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Did the Russian Winter Defeat Germany?

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  Quote Crystall Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Topic: Did the Russian Winter Defeat Germany?
    Posted: 20-Sep-2007 at 17:01
I have seen this question adressed in another topic, but I wanted to make my own post about it.
 
I grew up hearing that the invasion of Yugoslavia/Greece delayed the German attack for 6 weeks or so and it was the reason the Germans lost in the Eastern Front. Now I have started to come across others who say this is just propaganda from what Hitler said, and what the West took as the truth.
 
What do you guys think? Was the winter as important as many historians say it was, and lead to the eventual (or quicker) defeat of the Nazis?
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  Quote Justinian Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 20-Sep-2007 at 18:12
My personal opinion is yes, having read a lot of memoirs and german histories (all in translation) every single one of them has said how much the winter wrecked barbarossa.  Entire divisions ceasing to exist simply because of the cold.  The panzers being useless, lack of supplies, roads, no winter clothing because of OKW thinking the campaign would be over by then etc.  A thing to note is the germans were forced to attack in the winter to capture moscow because of hitler and failed with horrific casualties.  The russians made numerous counter-attacks and all of them were brutally beaten back with high losses.  The german offensive slowed to a crawl because of the winter, they were incapable of going on because the panzer losses were enormous both from soviet inflicted casualties and breakdowns due to weather, the soldiers casualties from the cold were even bigger and the russian infastructure was so poor, especially with guerillas continually destroying it, that supplies and re-enforcements were incapable of getting to the front.
 
I'll comment more later.
 
This is a bit off topic but one thing that shines out from reading all those memoirs is how the german military was continually protesting hitlers decision-making to go to war with other countries, they would get nowhere and then they would do as told.  He would deflect their protests and they would be forced to get down to business and try to beat the enemy.  At first it was the anchluss with austria, then the idea of invading poland was not sound, then it was thought impossible to beat france, then invading england, (which actually did fall through, though the lessons to be learned from it were lost on the high command) then barbarossa.  Also interesting is how some of the enlisted soldiers memoirs were puzzled as to their "allies", the japanese not declaring war on the soviets when the germans declared war on the United States.  Perhaps this should be in that other thread you referred to.  Oh well.


Edited by Justinian - 20-Sep-2007 at 18:19
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  Quote Sarmat Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 20-Sep-2007 at 22:25
This surely is a myth.
 
Tell me again why the Russian tanks could move during the winter of 1941?
 
Did they invent a special type of winter tank which Germans didn't have?
 
The lack of supplies is indeed the reason. But this problem relates to the general military planning of the German campaign. They thought the the victory would come faster. It was their mistake. Logistic mistake, strategic mistake. They perfectly knew about  the size of the Russian territory and the problems of infrastructure, so this problem relates to the flaws of the German military headquarters, not to the Russian winter.
 
In fact, the initial Russian counter attack near Moscow was very succesful. Germans were pushed back significantly.
 
Germans were exhausted, they simply couldn't push further and Russian offence near Moscow simply overwhelmed them.
 
But this was only one episode from the 4 years campaign  on the Eastern front. And German army was not defeated complitely near Moscow. It took for the Red army 4 more years to defeat Wermacht and make it to Berlin.


Edited by Sarmat12 - 20-Sep-2007 at 22:46
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  Quote ChickenShoes Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 00:56

terrible military intervention bya vain egotistical demagogue caused the german failure.

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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 13:43
Winter played some role in the battle of Moscow, but thats about it. it was not winter who encricled the 6th Army in Stalingrad and it was not winter who basically destroyed all of the Army group center in operation Bagration.
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  Quote aslanlar Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 14:26

However, it was the winter which totally ruined the German offensive plan. Blitzkrieg was dependant on speed and suprise, overwhelming the opponent. The winter was not only devastating to the soldiers (who encountered frost-bite as many were wearing summer clothing) but also for the machinery. Tanks and artillery froze up with the fuel and were left behind. The whole attack became disorganized and in turn, lead to the defeat of the German army, who, were far superior to the Soviets imo.

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  Quote Justinian Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 15:06
Ah, you have brought up a key point, the blitzkrieg.  That was how the germans defeated the polish and french.  The entire german military was geared for this system of war, the air force with dive bombers, the army with panzer divisions and so on.  Once it had failed the chances for success were considerably decreased.
 
Originally posted by Sarmat12

This surely is a myth.
 
