Most definately.

 

I don't think Rome chose not to dwell on Teutoburg.  I think a sober realization was made, not too long after the event, that the Empire had reached most of the geographical limits that it could support and defend.

 

The region around the Rhine became the extent of Rome's control on the continent, and there was not very much in the way of expansion in the next couple of centuries.  After the limits of Rome's expansion had been reached, it seems more energy was expended in civil wars and other internal matters (that were the beginning of the weakening of the Empire).

 

If that view has any merit, Teutoburg was surely a momentous event.

 

 

Caesar built the trestle-bridge in just 10 days (near modern Coblenz). Sorry if I'm being choppy with all this information. Caesar had refused aid from the people to the south, the Ubii, in order to impress the locals of Roman ingenuity and engineereing capacity, showing he wouldn't need boats. The impression worked, but all the tribal people did was abandon their towns and seek refuge in the forests, and assemble the warriors at a central point to get ready for Caesar. In the forested territory of the Suebi, they were resolved to resist him. He refused, knowing his army was not suited to forest warfare, dismantled the bridge, and returned to Gaul.

Now, bridges such as this would have needed to be constructed on strategic points along the Rhine and possibly the Danube for a serious conquest of Germania. I seriously doubt briganding raiders would have not furiously attempted to sabotage them, even after solid completion.   

Further to the north, west near Emmerich, the tribes of the Usipetes and Tencteri, numbering about 430,000 people, had settled west of the Rhine. This number should be treated with with critical caution, as we should Caesar's claim of the numbers comprising the Gallic relief force at Alesia. But no doubt the Germanic tribes were plentiful with warriors. He massacred them before building the bridge, and part of his reason for venturing across the Rhine was to follow up the escaping cavalry. The Sugambri refused, or were unable, to surrender the fugitives.  

I realize I am mentioning events 4-5 decades before the backdrop we are discussing, but the conditions were not substantially different, and Caesar had other priorities. But he seemed to realize the handicap Roman legionaires would face if opposed by the Germanic tribes on a scale of determined resistence. He certainly would have considered conquest in these lands if he deemed it possible. He was planning to invade Parthia, certainly a formidable task, before his death.       

The disparagement of Varus, most notably form the historian Velleius, is unjust.vVarus' handling of the disturbances in Judaea was quite thorough. He was simply the wrong guy in the wrong place when he was destroyed. Some events are simply circumstantial. There was no reason for him to be untrustworthy of Arminius, who had led his people in the service of Rome, being granted both Roman citizenship and equestrian status. He even learnt Latin. His fidelity to Rome was genuine before he changed his view of Roman domination in his homeland. I think Varus did ignore warnings of Arminius' intentions, though.

The peace Tiberius achieved with one Maroboduus of the Marcomani (do I have this tribal name correct, somebody?) was soon nullified when he was driven out by his rival Catualda, who didn't favor friendship with Rome (I'm not 100% certain about this). This type of internicine would have probably been exploited by the Romans to their benefit. But would Germanic tribes conform? It's just very hard to say for sure.

OK, for Aemilianus' question concerning Teutoburger Wald - that of a Roman victory. 2 things are certain: Augustus' whole German policy would not have been shattered at the time, and the territory east of the Rhine would not have not been immediately lost. But it would need to be a decisive victory for Varus; a tactical withdrawal, stalemate, or even Pyrrhic victory would have lost the Roman holdings in the region. To reiterate, Roman culture was based on cities (ie, colonization), and the Germanic peoples on the fringe of the Empire were comparitively civilized, but the bulk of the Germanic peoples, in the east and north, were not. The Celts throughout Iberia, Gaul, and Britain were somewhat urbanized. The restless German tribes of the northern and eastern regions of Germania, the 'bulk' I just mentioned, were not.     

