World War II is funny, because even in America people think Hitler, although the Americans had their military bases attacked by the Japanese.

The Japanese were also very violent an inhumane. The amount of lives lost in Manchuria coupled with the European invaders of China (Britan, France, America, etc) created a distrust of foreigners in China.

Hello to you all

Sure but breaking the Treaty of Versailles is different then an inevitable path to global conquest isn't it? Do you think the Weimar Republic was heading in that direction?

`(England) kept hoping against hope that she could embroil Russia and Germany with each other and thus escape scot-free herself.'

...In the meantime the British had been working out a plan of their own. It involved, as we have said,

(1) separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, probably through the use of a plebiscite or even by outright partition;

(2) neutralization of the rest of Czechoslovakia by revising her treaties with Russia and France, and

(3) guarantee of this rump of Czechoslovakia (but not by Britain).

This plan was outlined to the Czech ambassador in London by Lord Halifax on May 25th, and was worked out in some detail by one of Lord Halifax's subordinates, William (now Lord) Strang, during a visit to Prague and to Berlin in the following week. This was the plan which was picked up by Lord Runciman and presented as his recommendation in his report of September 21, 938.

It is worthy of note that on September 2nd Lord Runciman sent a personal message by Henlein to Hitler in which he said that he would have a settlement drawn up by September 15th. What is, perhaps, surprising is that Lord Runciman made no use whatever of the Karlsbad Demands or the extensive concessions to meet them which the Czechs had made during these negotiations, but instead recommended to the British Cabinet on September 16th, and in his written report five days later, the same melange of partition, plebiscites, neutralization, and guarantee which had been in the mind of the British Foreign Office for weeks. It was this plan which was imposed on the Czechs by the Four-Power Conference at Munich on September 30th...

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#45 - http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#45

French Ambassador gives his assessment of German foreign policy:


M. COULONDRE, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs.  Berlin, December 15, 1938.

...The German people, which taken as a whole is peacefully minded, sees in the better understanding of the two countries a guarantee of peace. Those who are disturbed by the excesses of National-Socialist "dynamism" and by the political and economic tension brought about by the regime, are hoping for some relaxation in the internal and external situation, which might help Germany to return gradually to more normal conditions of life. As to the Party, it is evident that they wanted an agreement with France essentially because of the security it offers in the West, if enterprises in other directions are contemplated.

(2) The will for expansion in the East, as a matter of fact, seems to me as undeniable on the part of the Third Reich, as its disposition to put aside-at least for the present-any idea of conquest in the West; the one is a corollary of the other. The first half of Herr Hitler's programme-the integration of the Deutschtum into the Reich-has been carried out more or less completely; now the hour of the "Lebensraum" has come. The insistence with which it has been explained to me that Germany has no claims in the direction of France would have been enough to enlighten me. But I received even more explicit information; all those with whom I held conversations, with the exception of Herr Hitler, spoke to me, in different ways, and always with intentional vagueness, of the necessity for German expansion in Eastern Europe, Herr von Ribbentrop spoke of "the creation of zones of influence in the East and South-East"; Field-Marshal Goering, of "an essentially economic penetration in the South-East."

I have not personally received very definite confidential information on this subject; but it appears that little by little one can see the outlines of a great German enterprise emerge from what is still nebulous. To secure mastery over Central Europe by reducing Czechoslovakia and Hungary to a state of vassalage and then to create a Greater Ukraine under German control-this is what essentially appears to be the leading idea now accepted by the Nazi leaders, and doubtless by Herr Hitler himself.

Unfortunately the vassalage of Czechoslovakia is almost complete by this time. "My country is now nothing more than a province," my Czech colleague said only yesterday. The German Secret Service is said to be already only working there with Poland in mind and certain German circles are reported to have gone so far as to declare that from now on the Czech army will be called on to play the same part as the Bavarian army under the Second Reich. The construction of the motor road between Breslau and Vienna and of the canal between the Oder and the Danube will be entrusted exclusively to Czech labour. From two equally trustworthy sources I have learnt that in the near future a German-Czech currency agreement will be concluded and will soon be followed by an economic and monetary union.

