QuoteReplyTopic: Chinese Battles Posted: 03-Jan-2006 at 12:23
I found it odd that there are far fewer decisive battles in China throughout ancient to medival history as compared to the multitude recorded in the West. They were constantly engaged in wars with each other as well as different attacking nomads.
Is it because warfare was more guerilla style, wasn't recorded or what else? If you know any with recorded numbers and other statistics please post.
The beginning of a revolution is in reality the end of a belief - Le Bon
Destroy first and construction will look after itself - Mao
Few battles of the west was decisive; specially when you study the
warfare in Medieval Age, you understand that the main work for the
armies was siege and waste, the battle was very very strange.
It depends on how you define the word decisive. If it means the complete destruction of one faction by another faction, then perhaps. Here is my theory:
A. There may have been more decisive battles in the West in terms of complete eradication of one faction by another than in China because in ancient China, nationalism and complete political-religious alligence to one particular faction was not inbred into the population. Unlike Medieval Europe and the Near East, religious alligence did not approach the level of fanaticism and intensity that characterized crusades and jihads. In addition, relative homogenity of the population meant less mutual antagonism than that exhibited amongst populations in the Ancient Western World. With the exception of the wars against nomads to the North, most Chinese wars were civil wars, political struggles of opposing leaders utilizing the same population and military as their power base. In many cases, the various factions that engaged in warfare in Ancient and Medieval China employed the same soldiers. Generals and armies exchanged alligences often.
One of the most illustrative examples of this situation is the Three Kingdoms Era, where three Han Chinese political entities fought constantly against one another, recycling troops captured from the enemy and often experiencing generals switching sides.
B. Logistics. In Medieval times, the population and economic base of China was significantly larger than that of any Medieval state. Thus, while a single battle may involve and destroy the entire military and economic base of a Medieval state, the situation rarely happens in Medieval China. Oftentimes, the defeated faction of a battle would simply conscript more civilians into the military and raise another army. For example, the resounding defeat of Cao Cao in the Battle of Chibi did not shake his powerful economic and military base in Northern China, and Cao Cao continued his campaigns to the South and West two years after Chibi, and formed the foundation of a Wei state with 300,000 regular troops.
As to guerilla warfare, it was rarely used by government troops in Ancient China. Guerilla warfare, by its nature, is usually the tactic of the less institutional against the institution, and usually utilized by rebel forces, and often, by the Vietnamese against the Chinese posted in Vietnam in Medieval times.
Edited by poirot
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"The crisis of yesterday is the joke of tomorrow.� ~ HG Wells
but what I'm actually looking forwards to is to read Ralph Sawyers text that will soon be published:
History of Warfare in China
Conceived as a multi-volume project spanning the entire period of Chinese history through the Ming, the first volume, Antiquity, is necessarily grounded in extensive archaeological evidence and early bone and bronze inscriptions. Experiments with reconstructed weapons coupled with a re-examination of traditional historical texts results in a surprisingly revised view of warfare for this much idealized period. The first volume ends with Sun-tzu and the battles that concluded the Spring and Autumn period, while the second is devoted to the Warring States, a period that saw warfare escalate to massive proportions and the accompanying devastation and casualties reach astounding proportions. Subsequent volumes will ponder the gradual shift of civilization and warfare south of the Yellow, Huai, and finally Yangtze Rivers; developments in technology and battlefield practices; and the evolution of tactical doctrine, thoroughly illustrated with key campaigns and major battles.
B. Logistics. In Medieval times, the population and economic base of China was significantly larger than that of any Medieval state. Thus, while a single battle may involve and destroy the entire military and economic base of a Medieval state, the situation rarely happens in Medieval China. Oftentimes, the defeated faction of a battle would simply conscript more civilians into the military and raise another army. For example, the resounding defeat of Cao Cao in the Battle of Chibi did not shake his powerful economic and military base in Northern China, and Cao Cao continued his campaigns to the South and West two years after Chibi, and formed the foundation of a Wei state with 300,000 regular troops.
As to guerilla warfare, it was rarely used by government troops in Ancient China. Guerilla warfare, by its nature, is usually the tactic of the less institutional against the institution, and usually utilized by rebel forces, and often, by the Vietnamese against the Chinese posted in Vietnam in Medieval times.
The first hypothesis is good, i like it, but that can explain why the factions survive not why the western enemies die. I think, if we search in the chinese history can get many factions absolutelly destroyed by the other chinese faction, i'm remenber the Qin wars.