The bulk of Germania not already incorporated into the Empire would probably never been absorbed by Rome, no matter what happened at the Teutoburger Wald. With Varus' victory, Roman hegemony, at best, would have furthered towards the Elbe and Weser from the districts they had already subdued, but not much, and a massacre would have, in all likelihood, occured upon a Roman army on the march if they attempted the conquest too far east and north. The forests provided both cover and viable launching points for harrassing raids etc. Germania was too big, too forested, the warriors too tough, and the lands did not offer what was important to sustain such a vast conquest. This is what the British faced with the American colonies; as long as resistence was imminent, the vast land could not be contained militarily. Of course, Germania wasn't quite that big. Now, back to the point of economization; draining the imperial treasury for a dubious conquest was simply not worth the risk. Doing so would have compromised the solidarity of the other frontiers, if money and troops were poured into Germany.

An important question is whether the Germanic peoples beyond Roman suzerainty would have cooperated with each other to put up the resistence necessary to thwart Roman armies. They certainly could have beaten back the legionaires, provided they avoided conventional engagements in open terrain. But only in relative conjunction with each other. Germanicus narrowly avoided disaster when he faced such a predicament after defeating Arminius in open battle. Interestingly, that very cooperation did indeed occcur in the 5th century, which saw the downfall of the Western Roman Empire from these very people from Germania (for the most part). But it certainly didn't endure, as chiefs began killing each other.

This is all hindsight though; in the recent years before the Teutoburger Wald, the territory between the Rhine and the Weser was considered to be prettty much subdued, though not totally conquered. With the exception of a defeat at the hands of the Sugambri in 16 B.C., the Romans had bettered all Germanic forces since Caesar's first incursions over the Rhine. The Romans were wary of the potential for trouble from the Germanics, but they were not considered a formidable enemy by any means.

It is certainly a tough hypothesis to pinpoint. Much depends on the attitude of the Germanic peoples, which may or may not have been significantly disparate. Rome's major talent was absorbing peoples into their realm. If a confederated German resistence was applied, then no way - Rome would not have been able to conquer the lands, even the regions west of the Elbe. If, contrarily, they came across many Friends, which was the case in many regions just beyond the Rhine and Danube, than much of Germany could have been pacified. But if they had, concern and vigilance would have sprouted from the Hunnic peoples to the east of Germania.

Thanks, Spartan
    
    

 

It was not the Roman didn't have the capability to conquer all the barbarians of Germania, it was just Germania was open to the east to barbarian invasion (The Hun were among the many Eastern Barbarians that subdued the germanics at one time or another); any efforts to bring this area under Roman dominion would therefore be ilogical. So the roman decided to create a more or less symbolic barrier called the Limes line that hugged the Rhine, forming a bottle-neck, a very defensible position.

 

http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/Courses/maps/fullmap3.jpg -  

 

Utter nonsense, anti-french propaganda by the anglos. Either Caesar is a chronic liar or his words had expressly been distorted by the Anglo-saxons and germanophiles to further their pretentious claims of superiority over the Gauls.

 

Sorry my friends but ever since I read about this battle I have never been able to comprehend its significance. All the Germanic tribes became part of Rome and affected by it one way or another. Only 3 legions were lost from 50 Rome had and Germanicus lead a successful punitive action that regained Roman honour and if I am mistaken, the Romans took the same lands Arminius was defending later on, so could some one please explain why it so so significant?

 

Al-Jassas

 

After the successes of the last century BC, the shock of a defeat of this magnitude was difficult to swallow for the hyperpower of the day.  The significance of the event was not that Roman armies were not still formidable (and that they could still venture into Germania).  It marked the furthest practical extent of Roman expansion on the European continent. 

 

Roman presence beyond the Rhine never became widespread, and the Limes Germanicus became the Rhine valley in the west, as the Danube became the limes further east.

 

Rome's center was the Mediterranean world, not the alien north with its endless forests.  After the punitive expeditions toward the Elbe, I think the Romans determined that the development of Gaul, and possibly Brittania, were worth far more than Germany....at least at that time.  In future, maybe it would change.

 

All the alternative history about "what would have happend if the Germans had been subjugated," etc., holds little attraction for me.  It didn't happen, but the Germans through the following centuries helped to preserve Roman concepts by adapting many of them, or enough of them to matter.

 

I digress, but this suff is fascinating.

