Cypriots to get their lands back ???

As can be seen from the above texts, the island was claimed to be a GREEK ISLAND by the largest of the two "partners". Since the 1963 constitutional crisis the Turks had been absent from the government and they had been living in their homogeneous enclaves. So the Greek Cypriot side was enjoying a de facto "unitary state" in terms of government machinery and territory. Also, the Turkish Cypriots were, then, the de facto "minority."

Clearly, there was "Enosis Discourse" which dominated the texts that were produced by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

However, when we look at the texts below which were also produced by the Greek Cypriot leadership - yet, this time in the 1990's, we should be able to distinguish a totally different discourse that dominates the texts: INVASION AND INDEPENDENCE DISCOURSE AFTER 1974 "Independence came to the Cypriots after centuries of foreign rule and after a hard guerrilla war against the colonial power. MAKARIOS, the leader of the anti-colonial struggle, and first President of the Republic of Cyprus, WELCOMED IT AS THE HERALD OF A NEW AGE FOR THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS:

According to the 1960 CYPRUS CONSTITUTION, which is STILL THE CONSTITUTION under which the CYPRUS GOVERNMENT AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES function and THE COURTS dispense justice, the Turkish Cypriots were guaranteed a privileged position AS A MINORITY. They were guaranteed full cultural and religious autonomy and reinforced political representation..." (Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion, "They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace," 1991. p.37).

"For hundreds of years Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived in social harmony and economic interdependence in the villages and towns of Cyprus. This web of interdependence was only disturbed after protracted and violent attacks against it. Even after incidents, planned and instigated to prove that Greek and Turkish Cypriots could not live together, ordinary people again and again proved the opposite UNTIL they were TORN APART BY THE ATTILA OPERATION6 IN 1974. [The Turkish Cypriots]' interdependence with the rest of the population of Cyprus is indicated by the fact that UNTIL 1974 THEY LIVED INTERMINGLED IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES ALL OVER CYPRUS. The mass of Greek and Turkish Cypriots LIVED AND COOPERATED PEACEFULLY IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL TOLERANCE." (Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion, "They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace," 1991. p. 26).

"The Cyprus problem primarily is a question of TURKEY'S ATTACK ON THE CYPRUS AND INVASION of part of its territory which was undoubtedly made possible by foreign powers and the coup which constituted a betrayal." (Letter from Greek Cypriot President Vassiliou to EDEK party leader Lyssarides, February 1988)

Here, we see that the "Enosis" discourse was replaced by the "Invasion" discourse. Makarios, who was giving clear and blunt "Enosis" messages and calling on Greek Cypriots to struggle for Enosis in the 1960's, is now shown as if he "WELCOMED [THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS] AS THE HERALD OF A NEW AGE FOR THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS" The Turkish Cypriots are portrayed as the lucky "minority" who enjoyed vast rights and privileges of living under the Republic of Cyprus until 1974, when the Turks from Turkey "invaded" the island.

The general picture one gets from the above texts is that there was "social harmony," "cultural and religious tolerance" and "interdependence" between the two communities, and that they were living together intermingled. So, the Turkish Cypriots are no longer the "this small TURKISH COMMUNITY FORMING PART OF THE TURKISH RACE ... [should be] EXPELLED" (1960's), but a happy "minority." There was also a little mention about the "coup d'�tat" that was sent by Greece to unite the island with Greece (Enosis) which caused the landing of the Turkish troops in Cyprus five days later (July 20, 1974). So, basically the Turkish "intervention" or "invasion" was shown to happen without any reason which also gives one the implication that it was an action of pure aggression and violence of an imperialist (expansionist) power.

The events which was portrayed above (1963-74) by the 1991 Greek Cypriot government are in great conflict with what Glafcos Clerides (present Greek Cypriot President) stated in his memoirs which were published in the early the 1990's:CONTRADICTING DISCOURSES WITHIN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY "It was by the virtue of EQUALITY OF POWERS vested in the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President that the PARTNERSHIP of the TWO COMMUNITIES was created by the Zurich agreements." ("My Deposition" by Glafcos Clerides [present President of Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus], Vol.2, p. 382)

"The constitutional crisis of the year 1963 DISRUPTED the constitutional order, the continuity, and the PARTNERSHIP STATUS of the two communities, which was CREATED BY THE ZURICH AGREEMENTS.