But i can't agree with the second hypothesis: first it ignore (sorry) the nature of the medieval western states; between V and X centuries, in a dull period for the europeans, very few battles were absolutelly crucial. Since XI century to XV century, only one or two, because the highl political, social, economic and military level of the european society (increased between those dates). The process was deeped by 1530, when after a time of short wars originated with the fire weapons, the europeans turned to the long and pirric wars with the italian trace.
My hypothesis is exactly the opposite to the basis of this thread: the importance of the chinese battles are decreased because are not well known, and the western battles are overvalued because are excesivilly known, by many time we put our attention in the battles, and not in the war.
Reading the opinions of chinese and western that know well the warfare in Middle Age, both think that the war was a question of siege and waste, more than an epic battle. The question must be why in determinated examples western and eastern had long or short wars, crucials or unimportant battles.
Surely there must have been more battles even in civil wars were a substantial amount of soldiers have been involved. Most of the battles that wikipedia has are not very informative on that, they simply state the victor without giving you a number on how many people were involved, how many were killed and how the outcome of the battle affected future events.
I find the opinion of dej2 here that most of the records have not been translated and put in wikipedia more plausible. Descriptive battles are not only missing in Chinese but Asian warefare history as a whole as well. There is also minimal mention of key battles that the Mongols have won during their expansion in Korea, China, Kitan, Tangut and Uighur kingdoms. Surely there must have been a few decisive engangements amidts the usually hit and run Mongol surprise attacks to seriously weaken these armies.
The beginning of a revolution is in reality the end of a belief - Le Bon
Destroy first and construction will look after itself - Mao
Yes there Are very Decisive battles in chinese history,there is alot of them though,what dynasty do u want to know about?
Ok mongols invasion of china,the mongols think that there most desivive battle in their history was the battle of beaver peak hills.
Battle of Huan Er Tsui
Battle of Huan Er Tsui is perhaps the most important victory in the history of the Mongol empire. In the secret history it was their greatest accomplishment, and the Moslem historian Rashid ad-Din writing over a hundred years later, declared the Mongols still regarded it as one of their greatest victories. This battle secured Mongol supremacy, enabled later conquests and marked the begining of Mongol expansion. Yet ironically, it it very little known to Occidental sources which seem to concentrate on the Mongol's western campaigns which in reality was much less important as the Secret history itself indicate by the much more information on the East.
The numbers of this battle are debated. According to Yuan Shi and Meng Wu Er Shi, the number was 300,000. In the Xin Yuan Shi and Yuan Chao Ming Cheng Shi Liao, Biography of Mukhali, it was 400,000. Yet this number is much less unlikely. In reality the number of 300,000 probably included logistic support and the effective force of the Jin was probably more around 150,000-200,000. Genghis's force is unkown, but taking account of the invading force and those he despatched for patrol, it is more or less around 100,000. The Jin army is composed of Jurchen and Khitan cavalry and Han infantry. The cavalries were the elite of the army and were in the front and wings. While the infantry was placed closely behind.
The two armies were separated by some 15-20 miles. In Yuan Chao Bi Shi, the earliest record, it merely say the Mongol army of the center clashed and defeated the main forces of the Jin. The Yuan Sheng Wu Qin Cheng Lu has a fuller account. According to it "After the Jin army had reached the Ye Hu Ling, two Khitan officers of the staff came to Shi Zong and said: "Since the capture of Fu Zhou, the Mongols are grazing loose near town, so if we now attack them with our cavalry they will be unprepared and we shall win a decisive victory". Shi Zong however, disagreed and suggested to attack the next day with combined cavalry and infantry.
