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  Quote DSMyers1 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Topic: Top 100 Generals
    Posted: 16-Aug-2007 at 07:46
One point though--if I remember correctly, Carthage was larger than Rome at the time of the Punic Wars, something like 700,000 to 600,000.  Rome's great advantage was their populous allies--most of Carthage's allies were low-population desert tribes.  Thus, Hannibal's object was to break Rome's allies away, which he succeeded in doing in part.  However, Carthage never threw its weight behind him fully.  Rome was straining every resource to defeat Carthage; Carthage was not straining every resource in response.  It was the political situation in Carthage that defeated him, in spite of Hannibal's putting them in position to win.
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  Quote Praetor Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 16-Aug-2007 at 08:52
Originally posted by Challenger2


So how many of Romes allies actually defected? Capua, along with a few minor towns, a few Samnites [there's a surprise!] and Lucanians. After Nola, any wavering allies saw that Rome was far from beaten and decided to stick with the devil they knew.



Firstly I would like to remind you that quite a number of towns and communities defected, a particularly prominent ommission from your list is Syracuse. Not to mention all those communities who though not aiding Hannibal, refused to aid Rome. Though it is obvius that more defections and/or the taking of Rome would be required to end the war. Hannibal's strategy allowed him to achieve far more but with all oppurtunities at reinforcement going sour he did not quite have the numbers to either take Rome or defend more allies simultaneously.



Originally posted by Challenger2

Not really. In 215, one year after Cannae the Romans had about 140,000 men in the field. They concentrated about half that to contain Hannibal. They were, as you well know no longer interested in beating him, just containing him. Rome, as far as I'm aware, did not recall a single army or garrison outside Italy to aid against Hannibal; they were that sure of ultimate victory. By 213 Rome had about 200,000 men in the field, but the troops containing Hannibal remained roughly the same as in 215. Hannibal, although still dangerous, was a spent force as far as Rome was concerned.


I will respond to this later if you feel it is necesary, as It is difficult for me to find my sources on the matter and I really must for my own good retire to bed now.


Originally posted by Challenger2


Yes he did. But at least he had an empire he had created, to lose.  Napoleon achieved  virtually all his his ambitions, albeit for a short time, but Hannibal  failed to achieve any of his from the outset.


Napoleon only created an empire in the sense that he changed the form of government in the french empire to one led by an emperor. Furtheremore as Knights and Spartan have pointed out Hanibal led succesful campaigns in Spain prior to the 2nd Punic war....he certainly achieved the Barca family ambition of consolidating Carthaginian control over Iberia south of the Ebro river.

Originally posted by Challenger2


I've never said  Hannibal was a bad general, far from it. But in a list of 100 military "geniuses" you have to find some way of differentiating between them to be able to rank them.


I agree in principle but not with your methods of differientiating between them.

Originally posted by Temujin


no he was not the better. Napoleon deserves this list alone for his camapigns in 1805, 1806 and 1814 taken individually. and no, Napoleon did NOT lose in the end contrary to popular believe. France could remain in the borders before the war and lost only minimal amoutn of colonies (most major colonies were lost already in the 7 years war anyways). Napoleon won over 4 campaigns/wars, hannibal didn't even won one. Napoleon dominated his enmies for almost ten years, hannibal never forced his will on any enemy. in 1814 napoleons army was only seriously defeated at Arcis-sur-Aube btu was still fit enough to fight another battle. napoleon was tricked into followign Wintzigeraodes corps who pretended a retreat to draw him aways from paris while the Coalition forces which outnumbered him significantly bypassed him to capture Paris. there was no Zama were he was defeated on his own soil by his own tactics and Hannibal really showed no skill in Zama at all, it clearly betrays his limited scope.


Firstly I never said he did not deserve a spot on the list what i brought into question was judging him above Hannibal and placing Hannibal out of the top ten because in the end Carthage lost the war. This is a hypocritical argument when applied to Hannibal and not Napoleon (I do not think its a good argument anyway). Secondly Napoleon certainly lost in the end, he was exiled to a little island off the coast of Africa, his enemies the Bourbons returned to power and at the end of the war France had less territory then when he came to power even if only slightly that is still a loss. Furtheremore even if you count Hannibals whole time fighting the Romans in Italy as one campaign then he still won some campaigns in Spain anyway so your wrong about him never winning a campaign. Also though you say Napoleon had "no Zama" (many would see Waterloo as similar to Zama) you go on to explain how he lost anyway by bieng tricked....your not making a good case for Napoleon here. Finaly please explain how Hannibal showed no skill at Zama as it was the closest battle in Scipio's distinguished career, with Scipio only triumphing in the end because of his superiority in cavalry.

Originally posted by Temujin


last time i checked Hannibal held the office of "prime minsiter" of this senate, and even then, if the senate had not claled him back from Italy, what was he supposed to do if the Romans captured carthage and took aways his last opportunity of reinforcement and supply. it seems you live the same daydreams as hannibal back then. Hannibal is in every way like Pyrrhus, sucessfull in battle but eventually a strategical failure.


Hannibal held the office of "prime minister" or Sufet (its really a bad comparison) AFTER the second punic war and the position held no direct military authority unlike the position of Consul. unlike Pyrrhus he was only a general and not a king and facing a much stronger Rome which he came closer to destroying than Pyrrhus did anyway. Pyrrhus as king holds full responsibility for strategic failure's. Hannibal is subject to the Carthaginian senate and its changing stance toward him (which he could not counter while in Italy) and strategic incompetance, acting contrary to his advice.

Originally posted by Temujin


yeah obviously zama is the perfect example for this... and unlike Hannibal, Napoleon fought well over 60 battles, unlike Hannibal so its really tedious to hold against him that he lost more than one battle because he fought much more battles than Hannibal! and unliek Hannibal, Napoleon won at least one battle in Africa... Tongue


Zama is the only battle I can think of where Hannibal did not fight on his terms. Though I do believe he knew who he was facing but had little choice anyway. he gave Scipio quiet a challenge actually and I don't think he underestimated him. Napoloeon won battles against inferior enemy forces in Africa not led by anyone who demonstrated ability comparable to Scipio Africanus.

Regards, Praetor.
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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 16-Aug-2007 at 14:39
Originally posted by Al Jassas

Hello to all.

 

Hi Temujin. I think that you may have missed the point that I and other colleagues have been trying to prove in the past few post and that is Hannibal was betrayed by his government while Rome gave full support to their commanders even after the terrible losses aforementioned and the apparent failure of some of the counter tactics. And no, Hannibal could have never replenished his losses as fast as his foes could. At Trebia, the Romans lost 20 000 men from 36000, yet they managed to gather strength and muster up to 40 000 new troops at lake Trasimene only to lose 30 000 dead there and this was only 6 months after Trebia. Then the Romans mustered even a larger army than ever for Cannae, 16 legions or roughly 87 000 men, this was only one year after Lake Trasimene  and they lost from 50 000 to 70 000 men which means that in two years of campaigning, Hannibal killed from 100 000 to 120 000 men and yet Rome managed to gather more and more men while, as far as I know, Hannibal did not receive not even a single soldier to help him during the same period and that whenever he lost men the only source to replenish his losses was by recruiting from the locals or calling whatever the meager amount of troop he had back in Spain. While Rome was preparing and recruiting by the day and giving its revered citizenship to every body especially in south Italy Hannibal stood their without   enough resources nor enough soldiers to complete his mission and to make the matter worse he was denied help from his home country where politicians feared his popularity. On the other hand the Roman Senate gave full and unrelenting support to the Roman commanders including making Fabius a Dictator with all powers necessary to face Hannibal, and even when Hannibal attacked the properties of important senators during his campaign and pillaged their lands the senate kept its unity and whenever a successful commander was found (Scipio Africanus for example) they gave him all the attention he needed. Hannibal was betrayed by his own people since he never had at any one point more than 50 000 men under his command in Italy while the Romans had far more than that number and could have recruited even more. Napoleon on the other hand, and this applies to Genghis also, had both the political power as well as military prowess to continue with his vision in addition to a huge professional army and unlimited resources at home, France had 26 million people by 1800 if I am not mistaken. When ever he lost a lot of men (the Russian campaign in 1812 for example where he lost 400 000 men where de Tolly ironically used the same methods of Fabius) he quickly and some times forcibly mustered enough recruits to replenish his losses and thus we see that in Lutzen (1813) when he had 120000 men. Hannibal could not have taken on Rome directly because he did not have the logistics nor the sufficient resources to do such a thing especially if we know that Italy was much more than Rome. M. Cary in his wonderful book about Rome mentions that Italy had 30 million people by 100 AD and since population growth was slow during those times my guess is that Italy had about 10 million inhabitants c. 200 BC which meant that in the most desperate circumstances Rome could have up to 1 million men under arms more than the entire population of Carthage, for 50 000 men to do mayhem against 10 million is a feat with no parallel.