In Hungary, where resistance will evidently be more determined, they will first endeavour to establish a sort of economic vassalage, and to ensure for the German Army the right of transit, which has become indispensable for action in the east, since Hungarian territory cuts across the Slovak railway.

With regard to the Ukraine, it has been talked about by the whole staff of the National-Socialist Party for the past ten days. Dr. Rosenberg's Centre of Studies, Dr. Goebbels's Services and the "Ost-Europa" organization under the former Minister, Herr Curtius, as well as the Intelligence Service of the German Army, are working on the question. It looks as if the ways and means had not yet been decided upon, but the aim appears to be well defined: to create a Greater Ukraine which would become Germany's granary. In order to achieve this Rumania must be subdued, Poland won over, and Soviet Russia dispossessed; German dynamism is not to be stopped by any of these obstacles, and in military circles, they already talk of the advance to the Caucasus and to Baku.

It is unlikely that Herr Hitler will attempt to achieve his plans concerning the Ukraine by direct military action. It would be contrary to the principles he has professed at different times, and according to which the regime wants neither an ideological war nor the annexation of heterogeneous populations. It seems, moreover, that he has not yet decided on the means of action.

Among those who approach him, a political operation is thought of which would repeat, on a larger scale, that of the Sudeten: propaganda in Poland, in Rumania and in Soviet Russia in favour of Ukrainian independence; support eventually given by diplomatic pressure and by the action of armed bands; Ruthenia would be the focus of the movement. Thus by a curious turn of Fate, Czechoslovakia, which had been established as a bulwark to stem the German drive, now serves the Reich as a battering-ram to demolish the gates to the East.

(3) Nobody in Germany has mentioned the Colonies to me. For the moment at least, only certain specialized circles are occupied with that question. When Herr von Ribbentrop alluded to the demonstrations in France following the German claims it was only to declare that the question might be discussed in five or six years' time. He expressed himself in precisely similar terms when speaking to one of my colleagues, which points to the existence of instructions on the subject. The Führer gave the Belgian Ambassador the definite impression that he was not interested in the question, and that he only raised it from time to time to prevent the "rights of ownership" of Germany from falling into abeyance. The Nazi leaders use the method of Descartes, taking up each question in turn; above all, their appetites, whetted both by their needs and by their ambitions, drive them towards the East, towards the "glorious adventure" and the great achievement of the regime, which they are eager to undertake.

(4) It would appear that the difficulties of the economic situation contribute largely to this haste. The shortage of foreign currency following on the enormous expenses for armament entails ever increasing restrictions, particularly of food stuffs. The population is badly nourished, and sometimes probably even underfed. Unemployment has disappeared, in fact there is actually a shortage of labour, as the manufacture of substitutes requires much more labour than the preparation of natural products, but the working men, who are forced to work ten hours a day, are showing signs of weariness, and I have heard of recent cases of ca' canny strikes that were fairly serious. Competent authorities which do not belong to the Party hold that the financial and economic capacity of the country is strained to the limit. But most of the leaders refuse to admit this. In order to sustain and reinforce this preparatory war economy, there is need of a granary, of mines, and of labour; the Ukraine is at the door of the Reich...

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/fyb/part_2.html#33 - http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/fyb/part_2.html#33

Letter from WSC (Chateau de L'Horizon, Cannes) to CSC, reporting on visit to Paris, where he had meetings with Paul Reynaud, Sir Eric Phipps, Leon Blum, discussing French relations with Italy and Germany, also discussing fear in London that Hitler would turn against Britain, instead of going to the East...

http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?search_id=1175486;sort_by=Dscore;index=0 - http://www-archives.chu.cam.ac.uk/perl/node?search

thanks for the backup gcle

...From this point onward, the course of the Milner Group was more rigid against Germany.  This appeared chiefly as an increased emphasis on rearmament and national service, policies which the Group had been supporting for a long time.

Unlike the Chamberlain group, they learned a lesson from the events of 15 March 1939.  It would be a mistake, however, to believe that they were determined to resist any further acquisition of territory or economic advantage by Germany.  Not at all.  They would undoubtedly have been willing to allow frontier rectifications in the Polish Corridor or elsewhere in favor of Germany, if these were accomplished by a real process of negotiation and included areas inhabited by Germans, and if the economic interests of Poland, such as her trade outlet to the Baltic, were protected.  In this the Milner Group were still motivated by ideas of fairness and justice and by a desire to avoid a war.  The chief changes were two:  (1) they now felt, as they (in contrast to Chamberlain’s group) had long suspected, that peace could be preserved better by strength than by weakness;  and (2) they now felt that Hitler would not stop at any point based only on justice but was seeking world domination. 

