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Majkes 
Chieftain 
Imperial Ambassador Joined: 06-May-2006 Location: Poland Online Status: Offline Posts: 1144 |
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 Topic: Top 100 GeneralsPosted: 19-Aug-2007 at 09:58 |
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What are You talking about? He was destroying crusade after crusade. The best armies in Europe were fighting against him and couldn't do anything. Teuton Knights were shaking their asses from fear that He would visit them. Strange for so many years there was no one to beat him. I would rather stay with Zizka than fighting with leader using Your tactics against him
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Temujin
King 
Sirdar Bahadur Joined: 02-Aug-2004 Location: Eurasia Online Status: Offline Posts: 5221 |
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Posted: 19-Aug-2007 at 15:00 |
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of course 1815 is Napoleons fault, i didn't said it wasn't i just wanted to say 1815 and Waterloo should not be given so much importance. of course you can say Waterloo was his "Zama" but the game was already over for him before it began, in his situation i wouldn't have returned to France at all but it speaks much of his reputation that he was so readily accepted and could virtually start from where he left before he was forced into exile. as about Hannibals italian campaign, i don't know too much about him to judge if he had the ressources or not to bring down Rome in a fast and determined campaign, at leats he showed the tactcial skill to do so, the only question is if he had the administrative skill and the strategical farsight. ideally, Cannae should have never happened and Roem should ahev been taken right after lake Trassimene, i have only insuficient knowledge about why it did not happen but he descided to establish himself in southern italy instead, taking a more time consuming approach. |
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Praetor
Consul 
Suspended Joined: 26-Jun-2006 Online Status: Offline Posts: 386 |
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Posted: 20-Aug-2007 at 09:39 |
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Even if the allies could not take any more territory (If Napoleons forces could subjugate large territories why can't Napoleons enemies annex significant French territory on his defeat?) from France It is hardly due to Napoleon that they could not.
"so he had gambled for something and lost in the end", "his venture in 1815 was also already doomed from the beginning" these two qoutes refer to Napoleon and were made by you However this qoute is about Hannibal: "Hannibal is not good because he lost in the end" Please explain your reasoning for ranking Hannibal down but not Napoleon? Furtheremore the "senate" of Carthage is blamed because it was largely the decisions made in its councils and the mistakes of other field commanders (then Hannibal) as well as the resources, stubborness and Adaptability of Rome (along with the ability's of some of its commanders) that resulted in the loss of the 2nd Punic war not any failing on Hannibal's part (blame and credit should be attributed were it is due not because so and so is the general and so and so is the head of state). Adolf Hitler held Supreme Autocratic command of his nations forces in every theater, something Hannibal never had. Instead of explaining to you why Hannibal did not besiege Rome I will link you to a decent thread on the matter: http://www.allempires.com/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=18816&PN=1 ps. I particularly recommend Spartan's post at the begining of the second page, admittedly me and Kamikaze eventually got sidetracked discussing Zama.
Hannibal was Suffet AFTER the second Punic war, he was exiled afterwards as he made enemies of many of the Carthaginian Oligarchs with his reform policies and popularity, He was forced to flee Carthage after they (his political opponents claimed to Rome that he was tring to establish an alliance with the Seleucid empire against Rome. The Romans may have also been motivated by the growing prosperity Hannibal's administration was resulting in Carthage. They expected the indemnity Carthage was to pay to Rome to cripple them economically for many years, however thanks to Hannibal this was not proving to be the case and Carthage's economic prosperity was recovering at an alarming rate.
Hannibal, unlike Pyrrhus was not foolish enough to start a war with the other major western mediteranean power while still at war with Rome. You finish what you start before starting something else, Pyrrhus failed to attack Rome again because he was weakened by his "victories" and decided Sicily looked like an easier target, then came back when Rome had recovered even weaker then before, he showed a total lack of focus (something Hannibal I think clearly showed) and strategic ability. besides Pyrrhus's victories were over a weaker Rome then the one Hannibal faced and unlike Hannibal most of his victories were to varying extents "Pyrrhic" according to some sources losing approximately half as many men as his Roman opponents at the battle's of Heraclea and Asculum, not to mention his losses at the battle of Beneventum, Hannibal never had "victories" like Asculum and Heraclea. Pyrrhus was a very good tactician but not close to Hannibal as a general overall.
So Cannae was a small success? Trebia? Trasimene? the defection of Capua? the defection or capture of almost every significant settlement in the southern end of Italy? the First and second battle of Herdonia? the battle of Silarus river? It wasn't enough but it was FAR more then a tear drop. Hannibal drained Roman manpower and concentration enormously preventing them from taking the war with thier customary aggression to Carthaginian territory. largely because of Hannibal the Roman armies in Spain did not recieve significant reinforcements for the majority of the war and a military genius (Scipio) was required to bring the war to a conclusion (largely) because of the lack of resources available On a final note Sempronius Longus the consul defeated by Hannibal at Cannae was preparing for an invasion of Africa but was recalled to confront Hannibal. Hannibal effectively delayed the invasion of Africa by over a decade. I would say he seriusly hampered Rome's war effort.