 

Thank You

 

Al-Jassas ibn Murrah




about Senate: the carthaginian senate obviously sanctioned his daredevil plan to invade Italy from Spain crossing the Alps, which alone should convivne everyoen that teh senate did not hinder him. the senate onyl recalled him from Italy after 15 years of no progress being made and Carthage itself being threatened. yes, Carthage itself being threatened. he had no other choice anyways, senate or not. what should he have done in italy anyways? his efforts of winning support of more Italic allies failed, there was no prospect of takign Rome herself.

about manpower: the Roman army was in nature completely different fromt eh Carthaginian, the Roman army was composed of citizens and of course her italic allies, while the army of Hannibal had almost no Punic soldiers with it. his army was a mercenary army composed of tribal armies, Numidinas, Iberians and Gauls. and this is actually his strogn point but none of the Hannibal fanclub even found it worth mentioning yet. to hold those mercenaries together and form them into a strong fightign force was the real achievement of Hannibal. and due to the nature of the Carthaginian army it is worhtless do discuss manpwoer differences. of course a roman citizen army had to be trained first while a tribal warrior was fit for combat sicne childhood, which is the advanatge of the mercenary army.

anyways, Hannibal had only one chance, cross the Alps [achieved], defeat any army bewteen him and Rome [achieved] and then capture Rome itself, which would have been shown the weakness of Rome and each and every italic ally would have fallen away from them, and Romes manpowerpool would have been drained. this he failed to achieve and there was no other way to show the italic allies who was the real power in the western mediterranean.


Napoleons Army was far from professional. to get the numbers needed to invade Russia in the first place he had to take every soldier from his sattelite states in Germany and even contingents from his forced allies Prussia and Austria. the armies that fought 1813-15 were for most part untrained green recruits directly conscripted with little military trainign at all. and even with this army he still achieved many spectacular victories. enemies of Napoleon had to do the same but in Napoleons time there were no longer mercenary armies around in europe.
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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 16-Aug-2007 at 15:06
Originally posted by Praetor


Firstly I never said he did not deserve a spot on the list what i brought into question was judging him above Hannibal and placing Hannibal out of the top ten because in the end Carthage lost the war. This is a hypocritical argument when applied to Hannibal and not Napoleon (I do not think its a good argument anyway). Secondly Napoleon certainly lost in the end, he was exiled to a little island off the coast of Africa, his enemies the Bourbons returned to power and at the end of the war France had less territory then when he came to power even if only slightly that is still a loss. Furtheremore even if you count Hannibals whole time fighting the Romans in Italy as one campaign then he still won some campaigns in Spain anyway so your wrong about him never winning a campaign. Also though you say Napoleon had "no Zama" (many would see Waterloo as similar to Zama) you go on to explain how he lost anyway by bieng tricked....your not making a good case for Napoleon here. Finaly please explain how Hannibal showed no skill at Zama as it was the closest battle in Scipio's distinguished career, with Scipio only triumphing in the end because of his superiority in cavalry.


France at the end of the napoleonic Wars that remained in its original borders, losign only insignificant colonies and was still a great power, Carthage after the war was nothing as shown in the 3. Punic war. i didn't said he had no Zama, he had his Zama in 1814 in the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube as is aid and i went on to say that even after this major defeat he was still able to win another battles and the coalition forces were still too afraid of fightign him directly and bypassed him to capture Paris. they did so by sendign a single Russian corps west fakign retreat over which napoleon fell with no mercy. this wa sthe bait to get enough time to reahc Paris and have Napoleon out of their way. i don't think Napoleon could have done anything to prevent it, given that the Czar only agreed to this dashign move after having intercepted a depeche containing informations as about he locations of Napoleon and his corps by Cossacks. Arcis-sur-Aube was actually a battle Napoleon hismelf entered, he wanted to fall upon an isolated corps of the Army of Bohemia but acciedntly ran into the whole army and barely escaped total annihilation. givent his, it is remarkable the Coalition overcommand was still afraid fighting him again after this.


Hannibal held the office of "prime minister" or Sufet (its really a bad comparison) AFTER the second punic war and the position held no direct military authority unlike the position of Consul. unlike Pyrrhus he was only a general and not a king and facing a much stronger Rome which he came closer to destroying than Pyrrhus did anyway. Pyrrhus as king holds full responsibility for strategic failure's. Hannibal is subject to the Carthaginian senate and its changing stance toward him (which he could not counter while in Italy) and strategic incompetance, acting contrary to his advice.


from what i know Rome forced Carthage to exile Hannibal and Hannibal in turn went to the services of Romes enemies in Anatolia (Pontus and/or Seleucids, can't remember).
as about Pyrrhus. Pyrhuss could have defeated Rome when he had the chance (given he had the necessary siege engines) but he descided against marching on Rome because he thought Rome was defeated and would pose no longer a thread and because it was recuqired for him to appear on Sicly and intervene there. Hannibal above all knew of Pyrrhus earlier failure and still amde the same mistake and secondly, unlike Pyrhhus he didn't left Italy for Sicily but wasted his time in southern Italy while the Romans took away Spain and threatened Carthage itself.


Zama is the only battle I can think of where Hannibal did not fight on his terms. Though I do believe he knew who he was facing but had little choice anyway. he gave Scipio quiet a challenge actually and I don't think he underestimated him. Napoloeon won battles against inferior enemy forces in Africa not led by anyone who demonstrated ability comparable to Scipio Africanus.

Regards, Praetor.


the battle of the pyramids was not an easy battle, Napoleon was much afraid of the Mameluk cavalry and orderd all his infantry to take up square formation and to let the Mameluks approach his own position, a tactic akin to that of Scipio at Zama when he faced Hannibals elephants. if Napoleon would have approached them in line he would have probably been swept away by the furious charges of the mameluk army. and what does the Mamluk comamnder has to do with anything? what about the Roman commanders of lake Trassimene and Cannae? they weren't exactly geniuses either, what does that tell you?


Edited by Temujin - 16-Aug-2007 at 15:10
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  Quote Al Jassas Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 16-Aug-2007 at 16:25

Hello to you all.

 

Well Temujin I have to disagree with what you said in your previous post about Hannibal been given orders to defeat the Roman army and then destroy Rome after that. While Hannibal did get the initial support from the 104 council the pro-Roman faction under Hanno who was called the Great by Roman historians for obvious reasons prevented reinforcements from coming to Hannibal in Italy after the success at Cannae and no, Hannibal did not destroy the Roman army, each time he wins they return with greater force even after Cannae while after each victory Hannibals army gets smaller and more tired, it has been in a foreign land for three years and yet no progress has been made, what made things even more difficult for Hannibal were the wise policies that the Romans did and the unity of their senate as apposed to the disunity among the Carthaginians. Hannibal made his gamble based on the theory that if he defeated Rome in a large military engagement and with the financial and military support from home he can break the tight allegiance to Rome amongst various Italic peoples and tribes especially among the Gauls in the north who in a previous age did just that when they defeated Rome at Allia and managed destroy the city. Yet the lessons of Yesteryears were learned and through fear and persuasion the kept tight their allies and those who saw Romes quick resurgence after defeat wanted more to be done so that they can take the gamble feeling safe from Romes retribution. One thing is certain however, Hannibals movements and the lack of reinforcements show that he had a plan that did not materialize because the lack of support, and since history is written by the victor there is little doubt why the Romans called Hanno the Great, he was instrumental in stopping Hannibal from gaining victory.