The short-run goal of the Milner Group still remained a Continent dominated by Hitler between an Oceanic Bloc on the west and the Soviet Union on the east.  That they assumed such a solution could keep the peace, even on a short-term basis, shows the fundamental naïvete of the Milner Group. 

The important point is that this view did not prohibit any modification of the Polish frontiers;  not did it require any airtight understanding with the Soviet Union.  It did involve an immediate rearming of Britain and a determination to stop Hitler if he moved by force again.  Of these three points, the first two were shared with the Chamberlain group;  the third was not. 

The difference rested on the fact that the Chamberlain group hoped to permit Britain to escape from the necessity of fighting Germany by getting Russia to fight Germany.  The Chamberlain group did not share the Milner Group’s naive belief in the possibility of three great power blocs standing side by side in peace.  Lacking that belief, they preferred a German-Russian war to a British-German war. 

And, having that preference, they differed from the Milner Group in their willingness to accept the partition of Poland by Germany.  The Milner Group would have yielded parts of Poland to Germany if done by fair negotiation.  The Chamberlain group was quite prepared to liquidate Poland entirely, if it could be presented to the British people in terms which they would accept without demanding war. 

Here again appeared the difference we have already mentioned between the Milner Group and Lloyd George in 1918 and between the Group and Baldwin in 1923, namely that the Milner Group tended to neglect the electoral considerations so important to a party politician.

In 1939 Chamberlain was primarily interested in building up to a victorious electoral campaign for November, and, as Sir Horace Wilson told German Special Representative Wohl in June, “it was all one to the Government whether the elections were held under the cry `Be Ready for a Coming War’ or under a cry `A Lasting Understanding with Germany.' ”

...These distinctions between the point of view of the Milner Group and that of the Chamberlain group are very subtle and have nothing in common with the generally accepted idea of a contrast between appeasement and resistance.  There were still appeasers to be found, chiefly in those ranks of the Conservative Party most remote from the Milner Group;  British public opinion was quite clearly committed to resistance after March 1939.

The two government groups between these, with the Chamberlain group closer to the former and the Milner Group closer to the latter.  It is a complete error to say, as most students of the period have said, that before 15 March the government was solidly appeasement and afterwards solidly resistant. 

The Chamberlain group, after 17 March 1939, was just as partial to appeasement as before, perhaps more so, but it had to adopt a pretense of resistance to satisfy public opinion and keep a way open to wage the November election on either side of the issue.  The Milner Group was anti-appeasement after March, but in a limited way that did not involve any commitment to defend the territorial integrity of Poland or to ally with Russia...

...The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31 March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters wanted.  He had no intention of ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be evaded and, for this reason, refused the Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate staff discussions to implement the guarantee.  The Milner Group, less susceptible to public opinion, did not want the guarantee to Poland at all.  As a result, the guarantee was worded to cover Polish “independence” and not her “territorial integrity.” 

This was interpreted by the leading article of The Times for 1 April to leave the way open to territorial revision without revoking the guarantee.  This interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain in Commons on 3 April.  Apparently the government believed that it was making no real commitment because, if war broke out in eastern Europe, British public opinion would force the government to declare war on Germany, no matter what the government itself wanted, and regardless whether the guarantee existed or not.

On the other hand, a guarantee to Poland might deter Hitler from precipitating a war and give the government time to persuade the Polish government to yield the Corridor to Germany.  If the Poles could not be persuaded, or if Germany marched, the fat was in the fire anyway;  if the Poles could be persuaded to yield, the guarantee was so worded that Britain could not act under it to prevent such yielding.  This was to block any possibility that British public opinion might refuse to accept a Polish Munich.