Where does that leave Guerrila Warefare then? However in this case you are correct, defeating Rome in the field was not enough to attain victory on its own nor was the capture of varius other cities. The defection of the latin ally's and/or the capture of Rome would be required for final victory or at the least a far more secure control of those allies that had already switched sides.
My mistake on Moscow and a foolish one at that  , though on Napoleons part the mistake was far more foolish, at least Hannibal knew the capitol of the Roman Republic was Rome .
As for the Celtic SACK of Rome, I did not say Conquest. The celts
failed to take the Capitoline hill and were forced from Rome and then
defeated in the field by a relieving army, according to the history's
(which are not trusted by many in regards to this era of Roman history).
As I wrote earlier Hannibal actually achieved something in his campaigns in Spain and gained new client allies in Italy and weakened Rome, only in the "third phase" did he lose it all (flawed argument I know, I'm using it to make a point about yours). Seriusly though a generals ability can not be measured simply by whether they won or lost (in the end), there are so many factors to consider for example who is a greater fighter one who is attacked by thirty armed men and overcomes 28 of them or Goliath defeating a midget (unlike David, the midget is unarmed)? or who is a better driver one who completes a lap of a course in 14 minutes in a lada or one who completes the same lap in 12 minutes in a Ferrari? Regards, Praetor. |
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Spartan
Knight 
Joined: 23-Feb-2005 Location: United States Online Status: Offline Posts: 93 |
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Posted: 20-Aug-2007 at 10:00 |
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Hannibal was indeed Chief Magistrate of Carthage around 196 B.C. He certainly used his position to settle some scores with the oligarchs, but his economic and agricultural reforms were brilliant: he pursued and checked all the venality to its source, and carried a bill that precluded members of the Council of 104 to be elected in consecutive terms, thus not allowing one to get too 'comfortable' in a position of power. He relieved the citizens of extra taxes, and offered to pay the indemnity to Rome in full - 48 years early! Rome refused, as she wanted a long payment plan to be a reminder of Carthage's defeat. His political enemies successfully played on Roman concerns of his intentions, certainly now internal, and it then he was forced into exile, around 194 B.C.
Thanks for the comments of praise everybody; ditto!
This is a very credible point. But such assessments become lucid only via hindsight. It never occured to Carthage as much as the Barcids that Rome would ever come to Africa to destroy her; Carthage assumed, as Syracuse and Macedon did in around 215 B.C., Rome would be reduced, thus she placed priority in Spain over Hannibal's campaign, for a trade mart. The Scipio brothers had done much damage with their interests there.
Carthage was not larger than Rome at the outbreak of the 1st Punic War, from a certain perspective. The population of Carthage itself was probably a little larger at the time, and her domains spread further. But Carthage's wealth was not as much the advantage some seem to imply; after all, they had to pay demanding mercenaries, as Rome didn't need to pay her citizen-soldiers as much. Rome could raise loans from her nobles classes (most notably realised between the naval battles of Drepana and the Aegates Islands), whereas Carthage unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a loan from Egypt, and couldn't afford what her mercenaries demanded after the war - a condition Rome ultimately exploited.
Basically, the very structure of Rome's federation allowed for her to dispose of her manpower more thoroughly, and Carthage's ties with her subjects were much looser; not only did Carthage not grant citiizenship to her subjects, she didn't even extend to them similar privileges enjoyed by the Latins. In the 1st war, Carthage proved she could soundly beat the Romans at sea in a conventional manner, and had the best commander of the war on land. But Rome's adoption and perfection of the corvus - the huge boarding plank which was attached to an enemy ship - enabled Roman marines to fight to their likening at sea, and by the time the device was abandoned (its liabilities ultimately outweighed the benefit it provided), they were experienced enough to hold their own at sea in a standard manner: however, the Aegates Islands victory in 241 B.C., wrought with the fleet established by the wealthy citizens, after Rome had but a handful of ships after the disasters suffered at Drepana and Lilybaeum (Carthalo followed up Adherbal's victory with a successfull and stealthy night raid into the Romans' anchorage), was achieved with a little luck. The Carthaginians, also exhausted by this time, had hastily raised a fleet to supply Hamilcar Barca in Sicily. This fleet may have been undermanned, but it was definitely hampered by the supplies and men for Hamilcar's army. They were planning to fight after they landed this load. But Catalus, commanding ships modelled on fast captured vessles, not to mention the best crews now available, caught them in stormy conditions. As Polybius tells us of the Romans' supreme ability to adapt and adopt, Book 6.25,
"...no people are so ready to adopt new fashions and imitate what they see is better in others."