 

As for the mamelukes, the Battle of the Pyramids was between a medieval combination of undisciplined feudal lords which refused the use of firearms or cannons and a professional army with lots of experience and disciple. Al-Jabarti who lived in those years said that one of the most amazing things of the French army is that when the sergeant say March they all march in order and that he has power on all soldiers despite the difference in colors (different units wore different colors) obeyed an unthinkable thing for the Mamelukes.

 

Al-Jassas ibn Murrah  

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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 16-Aug-2007 at 17:05
i think you misunderstood me, i didn't said Hannibal was ordered to march to Rome and take it, but they didn't prevented it either. and it should have been its real goal, you cannot defeat an enemy without taking his capital. Carthage DID however sent in reinforcements to Hannibal, they were however destroyed in the battle of Metaurus. it seems the carthaginian senate gets bashed for no reason at all here. again, how xou expect Hannibal to finally defeat Rome if Carthage itself and all hsi posessions get conquered by the Romans? and lets assume Hannibal was not called back to defend Carthage, how in the world should he overcome the Romans at all?

i have the feeling Hannibal is more praised for what could have been and not for what really happened. in this case why not put Hitler on first spot...


about Mamlukes. European light cavalry was equipped not much differently than Mamelukes at this time and it could have happened that the Mamelukes would overrun French battaillions in line and put them to flight by sheer ferocity and fright of those ancient warriors.


Edited by Temujin - 16-Aug-2007 at 17:07
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  Quote Challenger2 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 02:27
Just a quick thought, Scipio "Africanus". Wasn't he known as Scipio the Younger?
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  Quote Knights Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 02:38
Scipio Aemilianus (the Roman who took Carthage in the third Punic War) was known as Scipio the Younger. Scipio's (the one who beat Hannibal at Zama) son adopted Scipio Amelianus.
Scipio Africanus, the victor at Zama, is sometimes referred to as Scipio the Elder. It's a bit confusing isn't it? Oh and Scipio's (Zama Scipio) father was also Publius Cornelius Scipio, just did not bear the agnomen of "Africanus".
If you want me to rephrase this or elaborate further, let me know.
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  Quote rider Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 02:50
Well, let's remain to Scipio Africanus Maior and everyone will know it is the one who beat Hannibal...
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  Quote Praetor Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 04:26
Originally posted by Temujin


France at the end of the napoleonic Wars that remained in its original borders, losign only insignificant colonies and was still a great power, Carthage after the war was nothing as shown in the 3. Punic war. i didn't said he had no Zama, he had his Zama in 1814 in the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube as is aid and i went on to say that even after this major defeat he was still able to win another battles and the coalition forces were still too afraid of fightign him directly and bypassed him to capture Paris. they did so by sendign a single Russian corps west fakign retreat over which napoleon fell with no mercy. this wa sthe bait to get enough time to reahc Paris and have Napoleon out of their way. i don't think Napoleon could have done anything to prevent it, given that the Czar only agreed to this dashign move after having intercepted a depeche containing informations as about he locations of Napoleon and his corps by Cossacks. Arcis-sur-Aube was actually a battle Napoleon hismelf entered, he wanted to fall upon an isolated corps of the Army of Bohemia but acciedntly ran into the whole army and barely escaped total annihilation. givent his, it is remarkable the Coalition overcommand was still afraid fighting him again after this.


France did lose territories and the allies could have taken far more territory from  France if they wished, it was not Napoleon's doing that France's losses at the end were so light. Furtheremore you claimed that " Napoleon did NOT lose in the end contrary to popular believe" and if he was forced from power and the Bourbons restored to it, ending the first French empire which he founded and restoring to power people he opposed as much as any foriegn monarch alied against him and France lost territory (it really doesn't matter how much) and he was exiled to an island, then I believe is is safe to say he LOST!!!! "there was no Zama were he was defeated on his own soil by his own tactics" I took this statement as a claim he had no Zama, though it is highly debatable whether Scipio defeated Hannibal with his own tactics.

Originally posted by Temujin


from what i know Rome forced Carthage to exile Hannibal and Hannibal in turn went to the services of Romes enemies in Anatolia (Pontus and/or Seleucids, can't remember).


It was the Seleucids at first, to my knowledge he never served Pontus and why is this relevent?

Originally posted by Temujin


as about Pyrrhus. Pyrhuss could have defeated Rome when he had the chance (given he had the necessary siege engines) but he descided against marching on Rome because he thought Rome was defeated and would pose no longer a thread and because it was recuqired for him to appear on Sicly and intervene there. Hannibal above all knew of Pyrrhus earlier failure and still amde the same mistake and secondly, unlike Pyrhhus he didn't left Italy for Sicily but wasted his time in southern Italy while the Romans took away Spain and threatened Carthage itself.


It was not required for Pyrrrhus to appear in sicily, he saw an oppurtunity to gain power there and he took it. Only problem was he hadn't finished dealing with Rome first and by the time he was booted out of sicily for tyranical behavior Rome had recoverd and learnt from its defeats which had themselves cost pyrrhus much. he lacked focus and left the job half finished to move on to another, what a waste of men he was clearly a fairly poor strategist.


Originally posted by Temujin


the battle of the pyramids was not an easy battle, Napoleon was much afraid of the Mameluk cavalry and orderd all his infantry to take up square formation and to let the Mameluks approach his own position, a tactic akin to that of Scipio at Zama when he faced Hannibals elephants. if Napoleon would have approached them in line he would have probably been swept away by the furious charges of the mameluk army. and what does the Mamluk comamnder has to do with anything? what about the Roman commanders of lake Trassimene and Cannae? they weren't exactly geniuses either, what does that tell you?


You made the remark that "and unliek Hannibal, Napoleon won at least one battle in Africa... Tongue" and I was responding to that and your criticism of Hannibal for losing the battle of Zama, when mentioning the inferiority of the Mamluk army compared with Napoleons own forces, though the cavalry may have been fierce they possesed nothing else even comparable to Napoleons forces. compared to Zama Napoleon's battles In Egypt were cake-walks. i do admit however that Varro and Titus Flaminius were no military geniuses.

Originally posted by Temujin


about Senate: the carthaginian senate obviously sanctioned his daredevil plan to invade Italy from Spain crossing the Alps, which alone should convivne everyoen that teh senate did not hinder him. the senate onyl recalled him from Italy after 15 years of no progress being made and Carthage itself being threatened. yes, Carthage itself being threatened. he had no other choice anyways, senate or not. what should he have done in italy anyways? his efforts of winning support of more Italic allies failed, there was no prospect of takign Rome herself.


The senate did originally support Hannibal but by the time he requested reinforcements, this had changed. With the party of Hanno the "Great", supplanting the supporters of the Barcas as the dominant power in Carthaginian politics. Hanno was a life long enemy of the Barcid clan and their policies. Largely due to Hanno's pettiness and inability to see the big picture, Hannibal as never reinforced on order of the Carthaginian senate to any significant extent.
Secondly, contrary to your opinion, I do not disagree with the decision reached by the Carthaginian Senate to recall Hannibal to defend Carthage from Scipio Africanus. But, I do disagree with the assertion that Hannibal had achieved no progress in 15 years in Italy. Though he failed to achieve enough progress to conclude the war, in removing many of Rome's key allies from the war. and stretching its resources to near breaking point. I would call that progress.

Originally posted by Temujin

anyways, Hannibal had only one chance, cross the Alps [achieved], defeat any army bewteen him and Rome [achieved] and then capture Rome itself, which would have been shown the weakness of Rome and each and every italic ally would have fallen away from them, and Romes manpowerpool would have been drained. this he failed to achieve and there was no other way to show the italic allies who was the real power in the western mediterranean.


Capturing Rome would not necesarily mean the war was over, though in my opinion it would have resulted in the end of the war when taking into account what damage Hannibal had already done.

Originally posted by Temujin

i think you misunderstood me, i didn't said Hannibal was ordered to march to Rome and take it, but they didn't prevented it either. and it should have been its real goal, you cannot defeat an enemy without taking his capital. Carthage DID however sent in reinforcements to Hannibal, they were however destroyed in the battle of Metaurus. it seems the carthaginian senate gets bashed for no reason at all here. again, how xou expect Hannibal to finally defeat Rome if Carthage itself and all hsi posessions get conquered by the Romans? and lets assume Hannibal was not called back to defend Carthage, how in the world should he overcome the Romans at all?