That this line of thought was not far distant from British government circles is indicated by a Reuters news dispatch released on the same day that Chamberlain gave the guarantee to Poland.  This dispatch indicated that, under cover of the guarantee, Britian would put pressure on Poland to make substantial concessions to Hitler through negotiations.  According to Hugh Dalton, Labour M.P., speaking in Commons on 3 April, this dispatch was inspired by the government and was issued through either the Foreign Office, Sir Horace Wilson, John Simon, or Samuel Hoare. 

Three of these four were of the Milner Group, the fourth being the personal agent of Chamberlain.  Dalton’s charge was not denied by any government spokesman, Hoare contenting himself with a request to Dalton “to justify that statement.”  Another M.P. of Churchill’s group suggested that Geoffrey Dawson was the source, but Dalton rejected this.

It is quite clear that neither the Chamberlain group nor the Milner Group wanted an alliance with the Soviet Union to stop Hitler in 1939, and that the negotiations were not sincere or vigorously pursued.  The Milner Group was not so opposed to such an agreement as the Chamberlain group.  Both were committed to the four-power pact.  In the case of the Chamberlain group, this pact could easily have developed into an anti-Russian alliance, but in the case of the Milner Group it was regarded merely as a link between the Oceanic Bloc and a Germanic Mitteleuropa.

Both groups hated and despised the Soviet Union, but the Milner Group did not fear it as the Chamberlain group did.  This fear was based on the Marxist threat to the British economic system, and the Milner Group was not wedded nearly as closely to that system as Chamberlain and his friends.  The Toynbee-Milner tradition, however weak it had become by 1939, was enough to prevent the two groups from seeing eye to eye on this issue.

The efforts of the Chamberlain group to continue the policy of appeasement by making economic and other concessions to Germany and their efforts to get Hitler to agree to a four-power pact form one of the most shameful episodes in the history of recent British diplomacy.  These negotiations were chiefly conducted through Sir Horace Wilson and consisted chiefly of offers of colonial bribes and other concessions to Germany.  These offers were either rejected or ignored by the Nazis.

One of these offers revolved around a semi-official economic agreement under which British and German industrialists would form cartel agreements in all fields to fix prices of their products and divide up the world’s market.  The Milner Group apparently objected to this on the grounds that it was aimed, or could be aimed, at the United States.  Nevertheless, the agreements continued;  a master agreement, negotiated at Dusseldorf between representatives of British and German industry, was signed in London on 16 March 1939.  A British government mission to Berlin to help Germany exploit the newly acquired areas of eastern Europe was postponed the same day because of the strength of public feeling against Germany.  As soon as this had died down, secret efforts were made through R.S. Hudson, secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, to negotiate with Helmuth Wohlthat, Reich Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, who was in London to negotiate an international whaling agreement.

Although Wholthat had no powers, he listened to Hudson and later to Sir Horace Wilson, but refused to discuss the matter with Chamberlain.  Wilson offered:  (1) a non-aggression pact with Germany;  (2) a delimitation of spheres among the Great Powers;  (3) colonial concessions in Africa along the lines previously mentioned;  (4) an economic agreement.  These conversations, reported to Berlin by Ambassador Dirksen in a dispatch of 21 July 1939, would have involved giving Germany a free hand in eastern Europe and bringing her into collision with Russia. 

One sentence of Dirksen’s says:  “Sir Horace Wilson definitely told Herr Wohlthat that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would enable Britian to rid herself of her commitments vis-a-vis Poland.”  In another report, three days later, Dirksen said:  “Public opinion is so inflamed, and the warmongers and intriguers are so much in the ascendancy, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to become public they would immediately be torpedoed by Churchill and other incendiaries with the cry 'No second Munich !' ”

The truth of this statement was seen when news of the Hudson-Wohlthat conversations did leak out and resulted in a violent controversy in the House of Commons, in which the Speaker of the House repeatedly broke off the debate to protect the government.  According to Press Adviser Hesse in the German Embassy in London, the leak was made by the French Embassy to force a break in the negotiations.  The negotiations, however, were already bogging down because of the refusal of the Germans to become very interested in them.  Hitler and Ribbentrop by this time despised the British so thoroughly that they paid no attention to them at all, and the German Ambassador in London found it impossible to reach Ribbentrop, his official superior, either by dispatch or personally. 

