the amount of war heads is not what makes a country stronger. 

The Communist revolution eliminated that segment of Russian society that was most Westernized, and put the peasant class in power. History had taught the Russian peasant that cunning and coercion assured survival; cunning when weak; cunning and coercion when strong. "Not to use force when one had it indicated some inner weakness." That concept of the use of power and the fact that, since 1914, the USSR  has lost up to 60,000,000 citizens through war, famine, and purges and survived has no doubt conditioned the development of Soviet nuclear strategy.   Soviet nuclear doctrine, expounded in a wide range of Russian defense literature, has five related elements:

• Preemption (first strike).
• Quantitative superiority (a requisite for preemption and because the war may last for some time, even though the initial hours are decisive).
• Counterforce targeting.
• Combined-arms operations to supplement nuclear strikes.
• Defense, which has been almost totally neglected by the U. S. under its concept of mutual deterrence.

Soviet writing on nuclear strategy has been largely ignored, or has been ridiculed in this country because if its jingoism and crudity, and the obscurity of Communist semantics. It is a strategy of "compellance," in contrast to the U. S. doctrine of deterrence.

But "... the relationship of Soviet doctrine and Soviet deployments (is) sufficiently close to suggest that ignoring or not taking seriously Soviet military doctrine may have very detrimental effects on U. S. security."

Immediately after World War II, the USA, which was the first to develop nuclear weapons and, thus, left behind the rest of the world, began to build up its nuclear arsenal to ensure its superiority in this area. This course of action was aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR so that the USA could dictate the rules of the game and destroy the USSR, under certain circumstances, at least, as a developed state. The USA had such an opportunity for several years before the USSR constructed its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

As soon as the Soviets acquired nuclear arms, and hence the ability for retaliatory strike, the USA accelerated the pace of nuclear build-up. In the mid-1960s the US nuclear arsenal reached its peak and amounted to more than 30,000 warheads. The possession of such a huge nuclear arsenal was necessary to disarm the enemy with a nuclear strike. At the same time, nuclear weapons were supposed to play a decisive role in resolving armed conflicts. The US nuclear superiority in the 1960s implied that an exchange of counter-force strikes (i.e. strikes against military targets only) during a limited nuclear conflict would have led to the US victory. Hence, any retaliatory counter-force strikes of the Soviet Union would have only deteriorated its situation because of the remaining US nuclear arsenal. Thus it was only natural that the Soviet nuclear concept, approved in the early 1960s, was based on the principle of unlimited retaliatory strike, i.e. any US counter-force strike would have resulted in the Soviet counter-value strike to inflict unacceptable damage. This concept met the interests of nuclear deterrence but, evidently, the decision-making barrier for a total retaliatory strike was quite high, since one could hardly compare the damage from the first strike with the damage inflicted by the second strike. This balance of power affected the entire system of political relations and weakened the position of the USSR.

Obviously, Moscow was not satisfied with the situation that a total retaliatory strike, and hence unlimited nuclear war (equal to suicide), was the only response in the case of an escalating limited conflict. Thus, the USSR made titanic efforts and achieved relative nuclear parity with the USA in the early 1970s. The system of strategic nuclear weapons created a state of strategic balance in which each party possessed the capability to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike � the essence of the concept of mutually assured destruction. At the same time, at this stage, neither party, theoretically, had the ability to gain superiority after exchanging counter-force strikes. However, the USA continued to seek such superiority. The most vivid example was the US forward deployment of nuclear forces in Europe and the Reagan doctrine of limited nuclear war.

The concept of mutually assured destruction provided for a strategic balance and each party was interested only in maintaining the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. This situation implied that the parties would not strive to obtain the ability of making a first disarming strike, since such a change would have destabilized the balance and provoked the other party to make a preemptive strike.

Nonetheless, the balance concerning total nuclear war did not ensure a balance concerning lower-scale conflicts. Such conflicts included the aforementioned exchange of counter-force strikes and conventional arms conflicts. When TNW emerged, the conflict with the use of TNW joined this group in an intermediate position.

TNW were, in fact, NATO's response to WTO's conventional superiority in Europe. For European NATO members, TNW guaranteed US participation in defense of an armed conflict. Meanwhile, the USA, making plans to use TNW in conventional conflicts, believed it could contain the conflict within Europe. The USSR rapidly deployed its TNW in response (the adequacy of this response can be called into question). Thus, the unstable situation concerning conventional forces in Europe transformed into a nuclear balance. However, this balance was asymmetric, since TNW deployed in Europe belonged to the USA and were targeted at the USSR. The US territory, at the same time, could not be reached by the Soviet tactical nukes. Nonetheless, stability concerning conventional and tactical arms in Europe played a positive part in achieving and maintaining global balance.

One of the most important instruments for achieving strategic balance (or unilateral superiority) is strategic defense. Strategic defense is known for its paradoxical nature: the concept of mutually assured destruction implies that the protection of valued facilities (cities) is a destabilizing and aggressive act, since it deprives the enemy of inflicting unacceptable damage with a retaliatory strike. At the same time, activities to enhance the viability of offensive nuclear means are stabilizing and defensive by nature, since they help to preserve the potential for retaliatory strike.