Carthage did not send significant reinforcements to Hannibal, the commander of the Carthaginian army at Metaurus was Hasdrubal Barca and acted on his own initiative with no orders from Carthage in order to link up with his brother and take Rome. On another note you both can win a war without taking a states capitol and taking a states capitol does not always mean you win the war, take the celtic sack of Rome or Napoleon's siezure of Moscow for example.

Originally posted by Temujin


i have the feeling Hannibal is more praised for what could have been and not for what really happened. in this case why not put Hitler on first spot...


Or for that matter NapoleonWink Seriusly though comparing Hitler to Hannibal is ridiculous as though Hitler was the autocratic head of his state and never commanded in the field. He had excellent generals but constantly interfered in military affairs with disastrous consequences (for the third reich), whereas Hannibal was a field commander who's requests for reinforcements were largely ignored by his government and let down in all other theaters by incapable commanders (though not all other Carthaginian commanders were inept, Carthage certainly did not possess as many high quality generals as Hitler had at his disposal).

Regards, Praetor.
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  Quote Challenger2 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 07:49

Can anyone tell me why Jan Ziska is on the list? He seems more fortunate in his opponent than being any form of military genius. Admittedly after just a quick overview of his achievements, all he seems to have done was send his wagons deep into enemy territory, find a suitable spot form a laager and goad the enemy to attack him.

I would have thought any of the generals ranked below him on the table would have taken one look, rolled around the floor laughing, got their troops to get the local peasantry out and dig a ditch around the laager, [banking up the spoil and perhaps garnishing it with an ad hoc abattis]. Missile troops and strong cavalry patrols would be used to keep Ziska from interfering, and so leave him with the stark choice of leaving and risking being caught on the move, or staying and being besieged and starved into submission. While digging the peasants would be relatively safe from the primitive artillery then in use, but then again there are plenty of peasants. Big%20smile

Yes, his tactics were innovative, but does that merit such a high position on the table?

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  Quote Knights Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 07:58
Concur. Zizka definitely did display very innovative tactics, which paid off for him. His foremost achievement was making full use of a lower quality army, and managing to stand up to a European superpower. While Zizka definitely possessed a keen military eye, I don't believe he is worthy of a place in the top ten.

EDIT: Excuse the pun ^


Edited by Knights - 17-Aug-2007 at 07:59
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  Quote Challenger2 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 13:16
I know, I said I'd finished debating  Hannibal but it's only polite to respond. Big%20smile

Originally posted by Praetor

Firstly I would like to remind you that quite a number of towns and communities defected, a particularly prominent ommission from your list is Syracuse. Not to mention all those communities who though not aiding Hannibal, refused to aid Rome. Though it is obvius that more defections and/or the taking of Rome would be required to end the war. Hannibal's strategy allowed him to achieve far more but with all oppurtunities at reinforcement going sour he did not quite have the numbers to either take Rome or defend more allies simultaneously.


Since you seem better informed about this war than I am, can you please name for me the communities which defected, and the communities that remained neutral and their importance to Rome? Syracuse wasnt really relevant to Hannibals Italian campaign as Sicily was effectively a separate theatre of operations, like Spain. Syracuse defected in 215 as a result of a palace coup dtat, this was hardly as a direct result of Cannae.

Hannibal managed to reinforce his army from within Italy in any event, though unfortunately for him not enough natives were willing to go against Rome. In any event, Hannibal recovered his manpower losses during his years spent in aimless wandering around the peninsula. His forces remained about the same quantitatively compared to the Romans as they were at Cannae [about 40,000 against 80,000], but it seems once committed to his strategy and when it failed, he lacked the flexibility and imagination to adapt to the new Roman tactics. In that respect, was Cannae a fluke and is Hannibal a paper tiger after all?

BTW, why did Hannibal's allies need defending?

Originally posted by Praetor


I will respond to this later if you feel it is necesary, as It is difficult for me to find my sources on the matter and I really must for my own good retire to bed now.


Up to you. Have a good rest and if you find my figures are way out, by all means let me know.Smile

Originally posted by Praetor


Napoleon only created an empire in the sense that he changed the form of government in the french empire to one led by an emperor.


Sorry youve lost me here. Can you elaborate please? Confused

Originally posted by Praetor


Furtheremore as Knights and Spartan have pointed out Hanibal led succesful campaigns in Spain prior to the 2nd Punic war....he certainly achieved the Barca family ambition of consolidating Carthaginian control over Iberia south of the Ebro river.

Isnt this clutching at straws? Wasnt the Barca family ambition to make Carthage supreme in the Mediterranean? Wasnt there some apocryphal tale of young Hannibal being made to swear an oath never to make peace with Rome? Now that I think about it Im sure I read somewhere that Hannibal was refused permission to go to Spain until he became C-in-C of the Carthaginian forces?

Originally posted by Praetor


I agree in principle but not with your methods of differientiating between them.

Okay, what do you suggest?



Edited by Challenger2 - 17-Aug-2007 at 13:20
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  Quote Challenger2 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 13:24
Originally posted by DSMyers1

One point though--if I remember correctly, Carthage was larger than Rome at the time of the Punic Wars, something like 700,000 to 600,000.  Rome's great advantage was their populous allies--most of Carthage's allies were low-population desert tribes.  Thus, Hannibal's object was to break Rome's allies away, which he succeeded in doing in part.  However, Carthage never threw its weight behind him fully.  Rome was straining every resource to defeat Carthage; Carthage was not straining every resource in response.  It was the political situation in Carthage that defeated him, in spite of Hannibal's putting them in position to win.


Population didn't matter so much to Carthage, she could hire mercenaries by the boatload. Rome was based on a militia citizen force at this time, yet remarkably managed to rebuild her armies time and again. Scary! Shocked
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  Quote Challenger2 Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 13:29
Originally posted by rider

Well, let's remain to Scipio Africanus Maior and everyone will know it is the one who beat Hannibal...


yet another thought, why is he so low down on the list? He beat Hannibal and basically conquered Spain for the Romans. If Hannibal rates top 5, Scipio should be so far behind.
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  Quote Spartan Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 17-Aug-2007 at 15:39

Great discussion everybody.

I'd like to add plenty, but, seeing these comparisons with Napoleon, and my desire to disagree with the assessment that because Hannibal places him in a sweeping generalization that because a general lost, it automatically means he is less able than one who wins. We should scrutinize the campaigns. Here at Zama, I feel both great generals were on top of their game, unlike at Waterloo.  
 
The works of Polybius and Livy, and other ancient writers, are available online:
 
 
This is a possible account of what happened at Zama.
 
I feel we should always keep in mind that much of antiquity, with the great Battle of Zama not exlusive form that proclamation, presents ground for modern speculation. Polybius was a fine historian who wanted to establish the truth of events, but though we might expect him to have been hostile to the Romans for causing him to be exiled from his own country, he did work and live under the patronage of the Scipionic circle. This meant he was in a very favorable situation to understand how the Roman political and military systems worked. He could be critical of Roman actions, such as their seizure of Sardinia in the wake of Carthage's 'Mercenary War', but his absorbing interest as to why Rome came to be the dominant power in his world certainly led him to see things through Roman eyes.
 
Scipio was a brilliant general, evidenced here at Zama by the fact he knew he had the better army (particularly the cavalry arm), and by not making any major mistakes, Hannibal could not exploit anything. His countering of the elephants was masterly, but the elephant drivers were possibly trained to kill them if they became unmanageable. Killing an out-of-control elephant with a hammer and spike was no child's play, but it did not take years for men to learn this. Only Livy writes of this Carthaginian tactic, and only with regards to Hasdrubal Barca. But that doesn't mean Hannibal didn't undertake this countering practice. It would make sense that he did.
 
