Early and mid twentieth century geographers who indentified with geopolitics viewed Russia, the Ukraine and central Asia as the "Heartland" of the Eurasian land mass. This was perceived by several of them as the key to both an unassailable defensive bastion and to self sufficiency, with contiguous access through modern transportation (railways/canals).
The demise of the USSR has detached both the agricultural Ukraine and control of the energy resources of much of central Asia from the Russian "empire." Since the later 1990s, strategic thinking and actions have sought to re-establish Russian influence as far as possible in these areas.
Also, the role of Russia as a potential counterweight to both China and to the US has been a goal set by Russian leadership.
Russia has historically been, if not hostile, distrustful of "the West," or Europe beyond the river Nieman, and of western society. There still seems to be an almost romantic nostalgia for Old Russia and of Russia's own perception of Russian civilization. Russian expansion to south and east in the 19th century was similar to US expansion across North America.
The detachment of central Asian territories, acquired at great effort under the Empire has been a loss in terms of economic and strategic value. The loss of Ukraine is a monumental loss as much arable land of the USSR was removed, putting stress on what was not an efficiently developed part of Russia's economy.
In both of these geographical regions, the West, in the form of NATO has been seen as an interloper, unwelcome and threatening to Russian interests. In this regard, the West is still seen as a security concern for Russia especially the military resources expended by the US in Germany, the Caucasus (Georgia/Azerbaijan) and until recently in Uzbekistan. Thus:
1) Western (US) military presence, even as advisors, and new missile shields in Europe are seen as infringements on Russian interests, security and prestige.
2) The diversion of hydrocarbon resources from central Asia to other states' uses limits both economic benefit and strategic control in a sensitive geography for Russian interests.
In addition, the loss of direct control over the central Asian states has created potential strategic and political security issues for Russia. Not only had US forces been deployed to Uzbekistan, but India is maintaining an air base now in Tadjikistan, though not seen as directed against Russia. In addition, Islamist influences, official or otherwise, are less able to be controlled by security forces in these independent republics.
Not yet mentioned, but ultimately most important, Russia and China share a very long border, and have had an historically tense relationship since the emergence of Russian influence, railroads and troops in the East in the late 19th century. Even as Communist states, they were rivals with their own geopolitical issues (Russia-Viet Nam; Sino-American relations under Nixon, etc.)
3) China is seen as a longer term security concern along the Asian border, with long and vulnerable Russian economic lines of communication to the Pacific. As Sparten has observed elsewhere, there is a serious lack of strategic depth along this line, and China, as a resource hungry state (with her own historic sense of civilization) may at some time infringe on Asiatic Russia's natural raw materials and hydroelectric resources.
Although the "Heartland" is undeniably a strong defensive position strategically, it is as yet undetermined if Russia can overcome her diminishment as a great power. Internally, there are still systemic problems yet to be solved:
4) As part of her economic security, Russia needs to promote demand for Russian products outside Russia....This has always been a problem. Outside of oil, capital has been insufficiently created.
Oil and Gas are the current world riches, but foreign business primarily determined by one commodity with historic price fluctuations is insufficiently diverse. Much of that income has been allocated for rebuilding the military forces (for use against whom?)
Russia's population is somewhat less than a third that of North America, and one tenth that of China, and with a declining birth rate.
5) Russia's international influence has been lessened since the early 1990s, but energetic leadership has sought to recover some important aspects of it. The primary leverage for this influence continues to be control over hyrdocarbon resources, and their potential denial, with the defensive military backup of nuclear strike capability (including submarines). Russia's peripheral capabilities in terms of overall naval power are currently much reduced and not adequately postioned for strategic effect.
These are the primary security concerns (as seen by the writer) for the Russian republic.
Comments?
Edited by pikeshot1600 - 08-Jun-2008 at 13:30