When Genghis heard the Jin army was approaching, he ordered his men to prepare for action and move toward Huan Er Tsui. The two armies then met at that place. Apparently the Jin emperor deployed his Khitan and Jurchid horseman on the front and wings of his army and the infantry behind. The former were immediately attacked by successive waves of Mongol light troops, and evidently with too little space in which to maneuver, at length faltered under the storms of arrows poured into their ranks. Seizing the opportunity, Mukhali delivered a tremendous assault, his troops charging lance in hand. This was supported by the Guard(Keshik) under Genghis Khan, and the Khitan and Jurchid cavalry was hurled back upon its own infantry. With no chance to reform and no room to maneuver do to the packed formation, they trampled the soldiers and involved the whole army into confusion, the battle lasted half day and by noon the disordered Jin was driven from the field. The Mongols pursued the Jin through Huan er Tsui to the valley of Yang below, the Jin suffered tremendous losses, but at Hui He Bao, part of them under the emperor rallied and joining Wan ye Hu Sha, turned to fight a second battle. Hu Sha was proceeding towards Ye hu Ling when he heard the Mongol were coming through the ranges. Surprised, he retired to Xuang Ping. The officers begged to make a stand but he only thought of retreat. But he was slow and at Hui He Po he was first overtaken by the Jin emperor and then by the pursuing Mongols which pursuited relentlessly without rest. Although his troops were more fresh, Hu Sha was alerady in a panic and when he gave battle he was routed and escaped to Xuan De Zhou which he abandoned later and fell to the Mongols.
Meanwhile the emperor who saw the day lost fought his way off the field with 7,000 picked troops, fled to the Sang Kan River. There on the opposite bankof Hu lai He, Ye Lu Tukha of the rebel khitans came up with 3,000 cavalry and he was forced to fight another battle, the battle lasted a whole day until the exhausted Jin finally gave up and fled.
This battle destroyed the core troops of the Jin and paved a way for Mongol conquest.
The main cause for Jin's defeat in the decisive battles of Hu Er Sui, Wu Sha Bao, and Hui He Bao is because the Jin did not utilize the mobility of their cavalry as they had in their early conquests and used a tightly packed formation with the infantry placed close to the cavalry letting little room for maneuver. And when the decisive charge came, the cavalry was forced back to the infantry causing chaos
Very odd, most of the Chinese battles in Wiki date to the Three Kingdoms Era, and many important battles are left out. No account on the Battle of Ningyuan?????
AAAAAAAAAA
"The crisis of yesterday is the joke of tomorrow.� ~ HG Wells
I agree its a translation problem with a bit of a western slant that exists in military history. When China is again the major power (a position it has held in history more times than any other nations) the important battles in her history will become more famous and prominent.
"the people are nothing but a great beast...
I have learned to hold popular opinion of no value."
-Alexander Hamilton
China, like the middle east and Europe, during the medieval period, had it's share of battles and decisive battles.
A significant difference between the east and west is in the east they focused more on the overall aspect than individual battles. It seems in the west you can read about battle "A" and battle "B" but there isn't much about what happened during the time between the battles. In China the focus was more on the strategic aspect, instead of giving details of the battle the resulst's were more important.
A good example of this is comparing the info on the siege of Acre in 1189 CE versus the info on the siege of Xianyang and Fan-cheng around 1270 CE. There is plenty of info on different things at Acre such as Turkish/Arabic kids wrestling with European kids and the parents of the loosing kid would have to pay a "ransom" fee. There is mention of Turkish/Arabic soldiers playing chess with knights. There is good info on several different battles, skirmishes in and around the area of Acre. At the siege of Xianyang which laster longer (approx 5 years, siege of Acre apporx 2 years) there is mention of many heroic deeds but little description of anything else. There are two accounts of a skirmish between Mongol boats and Song boats who were trying to break the blockade to bring supplies to the defenders. There is also an account of several thousand Song troops trying to break out but they took heavy casualties and had to retreat back into the city.
The true answer to the initial question is that there is a tradition in
Western history to chronicle a sequence of 'decisive' events.
Summaries of the numerous chronicles provided a list of battles (and
other events) that were 'decisive' by definition (ie they had been
recorded). 19th C historians took these lists and stripped out
the religious and astronomical events (they were not seen as
'scientific'). This basicallly left lists of battles. And a
trend was born.
Chinese (also Persian and Indian) historians never went through the rationalisation phase...
its not just about decisive battles, much more western battles in general are very well recorded in wikipedia and elsewhere in the net. I guess Chinese battles are waiting to be translated first.
The beginning of a revolution is in reality the end of a belief - Le Bon
Destroy first and construction will look after itself - Mao
Another battle of China vs Mongolia during Ming dynasty.
The Tumu Crisis (Chinese: 土木之變; pinyin: Tŭm zhī ban); also called Crisis of Tumubao (土木堡之變; or Battle of Tumu (土木之役, was a frontier conflict between Mongolia and the ChineseMing Dynasty which led to the capture of the Zhengtong Emperor on September 8, 1449.