However, I disagree with anyone who claims Hannibal was a spent force at Zama let alone in Italy. He was now 45-47 years old, and there is no reason to think that he wasn't suffering exhaustion. The stress factor certainly was every bit as prevalent in ancient times. His actions after Zama do not illustrate a man not having still an iron will, resilient determination, and a sound mind. To use the raw elephants in such numbers as a shock force was, in my opinion, the most prudent decision. Please try to remember that Hannibal certainly knew all about the strengths and liabilities of these pachydrms - certainly every bit as much as Scipio did. He probably hoped they would do their stuff, but he could easily have known they would do exactly what they did do - swerve out to the flanks and disrupt things, which would aid his possible plan of deception of sacrificing his inferior cavalry to lure the better Roman/Numidian contingent away from the battlefield. He had done such things before with feigned withdrawals etc. (the ager Falernus, the Rhone, Tarentum). Again, there is nothing to indicate that the 45-47 year old Hannibal had lost any of his touch.
 
For the most part, Livy and Appian take a back seat to Polybius. We don't know exactly the relative strengths of the two armies, but many feel that Hannibal did not outnumber Scipio as much as the ancients claimed. Remember, this was a frontal engagement devoid of flank attacks or oblique lines etc., and though Scipio's army was more experienced (except Hannibal's 3rd line) and of higher quality, this wasn't Alexander against the motley levies of Asia, Caesar's X or XIII Legion against the unweildy Gauls, or even Belisarius' famed bucellarii against city mobs and Vandals. There is no way Scipio would have been hanging on in the final stages of the battle if his infantry had been outnumbered significantly, such as 50,000 vs. 23,000 or so as Appian claims. It is also improbable that 4,000 Macedonians under one Sopater were part of Hannibal's 2nd line, as Livy would have us believe. Polybius, a Hellene himself, would have mentioned that. 
 
Basically the armies were as follows:
 
Scipio: approx. 30,000 infantry, and 5,500-6,100 cavalry.
 
Hannibal: approx. 40,000 infantry, 80 elephants, and 3-4,000 cavalry.
 
I'll be glad to break this all down if one asks, and where I formed my conclusions. Both great generals took risks with their movements before the battle, Scipio to avoid fighting while without Masinissa (he endangered his communications and risked a flank attack), and Hannibal to bring on the battle in an attempt to interpose between Scipio and Masinissa (he wasn't fully prepared). By terrific maneuvering by Scipio (he ransacked the interior, forced Hannibal out earlier than Hannibal wanted, and closed the gap between he and Massinissa). But fortune was with Scipio when Masinissa arrived with 10,000 men before Hannibal could intercept either one of them; neither knew exactly where he was.   
 
Polybius' account of the Battle of Zama is in Book 15.12-15 of The Histories. Read it if you would like.
 
Did you do that? OK. Breakdown time Wink
 
We have to assign the motives of Hannibal and Scipio where Polybius does not.
 
Hannibal was weaker in cavalry and numerically stronger in infantry. Thus he surely would aim at a decision by his infantry (for the first time). His cavalry would have little hope of success, so he would somehow want to nullify the superiority of the Roman/Numidian cavalry while his infantry won the day. Hannibal's use of three independent lines compensated to a degree for the lack of time in which to blend the varied elements into a homogenous command structure. 
 
Scipio would need to handle the elephants first (after the preliminary skirmishing). He probably learned from Regulus' failure in 255 B.C., in which the elephants were attempted to be absorbed by infantry mass from doubling the intervals. The part that somewhat worked for Regulus, though probably inadvertantly, at Tunes, was by abandoning the checkerboard formation, lanes were created, which created a line of least resistence for the elephants to charge down. But he was far outmatched in cavalry that day 53 years earlier. Scipio achieved the nullification of the elephant charge by creating lanes and deafening noise from bugles and trumpets (and probably exuding screams from his troops). Now he would doubtless attempt, in some form or another, his tactics which had worked brilliantly before, with increased efficiency, at Baecula, Ilipa, and the Great Plains. Overall, Scipio would attempt to expose Hannibal's wings with his superior cavalry squadrons, hold the enemy's first line, and send out his principes and triarii to outflank Hannibal.
 
But Hannibal adopted a Roman-style triple-line, and placed his 3rd and largest line (about 15,000 men) of his veternas about 200 yards behind the 2nd (perhaps 100 yards seperated the first two lines). When his first two lines advanced, he evidently ordered his third to stand fast. This could be the very first 'true reserve' in the history of warfare, and this disposition immediately thwarted Scipio from any outflanking maneuver; Hannibal could also use his third line offensively as the battle progressed, hopefully for a coup de grace.
 
I think Hannibal ordered his cavalry units to give ground in order to draw their counterparts off the field. It explains the ease with which Scipio won this part of the battle, and why they returned at a late stage. Adrian Goldsworthy, one of the finest scholars on Roman history disagrees, but the likes of H. H. Scullard, J. Kromayer, and G. Veith all think so. J.F. Lazenby thinks it is likely. However, Hannibal was taking a risk by doing so, because it still involved their defeat, exposed his flanks, and the Roman/Numidian cavalry could return before he had finished off Scipio's smaller body of infantry. But he had to do something, and I don't think if they had held their ground they would have lasted long. The fact it was pretty close later shows Hannibal made a viable decision. Furthermore, Scipio had superior cavalry and proved his adeptness with 'boomerang' style tactics before. Hannibal was a student of war, and a master of simple and double bluff. He knew his history, particularly that of the Hellenistic kingdoms (he had Greek tutors). He knew what happened to Antigonus when his son, Demetrius Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at the great battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. Did Scipio order his cavalry to merely ride out and ride back in the manner they did? Why didn't Scipio try a flank/enveloping maneuver, as Hannibal had done at Cannae, with only his cavalry on the left? He was certainly capable, and with superior material at his disposal. True, cavalry was notoriously difficult to control, but let me offer Professor H. H. Scullard's credible statement from his terrific Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician pg. 150,
 
"...Since it would take longer to convert a nominal into an actual flight than to drive a defeated enemy off the field, and since in fact the Roman cavalry only returned in the nick of time, it seems more probable that the Carthaginians deliberatley drew them away.
 
After getting rid of the Roman cavalry, though with little hope that his own could rally against them, Hannibal would throw all his weight against Scipio's numerically inferior enemy. The elephant charge, with which he had hoped to confuse his foe, miscarried somewhat, partly through Scipio's foresight in leaving gaps in his line for the animals to run through, partly because they were always of rather doubtful quality, and here fell afoul of the Carthaginian cavalry. However, they cannot have done great harm to their own side, since their drivers had the means of killing them if they got out of hand..."
 
I bolded the last sentence because if this was the case (we'll never know for sure), it means the 'scattered cavalry' of Hannibal were quickly vanquished because they were in a running fight. I need to be careful - I have no right to theorize to the point of appending something not even mentioned, even slightly, as a remote possibility, by our ancient sources. I would like to add to Scullard's theory; Polybius only mentions it was Hannibal's left flank that was disrupted by elephants sent out of control. On the right flank he tells us that the scattered elephants,
 
"...at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to a headlong flight..." 
 
How did Gaius Laelius so easily send the Carthaginian cavaly, though green but not outnumbered on this side (assuming Masinissa's 4,000-strong were not interdispersed with the Romans), into such quick flight? The flight seemed immediate. The answer is they were probably ordered to give ground. Can we believe that any mass 'confusion' caused by maybe 25 elephants (on each flank) sent thousands of horsemen into disorder, and the horsemen who 'exploited the 'confusion' so easily rode in and sent them into flight, without being impeded by the scattered elephants themselves? Did the elephants disrupt only Hannibal's men, and then get out of the way of Massinissa and Laelius, allowing them to charge in with stout authority? I seriously doubt it.
 
B.H. Liddell Hart says on pg. 179 of his renowned (but extremely tendentious) Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon,
 
"...Both Hannibal's flanks were thus stripped bare. The decisive maneuver of Cannae was repeated, but reversed..."
 
No, Sir Basil, with all due respect, the decisive maneuver at Cannae was Hannibal having his infantry wings, held back in possibly the 1st display of offensive reserves, wheel inwards to attack the Roman flanks, once his crescent formation of Gauls and Spaniards had sucked the huge Roman infantry body in towards them. By achieving this, the Roman infantry's forward pressure funnelled itself into a colossal trap. Hannibal's heavy cavalry turned a Roman defeat into an annihilation. It was entirely different here at Zama, and Scipio's cavalry were off the battlefield, too. Hannibal's placement of his third line prevented any similar maneuverings from Scipio's legions here at Zama as Hannibal had achieved at Cannae. This battle was also entirely different from Cannae with the cavalry, as Scipio did not attempt any flank maneuvers. Perhaps he took the very open terrain into account, but the fact he didn't attempt outflanking maneuvers with better cavalry squadrons lends even more credibility to the possibility that Hannibal's cavalry was luring them away in a rearguard action. Although he countered the elephant charge, Scipio was not in a substantially favorable position whatsoever at this point.
 