Professor J.F. Lazenby tells us, in his The First Punic War, "...it is at the higher levels of strategy that there was a crucial difference between the two sides...no Carthaginian seems to have had the slightest inkling how to defeat Rome, except in the short term, whereas the Romans made a series of decisions that show that some of them at least knew how to fight a war like this...ultimate credit for the strategy adopted must presumably go to the Senate...Rome fought for "victory" in a far more real sense than Carthage. To Rome, wars ended when the Republic dictated its terms to a defeated enemy: to Carthage, wars ended with a negotiated settlement - even Hannibal was later to think in much the same terms."
Polybius tells us, Book 6.52,
"...the conduct of war, the Carthaginians naturally are superior at sea both in efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has long been their national craft, and they busy themselves with the sea more than any other people; but as regards military service on land the Romans are much more efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens. So that in this respect also we must pronounce the political system of Rome to be superior to that of Carthage, the Carthaginians continuing to depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a mercenary force but the Romans on their own valour and on the aid of their allies. Consequently even if they happen to be worsted at the outset, the Romans redeem defeat by final success, while it is the contrary with the Carthaginians. For the Romans, fighting as they are for their country and their children, never can abate their fury but continue to throw their whole hearts into the struggle until they get the better of their enemies. It follows that though the Romans are, as I said, much less skilled in naval matters, they are on the whole successful at sea owing to the gallantry of their men; for although skill in seamanship is of no small importance in naval battles, it is chiefly the courage of the marines that turns the scale in favour of victory. Now not only do Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and personal courage, but by their institutions also they do much to foster a spirit of bravery in the young men. A single instance will suffice to indicate the pains taken by the state to turn out men who will be ready to endure everything in order to gain a reputation in their country for valour."
There was always an element of pro-Roman circumlocution on the part of Polybius (is there a unbias human being anywhere?), but this is basically a sound judgment (IMHO). Thus Carthage could have done nothing to win the 1st war; they had not the manpower to outmuscle or outbuild Rome, even with further raids on Sicily and southern Italy. The 3rd war was an arduous siege, but the outcome was never in doubt. The martial superiority of Rome in war over Carthage was evident, and that superiority is what Hannibal assiduously resolved to take away from them.
I never in any way implied, let alone outright stated, that Hannibal never knew the Alps didn't exist. My point is that the 'wrath of Hannibal' is probably Roman tradition to obscure the extent to which they seized Sardinia, which drove Carthage to not even considering to kowtow to their upcoming demands, and that she never intended to bind to the implications of the Ebro Covenant, which she herself imposed. Hannibal never went near Saguntum nor the Ebro before they started pressing their demands. If the Romans had turned a blind eye after his attack on Saguntum, their ally they never sent help towards (they were probably bluffing the whole time, and he called them on it), there is nothing to suggest he would have invaded, other than what the Romans would want us to believe. The entire build-up in Spain was to offset Carthage's losses from the 1st Punic War and Mercenary War. Coupled with this, it was indeed to be the furnishing of a new and brilliant army to be ready for another war. But strategic success from an alpine crossing entailed the conciliation of the Cisalpine Gauls, which would not have been possible during the time of Hamilcar Barca, as the beating down of the Gauls in northern Italy by the Romans came some 4 years after his death.
But if Hannibal had been planning the war with Rome far in advance, the logistics carried out leading up to it was the planning and effect of a brilliant and patiently composed leader who understood reconnaisance and supply, not that of a fanatic, blinded by a pathological degrre of revenge-seeking.
Capturing Rome itself was not necessary; the reason why Hannibal was prepared to fight in long run was because by reducing Rome to the limits of around 120 years earlier, the Roman state would have been destroyed because by reducing her political significance, it would have made her prey to the ambitions of other Italian states, most notably Capua and Tarentum. Nobody could have known how precisely the peoples would react to an onslaught of Italy.
Hannibal's grand strategy was certainly not doomed from the beginning: not only is nothing in history concretely inevitable, but the past afforded no clear refutation of the hope that the Roman federation could not be broken up by the presence of a brilliant commander with oustanding personal magnetism, and an understanding that policy, not mere battle victories, wins wars. Hannibal was brought up on the knowledge of the uneasy relations Carthage had with her subjects, reinforced from similar situations in Greek history. But for one to think Hannibal assumed things were the same in Roman Italy would be to undermine the man's intelligence; in letters to the people of Larissa in 215 or 214 B.C, Philip V of Macedon explained the liberal talent Rome possessed for absorbing peoples into their realm, one of creating numerous colonies ; he identified the political innovation which established a dynamic force force which could operating centripetally and centrifugally - ie, outwards from a sytem of centralization. He wrote of Rome's extension of citizenship to released slaves and her numerous colonies. It is inconceivable that Hannibal did not know this either; after all, it was he who began to open talks with Philip V after Trasimene. But if Hannibal did not apprise Philip, or not reinforce what Philip already knew on the surface, perhaps,, there is no reason to think Philip V would understand soemthing like this and Hannibal not.