Because of the disruption of constitutional order a peculiar situation was created by virtue of which THE STATE AUTHORITY, on the other hand, became under the ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF THE GREEKS, and though THE GOVERNMENT WAS RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONALLY, yet INTERNALLY TURKISH ENCLAVES WERE CREATED within the territory of the Republic which at first, an elementary organization for the purpose of governing the Turkish Cypriots was established, the main characteristic of which was the confusion of military and political powers and functions, and the prevailing of military power.

After the crisis of 1967 (Kophiniou Crisis) the above DISRUPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER BECAME MORE CLEAR and showed tendencies of permanency. Thus in December 1967, the elementary military-political organization of the TURKS IN THE ENCLAVES developed into a "temporary Administration" on the basis of a charter, and at the same time the POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES were SEPARATED.

In the years that followed a steady, stage by stage development is noted in the Turkish administration, with the SEPARATION IN ITS LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS. An administrative organization is created, as well as police force and an army. The increase of the financial resources of the Turkish Cypriots through economic aid from Turkey permitted the functioning of their administration on a more permanent basis, a fact which they made clear, by renaming their "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration" to "Turkish Cypriot Administration."

Thus THERE EXIST TODAY [END OF THE 1960'S] IN CYPRUS TWO POLES OF POWER ON A SEPARATE GEOGRAPHICAL BASIS I.E THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC, controlling the largest section of the territory of the state and iNTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED, and the TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION, which CONTROLS A VERY LIMITED AREA and is NOT INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED, but has ALREADY TAKEN ALMOST ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A SMALL STATE." ("My Deposition" by Glafcos Clerides [present President of Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus], Vol.3, pp. 236, 237).

The reality of what actually happened in the 1960's and 1970's in the above texts is in great conflict with the portrayal of the reality in the government's texts in the 1990's (presented before).

Clerides stated that "[A] lot of wrongs have been done to Turkish Cypriots" and that "the GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE has TRIED TO DO AWAY WITH THE AGREEMENTS and to DEPRIVE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS FROM THEIR RIGHTS," that "the ENOSIS ROAD WAS FOLLOWED".

He also stated that the Turkish Cypriots were living in their HOMOGENEOUS ENCLAVES (3%) and that they were absent from the government of which they were once the EQUAL CO-FOUNDER7. This argument is also in conflict with the reality pictured by the Greek Cypriot government in the 1990's: that the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots were living intermingly in harmony until Turkish "invasion."

The attempt of Greek Cypriot government to present the Turkish "military operation" similar to the "Invasion" of Kuwait by Iraq was also commented on by Clerides:

"I am sorry that it is wishful thinking and a false dream to believe that we will be successful in such a thing. Such an evaluation is not realistic. Why? There is NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT RECOGNIZES THAT AN INVASION TOOK PLACE IN CYPRUS. The Security Council has not condemned Turkey as an occupationist so far. If we are lead to such a recourse, they will tell us at the Security Council that there was a (Greek) coup in Cyprus, the legal government was overthrown, THE CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED and TURKEY (AS A GUARANTOR POWER) HAD THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION. The things that count are arguments, not slogans."

It is clear from all the above texts that there exists today an "Invasion" discourse in the Greek Cypriot government texts which portrays the "facts" of 1960's and 1970's very different from the government texts in the 1960's and early the 1970's which were mainly dominated by the "Enosis" discourse.

The "Invasion" discourse of the government is challenged by both some internal non-governmental (Greek Cypriot) texts, eg., Clerides' memoirs, and foreign texts, such as the dozens of UN Security Council Resolutions which agree on the need of UN peace keeping forces in Cyprus and Secretary General reports7 SINCE 1963.