Chamberlain, however, in his eagerness to make economic concessions to Germany, gave to Hitler £6 million in Czechoslovak gold in the Bank of England, and kept Lord Runciman busy training to be chief economic negotiator in the great agreement which he envisaged.  On 29 July 1939, Kordt, the German charge d’affaires in London, had a long talk with Charles Roden Buxton, brother of the Labour Peer Lord Noel-Buxton, about the terms of this agreement, which was to be patterned on the agreement of 1907 between Britain and Russia.  Buxton insisted that his visit was quite unofficial, but Kordt was inclined to believe that his visit was a feeler from the Chamberlain group.

In view of the close parallel between Buxton’s views and Chamberlain’s, this seems very likely.  This was corroborated when Sir Horace Wilson repeated these views in a highly secret conversation with Dirksen at Wilson’s home from 4 to 6 p.m. on 3 August 1939.  Dirksen’s minute of the same day shows that Wilson’s aims had not changed.  He wanted a four-power pact, a free hand for Germany in eastern Europe, a colonial agreement, an economic agreement, etc. 

The memorandum reads, in part:  “After recapitulating his conversation with Wohlthat, Sir Horace Wilson expatiated at length on the great risk Chamberlain would incur by starting confidential negotiations with the German Government.  If anything about them were to leak out there would be a grand scandal, and Chamberlain would probably be forced to resign.”  Dirksen did not see how any binding agreement could be reached under conditions such as this;  “for example, owing to Hudson’s indiscretion, another visit of Herr Wohlthat to London was out of the question.”  To this, Wilson suggested that “the two emissaries could meet in Switzerland or elsewhere.”  The political portions of this conversation were largely repeated in an interview that Dirksen had with Lord Halifax on 9 August 1939. ^{file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Avatar%20Viper/Desktop/New%20Folder/0%20-%20World%20War%20II/Carroll%20Quigley%20-%20The%20Anglo-American%20Establishment%204.html#n_18_ - [18]}

It was not possible to conceal these activities completely from the public, and, indeed, government spokesmen referred to them occasionally in trial balloons.  On 3 May, Chamberlain suggested an Anglo-German non-aggression pact, although only five days earlier Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934.  As late as 28 August, Sir Nevile Henderson offered Germany a British alliance if she were successful in direct negotiations with the Poles. ^{file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Avatar%20Viper/Desktop/New%20Folder/0%20-%20World%20War%20II/Carroll%20Quigley%20-%20The%20Anglo-American%20Establishment%204.html#n_19_ - [19]}

This, however, was a personal statement and probably went further than Halifax would have been willing to go by 1939.  Halifax apparently had little faith in Chamberlain’s ability to obtain any settlement with the Germans.  If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it.  It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States. 

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland.  Instead, he sought to get nothing more than a unilateral Russian guarantee to Poland to match the British guarantee to the same country.

This was much too dangerous for Russia to swallow, since it would leave her with a commitment which could lead to war and with no promise of British aid to her if she were attacked directly, after a Polish settlement, or indirectly across the Baltic States.  Only after the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland.  This was done to warn Hitler that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public opinion.

Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain.  Even after the German attack on Poland, the British government was reluctant to fulfill this pact and spent almost three days asking the Germans to return to negotiation.  Even after the British were forced to declare war on Germany, they made no effort to fight, contenting themselves with dropping leaflets on Germany.  We now know that the German generals had moved so much of their forces to the east that they were gravely worried at the effects which might follow an Allied attack on western Germany or even an aerial bombing of the Ruhr...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html - http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46 -

This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group.  Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group. 

The two policies followed parallel courses until March 1939.  After that date the Milner Group’s disintegration became very evident, and part of it took the form of the movement of several persons (like Hoare and Simon) from the second circle of the Milner Group to the inner circle of the new group rotating around Chamberlain. 

This process was concealed by the fact that this new group was following, in public at least, the policy desired by the Milner Group;  their own policy, which was really the continuation of appeasement for another year after March 1939, was necessarily secret, so that the contrast between the Chamberlain group and the inner circle of the Milner Group in the period after March 1939 was not as obvious as it might have been.

In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:

(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia; 

(2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries;  and

(3) to hoodwink the English people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem. 

