road, hit Blucher in the flank and possibly resulted in a crushing defeat at Ligny.  THAT would have represented a strategic victory for the French at Quatre Bras.  Using 45,000 French troops merely to prevent Wellington's smaller force from fighting through to Ligny, which Wellington had no intention of attempting once he was attacked, does NOT represent a strategic victory. 

No, Napoleon did not have the strength to defeat the combined forces of Blucher and Wellington let alone the other armies massing. His only hope was to smash the two armies and (hopefully) convince the rest of Europe to let him be.

He could only hope to smash the two armies individually. Time was NOT on his side.

So he faced Blucher at Ligny the nearest of his enemies. Ney was to ensure that Quatre Bras was held so that the flank/rear of Blucher's army could be attacked by D'Erlon's corps at the very least. Similarly Wellington (if he could) was to march and support Blucher provided he himself was not opposed.

In the end the battle at Quatre Bras stopped Napoleon's strategy dead. Blucher's army was beaten but remained an effective fighting force.

Wellington fell back to Mont St Jean which he had already reconoitred and informed Blucher that he would give battle there if Blucher would support him with at least a corps. To this Blucher assented and kept his word.

Napoleon then faced Wellington at Waterloo with the result we know. Wellington's and Blucher's co-operation and the result at Quatre Bras totally foiled Napoleon's plans strategic and tactical.

Wellington only promised to bring forces to Ligny IF he was not himself attacked.  On the one hand you claim that Ney's forces were insufficient to 'defeat' Wellington.  Yet from early morning until about 3:00pm Ney had 24,000 troops (plus d'Erlon's additional 20,000 nearby) facing only 8,000.  The fact that Ney didn't start his attack until after 2:00pm doesn't justify 'moving the goal posts' regarding what he was expected to or able to achieve.  Napoleon reasonably expected that Ney's 24,000 men should easily push aside Wellington's 8,000, capture the crossroads and then send at least d'Erlon, possibly additional forces, down the Namur road to take Blucher in the flank.  The simple fact is that Ney delayed and thereby lost his chance to win.  Not only that, but Ney actually called on d'Erlon to support him at Quatre Bras and thereby denied the use of those forces at Ligny as well. 

Again, you claim Ney's orders were 'unrealistic', yet somehow you believe that it is reasonable to expect Wellington to have fought his way through Ney's force and then d'Erlons force in order to get to Ligny and fight there?  It seems pretty clearly contradictory to absolve Ney of having to achieve the objects in his orders on the basis of having missed the opportunity which clearly existed earlier in the day while holding Wellington to a 'promise' which actually explicitly included an 'out' (i.e. IF not attacked himself).