Tell me again why the Russian tanks could move during the winter of 1941?
 
Did they invent a special type of winter tank which Germans didn't have?
 
The lack of supplies is indeed the reason. But this problem relates to the general military planning of the German campaign. They thought the the victory would come faster. It was their mistake. Logistic mistake, strategic mistake. They perfectly knew about  the size of the Russian territory and the problems of infrastructure, so this problem relates to the flaws of the German military headquarters, not to the Russian winter.
 
In fact, the initial Russian counter attack near Moscow was very succesful. Germans were pushed back significantly.
 
Germans were exhausted, they simply couldn't push further and Russian offence near Moscow simply overwhelmed them.
 
But this was only one episode from the 4 years campaign  on the Eastern front. And German army was not defeated complitely near Moscow. It took for the Red army 4 more years to defeat Wermacht and make it to Berlin.
First thanks for correcting me; the germans were forced to attack and attempt the capture of moscow, they failed and the soviets (under zhukov if memory serves with his fresh siberian divisions) counter-attacked pushing the germans back.  My memory is blurring things, what I believe I mean't to say is the germans attack failed, met resistance and retreated to better defensible winter quarters.  The russians decided to continue counter-attacking once the germans were in these more defensible positions and this is where the soviets met with heavy casualties.  Retreating to more defensible positions is what the commanders had wanted to do all along; build field fortifications and wait for spring to resume the offensive, or retreat to poland in the case of Rundstedt.  I will have to check sources to get this accurate, but that is the jist of it.
 
One thing that seems to be ignored is how the germans were repeatedly denied the opportunity to build field fortifications, especially in reserve in case of defeat because hitler thought that was defeatist.  Manstein and Guderian mention this repeatedly.  It would be an interesting topic to discuss what significance this lack of field fortifications on the eastern front had on the flow of the campaign, especially for the germans.  I would think the germans would have held up better if this had been the case.  When a hitler sponsered offensive failed miserably like all the general officers knew it would, instead of measuring the retreat in hundreds of miles it would be measured in tens or less.  The Caucusus offensive ruined the entire eastern front, that campaign forced the germans to retreat literally hundreds of miles.
 
With regards to the tanks; firstly the soviet tanks, especially the T-34's, were enormously superior in quality to the german Pzkw III's and even IV's.  It wasn't until the panthers were unleashed were the germans equal in tank quality, even then hitler threw them in willy nilly without the proper testing and build up of numbers, so the soviets still had an advantage, just not as large a one.  Also the soviets were prepared for winter warfare, you kind of answered your own question in the next paragraph.
 
You are right, the german generals were aware of the size of russia and realized how borderline crazy invading it was.  It seems the hysteric atmosphere of victory in france clouded judgement.  I've read memoirs that have said as much, france was thought impossible to conquer.  The older generals held this view with great furvor.  When they were basically embarassed with how that turned out, the younger generals like manstein were thought in a much higher regard and these were the ones who seemed to be more positive in an invasion of russia.
 
Your statement about the germans being exhausted, incapable of pushing further and being overwhelmed is 100% correct, that is a perfect summing up of the situation.
 
That brings me to your last paragraph; you are correct that it took four more years for the germans to be defeated, and that they weren't wiped out before moscow.  However, the casualties outside moscow were so atrocious for the germans that they were never going to come close to capturing moscow again.  Those losses were never replenished.  Barbarossa was a failure from this moment on, it was just streching it out.  The blitzkrieg had failed.  If the offensive in the south had not being made in the first place, the germans could have held out in russia for a while longer.  You back up both are opinions that the germans were the best troops in this war by saying it took the russians four years to defeat the germans.  I honestly believe if this had been british troops or american troops, the russians would have won in a year or less.  The thing the germans could do like no other (besides perhaps the russians) was fight without supplies or proper equipment.  The comraderie and elan of the germans seemed much higher than the allies.  How much of that was because of the situation they were in?  I do not know.  The difference between the germans situation on the western front compared to the allies was shocking.  The supplies a single american soldier had when going into combat was practically equal to a german company.  If the allied high command wasn't so conservative and well bad, the germans would have been completely defeated in a year.  If Patton would have been leading the allies, they would have steamrolled the germans all the way to berlin.  He risked more lives than say Eisenhower or Montgomery, but overall I think less allied soldiers would have been killed if he was in charge, no ardennes offensive war ending that much earlier etc.
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  Quote Sarmat Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 16:02
Again, the whole thing is about the German strategical planning. Yes, they were superior for the overall quality. But they underestimated the potential of the USSR.
 
