Top 10 german generals of WWII

 

1. von Manstein

2. Guderian

3. Raus

4. Heinrici

5. Rommel

6. Model

7. von Kluge

8. Hoth

9. von Kleist

10. Hoepner

 

Some of the notables I left out:   von Bock, List, von Manteuffel, von Rundstedt, von Weichs, von Thoma, Reinhardt, Kurt Meyer, Geyr von Schweppenburg.

 

I thought ranking Napoleonic generals was difficult, leaving off the likes of Thoma and Meyer was terribly difficult.  I will admit that it will take some convincing to change the top two.  3-10 are much more subjective.

 

Edit:  I was not sure whether to post this in modern history or military history.

 

Also, I tended to favor generals that commanded at the highest level (armies and army groups) over ones that commanded divisions and corps.

 

Did wonder about that myself, that maybe I was thinking of an entirely different Reichenau. Even if he hadn't been a horrid war criminal I wouldnt rate him as particularly talented anyway when compared to others within the Wehrmacht.

 

On a seperate note, Temujin what are your reasons for not rating Manstein? He strikes me for example as having been an immensely talented commander, I'm curious to hear an alternative view on him.

 

Thanks for expanding on your opinion.

 

I think when it comes to the relief attempt of Stalingrad, Operation Winter Storm, Manstein was put into a position which first off should of been avoided in the first place. Sixth army should not of been trapped inside Stalingrad and Manstein should not of had to attempt a relief operation with such hastily gathered and tired forces. I think he was in a near impossible situation from the start, Sixth army was likely incapable by this point of mounting a major breakout attempt, the army was paralyzed anyway because of Paullus' unwillingness to breakout without Hitlers order. This made the relief far more difficult.

 

Made worse by first the increasingly horrendous weather and Operation Saturn launched by the Soviets not long after Winter Storm got underway, forcing Manstein to divert crucial units to save first of all the Italian Eighth Army and secure the withdrawel of Army Group A to the Ukraine. To not of done this would of resulted in the collapse of the entire front and likely destruction of the relief army along with Sixth army.

 

I feel Manstein was given an almost impossible task of relieving Sixth Army and under the circumstances he found himself in, did the best he could be expected of doing.

 

In the midst of the enormous battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the 3rd battle of Kharkov is little remembered, despite being an impressive German victory spearheaded by Manstein. Where outnumbered German forces retook Kharkov and severely mauled the Soviet forces they fought, it's as good an example as any of mobile defence at it's finest.

 

When it comes to his relationship with Hitler, I think Manstein was vocal enough in his disapprovel of Hitlers interference in military matters without unnecessarily committing professional suicide. He repeatedly disobeyed Hitlers orders, by himself ordering trapped units to breakout, despite the Fuhrers refusal to sanction anything associated with conceding territory.

 

In just about every major battle Manstein took part in against the Soviets post-Stalingrad his forces were massively outnumbered in terms of men, armour, aviation and guns, yet he was always able to inflict enormous casualties upon the Soviets even when he was often forced to withdraw to save his forces from annihilation.

 

This is just my opinion of Von Manstein, I think he was often in extremely difficult positions and couldn't be expected to always magically turn the tide, but always did the best he could with the forces he had available to him.

 

I agree that Stalingrad and Kursk were more important and decisive battles strategically on the Eastern front.

 

Manstein didn't save Sixth army at Stalingrad and didn't sufficiently breakthrough Soviet defences at Kursk to achieve envelopment. That is true.

 

Does that necessarily mean though that he made significant blunders?

 

Does a lost battle always mean the commander was incompetant or lacking in ability?

 

I think in terms of Stalingrad there was nothing more Manstein could realistically do, it wasn't a matter of his talent as a commander, but simply what was possible.

 

A breakout would of been possible had Hoths Panzers been able to advance toward the outskirts of the city, it was however blunted by Soviet counter-offensives. Realistically though Sixth Army was a spent force, what armour it had left was chronically low on fuel, it's men starving and exhausted. It's likely they'd of been cut to pieces had they broke out. I think Manstein knew this, the chance for Sixth Army to escape in anything resembling a force had been lost weeks earlier.

 

In the words of Anthony Beevor in his book Stalingrad;

 

"That same night, Paulus and Manstein discussed the position in a conference conducted via teleprinter. Manstein warned that the 4th Panzer Army had met heavy resistance and that the Italian troops on the northern flank had collapsed. Paulus asked whether he had finally recieved permission for the Sixth Army to break out. manstein replied that he still had not obtained agreement from supreme headquarters. He was sparing with the details. If Paulus had been given sufficient information to update his operations map, he would of seen that the Sixth Army was beyond help."