Peninsular Italy at the time of Hannibal's invasion was united under Roman imperium, with Cisalpine Gaul recently planted with Latin colonies. But it was not a single state, but an agglomerate of many states and peoples whose common ground was that each was allied with Rome. But there was no universal feeling of 'us' and 'them' amongst the Italic peoples. Many had nothing in common with each other.
Hannibal was certainly surprised and disappointed of Rome's brush rejection of his embassy sent to them after Cannae; but though later generations of Romans would look at this incident with proud and patriotic pride, they were taking a grave risk. Hannibal's 'Plan B' was then to try to crack the morale of Rome and her federation by drawing them into constant war-service, which resulted in the devastation of farms and many losses in battle - the difference between this war, Hannibal purposely effected, and the 1st Punic War was that this time it was on Rome's doorstep. As we have shown, the allies were very disgruntled by around 208 B.C., even in the north. Adrian Goldsworthy even writes in his book on the Punic Wars, Pg. 217-219,
"..if the Romans refused to accept defeat and seek terms, he could continue to inflict real damage on their population and their property. The Romans were beaten and ought to have the sense to realize it...There was no reason to think that continued pressure on Rome would not eventually force her to acknowledge defeat."
Every theater affected the other. Hannibal was not aimlessly 'wandering around'. Throughout Italy every town had a popular party and a nolble class. There was often tension between them, and Rome supported the nobles, or oligarchs. Hannibal dashed from place to place hoping to exploit this by fostering a democratic cause among the commons. But in the larger towns which joined him, such as Capua and Tarentum, the nobles deliverd him the cities, as they were large enough to prosper without Rome. In some important towns Hannibal failed to procure, such as Nola and Neopolis, the commons actually favored an alliance with him, but the nobles, along with swiftly placed garrisons, kept them in check. Thus more people in Italy actually wanted detachment from Rome than ever did break away, but it couldn't be effected. The durability of the Roman system was simply too tough a nut to crack for ultimate success. But he had to give it a try, as the only way to win was fighting here in Italy, and the only way Rome would crumble was following the course Hannibal did. Hannibal's allies needed defending from Roman reprisals. As it turned out, they would be a disappointment, in that they never attempted significantly to fight Roman forces without appealing to him on every turn. Some he was able to garrison, and tough fights took place, such as at Casilinum.
But I don't mean to be misleading: there was no clear-cut commons-vs.-aristocrats situation. As has been stated, the Roman federation was a complex one. Both commons and aristocrats showed signs of sympathy, and not, for Hannibal, and even regional and domestic dissension broke out, as was the case in Bruttium among towns that hated each other (Croton and Petelia etc.). All this was a disrutption on the stability of the Roman sytem. It proved only with the failure of Hasdrubal in 207 B.C. that Rome was inexorably holding the cards. It really was a breathtaking crossroads in history. Thus, any idea from Hannibal apologists that he was promoting a democratic cause an a unilateral level is not true: the yoke on Italy from Rome was not a tyrannical one. But some displays of Romen cruelty helped Hannibal's cause, particularly with his capture of Tarentum.
He most certainly did adapt to new Roman tactics with imagination; one of the marvels of military history that a general could plan and win a Cannae, but then fight an enemy who was willing to attempt to starve him out. His actions of still beating Roman armies, which he compelled to fight due to his brilliant and stealthy marches, beared much fruit; by 209 B.C., the resolution of the 'ordinary' people was reaching a breaking point, including the Etrurian and Umbrian communities.