I agree that the logistic played a were important role at the battle of Moscow. But the logistic planning belongs to the realm of strategy and tactics. May be Germans didn't stop at the right time. May be they should have ensured proper supply and logistic system before attacking Moscow. Nevertheless, they failed to do that.
 
They did totally opposite thing they were pushed further to the limits and then they simply reached the limits. Fresh and superior Russian army pushed them back from Moscow. Winter has very few things to do with that.
 
Summarizing that, what was the key element of the failure of the german strategic plan of the war with the USSR? - It was the Soviet resistance.


Edited by Sarmat12 - 21-Sep-2007 at 16:10
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  Quote Sarmat Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 16:04
Originally posted by Temujin

Winter played some role in the battle of Moscow, but thats about it. it was not winter who encricled the 6th Army in Stalingrad and it was not winter who basically destroyed all of the Army group center in operation Bagration.
 
I totally agree with that


Edited by Sarmat12 - 21-Sep-2007 at 16:08
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  Quote Guests Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 16:10
Germans should never invade Russia. Germany was condemned to defeat when they invaded Russia, with winter or without it.
They should had put all its strength in invading Britain and only Britain. That would end the war in theirs favor. The German complex of "superiority" (that is indeed of inferiority) betrays them...
At the end of the war the red army was far superior and a lot better equiped than Germany..
 
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  Quote Guests Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 21-Sep-2007 at 20:45
The Germans defeated the Germans. The decision to move south to Kiev was the clincher, if it had not been made, AGC would have been in Moscow by October.
 
Secondly, the onset of winter helped the Germans historically, roads which had been turned to mud in the autumn rains, became usuable again. As for the wheather, well by the time the really harsh winter started the Tuetonic goose was well and cooked.
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  Quote Justinian Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 22-Sep-2007 at 19:24
Oh, excellent point Sparten.  I completely forgot about Kiev.  Guderian and I think also his superior Bock(?) had wanted to keep moving the panzers on moscow but were forced to head dead south to help out the struggling army group south.  That is absolutely right, moscow had no worry about being german after this manuver.
 
Originally posted by Sarmat12

Summarizing that, what was the key element of the failure of the german strategic plan of the war with the USSR? - It was the Soviet resistance.
 
If not the main one certainly one of the key ones.  That and poor, rushed strategic planning.  Interesting how that could have been overcome if it had not been for nazi policy, the nazi's actually made the campaign more difficult with that attitude, talk about ironic. 
 
Wasn't it Sun Tzu who said never surround an enemy completely, mostly because they will fight like cornered lions if no retreat is left open? 


Edited by Justinian - 22-Sep-2007 at 19:26
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  Quote Desperado Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 22-Sep-2007 at 20:01
Originally posted by Justinian

Oh, excellent point Sparten. I completely forgot about Kiev. Guderian and I think also his superior Bock(?) had wanted to keep moving the panzers on moscow but were forced to head dead south to help out the struggling army group south. That is absolutely right, moscow had no worry about being german after this manuver.

Say it clear then: The failure of Army Group South to achieve its goals according to the initial plan prevented taking Moscow.
If the winter of 1941 had come in October or earlier - that coud be an excuse, but it came just like every year before, if not even later(according to Glantz's "When Titans clashed: how the Red Army stopped Hitler" the weather was mild until early December). So the rainy autumn is more likely what defeated the germans than the freezing winter.
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  Quote Al Jassas Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 22-Sep-2007 at 22:20
Hello to you all
 
The question about Russian winter stopping Germans is a bit complicated. As I said in a previous post, the speed of the German advance came to a halt during that unusually cold automn and winter which I will prove later. The German army group center was supposed to give reinforcements if necessary to the other army groups since it was the largest and best fighting force of the invasion. Also, that army group was the most successful in their advance. Even if the delay did occure, that army group had enough time to advance to Moscow before winter if not as other have pointed out they were delayed by Hitler who ordered them to complete the conquest of Ukraine first making 30th of September the official stat for the battle of Moscow which wa too late. Had the Germans been 6 weeks early the battle would have started in the then mild August and the German would have definitely reached Moscow by mid September and might have entered the city by mid October and had enough time to prepare defenses untill spring came but that did not happen.
As for the winter not being responsible for stalingrad or Kursk, well, war is opportunity, if you do not gamble and take your chance you will lose. Russians Knew that and reorganized their positions very early in the war even when they were losing they had a plan for victory and when spring came their army was largely rebuilt and new commanders were in control as well as full authority in decisive military decisions and any dream of breaking Russia was shattered during the spring of 42. Dividing Army group south into two seperate groups each going into it own direction while the Russians were gather behind Stalingrad was not wise. It depleted valuable resources (army group A) that if were united (army group B which fought alone in Stalingrad) in one huge operation aimed not at Stalingrad but at the Russian bases behind the city. But constant interventions by Hitler made victory which was close several times further and further until Zhukov made his brilliant attack that made any reinforcements from Army group center specifically impossible, operations Uranus and Mars and he won the battle. After that victory which was an direct result of Germany's faliur to crush Russia in 41 the war was won by the Russians.
 