Back to the possible intentions of the two generals, Hannibal prevented any outflanking by Scipio's infantry because of his 3rd line being held back. But this disposition of Hannibal's wasn't entirely to prevent encirclement from Scipio. The third line was ready to act offensively if and when a suitable moment presented itself. If Scipio did not realize this in time and was too imbroiled in the fighting to make any changes, then his attack would be against the first two of Hannibal's lines, and when that was spent, Hannibal could attack with his fresh veterans, hopefully delivering a decisive blow as his cavalry was holding off Masinissa and Laelius in their simulated flight, slowly turning into their purposed defeat (a sacrifice).
 
Alternativley, if Scipio did realize Hannibal's trap of making him fight towards the third line (thus blunting his energy and weapons) in time and forced to forget about any outflanking possibility, Hannibal was in no worse position, because Scipio would rely on the traditional Roman method of three supporting lines whose weight would fall on Hannibal's first two lines, after which the weary legionnaires would have to advance against Hannibal's intact third line.
 
In my opinion, with the exception of the elephants, Hannibal was in the slightly better position amid the infantry clash. His first line, the remnants of Mago's army, fought bravely against the hastati. However, according to Polybius, they received no support from the 2nd line, who 'acted like cowards'. It is likely that Polybius is wrong, and the 2nd line didn't support the first not from cowardice, but because they were ordered not to at this point. Hannibal was attempting to keep his three lines as distinct as possible, with each line being thrown in separately. It was a sound plan, but such a deployment required good discipline, which wasn't extant here. The mercenaries of the first line turned against the second line. If Polybius' account of the fierce struggle between the first two of Hannibal's lines is taken at face value, this incident may have been, as Georg Veith suggests, a stroke of fortune that saved Scipio and wrecked Hannibal's plan. By this time, if not a little sooner, Scipio certainly knew that he couldn't outflank Hannibal in face of the Carthaginian's well-disposed 3rd line. Thus he was challenged by the task of fighting a purely frontal engagement, in which Hannibal's chances were greater. Hannibal's first two lines, in cooperation, would have forced Scipio to use all his ranks. But they turned on each other, which Scipio prudently exploited by not commiting the bulk of his principes and none of his triarii, and then breaking off the battle to reorganize. Presumably, many of the remnants of Hannibal's men, perhaps just a handful, of his first two lines had fled to his wings and were regrouped and implemented into the third line.
 
Again, Hannibal was hoping that as many Romans as possible became involved at this juncture with his first two lines, so that he could use his third line to deliver a devastating blow before Scipio's cavalry returned.
 
A couple of difficulties about Polybius' account come up. What happened after the clash between the mercenaries (first line) and the Carthaginian militia (second line)? Polybius says,
 
"...the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati..."
 
Therefore, only Hannibal's veterans were left, save for a 'smaller' number of Carthaginians? This is not possible, because if Hannibal's veterans stood alone and uncommited, he would not have needed time to reorganize, as his accepting (or permitting?) of the pause (the regrouping) suggests. Moreover, Polybius' earlier statement is now contradicted by his later claim that,
 
"...As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful..."
 
This could not have been so if nearly all the first two lines of Hannibal's had been scattered. Oh well, call me a nitpicker. Maybe Polybius meant the mercenaries alone, or simply exaggerated 'the greater part' of the Carthaginians. What is probable is that the hastati, and but a small portion of the principes, did not completely defeat Hannibal's first two lines, numbering some 24,000 men.
 
The role played by Scipio's 2nd line, the principes, is a little cloudy. If by stating,
 
"...the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist...,
 
...Polybius means that the principes aided the hastati in the normal manner, this would mean that both lines moved forward, which would explain the recovery of the hastati and the subsequent flight of Hannibal's first two lines. But Polybius later tells us,
 
"... after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy..."
 
Mmmmm. Maybe we can asssume Polybius meant the principes kept close to the hastati during the initial advance, then halted and the hastati went on alone.  The hastati seemed to have got into a precarious position in pursuing the broken lines of Hannibal's poorer troops, which Hannibal was forcing out to the flanks of his 3rd line. They were dangerously exposed upon coming face to face with Hannibal and his veterans. Scipio had to relieve them quickly! They didn't follow the scattered mercenaries and Carthagininas because we later find them in the center when Scipio extended his entire body of infantry into a single line. They were recalled and Scipio reorganized his line. This is where Roman cohesion and discipline came into play. But Hannibal showed sound judgment by not immediately attacking the isolated hastati (perhaps supplemented by some of the principes); this would have entailed committing his last troops into the fight while Scipio had nearly two lines intact, which could now outflank him. Thus he was ready for a pause to reorganize too. The battlefield impeded both armies as it was encumbered with bodies and slippery with blood. An advance had to be carried out carefully.
 
Scipio now lengthened his line by bringing up his rear ranks on the flanks of the hastati, with the gaps between the maniples closed up. There was now no need for Scipio to keep any intervals between his maniples, as the final blow with Hannibal's third line should be as concentrated as possible, thus no seperate engagements were necessary. Depth was now of lesser value than maximizing his missile power upon Hannibal's last line. This was superb generalship, as Scipio was clearly making allowances for his (presumably) returning cavalry. He needed to be quick because Hannibal, solidifying his deeper line of veterans and remnants of the first two lines, would have a slight advantage in a prolonged infantry clash at this point, particularly in the center, where his 'Old Guard' (Polybius mentions they lowered their spears to prevent any mingling of the first two lines' fugitives within his front, thus they were indeed his African spearmen, who had been with him since the beginning) were opposite the hastati. But Scipio wasn't fighting this last phase to win as quickly as possible, as Hannibal surely was; he was fighting for containment, hoping his cavalry squadrons were coming back. This was a fair presumption, but they weren't back yet! The Carthaginian horse (commander unkown) and Numidians under Tychaeus (Hannibal's ally) seemed to be (somewhat) achieving some success at keeping the superior enemy horses away from the infantry action. Remember, if it wasn't the case, and we'll never know for sure, that Hannibal did not sacrifice his horses to lure Scipio's cavalry units away, then this was not very marked leadership on the part of Scipio, Gaius Laelius, and Masinissa. It would have been similar to Prince Rupert's pursuit at Naseby 1,443 years later, who chased the Parliamentarian dragoons too far ('hell bent for leather'), as his belated return was ineffective to aid the Royalists' cause against the victorious Parliamentarians.
 
The infantry clash commenced, with the two great generals at the helm of two great units in a front-to-front slugfest. We can never know for sure who had the 'upper hand' here, but Hannibal's line of his veterans was deeper, so via deductive logic, Scipio would have been broken up. But if he wasn't waiting for the returning cavalry, his dispositions would have been different. He must have smiled from ear to ear when the approaching sound of hoofs and rising dust of the desert was the thundering return of Gaius Laelius and Masinissa. They took Hannibal's veterans in the rear, and rolled them up. It is very ironic that many of the Cannae legions, whom Scipio levied in Sicily some four years earlier, were involved in on of Rome's greatest victory.
 
Polybius clearly identified Hannibal's handicap at Zama and does give him some praise when he wrote in Book 15.16,
 
"...But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed...".
 
However, a couple of sentences later he writes,
 
"...For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, 'A brave man meets another braver yet', as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal..."
 
Scipio braver than Hannibal? Mmmm. This is where Polybius' bias may slip a bit.
 