 

Beevor also suggests that Mansteins regrets about Stalingrad post-war were due to what he thinks was Mansteins belief that Sixth Army was already doomed and that whilst Sixth Army was in Stalingrad it was occupying the attention of the Soviet armies. Allowing Army Group South to escape being cutoff by the Soviets in the Caucasus. I tend to agree that Manstein saw the hopelessneess of the situation, but attempted to make it work anyway.

 

I think Manstein could of been less loyal to Hitler, but again to blatently defy the Fuhrer would mean certain dismissal and likely replacement by a total sychophant who would go all the way down with Hitler and his mad orders. What good would that of achieved in the end?

In your opinion what do you think Manstein could of done differently to relieve Sixth Army and win this battle?

 

I'm less researched on Kursk than I am Stalingrad or some other battles, so I will have to look up on it more before I comment to much on the battle itself.

The reason I left Rundstedt out is because I look at him as one of the old guard that is held in such high regard because he had brilliant subordinates (such as von Manstein) which he allowed freedom of initiative in operations.  He was good, I just don't think as good as some of the younger generals who were more innovative.  Also the western allies propped him up as the leader of the german army and attributed everything to him.  So there is the allied propoganda to overcome as well.  Raus I included for his innovative tactics and brilliant conduct of the campaigns he was in.  Army Group north spearheading to leningrad, the defence outside of moscow etc.  I am currently reading his biography Panzer Operations in translation, so I'll give more information on my reasons for him later.  I'll admit I put Reichenau on there because I was curious others opinions on him.  (Though I also think he was a progressive and talented commander, the other reason he was disliked by the old guard, similar to others like Guderian)  I have read gorlitz and seeing as how he has a different opinion on him than others (more positive) I was curious if any here were supporters of his perspective.  In regards to him being a war criminal; since he died in 42' I wasn't aware he was a war criminal.  I assume he was branded one post mortem?  I wanted to put Hoepner on there, but I just don't know enought on him besides the basics; where he commanded and at what level.  (I wouldn't be able to defend him properly because of lack of knowledge)  Kesselring is tricky for me because he was both a successful air commander and army commander.  I wasn't sure whether to rank him as wehrmacht or luftwaffe.  Confusing, also I only know of his italian campaign, I can't remember if he commanded elsewhere as an army commander.  If he fought in more theatres and in more campaigns then I would revise my assessment of him.

 

Originally posted by Konstantinius 1. Rommel 2. Beck (sacked before 1939 but stood up to Hitler) 3. Guderian 4. Kleist 5. Hoepner 6. Hoth 7. Reichenau (part of the conspirators, was waiting for successful bombing by  Stauffenberg to arrest all SS in Paris--he was the military gov. of occupied france at the time) 8.  Busse  (last commander of the Berlin garrison, he commanded bravely and efficiently during a lost battle) 9. Reihardt 10. Kluge

Ah, yes I forgot about Beck.  I agree with you there.  Sad ending.  You can't help but admire his efforts to thwart hitler.  I have heard of Busse but my knowledge on him is limited like that on Hoepner.

 

I think you mistook Reichenau for either Stulpnagel or Witzleben in regards to the conspiracy.  If memory serves one of them, I think Stulpnagel was the governor of Paris, (can't remember for sure though) did indeed go through with the conspiracy and arrested the S.S. in paris according to plan even after the bomb failed to kill hitler.

 

Originally posted by Sparten Depends on what the generals highest position was, a div commander has a  different standard than say a corps or army commander.

To retain my sanity, I was basing my decisions on at least corps or army level, from there up to theatre level.  At division level I also think Rommel was one of the best, all you have to say is ghost division in france.  Balck for me is an enigma, he was brilliant at times and then there were some sub-par performances in 44' for which he has been blamed.  I haven't been able to figure out whether he was at fault or just made a scapegoat. 

 

I almost hate to bring up the comparison, but if you look at Hannibal; he lost his final battle but he is still judged as a brilliant general, same applies to a lesser degree with Pyrrhus.  Heraclius has summed up the Stalingrad situation quite well, even Guderian would have failed in that situation.  In regards to Kursk, first off von Manstein never wanted to attack there in the first place, he felt more decisive opportunities could be had elsewhere and that it was not worth the risk, if successful it would still be only a pyrrhic victory, the russians had numbers that could easily be replaced, not so with the germans.  It was well fortified and the chance of annihilating the enemy was low, chances of encircling the russians were not good.  Despite this he agreed to attack at Kursk in co-ordination with forces from army group center, (under von Kluge I think).  He wanted to attack immediately whereas the forces from army group center did not, they wanted to wait until they had recieved more tanks; von Manstein argued that this was a bad idea because the russians would also be bringing in more tanks and a lot more of them than the germans.  He was proven correct.  He was forced to wait something like 6 weeks(?) until finally getting the green light to attack.  He made good headway, the forces from AGC did not.  Even still Kursk could be argued as a pyrrhic victory of sorts tactically, von Manstein did defeat russian forces and progressed something like 15 to 30(?) kilometers.  He did inflict tank losses on the russians, its just they could replace those losses.  But I would agree Kursk was a strategical failure, though not on Manstein's part. 