As for the winter of 41, sorry, but this Glatz fellow is either imagining or an outright liar. Since I am insane about weather and climate and have the averages and historical data for some 1000 cities around the world including moscow I will give the numbers for the average temperature during 41 for Moscow and the average as well:
in 41, the average temp in Sept was 9.2 compared with the 30 year average of 10.9
in October 41 the average was 2.1 compared with the 30 year average of 4.2.
in Nov 41 (when they reached moscow) the average was -5.3 (the 3rd coldes in the 20 th century) while the normal is -2.
in Dec 41, the average was -12.8 while the normal is -7.5.
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  Quote Desperado Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 23-Sep-2007 at 10:23
Al Jassas, is the data about the weather condition available in Internet?
If not, could you please, provide some info on 1939/40 and 1940/41 winters.
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  Quote Al Jassas Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 23-Sep-2007 at 12:55
Most of the data you want for that time period you will find in http://climexp.knmi.nl. Normals are found at http://www.worldclimate.com
However, you must take into account several things. All western european nations put only daily averages as well as average percipitation but do not give average max and min. also, data are monthly averages, it is very hard to get daily data before 1973 for most stations but they exist, www.tutiempo.net/en has daily climate data. These data are accurate and their source is the GHCN which is part of the world meteorological organization. Also when searching the Climate Explorer, the first site, becareful about the spelling. Yakutsk is spelled Jakutsk and Moscow is spelled Moskva. If you write Moscow you will get the data of an american city in the midwest not the russian capital.
 
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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 23-Sep-2007 at 14:12
small correction. when looking at Barbarossa, the Army Group South was the only one to achieve its goal (Kiev) while it had to face the greatest ressistance, as opposed to Army Group North (siege of Leningrad) and Army Group Center (lost battle of moscow and was already significantly engaged at Smolensk).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue

this was aimed at the conquest of the industrious Donbass are as well as the Caucaus along with its adjacient oil fields (Baku & Maikop area). this was intended to cut off the suply lines from the south to Moscow & Leningrad.
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  Quote Desperado Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 23-Sep-2007 at 18:44
Yes, Kiev fell, but not without the help of 2nd Panzer Group and 2nd Army, which were part of Amy Group "Centre". Thus the planned assault to Moscow was delayed and the entire schedule was ruined.

The initial plan "Barbarossa":


The actual situation:


The question is why it was necessarily to reinforce AGS, using 2nd Panzer Group and 2nd Army to outflank Soviet 5,37,26 armies? Probanly because AGS was not able to capture Kiev on its own.
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  Quote konstantinius Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 23-Sep-2007 at 20:57
Originally posted by Crystall

I have seen this question adressed in another topic, but I wanted to make my own post about it.
 
I grew up hearing that the invasion of Yugoslavia/Greece delayed the German attack for 6 weeks or so and it was the reason the Germans lost in the Eastern Front. Now I have started to come across others who say this is just propaganda from what Hitler said, and what the West took as the truth.
 
What do you guys think? Was the winter as important as many historians say it was, and lead to the eventual (or quicker) defeat of the Nazis?


Hm, it's not as simple as that.