Again, Scipio displayed brilliant generalship by not trying to do too much, and defending his advantage. Letting things take care of themselves is often the smart thing to do. Scipio was trying to win this battle, not outgeneral Hannibal, in terms of individual wizardry etc. Hannibal tried to wear Scipio down, but Scipio was able to engage Hannibal's veterans with about 3/5 of his infantry hitherto uncommited. But like with many battles of our own civil war (I am an American), or maybe Hastings, Arsuf, Waterloo, and El Alamein, the better general did not necessarily win, in my opinion. I am bias though; I think Hannibal was a remarkable leader, and his plight against such an unyielding foe for nearly two decades, in which he received only grudging support from home (he wasn't banking on any outside support soon after Cannae), was exemplary. Hart is incorrect, in my opinion, with his coment on Pg. 118 of Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon,
 
"...For a venture of such magnitude, he was worse supported by the Senate than even Hannibal by Carthage..."
 
The venture Hart is referring to is Scipio's African expedition, and though he couldn't levy from Italy, besides his 7,000 volunteers, never in Rome's history was a general issued blank check, and Sicily, his base of supply etc. and a duck's walk from where he would be campaigning, was never hampered with, in comparison to Hannibal's great venture into Italy. Hannibal took a gamble, and it didn't work, but Hart and others seem to intimate that Hannibal, because he undertook the challenge of building up and defending a broad alliance system, and practically co-ordinated the entire Carthaginian war effort, is somehow guilty of strategic blunders due to the failures of the Carthaginian army and navy in other theaters, and failures to reinforce him from Spain and Africa. Rome indeed had 'command of the sea', but the that hardly carried the advantage it did in modern times. As far as we know, Hannibal never had a Quintus Caecilius Metellus, a fine public speaker in favor of Scipio who prevailed for Scipio's cause against the likes of Fabius and Cato, positioned in the Carthaginian senate to fight for his cause.
 
"Hannibal was the son of Hamilcar, and a native of Carthage. If it be true, as no one doubts, that the Roman people excelled all other nations in warlike merit, it is not to be disputed that Hannibal surpassed other commanders in ability as much as the Romans surpassed all other people in valour; for as often as he engaged with the Romans in Italy, he always came off with the advantage; and, had not his efforts been paralyzed by the envy of his countrymen at home, he would appear to have been capable of getting the mastery over the Romans. The jealous opposition of many prevailed against the ability of one. He, however, so cherished in his mind the hatred which his father had borne the Romans, and which was left him, as it were, by bequest, that he laid down his life before he would abate it; for even when he was exiled from his country, and stood in need of support from others, he never ceased in thought to make war with the Romans".
 
-Cornelius Nepos
 
Nepos would be more accurate if he had stated that the envy at home was by some of his countrymen; after Cannae, Hanno the Great was overruled, and troops were to be sent to Italy - about 27,000 between Hannibal and Sardinia. But because of the failure of the generals in Spain, troops were diverted there instead at the last moment. 
 
Thanks, Spartan Smile


Edited by Spartan - 17-Aug-2007 at 16:22
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  Quote Praetor Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 18-Aug-2007 at 07:29

Originally posted by Challenger2

I know, I said I'd finished debating  Hannibal but it's only polite to respond. Big%20smile


I concur Big%20smile.

Originally posted by Challenger2


Since you seem better informed about this war than I am, can you please name for me the communities which defected, and the communities that remained neutral and their importance to Rome? Syracuse wasnt really relevant to Hannibals Italian campaign as Sicily was effectively a separate theatre of operations, like Spain. Syracuse defected in 215 as a result of a palace coup dtat, this was hardly as a direct result of Cannae.


The defection of Syracuse was important as it further stretched Roman manpower and occupied one of Rome's finest generals for some time (Marcellus). Furtheremore the legitimate succesor to Hiero II of Syracuse sought an alliance with Hannibal before his assasination and the supporters of Carthage won the subsequent power struggle in Syracuse, do you think this would have happened if not for Hannibals victories making it appear to the Syracusans that the Romans were losing the war? The mainland Italian theater was not the only important theater in the war and indeed was affected by what occured in other theaters for example Roman victory at the battle of Dertosa In Spain resulted in the rienforcements initially meant for Hannibal after his victory at Cannae were sent to Spain instead.

Originally posted by Challenger2

Hannibal managed to reinforce his army from within Italy in any event, though unfortunately for him not enough natives were willing to go against Rome. In any event, Hannibal recovered his manpower losses during his years spent in aimless wandering around the peninsula. His forces remained about the same quantitatively compared to the Romans as they were at Cannae [about 40,000 against 80,000], but it seems once committed to his strategy and when it failed, he lacked the flexibility and imagination to adapt to the new Roman tactics. In that respect, was Cannae a fluke and is Hannibal a paper tiger after all?


the quality of native volounteers was not up to scratch with the forces he started with so whereas he was often able to replenish the numbers it would take a lot longer for these "green" troops to be of the same quality of the vererans he started with. Furtheremore I do believe his "wanderings" had aims, to maintain his allies and when possible gain new ones or defeat the Romans in the field, the last of which he managed to achieve a number of times after Cannae. He had mixed success at maintaining and gaining new allies however but that was largely due to a lack of manpower as well as a readoption of what has come to be called the "Fabian strategy". However I would very much like to hear your suggestions about what Hannibal should have done in these circumstances? Finaly Cannae was no fluke as evidenced by the Tagus, Trebia, Trasimene, Herdonia (1st and second) and silarus river.

Originally posted by Challenger2

BTW, why did Hannibal's allies need defending?


Because for the most part they were unable to defend themselves from Roman armies and thier loyalty was often shaky.

Originally posted by Challenger2

Up to you. Have a good rest and if you find my figures are way out, by all means let me know.Smile


I am sorry I do not presently have the time to contest your figures and it is unlikely I will for quite some time.

Originally posted by Praetor


Napoleon only created an empire in the sense that he changed the form of government in the french empire to one led by an emperor.


Originally posted by Challenger2

Sorry youve lost me here. Can you elaborate please? Confused


CertainlySmile you claimed that "at least he had an empire he had created, to lose. " I found this argument rather flawed as though the empire of Carthage was not created by Hannibal, the empire of France was not created by Napoleon either, though he temporarily expanded its territories. He only made France into an empire in the sense that he changed the form of government to one headed by an emperor. Though it is true he founded a few short lived pupet states I would hardly call any of these empires.

Originally posted by Challenger2


Isnt this clutching at straws? Wasnt the Barca family ambition to make Carthage supreme in the Mediterranean? Wasnt there some apocryphal tale of young Hannibal being made to swear an oath never to make peace with Rome? Now that I think about it Im sure I read somewhere that Hannibal was refused permission to go to Spain until he became C-in-C of the Carthaginian forces?


The story you mention could well be just that: apocryphal. Even so is it not possible for a general to have more than one aim in his/her lifetime? The Barcas and thier supporters aimed to set up Spain as a new powerbase for Carthage (and perhaps particularly for the Barcas themselves) to compensate them for losses to Rome in the first Punic war. Furtheremore Hannibal was in Spain while his father (Hamilcar Barca) was still the commander-in-chief of carthaginian forces there and after his fathers death Hasdrubal "the fair" took command with Hannibal serving as nominal second in command and admiral until his elevation to the supreme command in Spain upon Hasdrubal's death.

Originally posted by Challenger2

Okay, what do you suggest?


"I feel obliged to reiterate that despite all of that, Hannibal was a failure and so does not deserve his spot in the top 5." I disagree with the "he lost in the end therefore he was a bad general logic" (or not worthy of a certain rank on the list as in your case), I brang up Napoleons failure only to demonstrate hypocrisy within this argument not because I agree with it. For me the devil is in the detail, the odds a general faced should always be considered and why and how that general won and lost in battles campaigns and wars to determine to what degree success or failure is due to the generals ability or lack-there-of. Theres more to it of course. but you get the general idea.