Rome won, for all in all, because of the sound decisions of the Senate, and the utilization of her tremendous manpower reserves - more importantly, where and when to exercise that manpower. But despite the amazing spirit of the Romans and those loyal to her, without the resources she would have perished. Hannibal tapped into this considerably, even if it meant that he didn't make use of those resources for himself. It has been mentioned about the 12 Latin colonies who would no longer, perhaps because they didn't have the capacity to do so, supply Rome with men and money. But that's not all: including the recalcitrant 12 colonies the inner ring around Rome, Livy tells us of the situation, in 209 B.C., how tense things were for Rome regarding her federation (to reiterate),
"The deportation of the soldiers to Sicily, most of whom belonged to the Latin and the allied nationalities, very nearly caused a great rising; so often do small occasions involve serious consequences. Meetings were held amongst the Latins and the allied communities in which they complained loudly that for ten years they had been drained by levies and war-taxes; every year they fought only to sustain a great defeat, those who were not killed in battle were carried off by sickness. A fellow-citizen who was enlisted by the Romans was more lost to them than one who had been made prisoner by the Carthaginians, for the latter was sent back to his home without ransom, the former was sent out of Italy into what was really exile rather than military service. There the men who had fought at Cannae had been for eight years wearing out their lives, and there they would die before the enemy, who had never been stronger than he was today, quitted Italian soil. If the old soldiers were not to return, and fresh ones were always being enlisted, there would soon be nobody left. They would be compelled therefore, before they reached the last stage of depopulation and famine, to refuse to Rome what the necessities of their situation would very soon make it impossible to grant. If the Romans saw that this was the unanimous determination of their allies, they would assuredly begin to think about making peace with Carthage. Otherwise Italy would never be free from war as long as Hannibal was alive. Such was the general tone of the meetings. There were at the time 30 (Latin) colonies belonging to Rome. 12 of these announced to the consuls through their representatives in Rome that they had no means from which to furnish either men or money. The colonies in question were Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Carseoli, Sora, Suessa, Cercei, Setia, Cales, Narnia and Interamna.
The consuls, startled by this unprecedented step, wanted to frighten them out of such a detestable course, and thought that they would succeed better by uncompromising sternness than by adopting gentle methods. "You colonists," they said, "have dared to address us, the consuls, in language which we cannot bring ourselves to repeat openly in the senate, for it is not simply a refusal of military obligations, but an open revolt against Rome. You must go back to your respective colonies at once, while your treason is still confined to words, and consult your people. You are not Capuans or Tarentines, but Romans, from Rome you sprang, from Rome you have been planted in colonies on land taken from the enemy, in order that you may augment her dominion. Whatever duties children owe to their parents, you owe to Rome, if indeed you feel a spark of affection for her or cherish any memories of your mother country. So you must begin your deliberations afresh, for what you are now so recklessly contemplating means the betrayal of the sovereignty of Rome and the surrender of victory into the hands of Hannibal." Such were the arguments which each of the consuls advanced at considerable length, but they produced no impression. The envoys said that there was no reply for them to take home, nor was there any other policy for their senate to consider since there was not a man left for conscription nor any money for his pay. As the consuls saw that their determination was unshaken they brought the matter before the Senate. Here such general consternation and alarm were felt that most of the senators declared that the empire was doomed, other colonies would take the same course, as would also the allies; all had agreed together to betray the City of Rome to Hannibal."
Thus, Rome may have fielded many soldiers, which Challenger was stating, but many of them were increasingly becoming disdained, and Hannibal was never contained; he marched where and when he wanted with dazzling celerity and stealth, zigzagging through them repeatedly. Actually, on two occasions, in 215 and 211 B.C., soldiers from Sicily were brought to the Italian theater. Hannibal's approach march to Tarentum, when the nobles there offered to deliver him the city due to his policy towards non-Romans throughout his arrival in Italy, was an awesome display of miltiary marching. Instead of completely trying to conceal his movements, which would have been practically impossible, he dispatched 2 parties of Numidian horsemen, one on either side of his approach to scour the countryside. Thus anyone who spotted them would either be taken prisoner or simply report a Numidian plundering raid.
The fact that some senators thought this was the case reveals how serious the situation had become. But cooler heads prevailed, and the Senate was reassured by the consuls, Fabius and Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, that the other 18 Latin colonies would remain loyal - Signia, Norba, Saticula, Fregellae, Luceria, Venusia, Brundisium, Hadria, Firmum, and Ariminum; the Tyrrhenian ports of Pontia, Paestum, and Cosa; and the inland colonies of Beneventum, Aesernia, Spoletium, Placentia, and Cremona. A simple glance of a map of Roman Italy at the time shows us that the 12 colonies who could no longer furnish Rome were, for the most part, in closer proximity to Rome. Thus they constantly bore the brunt of the strain of the war against Hannibal, and their soldiers probably were composed of the men who fell at the recent few disasters at Hannibal's battles. If this is true, Hannibal's strategy of destroying Roman armies to detach the allies certainly showed signs of viability.