 

Heraclius mentioned his delaying to attack towards Stalingrad because he thought it hopeless.  I would like to add on that; the reason he delayed was because he had to withdraw von Kleists' forces from the caucasus', the forces in stalingrad were holding up something like 65 russian divisions.  The decision he made was the only logical one he could make, once Kleists' forces were safe he immediately attacked, also he just didn't have the manpower and strength to make it to Stalingrad, the job he, Hoth and Raus did getting as close to Stalingrad as they did was simply amazing.  Heraclius brought up a great point about Paulus refusing to breakout without hitlers orders, the thing about Manstein not standing up to hitler is somewhat inaccurate.  He was relieved of Command in 44' along with von Kleist precisely because he would argue with and disobey hitler.  This showing he did indeed disobey orders from hitler rather often, nothing compared to Guderian of course, but then again, no one would argue like Guderian would.  Even hitler conceded this point to Guderian, but I digress.  In fact he had tried to convince Paulus to disobey hitler and break out pretty much right after the 6th was encircled and continued to try and convince Paulus to breakout until near the end when it wouldn't have mattered.  I believe Paulus was finally willing to break out and von Manstein told him not to because this was too late to have succeeded without von Mansteins support, which could not be given at that moment due to the situation in the Caucasus.  Eventually von Manstein told Paulus to organize the 6th facing four directions and start withdrawing his forces to the west to prepare the break out, this was rather successful in fooling the russians I think, can't precisely remember this either though.  At the last moment Paulus decided against the breakout, again if memory serves, throughout this whole tragedy Paulus would vacillate between absolutely agreeing to breakout and then absolutely not agreeing to breakout.  You really kind of feel bad for him, anyway, I think I read somewhere that some small forces disobeyed Paulus and did manage to make it to the german lines.  (not counting the specialists, and wounded evacuated by the luftwaffe)

 

Heraclius again made a great point about von Manstein wanting to use elastic defence and hitler wanting to use static defence, ironically, showing the inepititute and borderline insane policies of hitler von Manstein wanted to construct field fortifications in reserve in case defeat was suffered which was always very probable after the collapse of the romanian and italian armies and the loss of the 6th in stalingrad.  Hitler categorically refused, these would be the examples of where von Manstein would not disobey hitler, sure enough the russian hordes would break through into the reserve areas necessitating withdrawls followed by further withdrawls because there was no reserve defensive line to hold.  All of 43' and 44' was carried on like this for the most part, von Manstein would want to use the rivers as reserve diffences, no said hitler, and then the germans are at the next river behind, again the same thing, again another river closer to germany until they were in hungary and romania and von Manstein was relieved. 

 

I forgot to mention the crimean campaign; von Manstein took over from his predecessor I believe it was von Schobert, who had just been killed in a plane crash, and successfully defeated the russians in several months pushing them across the isthmus of perekop with greatly inferior forces.  The siege of sevastapol was particularly well concieved and executed.

 

Well, thats my long winded response.  Perhaps I should have explained why I had the ten generals I did and in that order.  Allow my fingers to recover and I'll do that next.

 

Edit:  I completely forgot to mention France.  This is where von Rundstedt showed how he would allow his subordinates to develop their ideas and back them up with the high command.  First of all, Temujin is right that von Manstein didn't take a leading part in France.  Though the reason for that was because the old generals at OKH were pissed off at von Manstein for going past them directly to hitler to get his plan checked off on.  (though it was one of hitlers aid-de-camps who invited him to do so)  However, he was given command of an infantry corps and still took part, performing brilliantly specifically on the somme later in the campaign.  I would also argue that his plan was the basis for the invasion of France and that he would deserve the most credit for it.  I was under the impression he intended for it to entice the british and french in the north to move through belgium and for the main force to invade through the ardennes and cut off the BEF and the french armies in Belgium.  Temujin seems to have a slightly different view of it, I would be appreciative if you could elaborate.

 

At Army Group level, well Bock is the star IMO, his performances with AGC in the first months of Barbarossa, while Von Runsdetd also shone overall (problems with AGS nothwithstanding, his best performance was in the Frech campaign).