The "Invasion" discourse puts the Turkish Cypriots into "minority" status and also makes it more difficult to reach a solution to the Cyprus Conflict, based on the UN Resolutions and Secretary General's "Office of Good Mission.7"

So, the question is "Why does the Greek Cypriot government pursue this discourse which portrays a distorted reality of the 1960's and 1970's, and makes the negotiation process harder?" There might be many different answers to that question drawn from many contemporary theories. However, this writer believes that the question can mostly be tackled with the "Realist Theory" - more specifically with the "Power Politics" - which many theorists and academicians believe to be already dead:

The Greek Cypriot government is still recognized as the legal government of the 1960 "Republic of Cyprus." With the 1983 Resolution 541, the Security Council "Concerned at the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities issued on 15 November 1983 which purports to create an independent state in northern Cyprus.

... the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus." This shows that the Greek Cypriot side has a strong position on the table, i.e., being recognized by the UN as the legal government of the "Republic of Cyprus" and the other side (Turkish Cypriots) without any "governmental" title, or with an unrecognized state (i.e., "TRNC". The current "status quo" seems to be the Greek Cypriot side's BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). To change the current "Invasion" discourse and sit for negotiations, based on the UN resolutions, would not satisfy its "interests" and would deprive it from a considerable power it now enjoys - as the "legal" government of the whole Cyprus.

If we look at the following text of the UN Resolution 649 (March 12, 1990), it will be clear to demonstrate what the Greek Cypriot government has to give up to change its present "Invasion" discourse which obstructs a solution based on the UN Resolutions:

The Security Council "Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutual acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a FEDERATION that will be BI-COMMUNAL as regards the constitutional aspects and BI-ZONAL as regards the territorial aspects ... and to cooperate, on EQUAL FOOTING, with the Secretary General..." (UN Resolution 649, March 12, 1990).

Therefore, for a UN-based solution, the "Invasion" discourse should be modified to accommodate the following points of the UN Resolution: * give up the "unitary state" concept for a "bi-zonal" "federation" * give up its argument that the Turkish Cypriots are a "minority" and accept the concept of "bi-communality" and, negotiate with them on "equal footing" As can be understood from the above UN resolution (649), it would put the Greek Cypriot side into a troubled position if it pursued the Enosis discourse (union with Greece) in the 1990's. The "invasion" discourse, although in opposition with the UN Resolution, at least gives some room for modification in certain conditions8 and that it can be seen as 'one side is trying to strengthen its hand on the negotiation table' - that is, one can argue that it is giving up a lot in the negotiation, so that it can demand more concessions from the other side. As a matter of fact, in the actual negotiations the Greek Cypriot side is demanding territory from the Turkish Cypriot side in return to what it seemingly gives up (unitary state for a federation).

As we stated earlier, the "Invasion" discourse can be modified to accommodate itself to a UN proposed solution in certain cases. However, there is another powerful discourse within the Greek Cypriot community which, although not widely popular, is capable of blocking the way to a negotiated solution. This discourse is a mixture of the 1960's Enosis discourse and the government's post-1974 "Invasion" discourse. It borrowed the idea of "union of Cyprus with Greece" from the Enosis discourse and the claims that "Turkish invasion was an act of pure aggression and violence" from the "Invasion" discourse: CONTINUATION OF PRE-1974 DISCOURSE INTERTWINED WITH THE INVASION DISCOURSE TODAY "TURKS are a BARBAROUS PEOPLE. They are the LAST BARBARIANS OF CIVILIZATION. A people with VIOLENT INSTINCTS and a THIRST FOR BLOOD. We RATHER LIVE WITH SAVAGE ANIMALS THAN THE TURKS. Until the TURKS DIGEST that CYPRUS IS GREEK they can live in this country only as a MINORITY. And our slogan can not be anything else but "BEST TURK IS A DEAD TURK." The UNION OF CYPRUS WITH GREECE is the ONLY DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION for the Cyprus problem. NO to the talks, NO to the federation, ENOSIS AND LET CHANNELS FILL WITH THE FLOW OF BLOOD." (Excerpt appeared in Philelephteros, November 11, 1990) "IF THE CRETAN GREEKS WERE LIVING IN CYPRUS TODAY NOT A TURKISH CYPRIOT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE NORTH... I see the FATE OF GREECE AND CYPRUS AS BEING INTERTWINED. It would not be realistic to think that Cyprus cantoday fight for a prolonged period of time without Greece or that Greece is not interested in the fate of Cyprus. Because WHAT IS CYPRUS? IS IT NOT GREECE. If some people do not believe this, I am not one of them. On the contrary I say to the GREEKS WHO COME HERE 'THE PLACE THAT YOU HAVE COME TO IS NOT A FOREIGN PLACE, IT IS GREECE.'" (Statement of the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard Commander General Siradakis, Selides Magazine, October 3, 1992).