Hannibal didn't waste his resources as much as we have been led to believe, in my opinion. Polybius tells us he had at the beginning 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and arrived in the Po Valley with just 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry - a loss of 76,000 men. The 26,000 figure comes from the inscription left by Hannibal himself on the Lacinian promontory, thus should be the accepted figure. Yes, I can see why Hannibal's critics support an idea that he grossly wasted his manpower. But I don't think that's the case. We are told that Hannibal, before crossing the Pyrennes, left one Hanno (of so many by that name) with 11,000 men to police the region in NE Spain; Hanno blew it by not avoiding battle with the initial Roman arrival with superior numbers; the nature of the terrain could have allowed him to wait for Hasdrubal to come up to help. Instead, the Roman presence was immediately established. Hannibal certainly did not tell Hanno to accept battle should the Romans arrive without help from firendly forces a little further to the south. Anyway, Polybius tells us that another 11,000 were sent home - that makes a total of 22,000 to subtract from the 102,000, a total of 80,000. We are told Hannibal crossed the Pyrennes with 59,000 men. Where did the 21,000 go? We read of no major clashes or desertions, though his subjugation of the region north of the Ebro certainly involved losses. After crossing the Rhone, he had 46,000 men. Where did 13,000 men disappear to, with just the marching happening. Mass desertions would have surely entered the accounts. When he reached Italy with the 26,000, another 20,000 is missing. However testing the march from the Rhone to the Po may have been, there were no major clashes or mass desertions, thus 20,000 is far too excessive. We can only loosely guess, but I think Hannibal left Cartegena with about 60,000-70,000 men, still an enormous figure. But a good 22,000 were left in Spain for its defence, in anticipation of the arrival of Roman forces. Thus the losses sustained by the risky march from Cartegena to the Po Valley really only amount to less than what he showed up with in northern Italy. But Hannibal couldn't control the performance of his subalterns in Spain, who were flat out beaten by the Scipios, at least initially. As for Syracuse, it was not an isolated campaign; the reason behind Syracuse's trials is a complicated one, but they joined Carthage because of Hannibal's situation in southern Italy after Cannae, as did Macedon. Hannibal picked his men well: the two agents he sent manipulated events in Syracuse to bring them into the war on Carthage's side, and after the initial Roman sea assualt failed, thanks largely to the engineering genius of Archimedes, Hannibal sent a letter to Carthage urging them to act. They did - 28,000 men were sent to the southern coast of Sicily, and they established themselves solidly, moving towards Syracuse under Himilco. For the 1st time in the war, Carthaginian naval activity became active. Unlike with in Spain and Greece, Rome won in Sicily, arguably, quite by accident: a horrible and unprecedented pestilince destroyed the Carthaginan army while camped in near the Anapus marshes, just south of Syracuse. The Romans didn't go unscathed, but they were on the higher ground and possessed a better understanding of military sanitation (that wasn't by accident). But after successfully supplying Syracuse, Bomilcar was off the SE tip of Sicily with a superior fleet of 130 ships against the Romans' 100 or so. A Carthaginian success here, quite reasonable to succeed, would have altered everything dramatically. Hannibal could have opened up a second front, now with secure communications with Carthage, which was certainly what he was hoping for, evidenced by his dispatches to Carthage, urging them to act aggressively. In one of the most pusillanimous acts in military history, Bomilcar, apparently not liking the winds, ordered 700 cargo ships back to Africa, and sailed to Tarentum. The resolve and determination of Rome can be credited elsewhere, but these events were bad luck for the Carthaginian cause. Moreover, Philip V secured access to the sea with his capture of Lissus from the Romans. But the Carthaginians didn't help with a single ship (they held Tarentum, remember).
It gets worse with regards to Sicily; Syracuse was still holding out in 211 B.C., and Cartahge sent 11,000 men (3,000 cavalry) to the southern coast under the aristocratic Hanno. Hannibal sent one of his finest officers, one Muttines, to take command along with Hanno. Muttines, a Libyphoenician, ran roughshed over Roman outposts, and defeated Marcellus in what Livy decribes as 'almost a regular battle' near the Himera River. But something happened that would never have happened in the hierarchy of Chinggis Khan; due to racist envy, Hanno replaced Muttines with his own son, and the expeditionary force under Muttines turned coat, opening thr gates of Agrigentum for the Romans. The 2 commanders had earlier given battle with the Romans while Muttines admonished them to wait while he dealt with a mutiny in his ranks, but they snubbed his stern and smart suggestion, and the result was disastrous. Syracuse soon finally fell, due in aprt to treachery from within, now the Carthaginian progress was thwarted. The war in Sicily was now over. All a cruel blow to Hannibal's plans. This miserable performance justified Hannibal's doubts from the onset he could place no faith in the Carthaginian navy, now a broken reed compared to its earlier days.
No Temujin; Heinrici broke through a month after the primary operations, which involved simply going around the Maginot Line. The Schlieffen Plan entailed a huge wheeling movement, with the Russian Front in mind; this was far short of that, with no Russian Fron yet to worry about.
I don't agree. Not this French army in this time, in 1798. The technology possessed byt he six-deep French squares, led by the likes of Louis Desaix, were never going to be broken by chargiing Mamelukes; the intense volley fire was far too shattering. But lessons and experiences have to be sustained.