1941, later in the Summer. It should be mentioned that at this point in the war OKW was still running the eastern campaign with Hitler maintaining control of OKH through Jodl and Keitel. It is very important to stress that at this point in the war it is the generals and OKW (Halder and von Brauchitsch) that are  responsible for the  orders of the day under Hitler's direction of course. There's also considerable discourse and disagreement between OKH and OKW the consequences of which would prove disastrous for the German cause.
Conference (of the generals) at Novy Borisov July 27th 1941: All commanders of Army Group Center attend. There a memo compiled by Brauchitsch (head of OKW) was read that shows the extent of operational confusion that plagued the German command since the beginning of the campaign. Contrary to the desires of Bock (CinC of AG Centre), Guderian (CinC of 2nd Pz Army--nominally under control of von Kluge, commander of 4th Army, one of the 3 main formations that comprised AG Centre) were told that "any immediate advance on Moscow or even Bryansk was ruled out". The first task would be the reduction of the Soviet 5th Army (Maj. Gen. of the tank troops M.I. Potapov) which pivoted on Gomel and bulged out to the south with its westerly flank securely anchored on the Pripet marshes. This in effect meant that the 2nd Pz (Guderian) would swing around more than 90 degrees in a soutwesterly--homebound--direction. Guderian was rabid. Him and Bock definitely favored a direct advance on Moscow. At the same conference Guderian gets compensated by having his formation renamed into Armeegruppe Guderian in effect becomind independent and severing the strings to Kluge: " The Pz group is no longer subordinate to 4th Army". This must have come to Guderian's great satisfaction since him and Kluge never got along and were often at odds with each other since the days of France (aah, those were the times!). IMMEDIATELY and at direct OPPOSITION to orders Guderian, with Bock's eulogies, sets to implementing his own plans: an attack on Roslav. His attack culminated in a series of brilliant encirclement battles at Yelnya and Roslav in which a total of a further 100,000 Soviet troops were annihilated. This is a classic example of the many acts of insubordination committed by the generals when they were able to still run the show before Hitler stepped fully in and took direct personal command, yet it created a brilliant tactical situation: for almost seventy miles, between Yelnya and the Bryansk bend, there was NO POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET RESISTANCE WORTH SPEAKING OF. Moscow laid a mere 150 miles to the east. Obviously Guderian had tried to force OKH's hand by imposing a tactical situation (brilliant, albeit against orders) in which an advance on Moscow would become the obvious alternative to all other plans. Here Hitler himself steps in.
Hitler's conference at Novy Borisov, end of August 1941. HIlter declares that Leningrad was the primary objective at that time. After that had been achieved the choice would lie between Moscow and the Ukraine, and his inclination was to favor the latter on economic and strategic grounds. The capture of Leningrad would shut out the Soviets from the Baltic as well as impose a huge moral blow (Leningrad was the seat of the October Revolution) while the capture of the Ukraine would provide Germany with necessary agricultural products and open up the road to the Caspian oil fields. Why didn't Hitler jump on the opportunity created by Guderian's insubordination? here comes Alan Clark with his explanation: " Hitler...it is most likely that he was seriously taken aback by the ferocity and strength of Russian resistance. The ghost of Napoleon stood at his elbow, as it did at some moment for every German officer in the East, and he was determined to resist the temptation of a march on Moscow until he had laid (as he believed) a secure strategic foundation." OK, lets accept this explanation. So, at the end of August, LENINGRAD BECOMES THE OBJECTIVE. AG Centre is ordered to redirect a bunch of their units north to reinforce  Leeb's AG North. What happened? Here comes Alan Clark again: "Now followed an agonising period, two and a  half weeks long, of interregnum. AG Centre, its leadership hamstrung, floundered on the brink of a tremendous opportunity, while opposite them,  for nineteen perfect campaigning days, the Russians worked unmolested to build their shattered front." And he continues in what I consider a brilliant assesment: "It remains to be said that had the generals accepted Hitler's orders and put themselves wholeheartedly into the preparation of an immediate drive on Leningrad, that city would probably have fallen by the end of August. But instead, as will be seen, AG Centre procrastinated. The Panzers were not taken off the line, yet they did not move forward; some divisions were sent north to Leeb, others were released with great reluctance by bock for a southward move; but neither was done in the strength required. And while these hesitations and delays dragged on, the days--the priceless summer meridian of dry going and soft temperatures--slipped past." More on the disputes: "Not unnaturally, OKH was becoming increasingly restless at the continuing disobedience form its commanders. On 11th August, AG Centre was formally notified that the plan of Col. Gen. Guderian (for an advance along the Moscow highway) was rejected as being completely unsatisfactory. Bock thought it prudent not to demur and agreed to the cancellation. Guderian, however, was furious." When Guderian was ordered by OKH to release one division for the drive to Gomel he proceeded to order von Geyr's ENTIRE  24th Corps (comprising of the crack  3rd and 4th Pz and the 10th Motorized) hoping that Bock would never ascend to such drastic reduction of AG Centre's armored punch; Bock however gave the OK and the result was that these formations were recalled back too late  and in a sad state from the fighting around Leningrad when the advance on Moscow was finally agreed upon.
What about Leningrad? Here again "the German direction of operations suffered from overlap and contradictions with personal and political factors." Mannerheim's decision to not invade SU and directly attack Leningrad made a complete encirclement impossible. This is starting to change Hitler's mind AGAIN: "On 6th September he issued Directive No. 35 which provided for a return of the Panzergruppen to AG Centre and the preparation for a final attack on the Russian capital." As a result, the whole of Hoepner's Gruppe (4th Pz Army comprising of 41 Pz K-Reinhardt--,56th Pz K--von Manstein--, Pz A Reserve--SS Totenkopf), moved south in addition to those of von Geyr's (reaattaching himself to Guderian) and Hoth (3rd Pz Army consisting of 39th Pz K--Gen. Schmidt-- and 57th Pz K--Gen. Kuntzen) who was to reattach to AG Centre under Bock.
What does Leeb do? He decides to go on a FULL SCALE ATTACK on Leningrad AFTER he was ordered to return the formations South!!! Another insubordination in a drive for personal glory on the battlefield. On 12th September it is embarrassingly clear to OKH that a full-bloodied combat is taking place at Leningrad and Halder teleprints Leeb to remind him that the city 'was not to be taken but merely encircled. The attack should no go beyond the Petergof-Pushkin road ( a line that Leeb had already passed in his attack)." In the process, the elite formations of 6th Pz and 1st Pz will get caught in vicious street fighting, incur high casualties and loose many of their vehicles. As a result not only they are back (south) late but in a truly sorry state of mobility.