The discourse in the above texts (especially the first one) is much more dangerous than the "Invasion" discourse. Here, there is no room for a negotiated solution based on the UN proposals. Instead it suggests a very "BLOODY" solution in the name of "DEMOCRACY" - i.e., "Enosis." It makes one think of 'how a "barbarous", instinctively "violent", less-than-the-"savage"- "animals," "Turks" such as this writer, can be incorporated as a "minority" in a "democratic solution"! The answer has already been provided: by a "bloody" way. Although the above discourse is not widely popular among the Greek Cypriots, it is not discouraged by the government either. That gives the impression to the "other side" (Turks) that the Greek Cypriot government is actually supporting that discourse, which also plays a big role in the failure of the negotiations.

From the above study we got the evidence that there is at least one main "discourse" that dominates a government's global policy towards a certain issue:

In the 1960's and early the 1970's the dominant discourse in the Greek Cypriot government policies towards the Cyprus Conflict was the "Enosis" discourse. It greatly helped to prepare and execute the 1974 coup sent by Greek military regime. Failure of that action (the coup) or, rather the defeat of the coup by Turkish military operation created another powerful discourse (the "Invasion" discourse) that dominated the future policies of the Greek Cypriot government. Although we mentioned about a "main discourse" that dominates the global policy of a government on a specific issue, we are also aware of the other discursive practices that strive to influence a government policy. However, the scope of this paper is too small to deal with all the discursive practices that shape a policy. Instead, we talked about major non-governmental discursive practices that oppose to the "reality that the government's dominating discourse create.

We tried, also, to account on the failure of the UN sponsored negotiations in terms of the Greek Cypriot "Invasion" discourse. However, that is only part of the explanation. In a more comprehensive paper the dominant discursive practices of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments and non- government texts should be studied to obtain a more complete picture.

Because there are many discursive practices within the above mentioned Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Greek texts (especially government texts) that are in opposition to the UN proposed solution to the Cyprus Conflict. As a matter of fact, the most recent proposal of the UN to the two communities of Cyprus is to implement a series of "Confidence-Building-Measures" that will decrease the lack of trust between the two communities which, according to this writer, fostered by the "dominant discourses" of the two communities leaderships.

The Confidence-Building-Measures of the UN call on the two communities to give more chance to their PEOPLE to come together and establish more channels of communication through "joint committees," "joint workshops," "joint cultural events," etc. This, we believe, is an implication that the first-tract diplomacy of the political leaders has failed due to its dominant discursive practice. The second- and third-tract diplomacy of the PEOPLE (rather than the leaders) might help to create new discursive practices that can open the way to a successful negotiated solution.

1 Stephen, Michael (1986). "Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island", Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.

2 Stephen, Michael (1986). "Cyprus, Two Nations in One Island", Bow Educational Briefing, No.5, G. Britain.

3 To cut the channel of the Turkish Cypriots to present their case to the world.

4 Each community didn't have the right of "self determination" separately. An indivisible "sovereignty" was given to both communities to share.

5 The Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization which was originally formed to drove the British colonizers away from the island.

6 The name of the July 20, 1974 Turkish military operation.

7 "Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on equal footing" (The UN Secretary General's report to the Security Council, S/21183, March 8, 1990).

8 In 1986, some Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, threatened to recognize the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)" if the negotiations fail to give a solution. So, the possibility of a recognition of the "TRNC" is a condition which forces the Greek Cypriot government to modify its "Invasion" discourse to reach a UN-based solution - since the recognition of the "TRNC" is worse than the current UN proposed federal solution for the Greek Cypriot side.