I think we should to remember that all these great generals we discuss, regarding 'what they should have done' etc., had to make decisions without the luxury of time (in many cases) or hindsight (in every case). As Helmuth von Moltke stated,
"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled... to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted".
The 2nd War was not definitely inevitable from the beginning. The two great city-states simply wound up not respecting each other enough with the events in Sardinia and Spain. The Barcids certainly opposed the home governments policy of appeasement, but they were not independent viceroys who undertook things without approval. Hamilcar, Hasdrubal' the Handsome', and Hannibal were not like Wallenstein or John Hawkwood. Hannibal's colossal enterprise was carried out with full knowledge and approval from the Carthaginian Senate. As was stated by Al Jassas, Hannibal did not possess supreme power, though he carried almost the entire burden of Carthage's war effort on his shoulders. Alexander had Antipitar to secure the home base; Chinggis had superb subalterns who conquered without the need of his presence; Marlborugh was usually aided by Eugene; and some of Napoleon's marshals were superbly indispensible. Carthage did support fighting Rome, especially after Cannae, but of nearly 80,000 troops dispathed from Spain and Africa (not including Hannibal's initial invasion), for only 4,000 to reach Hannibal was inexcusable, particularly that they proved they could reach Italy ('command of the sea' does not carry the same value as in modern times). Mago Barca not only reached northern Italy by sea with 14,000 men in 206 B.C., but Carthage sent him an additional 6,800 by sea from Africa, along with some elephants and funds to hire more troops in northern Italy. In the closely fought battle with the Romans that shortly took place, he was seriously hurt. Much depended on the peoples of Spain and Italy; whomever had a significant success, they showed signs of wavering.
Thanks, Spartan  Edited by Spartan - 20-Aug-2007 at 10:28 |
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Challenger2
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Suspended Joined: 28-Apr-2007 Location: United Kingdom Online Status: Offline Posts: 508 |
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 07:42 |
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Interesting though this conversation is, its no longer relevant to this thread as Hannibal is "locked".
I've not had time to prepare a proper response, but I'm happy to continue this elsewhere. Praetor has posted a link to another thread which I'll look at and post there when I get time.
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Challenger2
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Suspended Joined: 28-Apr-2007 Location: United Kingdom Online Status: Offline Posts: 508 |
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 07:48 |
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Emperor Sigismund seems to have been his main opponent, and a non too clever one at that if he got repeatedly beaten by a bunch of wagons. I always thought the Crusades had finished by this time, or do you mean "crusade" in the sense of the modern "jihad", an over used term for an excuse to attack you ideoligical enemies? Weren't the Teutonics crushed by your countrymen at Grunwald before this time?
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rider
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Suspended Joined: 09-Aug-2004 Online Status: Offline Posts: 4664 |
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 13:53 |
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I'd suggest to continue. He has hinted that the TOP 5 can be changed if the proof is fine.
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Majkes
Chieftain
Imperial Ambassador Joined: 06-May-2006 Location: Poland Online Status: Offline Posts: 1144 |
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 16:13 |
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I don't know what is a diffrence betwen crusades and crusade. Only the first is plurar the second one singular. Crusades in Holy Land were over but not in Europe. There were Crusades against heretics in Europe and Pagans, against Lithuania. In the Battle of Tautenberg there were Crusaders on the side of Teuton Knights.
I agree Sigismund Luxemburg wasn't too clever but He was not the only Hussites oponent. They were fighting against all the neighbourgs except Poland: Hungary, Germans Duchies, Czechs that stayed faithful to Sigismund, Slask and against Catholic Church of course. Teutons were badly beaten in Grunwald ( Tautennberg ) in 1410 but they were still very powerfull. Their power was only broken during XIII Years War between Poland and Teuton Knights 1454-1466. I wouldn't underestimate wagons tactics. It was later used by Polish hetmans and Zaporozhian Cossacks to a very high effect.
Though I admit sometimes I have an image of dumb Crusaders keep repeating the same mistakes.
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Temujin
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Sirdar Bahadur Joined: 02-Aug-2004 Location: Eurasia Online Status: Offline Posts: 5221 |
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 17:34 |
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from Praetors responses i see there is nothing i can do to change a locked mindsetting so i cut it here as well.
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DSMyers1
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 17:56 |
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Yes, but so far, I haven't seen anything new about Hannibal... He still did exactly what I thought he did. Does anyone have comments about the lesser-known generals? It perpetually seems that the conversation centers on the best-known and most controversial generals. Edited by DSMyers1 - 23-Aug-2007 at 17:58 |
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Kamikaze 738
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Joined: 26-Mar-2007 Location: Hong Kong Online Status: Offline Posts: 463 |
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Posted: 23-Aug-2007 at 19:33 |
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I think Yuan Chonghaun should be added as he was quite an important general during the late Ming Dynasty... the only general that was capable of defeating the Manchus before they took over and established the Qing Dynasty. After he died, no one was able to stop the Manchus from storming into northern China.