The development of missile defense systems is an expensive action with unpredictable results. The creation of such a system would have provided an impetus for an arms race in this area and in adjacent spheres, i.e. the modernization of offensive means (equipping them with gadgets to penetrate the defense), the build-up and development of anti-defense systems, anti-anti-defense systems, etc. Moreover, the development of missile defense systems to counter a massive nuclear strike implies the commissioning of means that have been tested in conditions significantly different from the would-be situation of their deployment and hence, have an unknown efficiency. Therefore, the parties lose stability factors as important as certainty about the efficiency of its own means and information about the capabilities of the enemy. This understanding resulted in the 1972 ABM Treaty with indefinite term.

However, in the mid-1980s, the USA made another attempt to gain superiority with the help of SDI (whose co-lateral damage was the Soviet involvement in a new extremely expensive arms race). If one presumes that the USSR had survived in this arms race and the parties had implemented all measures relating to the deployment of such systems (development of the systems, modernization of offensive means, development of counteraction means, etc.), the planet would have found itself at a new higher, more unstable, and far more dangerous level of nuclear stockpiles.

The changes that have occurred during the last 10 years have significantly changed the military-political situation in the world and have had a positive impact on the strategic balance. Some of these changes can be regarded as positive (e.g. the end of ideological confrontation); others are negative (the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of one of the poles). However, all these changes inevitably result in a number of complicated and dangerous transitions to a new system of international relations.

US turns attention to al-Qaeda in Iran

http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/us-turns-attention-to-alqae da-in-iran/2006/03/21/1142703358742.html

china's newly deployed DF 41 ICBM.

Range: 12000 km

capacity of nuclear warheads: 6

solid fuel

preparation time for launch: 3-5 minutes

france already has chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

I doubt a missile of such a small size can have a range of 12,000 km, unless that 6 warheads is of very low yield.

The latest French missile will have a range of around 10,000 km with a payload of 16 warheads, about three time that of a chinese missile but still  it's a much bigger and expensive missile.

the smaller the size the icbm is, the more technologically advanced it is.

old icbm and nuclear weapons are of a much bigger size.

such as the following Chinese DF-5 deployed in 1971:

It has a range of 15,000 km and it is of a much bigger size.

yet, it is not more technologically advanced. modern nuclear icbms are generally of a much smaller size.

big icbms such as the DF-5 can only be silo based. DF-45 can be both silo and mobile based. The Chinese DF-35 can be submarined based as well with a range of 8000 km.

no mater how much you want to doubt, well, it's a fact. the DF-45 isn't even the longest range icbm china has. it is the latest variant, but not the longest range. it is more mobile and flexible than the DF-5 and has a longer range than the DF-35. The Chinese DF-5 from the 70's is the one with the longest range which is around 15000 km.

what is the code of the french icbm you are talking about?

as far as i know, the longest range icbm france has is the french MSBS M45 with a range of only 6000 km deployed in 1996. It is submarine based and can only carry 6 nuclear warheads as well.

bigger doesn't mean better. bigger in many cases actually means less flexibility. and no one knows how much each icbm costs, but the chinese seem to have an upper hand than the french in term of its strategic forces.

beside, currently, there are no icbms in the world that can carry more than 10 warheads. the us LGM-118A Peacekeeper can carry 10 warheads and it's the newest icbm in the world. there are no icbms that can carry 16 warheads as u indicated. do u mean 16 icbms can fit into a submarine or a missile can carry 16 warheads? i believe you have mixed it up. a nuclear strategic submarine can carry around 16 nuclear missles.

I made a mistake in the number of warheads, well I've confused number of warheads per missile with number of missiles per sub.

What missile I'm talking about: the M51 with a range in btw 8,000 km and 11, 000 km carrying 6 Tn 75 or 10 TNO (each independently targetable). unit cost 4 billion dollar.

http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/M51_SLBM

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M51_SLBM

And you got to be kidding by saying the primitive cold war chinese ballistic missiles is strategically superior to the French one.

French technology in that field is second only to the US, and emphasis is put on the stealthy MIRV rather than a delivery system. French MIRV can penetrate anything. In that area, the chinese are light years backward.

Yea the bigger the nukes the more fuel and more the range, it is simple logic. You can use a smaller for the same range as an older missile only if the fuel is more efficient.

And the statistic released on french nukes is always inferior of what they really are for tactical reason. For instance, it the Triomphant max depth is reported as 300 m but the real figure will twice that number.

Chinese and Russian on other hand tend to exxagerate their statistics to mask the inferiority of the weaponry. THis has been proven over and over by spies during the cold war.

The chinese has only 20 strategic nuclear missile, the rest is junk. On the other hand France can atomise at will 384 chinese cities.