 

   

 

In deed that is one of the main points. Impenetrable forests, few tribes , at odds among eachother. Not a covetable aim for an usurpator. The civilized world ended at the rhine banks at that time.

 

For the german soul however, the battle had a meaning during the time of nationalism and facism, as an example of strongness and defense power.

 

The link did not match any docments, but I have looked at some historical maps, and we can disagree on the matter of the "limes."

 

By the earlier 1st century (at the time of, and later than, Teutoberg) there were legionary fortified camps east of the Rhine, but none seem to have developed into locations with lasting Latin place names.  By the later 1st century, the legionary camps had been abandoned, although certainly others were temporarily constructed as military necessity dictated.  The earlier camps were along ther Lippe and the Main, and about Regenburg, that is on the Danube.

 

The more permanent settlements extended along the Rhine, which became, in effect the limes of the empire.  AFAIK, it was never decreed or official in some sense, it just developed that way.  Strategically and/or commercially important points along that valley became occupied and settled, and many of those places are cities today.  Not to say Romans, and Gallo-Romans later, didn't live beyond the Rhine, or have lands there, but it was not so common.  In the west, the Rhine became the geographic definition of the extent of "Roman" territory and the river had more economic value as a transportation route than the areas east of it.

 

Certainly Europe, away from the Mediterranean, was more forested, but Gaul, especially Aquitania and Provence, had both a more moderate climate/longer growing season, and closeness to areas where migration, and local population, could provide agricultural labor to clear and develop the land.

 

Just some thoughts.  Good discussion.

 

 

here are the romans on Limes Germanicus. Except fro a bit near modern day Netherlands the limes seems to deep inside modern Germany.

 

source.

http://content.answers.com/main/content/wp/en-commons/thumb/3/3f/300px-Karte_limes.jpg - http://content.answers.com/main/content/wp/en-commons/thumb/3/3f/300px-Karte_limes.jpg

 

 

The extent of Roman frontiers has always been debated, recently it has emerged that for example the Limes Arabicus extended a lot more deeper in the Hijaz in NW S Arabia then previously thought. So

 

I agree that the battle was very important for the Romans (Augustus complained a lot about, with his famous "Vare, redde mihi legiones"). But I disagree with the last statement of Ulrich: Italians visited the German forests as Lombard & Florentine merchants during the Renaissance.......Indeed, one of the first banks in western Germany (near Kohln) was founded by Italians in the XV century and was related to the famous "Lombard street" of London.

Anyway, I want to pinpoint two facts:

1) that Romans decided to choice the Limes based on the rivers Rhein and Danube EVEN because they rarely were frozen in winter: further east and northeast all the rivers (Elbe, Oder, etc..) get frozen in winter and so can be passed trough by an invading army.

2) that the historian Mommsen wrote that Augustus got only two "real" defeats: one in Teutoburg against the Germans and another in actual Yemen with the siege of Mariaba (capital of the Kingdom of Saba) against the Arabs. And -as a curiosity fact- both the Germans and the Arabs later conquered the northern half and the southern half of the Roman Empire.

It seems to me that Augustus was right in his complaints against Vare!

 

Is the map to depict Roman presence before 9 AD?  I can't read the legend, and the link is the same as the map.  Historical maps of necessity must correspond to some time period, so that info would be helpful. 

 

As I said, the limes did not mean there were not Roman citizens further east than the Rhine.  Over hundreds of years there surely was some permanent presence on the right bank of the Rhine, but mostly not within some cordon defense of fortifications, or at all times under protection of the army.  At the time of Arminius, the claim of Rome to the land between the Rhine and the Elbe obviously could not be well defended, and that territory was not then absorbed into the empire.  The punitive expeditions were intended to send a message.  As said, the mediterranean was the economic engine of the empire.  Germania was remote, primitive and more trouble than it was worth. 

 

The maps of Rome's extent at approximately 100 AD or 120 AD show the Rhine and Danube as the actual limes.  I don't think this was ever formalized, it just developed according to the capacity and resources of the empire, and the commercial/economic value of those rivers as transportation avenues.  Yes, Rhaetia, Pannonia and Dacia were considered part of "Rome," but they were tenuously held, and by the later third, and the fourth century they were mostly defended by German troops and other foederati. 