I also think that Han Xin and Yue Fei should move abit up because I think that their accomplishments are greater than some generals that are above them. |
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Justinian
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King of Númenor Joined: 11-Nov-2005 Location: United States Online Status: Offline Posts: 1399 |
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Posted: 24-Aug-2007 at 21:46 |
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You are quite right, though I haven't read or come across a lot of opposing sources on his campaigns. If you know of any I would be appreciative if you could enlighten me. Edited by Justinian - 24-Aug-2007 at 21:47 |
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"War is a cowardly escape from the problems of peace."--Thomas Mann
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Al Jassas
Arch Duke 
Joined: 07-Aug-2007 Online Status: Offline Posts: 1810 |
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Posted: 25-Aug-2007 at 13:18 |
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Hello Justinian
In my post, I did not trivialize what Belisarius did, after reading some of what he did I think he deserves to be amongst the top 100 generals, what I am saying is that the numbers that have been mentioned are quite absurd and that Byzantines when outnumbered tend to enlarge their disadvantage and when the victorious even in a small campaigne they make a huge fuss about them, for example when they succeeded in taking some lands rom the Arabs in the campaignes of Justinian II they made their victory enourmous and even invented events that didn't happen.
Al-Jassas
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Zagros
Emperor 
Suspended Joined: 11-Aug-2004 Online Status: Offline Posts: 8792 |
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Posted: 25-Aug-2007 at 13:43 |
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Has Nader Khan (later Shah) been mentioned? He never once lost a battle in his wars against the Russians, Uzbeks, Ottomans, Afghans or Moghuls - the closest he came was when he had to abandon his seige of Baghdad. He was known as the Persian Napoleon.
Edited by Zagros - 25-Aug-2007 at 13:45 |
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Temujin
King
Sirdar Bahadur Joined: 02-Aug-2004 Location: Eurasia Online Status: Offline Posts: 5221 |
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Posted: 25-Aug-2007 at 15:01 |
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Nadir Shah was never known as Nadir Khan, before he became ruler of Iran he was known as Tahmasp Qoli Khan. also, he lost a battle against Osman Pasha in Iraq. and he never fought against the Russians. but i'm trying hard to get him higher. |
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Prophet
Immortal Guard 
Joined: 27-Aug-2007 Location: United States Online Status: Offline Posts: 0 |
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Posted: 30-Aug-2007 at 17:41 |
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Forrestl was the best cavalry officer in the American Civil war; way better than JEB. Jeb liked to ride around Federal armies to no great value when his recon capability was sorely needle by Gen Lee. Bed Forrest: "got there furstest with the mostest."(sp) he must be on any fairly considered list. P
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You have never fought a war unless you have fought the Germans. W.S. Churchill
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Prophet
Immortal Guard
Joined: 27-Aug-2007 Location: United States Online Status: Offline Posts: 0 |
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Posted: 30-Aug-2007 at 17:45 |
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Hannibal drove his army across the Alps into Italy in the Winter!! With elephants!! Are you seriously considering leaving him off the list!! P
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You have never fought a war unless you have fought the Germans. W.S. Churchill
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Peteratwar
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Joined: 17-Apr-2007 Online Status: Offline Posts: 591 |
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Posted: 31-Aug-2007 at 05:56 |
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I would think in deciding 'great' generals, the opposition they faced must be considered.
If their opponents are second-rate to poor then that is hardly the same as fighting agains a general who is your equal. Basically thinking Wellington vs Napoleon, Hannibal vs Scipio , Duke of Marlborough vs various French Generals.
What is the class of opponents they faced, similar, more numerous, better-armed and trained and so on
Still I suppose the thread allows people to put up their favourites!
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Temujin
King
Sirdar Bahadur Joined: 02-Aug-2004 Location: Eurasia Online Status: Offline Posts: 5221 |
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Posted: 31-Aug-2007 at 13:37 |
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Hitler drove on Moscow in winter. with tanks!  |
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Justinian
Chieftain
King of Númenor Joined: 11-Nov-2005 Location: United States Online Status: Offline Posts: 1399 |
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Posted: 02-Sep-2007 at 02:11 |
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I know, I didn't take it that way. I will agree with you about the tendency for inflation of opposing numbers, though that is something every culture and civilization in the world has been guilty of at one time or another. Though like I said I haven't come across opposing sources about belisarios' campaigns so I will just have to go with the byzantine point of view and use common sense and the expert opinions of historians. Edited by Justinian - 02-Sep-2007 at 02:16 |
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] In this objective he failed spectacularly. Yes, he destroyed a few armies. Yes, he shook the system of alliances Rome had set up for a while, but despite all his trickery and triumphs, he failed.|
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