The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the implications of their policy and tried to reverse it...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html - http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html

Secret talks between Hitler and Chamberlain, who tries to bribe Germany

The story was leaked by the French, who feared the British were selling them out to Germany. There was an instant clamour in the press and political circles. The UK government's embarrassment was compounded by the German response. Hitler rejected the offer 'with indignation'. Hudson's proposal for a loan supposedly linked to German disarmament was dismissed as 'the fantasy of a government which has lost its grip on reality'. Hitler denounced an 'arrogant and shameless' offer which suggested Britain thought she was dealing with a 'defeated enemy'.

But Dirksen's papers revealed a much more sinister story of Anglo-German collusion designed to conceal the real, and far more substantive negotiations going on by means of a synthetic hullabaloo over Hudson's 'offer'.

These negotiations had begun more than a month earlier.

Dirksen explained the reasons for secrecy: 'the problem which is puzzling the sponsors of these plans [i.e. Chamberlain and Halifax] most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so inflamed that if plans to negotiate with Germany became public they would immediately be torpedoed'. Discussions took place between Hitler's economic adviser Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson, a member of Chamberlain's kitchen cabinet. The essence of Chamberlain's proposal, relayed to Wohlthat, was as follows.

Wohlthat was told 'there were still three big regions in the world where Germany and England could find wide opportunities for activity: the British Empire, China and Russia. England alone could not adequately take care of her vast empire and it would be quite possible for Germany to be given a rather comprehensive share. Just as little could Japan satisfy all China economically; in Russia the situation was similar'. Wilson went on to say that 'the British government had in view the conclusion of two pacts with Germany: the first on non-aggression and the second on non-intervention' in exchange for which, Chamberlain 'would end the British "guarantee" policy and agree to an acceptable settlement of the problems (sic) in Eastern Europe'.

Additionally, the British would prevail on France to abrogate her Mutual Assistance Pact with Russia and abandon all her ties in South-East Europe. It was made clear that the British 'guarantee' to Poland was nothing more than a device to achieve the main aim- a broad alliance with Hitler Germany.

The British wanted a 'non-intervention pact' in order to secure a general demarcation of spheres of influence throughout the world; this would be combined with an economic agreement which amounted to an eventual coalescing of the German and British economies in a mutual exploitation of each country's colonial empires.

There was discussion of the 'need to open and exploit' world markets- including China and the USSR. Just in case anything had been left out, Wilson commented that, if Hitler had any other demands, 'the Fuhrer only has to take a clean sheet of paper and list the questions he is interested in'. These talks were continued in Berlin through early August, when Britain also agreed 'to recognize East Europe as Germany's natural lebensraum (living space)'; to settle the colonial question and end 'Germany's encirclement'.

'Agreement with Germany is still Britain's dearest wish' wrote Dirksen. British efforts to woo Hitler continued into August. Sir Horace Wilson met Fritz Hesse, a Ribbentrop aide, at his Kensington town house to convey a new offer by Chamberlain to conclude a 25-year 'defensive alliance' with Germany. Hesse wanted clarification: did this mean the British would take Germany's side in a war with the Soviet Union? Wilson replied that it did.

Hitler did not respond directly to the latest British overtures. His main concern was that the Soviet Union might still manage to persuade the French and British to negotiate seriously for a mutual assistance pact. His own overtures to the Soviet Government for a Non-aggression Treaty now became more insistent; and they were buttressed, of course, with the plentiful evidence of British bad faith now available to Hitler.

In any case, Hitler had no worries about the likely British response to a German attack on Poland; he was now convinced, and could hardly be otherwise, that Britain would not go to war for the sake of Poland.

...The seven made their separate ways to Sylt for the meeting. Their purpose was to offer a "second Munich" - a four-power agreement involving Britain, Germany, France and Italy - to make further concessions to German demands for lebensraum (room for living) on condition that the Nazis did not invade Poland.

This offer, authorised by the leading appeaser Lord Halifax, shocked Halifax's biographer Roberts, who had not found any reference to this last-minute offer in either Foreign Office documents or Halifax's private papers. Aberconway showed Roberts 38 pages of documents...

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/12/1044927661990.html - http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/12/1044927661990.html

...If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it. 

It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States.

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland...

http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html - http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html