 

The line of fortified towns that became permanent, and of the military posts, corresponded more to the lines of the two great rivers.  Even earlier, in the second, and moreso the third centuries, that line had become rather porous whether purposefully or otherwise.

 

 

       

 

And also, a case unique in Roman history is the fact that the three legion numbers were never used again by the Romans after the defeat, unlike other defeats when the legions were simply restructured. It was also the biggest reason Augustus decided to staul Roman expansion. The battle in turn also allowed the "barbarians" to move to a higher stage of development and paved the way for profit from trade, and the absorbing of Roman culture. Very significant indeed.

 

Along that frontier region, even in the first century, it was common for Gallo-Roman merchants to trade with Germans for the needs of the Roman troops.  Their cattle were essential for meat and hides, and would have begun circulation of some money among the barbarian tribes (although that collapsed with the rest of the economy in the third century). 

 

I do think that from some of the earliest contacts, the barbarian Germans were impressed with Romans and with Romanitas.  However, with the disorder and economic collapse in the third century, they were less impressed with all of that, and, as a good part of the army, they were more interested in using their influence to get all they could out of the fisc...kind of like modern legislators. 

 

Teutoberg, however it may have been remembered by Germans, showed that Romans were nothing but mortals who could be overcome.  It seems unlikely that, after centuries, Teutoberg would have been much remembered by many Germans, but in 378 others did it again.

 

     

 

 

Nations generally reflect a bias in favour of their own history for various reasons.  Himmler, during the Third Reich, encouraged the S.S. through the Ahnenerbe (Ancestors Heritage) to study the greatness of the German past. Himmler wrote about the Battle of Teutoburg Forest and the victory of German tribes led by Armenius over the Roman Legions of Varius. War was not the only area of research. The Ahnenerbe also studied and wrote about civil, medical and scientific matters, in many cases, with excellence and high scholarship. Nations ought to be encouraged to write about and maintain their history in a way and manner that supports the integrity of their constitutional framework during war and peace.

 

In the case of Himmler most non German historians and certain militarists (at the time) did not wish to see references to German victory in antiquity or success as it was contrary to the agenda which supported anti-German propaganda used during WWII. This was in part because of S.S. contributions to extermination programmes. However bias towards a nation, because of those who determine  or influence the outcome of military history, must not be used to detract from the value of a national history whatever the circumstances.  

 

Enno Littman was a German archaeologist and linguist who did research in Aksum, Ethiopia. He  lived during the period that Adolph Hitler ruled. Does this diminish the value of his work to international archaeology today?

 

Propaganda, as a tool of communication, was used by all countries involved in WWII to influence victory.  History as a discipline was not exempt from these circumstances. 

 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

 

Dr. I.M. Spence-Lewis 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the year 9AD Rome didn't stand at the Rhine, they stood deep in the Germania. It was Varus attempt to install a provincia. The coastal area was under Roman control, along the Lippe river there was a line of castles until the Weser river. When Varus followed Saturninus in Germania,  Germania was quiet and peaceful. The reasons for the upcoming war you can see in Cass. Dio 56, 18, 1-2. In the campaign of 9AD the Romans lost 3 of there 5 Legions along the Rhine. So it was a severe defeat. But the defeat was not the end of Roman policy in Germania. In 10Ad Tiberius was send with 8 legions to the Rhine. In the next two years he raided in Germania. Under Germanicus, since 13AD, nothing changed. So the policy under Augustus did not change after the defeat of 9AD.

With Tiberius it changed. He thought that the campaigns were to expensive and he was jealousy of Germanicus success. So he stopped the campaigns in 16AD. But Rome was still the superpower of that region. They installed kings, they led wars and campaigns.

 

What happened for the germanic gentes. The gentes close to the Rhine were still under Roman influence, even control. Arminius tried to install a regnum of his own, which ended with his murder by his relatives.Only a hundred years later his gens, the former powerful Cherusci, were history. The Germans forgot him. Only Tacitus brought him back to them.