Regards, Praetor.
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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 18-Aug-2007 at 18:06
Originally posted by Praetor


France did lose territories and the allies could have taken far more territory from  France if they wished, it was not Napoleon's doing that France's losses at the end were so light. Furtheremore you claimed that " Napoleon did NOT lose in the end contrary to popular believe" and if he was forced from power and the Bourbons restored to it, ending the first French empire which he founded and restoring to power people he opposed as much as any foriegn monarch alied against him and France lost territory (it really doesn't matter how much) and he was exiled to an island, then I believe is is safe to say he LOST!!!! "there was no Zama were he was defeated on his own soil by his own tactics" I took this statement as a claim he had no Zama, though it is highly debatable whether Scipio defeated Hannibal with his own tactics.


no the allies could not have taken any more territory. this is not like the classical age where you conquer and annex. Napoleon soundly defeated Austria two times and Prussia once, even Spain and Portugal were for short time totally under French control. and all of italy and central europe were under his control. he could have kept it this way if he had not invaded Russia so he had gambled for something and lost in the end. he annexed big parts of Prussia and Austria individually but both countries combined together with Spain and Russia weren't able to strip France of significan territory.
not like Hannibal, Hannibal is not good because he lost in the end, he never was close to victory and his spectacular battles don't change that. therefore my comparison with Hitler. since he was never able to beat britain he was doomed from the beginnign and all the spectacular conquests of almost all of europe don't change that. Hitler after the spectacular Blitzkrieg victory over France was nicknamed GFAZ, which si short for "greatest commander of all times". and after the war was lost Hitler was again blamed. so you can see as long as everyhting went just fine, Hitler was hailed, and after everyhting was lost, Hitler again was blamed. of course i'm talking about a "what if". same here with hannibal. if his campaign had suceeded, he would have been hailed as greatest comamnder ever. now that eh lost, the blame goes to the senate, now thats very convenient... victory and defeat is either the credit of the head of state, or the general(s) but you can't remodel everything to fit your taste. thats why i also proposed to remove von Manstein. there are generals who won battles with even less ressources against bigger odds and suceeded, so it is really hypocrise to blame defeat on superficial reasons that didn't contributed much to the matter, even though Hannibal apparently was sucessfull on a small scale during his time in Italy, it doesn't change the fact that his very plan of conquest was flawed fromt he beginnign and the seeds of his defeat were already sown the second he crossed the Alps. every great commander in history defeated their enemies fast and determined, France was not conquered by bypassing the Maginot Line and then wait in southern france for italian reinforcements or Franco to join the struggle...

napoleons abdication in 1814 was a result of Paris beign taken and a refusal of his marshals to continue fighting. his venture in 1815 was also already doomed from the beginning as he had only one strong army and was facing 5 enemy armies this time around and lost already against the first two btu ti showed how France but more importantly the French Army and many of his former Marshals accept him again.

It was the Seleucids at first, to my knowledge he never served Pontus and why is this relevent?


you claimed Hannibal was prime minister AFTER the 2nd Punic War, but how is this consistend with him being forced into exile AFTER the war?

It was not required for Pyrrrhus to appear in sicily, he saw an oppurtunity to gain power there and he took it. Only problem was he hadn't finished dealing with Rome first and by the time he was booted out of sicily for tyranical behavior Rome had recoverd and learnt from its defeats which had themselves cost pyrrhus much. he lacked focus and left the job half finished to move on to another, what a waste of men he was clearly a fairly poor strategist.


the point with Pyrrhus is not that he had not dealt with Rome first, he had crushed Roman armies two times and thought they were done, as all other classical city states would have been in their situation, but Rome conquered the mediterranen world, Thebes, Sparta etc did not, so there must have been a difference. the difference is simple that Rome had the genuine determination to not accept a defeat until all straws are drawn. this was also a gamble on Rome's side and one that turned out sucessful. Pyrrhus gambles took him to Sicily and in his situation it was not a big gamble, but one that turned out bad as we all know. if Pyrrhus had defeated Roem another time, he certainly would have marched on Rome and leveled it to the ground. this was the risk that Rome accepted but they learned from their defeats (which was Romes perhaps greatest trait) and adopted to it. that was the downfall of both Pyrrhus and Hannibal. btu Pyrrhus was first, he couldn't have known but Hannibal knew of Pyrrhus failure, but he apparently didn't learned his lesson.

The senate did originally support Hannibal but by the time he requested reinforcements, this had changed. With the party of Hanno the "Great", supplanting the supporters of the Barcas as the dominant power in Carthaginian politics. Hanno was a life long enemy of the Barcid clan and their policies. Largely due to Hanno's pettiness and inability to see the big picture, Hannibal as never reinforced on order of the Carthaginian senate to any significant extent.
Secondly, contrary to your opinion, I do not disagree with the decision reached by the Carthaginian Senate to recall Hannibal to defend Carthage from Scipio Africanus. But, I do disagree with the assertion that Hannibal had achieved no progress in 15 years in Italy. Though he failed to achieve enough progress to conclude the war, in removing many of Rome's key allies from the war. and stretching its resources to near breaking point. I would call that progress.


this progress was just a teardrop in the sea, Rome was at large and Hannibal was not in the situation to change that, despite of small sucesses on his side. nothing Hanibal did in this time seriously hampered Romes war effort.

Capturing Rome would not necesarily mean the war was over, though in my opinion it would have resulted in the end of the war when taking into account what damage Hannibal had already done.


as i said two recuirements have to be met to win a war, defeat the enemy army and capture the enemy capital. if only one of the recuirements are met, victory is still uncertain.


Carthage did not send significant reinforcements to Hannibal, the commander of the Carthaginian army at Metaurus was Hasdrubal Barca and acted on his own initiative with no orders from Carthage in order to link up with his brother and take Rome. On another note you both can win a war without taking a states capitol and taking a states capitol does not always mean you win the war, take the celtic sack of Rome or Napoleon's siezure of Moscow for example.


from what Challenger 2 and Spartan wrote i get another impression. the two examples you agve are flawed because:

1. the Celtic "conquest" was in fact just a raid for loot, which is common in tribal societies. it was never intended as conquest and the Celts left by their own will.

2. the capital of Russia at this time was St. Petersburg, something Napoleon apparently didn't knew either... ;)


Or for that matter NapoleonWink Seriusly though comparing Hitler to Hannibal is ridiculous as though Hitler was the autocratic head of his state and never commanded in the field. He had excellent generals but constantly interfered in military affairs with disastrous consequences (for the third reich), whereas Hannibal was a field commander who's requests for reinforcements were largely ignored by his government and let down in all other theaters by incapable commanders (though not all other Carthaginian commanders were inept, Carthage certainly did not possess as many high quality generals as Hitler had at his disposal).

Regards, Praetor.


as i wrote above, Napoleon actually achieved something, first as general and consul of the Republic until the peace of Amiens, later as Emperor in the period 1805-1809. in both periods he secured his posessions. only in the third phase (1812-15) he was evenutally overpowered and lost everyhting accumlated to that point.
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  Quote Temujin Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 18-Aug-2007 at 18:13
Originally posted by Challenger2

Can anyone tell me why Jan Ziska is on the list? He seems more fortunate in his opponent than being any form of military genius. Admittedly after just a quick overview of his achievements, all he seems to have done was send his wagons deep into enemy territory, find a suitable spot form a laager and goad the enemy to attack him.

I would have thought any of the generals ranked below him on the table would have taken one look, rolled around the floor laughing, got their troops to get the local peasantry out and dig a ditch around the laager, [banking up the spoil and perhaps garnishing it with an ad hoc abattis]. Missile troops and strong cavalry patrols would be used to keep Ziska from interfering, and so leave him with the stark choice of leaving and risking being caught on the move, or staying and being besieged and starved into submission. While digging the peasants would be relatively safe from the primitive artillery then in use, but then again there are plenty of peasants. Big%20smile

Yes, his tactics were innovative, but does that merit such a high position on the table?



i'm not perfectly familiar with his campaign, but the wagenburg (wagon-fort) tactic is nothing new and was not invented by him, but the heavy use of field guns and handguns in combination to the wagenburg was new. also the peasant-army-fighting-for-their-liberty thing is nothing new, see Switzerland. the only genuinely new piece of equippment was the war flail. also, i heard since the Hussites were heretics, many routes by the knights armies of the emperor were explained by their fear of the wild heathen zeal of the Hussite countercharges. don't know if thats true.
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  Quote rider Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19-Aug-2007 at 09:15
Yes, I have also always wondered why Napoleon was speaking of taking 'the capital' and then marched on Moscow...

Anyways, you note that 1815 was doomed in the beginning and therefore it shouldn't be Napoleon's fault. Italy was also doomed from beginning but that is Hannibal's fault?
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