This outcome was largely due to the Chinese army's remarkably bad
deployment. The Ming expedition is regarded as the greatest military
debacle of the dynasty.
In July 1449 Esen Tayisi (也先 of the OyiradMongols launched a large-scale three-pronged invasion of China. He personally advanced on Datong (in northern Shanxi province) in August. The eunuch official Wang Zhen,
who dominated the Ming court, encouraged the twenty-two year old
Zhengtong Emperor to lead his own armies into battle against Esen. A
huge army (perhaps as many as 250,000 men) was hastily assembled. Its
command was made up of twenty experienced generals and a large
entourage of high-ranking civil officials, with Wang Zhen acting as
field marshal.
On August 3, Esen's army crushed a badly supplied Chinese army at Yanghe, just inside the Great Wall. The same day the Emperor appointed his half-brother Zhu Qiyu as regent. The next day he left Beijing for Juyong Pass. The objective was a short, sharp march west to Datong via the Xuanfu garrison, a campaign into the steppe, and then to return to Beijing by a southerly route through Yuzhou.
Initially the march was mired by heavy rain. At Juyong Pass, the
civil officials and generals wished to halt and send the emperor back
to Beijing, but their opinions were overruled by Wang Zhen. On August 12, some of the courtiers discussed assassinating Wang. On August 16, the army came upon the corpse-strewn battlefield of Yanghe. When it reached Datong on August 18,
reports from garrison commanders persuaded Wang Zhen that a campaign
into the steppe would be too dangerous. The "expedition" was declared
to have reached a victorious conclusion and on August 20 the army set out toward Beijing.
Fearing that the restless soldiers would cause damages to his
estates in Yuzhou, Wang Zhen took the decision to strike northeast and
return by the same exposed route as they had come. The army reached
Xianfu on August 27. On August 30,
the Mongols attacked the rearguard east of Xianfu and wiped it out.
Soon afterwards, they also annihilated a powerful new rearguard of
cavalry led by the elderly general Zhu Yong at Yaoerling. On August 31
the imperial army camped at the post station of Tumu. Wang Zhen refused
his ministers' suggestion to have the emperor take refuge in the walled
city of Huailai, just 45 km ahead.
Esen sent an advance force to cut off access to water from a river south of the Chinese camp. By the morning of September 1,
they had surrounded the Chinese army. Wang Zhen rejected any offers to
negotiate and ordered the confused army to move toward the river. The
Mongols attacked in force and destroyed the Chinese army, capturing
large quantities of arms and armour. All the high-ranking Chinese
generals and court officials were killed. According to some accounts,
Wang Zhen was killed by his own officers. The emperor was captured, and
on September 3 was sent to Esen's main camp near Xianfu.
The entire expedition had been unnecessary, ill-conceived, and
ill-prepared. The Mongol victory was won by an advance guard of only
20,000 cavalry. Esen, for his part, was quite unprepared either for the
scale of his victory or for the capture of the Ming emperor.
At first, Esen attempted to use the captured emperor to raise a ransom.
The beginning of a revolution is in reality the end of a belief - Le Bon
Destroy first and construction will look after itself - Mao
"Its not just about decisive battles, much more western battles in general are very well recorded in wikipedia and elsewhere in the net. I guess Chinese battles are waiting to be translated first."
Well have any one hared of the coulter revolution in China? The Red guard distorted lots of Chinese History!!
I agree its a translation problem with a bit of a western slant that exists in military history. When China is again the major power (a position it has held in history more times than any other nations) the important battles in her history will become more famous and prominent.
Maybe so? Maybe not? But as for world power, I think the USA will be for a long wile, also you for got about the EU?
Edited by Praetorian
Caesar si viveret, ad remum dareris
--If Caesar were alive, you'd be chained to an oar.
"Well have any one hared of the coulter revolution in China? The Red guard distorted lots of Chinese History!! "
They never tried to destroy Chinese history, they did try to destroy Chinese culture, which didn't work out. If anything, modern versions of the "peaceful" Chinese is pretty distorted. Animals such as the rhino and elephant went extinct because of Chinese wars.
"Yes, the various infantry battle of the Spring and Autumn period.