Certain things are clear to me:
a) the German High Command and Hitler personally DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR STRATEGIC GOAL at the beginning of Barbarossa. They functioned on the premise that large enemy formations should be encircled and put out of action which worked brilliantly for them time and again ( Kessels at Minsk; Zhitomir; Yelnya; Bryansk; biggest encirclement battle in History, 1st battle of Kiev, annihilation of Budenny's Southern front, 700,000 soviet troops dead/taken prisoner) other than that, commanders seem to have had their own appreciation of the situation with Hitler changing his overall approach MONTHLY.
b) they could have taken Moscow EASILY (as in 1942 Hoth could have advanced to STALINGRAD UNOPPOSED after the failure of the Soviet offensive in the South--2nd Battle of Kharkov--but instead he was REDIRECTED south to boost Kleist's advance in the Crimea) after Guderian's coup de grace at Yelnya/Bryansk
c) in essence the Germans had PLENTY OF TIME with or without the "Greek affair" in the south or the whole Balkan expedition.
Was it the winter? Or the inability to handle an apparently defeated and crushed enemy? Or their personal overlaps and ambitions?

Ahh, they came so close...
" I do disagree with what you say but I'll defend to my death your right to do so."
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  Quote konstantinius Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 23-Sep-2007 at 21:09
Originally posted by Sarmat12

This surely is a myth.
 
Tell me again why the Russian tanks could move during the winter of 1941?
Yes. Both the KV's and the T 34's had wider tracks and a higher chassis that made movement in those conditions much easier. there are hardly any accounts of t-34's being stuck in either mud or snow and their ability to traverse inhospitable ground much outclassed those of the Germans'
 
Did they invent a special type of winter tank which Germans didn't have?
Yes, the T-34. It dumfounded the Germans when they first encountered it, even more so because the traditional infantry anti-tank(Pak 34?) would just bounce off of T 34's frontal armor plate.
 
The lack of supplies is indeed the reason. But this problem relates to the general military planning of the German campaign. They thought the the victory would come faster. It was their mistake. Logistic mistake, strategic mistake. They perfectly knew about  the size of the Russian territory and the problems of infrastructure, so this problem relates to the flaws of the German military headquarters, not to the Russian winter.
 
In fact, the initial Russian counter attack near Moscow was very succesful. Germans were pushed back significantly.
 
Germans were exhausted, they simply couldn't push further and Russian offence near Moscow simply overwhelmed them.
 
But this was only one episode from the 4 years campaign  on the Eastern front. And German army was not defeated complitely near Moscow. It took for the Red army 4 more years to defeat Wermacht and make it to Berlin.
" I do disagree with what you say but I'll defend to my death your right to do so."
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