	Country	Suspected Strategic Nuclear Weapons	Suspected Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons	Suspected Total Nuclear Weapons
	China	20	390	410
	France	384	80	464
	India	0	60+?	60+?
	Israel	0	200+?	200+?
	Pakistan	15-25?	0	15-25?
	Russia	~ 6,000	~ 4,000	~10,000
	United Kingdom	185	0	185
	United States	7,200	~ 3,300	~10,500

Originally posted by Sino Defender Originally posted by Quetzalcoatl Originally posted by Sino Defender Originally posted by Quetzalcoatl Originally posted by Sino Defender china's newly deployed DF 41 ICBM. Range: 12000 km capacity of nuclear warheads: 6 solid fuel preparation time for launch: 3-5 minutes   I doubt a missile of such a small size can have a range of 12,000 km, unless that 6 warheads is of very low yield. The latest French missile will have a range of around 10,000 km with a payload of 16 warheads, about three time that of a chinese missile but still  it's a much bigger and expensive missile. the smaller the size the icbm is, the more technologically advanced it is. old icbm and nuclear weapons are of a much bigger size. such as the following Chinese DF-5 deployed in 1971: It has a range of 15,000 km and it is of a much bigger size. yet, it is not more technologically advanced. modern nuclear icbms are generally of a much smaller size. big icbms such as the DF-5 can only be silo based. DF-45 can be both silo and mobile based. The Chinese DF-35 can be submarined based as well with a range of 8000 km. no mater how much you want to doubt, well, it's a fact. the DF-45 isn't even the longest range icbm china has. it is the latest variant, but not the longest range. it is more mobile and flexible than the DF-5 and has a longer range than the DF-35. The Chinese DF-5 from the 70's is the one with the longest range which is around 15000 km. what is the code of the french icbm you are talking about? as far as i know, the longest range icbm france has is the french MSBS M45 with a range of only 6000 km deployed in 1996. It is submarine based and can only carry 6 nuclear warheads as well. bigger doesn't mean better. bigger in many cases actually means less flexibility. and no one knows how much each icbm costs, but the chinese seem to have an upper hand than the french in term of its strategic forces. beside, currently, there are no icbms in the world that can carry more than 10 warheads. the us LGM-118A Peacekeeper can carry 10 warheads and it's the newest icbm in the world. there are no icbms that can carry 16 warheads as u indicated. do u mean 16 icbms can fit into a submarine or a missile can carry 16 warheads? i believe you have mixed it up. a nuclear strategic submarine can carry around 16 nuclear missles.   I made a mistake in the number of warheads, well I've confused number of warheads per missile with number of missiles per sub. What missile I'm talking about: the M51 with a range in btw 8,000 km and 11, 000 km carrying 6 Tn 75 or 10 TNO (each independently targetable). unit cost 4 billion dollar. http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/M51_SLBM http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M51_SLBM And you got to be kidding by saying the primitive cold war chinese ballistic missiles is strategically superior to the French one. French technology in that field is second only to the US, and emphasis is put on the stealthy MIRV rather than a delivery system. French MIRV can penetrate anything. In that area, the chinese are light years backward.   Yea the bigger the nukes the more fuel and more the range, it is simple logic. You can use a smaller for the same range as an older missile only if the fuel is more efficient. And the statistic released on french nukes is always inferior of what they really are for tactical reason. For instance, it the Triomphant max depth is reported as 300 m but the real figure will twice that number. Chinese and Russian on other hand tend to exxagerate their statistics to mask the inferiority of the weaponry. THis has been proven over and over by spies during the cold war.   The chinese has only 20 strategic nuclear missile, the rest is junk. On the other hand France can atomise at will 384 chinese cities. Country Suspected Strategic Nuclear Weapons Suspected Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Suspected Total Nuclear Weapons China 20 390 410 France 384 80 464 India 0 60+? 60+? Israel 0 200+? 200+? Pakistan 15-25? 0 15-25? Russia ~ 6,000 ~ 4,000 ~10,000 United Kingdom 185 0 185 United States 7,200 ~ 3,300 ~10,500   i am not saying the DF-5 is superior, but the DF-45 is. DF-5 is from the cold war era, but the DF-45 has just been deployed. It also can carry 6 independently targeted warhead as well with a longer range than the french ICBM. Russian and the US are around the same in term of technology of nuclear warheads. Russian nuclear and space forces are superior to France and are superior to the US in some areas such as the space station. After all, Russia, US, China all got much larger defence budget than France. ICBM technology is related to space technology. China, USA, and Russia are the only countries that can perform manned space flights.

No china and Russia don't have a larger defense budget than France. French defense budget is around $42 Billion dollar this year. France may have never been interested in manned flight but was the creator of ariane space agency, now part of the ESA. Ariane rockets are more advance than anything the chinese can and have a very low failure rate as compared to any other rocket.

I know this source but the official source say china defense is $26 billion. That source is only estimating chinese defense. Anyway the chinese army is way larger than the french one so much of its resources is spread to buy large amount of low tech equipment.