Battles such as Song-Chu battle of Hong Shui in 638 b.c., Jin Chu
battle of Cheng Pu in 632 b.c., Jin-Qin battle of Xiao Han in 627 b.c.,
Jin Chu battle of Bi in 597b.c., Jin-Qi battle of An in 589 b.c.,
Jin-Qin battle of Ma Sui in 578 b.c., Jin Chu battle of Yan Ling in 575
b.c. , Jin-Qi battle of Ping Ying in 555 b.c., Qi-Jin battle of Tai
Hang in 550 b.c., Wu-Chu battle of Ji Fu in 519 b.c., Wu-Chu battle in
capital Ying, and the important battles of Gu Su and Li Zhe Jiang in
478 b.c. when Yue destroyed Wu.
In Li Zhe Jiang, Gou Jian
brought 50,000 Yue troops to the bank of the river Li Zhe(present day
Jiang Su province, southern part of Wu Jiang prefecture) where he faced
Fu Chai's Wu army of 60,000 on the other side of the river. They faced
each other and at night, Gou Jian sent out two separate units of around
10,000 each, from the tributary of Su and Shun and crosed the river
while beating the drum to let the Wu army know, Fu Chai thought the Yue
army was pincer attacking sent most of the Wu army into two separate
flank units to defend. Gou Jian used this opportunity when the Wu army
was still forming and sent his main force beating the drums right
across the river suddenly attacking the weak center of the Wu army, the
Wu army became greatly disrupted, when the two flanks of the Wu army
came bgack to rescue the center, the two Yue units also arrived and
attacked with the central army and totally routed the Wu army. The Yu
army gave chase to the Wu army and in Mo Xi and Gu Su city, again
routed the Wu and forced them into siege.
This is just one example of infantry battle of high discipline and deceptive tactics.
One
of the first battle of deception is Cheng Pu in 632 b.c., here the Jin
army of 30,000, 7,000 chariot, along with the ally army of Qin, Qi,
Song's army of 50,000(total of 80,000) facing the Chu and its ally of
Chen and Cai's total army of 110,000.
In the beggining a portion of
the left flank of the Jin army led by Xu put tiger skin on his horse
and charged right at the less trained Chen and Cai army and put them
into flight. This jeopardized the right flank of the Chu army. At this
time, the upper portion of the right flank of the Jin army led by Gu
Mao, waved two large flags and purposely retreated to trick the Chu
army into attacking, while the other left flank of the Jin army used
chariots that carried a bunch of branches and rode around the back of
the Jin formation so dust was everywhere. The Chu general Zi Yu thought
the Jin army was really running away and ordered his left flank to
attack. The central Jin army, seen that the Chu army was tricked, led
the elite light army of the center and horizontally stroke the
attacking left flank of the Chu, while the reterating right flank of
the Jin, turned around and attacked as well. This destroyed both teh
left and right Flank of the Chu army. Zi Yu saw that all was lost and
ordered his central army to stop advancing and reterated southwest
wards and managed to keep the whole army from routing."
Both the Jin and Mongol troops begin the battle with the light troops,
one body in support of another, advanced through the squadron intervals
in the 2 front ranks and poured volleys of arrows into the opposing
lines. Simultaneously one or both the wings began an eveloping movement
to take the enemy flanks and rear. If the first storm of arrows
succeeded in disordering his array, the shock troops received the
command of charge. Should the light troops be repulsed by a charge,
they retired shooting backward from the saddle, and other detachments
took their place and repeated the arrow storm. If these were
unsuccessful, the remaining light troops took up the assault.
Similar
methods was deployed by the Khitans, In Meng Da Bei Lu, the Liao army
was organised into a decimal system with regiments of 500 or 700 men,
ten of which formed a division, with ten division making up an army.
Attacks were carried out through a succession of controlled charges,
each regiment advancing in turn before being replaced and withdrawn to
rest. The attack is made by the 1st of the 10 squadrons, if it was
successful then the other 9 would charge forward, but if it fail it was
called to the back of the line to rest while the next squadron take its
place. If necessary, it would be repeated for days until the enemy is
exhausted. Then all 10 squadrons would charge and rout.
In
the Case of Murong Ke and Ran Min, The Yan general Murong Ke finally
manage to trap Ran Min's 10,000 infantry, and he formed encirclements
on Ran Min's army and greatly outnumbered his. Although Rang Min's army
is mostly infantry, all of them were highly disciplined troops trained
and fought at his side since the begining. And although Ran Min is a
butcher and tyrant he still love his troops so they would fight with
him to the death. For this Murong Ke was repeatedly defeated by Ran
Min's infantry since his infantry would just charge in formation at one
point of the Yan cavalry always breaking the encirclement.
And
over ten battles Murong Ke always failed to win. Murong Ke found out
that the reason is Ran Min's infantry always goes through the gaps that
result in his cavalry encirclement after it got hit by the force of Ran
Min's infantry.
Another instance is during Dingxian in 945, a
Khitan invasion was opposed by the Later Jin army under Fu Yanqing, who
pinned the enemy by advancing in the centre with his main body of
infantry, while concentrating 10,000 Shatuo [Turk] cavalry against one
flank. The Khitan army was routed, and their emperor escaped in a cart
pulled by camels. This proved not to be fast enough, and he transferred
ignominiously to a riding camel. Many horses and weapons were captured
by the Jin. Another example was Tang general Su Ding Fangs campaign in
Altai against the Tujue, The Turkut chieftain Landulu led more than
10,000 men to surrender to the Tang army, and Dingfang treated them
humanely. Shaboluo Kaghan, however, led more than 100,000 men of the
Huluwu, Wunushibi and other tribes to resist the Tang. Dingfang
attacked with more than 10,000 Uyghur and Han troops. Shaboluo Kaghan
saw that the Tang forces were outnumbered 10 to 1, and eagerly
surrounded them on all sides. Dingfang ordered his infantry to hold a
gentle slope to the south of his position, formed up in a circle
formation with long spears to defend against cavalry. He himself led
the Han cavalry to form up on a slope to the north of the position. The
Turkut first attacked the infantry, but could not break the formation
after three charges, with both sides suffering quite a number of
casualties. At this point Dingfang launched a sudden attack with his
cavalry, while his infantry counterattacked in support. The Turkut army
broke and fled, and was pursued for more than 30 li, with several tens
of thousands killed.
More examples include The Tang general Li Si
Qis deployment which numbered 60,000 plus 5,000 tujue auxiliars
against the Xue Yang Tuo which numbered some 200,000. These tribes used
the same tactic of arrow assault, while the Tang army suffered heavy
casualty, they dismounted and charged at the center while the cavalry
concentrated at the flanks with Tujue auxiliars returning the fire and
crushed the Xue Yang Tuo. In the Tang, crossbowmen also carried the
modao (a version of the zhanmadao) as a close-quarters weapon against
cavalry, while in the Song dynasty large crossbows and pole-axes proved
effective against heavy cavalry charges.
The more famous battle are
those done by Song general Yue Fei. In his battle against Jin Wu Shu,
he used the Zhangmadao to cut down the Jin Guaizima, and also the
powerful Shenbi Crossbow against the heavy cavalries to deadly affects.
"I got interested to read up more about anti-elephant tactics.
Fortunately, yesterday I found a new book "Southeast Asian warfare
1300-1900" by Michael W. Charney (Leiden: Brill, 2004), and it has a
whole chapter on elephants!
Apparently, the use of lion masks
against elephants was repeated by Ming troops against Vietnamese
elephant troops during the Ming invasion of Vietnam. But this time the
masks were worn by cavalry horses.
Normal arrows would also turn
back elephants if shot in a large enough volume. In 605, the Sui
dynasty invaded Champa. The Sui general Liu Fang had driven the Cham
south of the Do Le River, but the Cham prepared an ambush for the
pursuing Sui army. When the Sui army reached the ambush site, Cham
mounted on large elephants charged out from all directions. Liu Fang,
however, ordered his archers to concentrate their arrows on the
elephants, stopping them and sending them fleeing back to trample the
Cham foot soldiers.
The same thing happened with Mongol Yuan
troops during the Battle of Nga-zaung-kyan (1277), according to an
account written by Marco Polo. The Mongol cavalry was initially driven
off the field when their horses were terrified by the sight of Burmese
elephants. But the Mongols then countered this with showers of arrows
from better bows:
"They ... plied their bows stoutly, shooting
so many shafts at the advancing elephants that in a short space they
had wounded or slain the greater part of them as well as of the men
they carried... when the elephants felt the smart of thos arrows that
pelted them like rain, they turned tail and fled, and nothing on earth
would have induced them to turn and face the Tartars. So off they sped
with such a noise and uproar... And then too they plunged into the wood
and rushed this way and that, dashing their castles against the trees,
bursting their harness and smashing and destroying everything that was
on them."
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